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Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S.
Supreme Court
Mark D. Ramirez
This paper examines public support toward the U.S. Supreme Court. Although previous
scholars have rightly focused on policy outcomes in explaining public attitudes toward the
Court, outcome-based theories are unable to explain why support for the Court remains
high despite public disagreement with Court decisions. Some scholars argue the low
visibility of the Court shields it from public scrutiny. The exposure explanation, however, is
inconsistent with the empirical finding that to know the Court is to love it. This paper
reconciles these differences by showing how media coverage of the Court can influence
procedural perceptions and subsequent support for the Court. Expanding on recent studies
examining media coverage of the Court and perceptions of fairness, this study examineshow procedural perceptions mediate support for the Court. An experimental design shows
that the medias portrayal of procedural information as either fair or unfair influences
public evaluations of procedural fairness and subsequently support for the Court as an
institution and the individual justices serving on the Courts bench.
KEY WORDS: procedural justice, Supreme Court, public opinion, political support
Democratic government relies on the support of the public. Although all
political institutions need some public support, public approval of the judiciary,
particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, is especially important. As frequently noted,the Supreme Court does not possess the budgetary power of Congress or the
enforcement power of the President. Instead, low levels of support may reduce
compliance with court decisions (Murphy & Tanenhaus, 1968; Tyler & Rasinski,
1991). Despite the importance of maintaining high levels of public esteem,
the U.S. Supreme Court is not immune from controversy. The Court makes
controversial rulings on important public policy issues ranging from abortion
to affirmative action to school prayer. The nominations of its members are also
highly visible and politicized and controversial events surrounding the Court.
Political Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2008
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is able to maintain the support of the American
public in the face of controversy (e.g., Caldeira & Gibson, 1992; Hibbing &
Theiss-Morse, 1995; Mondak & Smithey, 1997).
An extensive literature examines public support for the Supreme Court.
Scholars have offered numerous theories explaining public esteem for the Court,
including a commitment to basic democratic values (Caldeira & Gibson, 1992)
and a mystique of legality surrounding the Court that predisposes citizens to view
controversies surrounding the Court in a matter that does not threaten the legiti-
macy of the institution (Casey, 1974; Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003; Scheb &
Lyons, 2000).
Other scholarship shows the immediate actions of the Court can weaken its
contemporaneous levels of public support (e.g., Caldeira, 1986; Franklin &
Kosaki, 1989; Hoekstra, 2003). Grosskopf and Mondak (1998) found individuals
disagreeing with two highly visible Supreme Court decisions (Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services and Texas v. Johnson) were less likely to have confi-
dence in the Court relative to individuals agreeing with both of the decisions.
Agreement with the decisions, however, failed to increase levels of individual
confidence in the Supreme Court. Although the Court may lose support with
unfavorable decisions, it appears unable to generate support with favorable
decisions. If unpopular decisions only hurt public support for the Supreme
Court, how does the Court maintain high levels of public approval? What keeps
support for the Court from taking a downward spiral upon successive unpopular
decisions?
One explanation is that media coverage of the Court is devoid of political
conflict and bargaining that permeates coverage of other institutions (Hibbing &
Theiss-Morse, 1995). This implies the Supreme Courts secret deliberations, infre-
quent media coverage, and low levels of visible conflict sustain the high levels of
support for the Court because citizens remain unaware of the debate and politi-
cizing within the Court. Therefore, exposure to Court proceedings should decrease
support for the Court. This explanation, however, contrasts with well-known
scholarship that citizens who are more attentive to the activities of the Supreme
Court hold the Court in higher regard in comparison to their inattentive peers
(Adamany & Grossman, 1983; Casey, 1974; Kessel, 1966; Scheb & Lyons, 2000).
This paper argues public support for the Court is not simply a function of the
visibility of Court proceedings, but a function of how information about the Court
is portrayed in the media. In other words, it is the type of information rather than
the volume of information that is important in how the public perceives the Court.
Information that reinforces the legal image of the Court should sustain favorable
attitudes, while information that portrays the Courts decision-making process as
unfair should lead to less favorable opinions. Specifically, media framing of Court
proceedings as fair or unfair should influence perceptions of procedural justice,
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Media Framing, Procedural Perceptions, and Support
The extent and limitations of media framing are becoming widely known
in political science and are being applied to various political domains (e.g.,
Druckman, 2004; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997).
How the media portrays political debates and government proceedings affects
public opinion by making some considerations more important than others
(Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997).
Several important pieces of research show a connection between media cov-
erage of the Court and perceptions of the Court. Nicholson and Howard (2003)
expand the framing literature to show that framing of political institutions and
actors can shape public support toward those attitude objects. They find that
framing the Courts Bush v. Gore decision as a partisan decision reduces the
confidence in justices by activating individuals partisanship and disagreement
with the decision, while framing the decision as an electoral concern decreases the
Courts diffuse or long-term support. Media coverage of the Court has also been
shown to alter perceptions of procedural fairness regarding the Court (Baird &
Gangl, 2006). These authors show experimental subjects had higher perceptions of
procedural fairness when presented with a media story portraying the Court in a
legalistic rather than political frame.
Although this previous work is important, it is still unclear if procedural
perceptions mediate support for the Supreme Court. Why should procedural per-
ceptions be important in how citizens think about political institutions such as the
Supreme Court? Procedural justice theory shows that the procedural components
citizens use in evaluating decision-making organizations are perceptions of citizen
representation, neutrality of the process, and belief in the trustworthiness of
the individual decision makers within an organization (e.g., Gangl, 2003; Tyler,
1988). Although Tylers research is focused on actual litigants experiences, there
is no reason why the theory should not apply to third-party observers of the Court.
Citizens want to believe they have a voice in the decision-making process of
organizations that can potentially shape their personal affairs. Although individu-
als do not have the opportunity to communicate their opinion directly to the
Supreme Court, it is important they are able to identify with individuals involved
in the decision-making process who symbolize their interests. Furthermore, the
process is expected to be neutral. It is important that the institutional structure,
norms, and rules ensure no single point of view dominates the decision-making
process. Finally, citizens need to trust the individual members serving on the
Court. People expect Court justices to derive their decisions from legal precedent
instead of political or personal interests. Individuals presume the Court justices to
be neutral interpreters of the law and Constitution. They should not be influenced
by political or special interest group pressure or decide cases according to their
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challenged, the Supreme Court should be able to sustain high levels of public
support. If citizens receive information portraying the Supreme Court as proce-
durally unfair, however, support for the Court should decline.
Procedural justice theory provides a solution to the puzzle between expo-
sure and support for the Supreme Court. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995)
assume greater exposure to the Courts decision-making process will increase
perceptions of procedural conflict and inherent biases within the Court. Although
citizens dislike the conflict associated with political bargaining (Hibbing &
Theiss-Morse, 2002), perceptions of procedural fairness of the Court are related
to perceptions of legality rather than mere bargaining and deliberation (Baird &
Gangl, 2006). Media coverage of the Court tends to focus on legitimizing
symbols (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003) and legal jargon (Slotnick & Segal,
1998). One recent theory accounting for the stability of support for the Court is
that the Court experiences a positivity bias where the most prevalent infor-
mation about the Court is framed in symbols and language that promote the
legality and procedural fairness of the Court (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence,
2003). These legal symbols perpetuate the perception of objectivity and neutral-
ity surrounding the Court, sustaining positive procedural perceptions among the
public and subsequently the institutions support. In addition to the publics
support for democratic principles, these positive procedural frames should con-
tribute in sustaining the publics positive perceptions of the Court. Conversely,
when citizens receive information about the Congress or executive branch, it
typically concerns partisan debate and procedural conflict. Therefore, it is not
exposure per se that influences evaluations toward the Court, but how the por-
trayal of the Courts decision-making process influences procedural perceptions
that shapes how citizens evaluate the Court. When the media portrays the Court
as procedurally fair, support for the Court should be higher relative to when the
media portrays the Court as procedurally unfair because media frames alter per-
ceptions of procedural justice.
Research Design
A 2 2 between groups experimental design is employed to test the preceding
hypotheses. The experimental factors are the portrayal of procedural justice as
either fair or unfair and issue domain (criminal justice or economic policy). The
design also includes a nonexperimental factorwhether or not a subjects policy
predisposition is congruent with the policy outcome of the Courts decision.
The study was conducted in the Spring of 2005 at a large research university in
Texas.Two hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students participated in the study.1
1 A i l 75% f h d i h l h i i i h d Th l
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for research and development costs from the U.S. government. The Court decided
against Boeing, making headlines primarily in business and trade publications.
Neither of the Court rulings are misrepresented in the vignettes nor are the
outcomes manipulated within experimental conditions.
Opinion-policy congruence. Prior to their exposure to the experimental stimu-
lus, participants answered a series of questions concerning their policy preferences
on several political issues in addition to basic political questions ranging from
partisanship to political interest. Subjects were asked: Some say a law called
three strikes and youre out, which requires that anyone convicted of three
felonies to be automatically sentenced to life in prison without parole, targets
career criminals. Others claim the law is too severe for minor felonies like petty
theft. In general, do you favor or oppose this law, or havent you thought about it
much? and Some people believe the U.S. government should provide private
U.S. companies with export subsidies to help them support private competition.
Other people believe the U.S. government should not support private companies
with tax revenue. In general, do you favor or oppose export subsidies, or havent
you thought about it much? The questions attempt to match the specific cases in
the vignettes; however, there is some discrepancy between the deterministic three-
strikes law in the opinion measure and the discretion of the justices of upholding
the sentence presented in the vignettes.3
I assume the Courts decision in the case is congruent with each subjects
predisposition if the subjects prestimulus response to the relevant policy prefer-
ence measure is in the same direction as the Courts decision. A policy predispo-
sition in the opposite direction of the policy outcome in the vignette is assumed to
be incongruent with the Courts decision. This measurement scheme is consistent
with the opinion-policy congruence measures in the representation literature
(Miller & Stokes, 1963; Monroe, 1983; Weissberg, 1976), but also subject to the
same limitations as these measures (Achen, 1977; Stone, 1979).
Support for a specific policy position does not automatically mean the subject
agrees or disagrees with the Courts decision. The Court may be able to persuade
the public into changing their views (Dahl, 1957; Hoekstra, 1995), although
Caldeira (1991) notes, [W]e have relatively few well-documented instances when
the Supreme Court has shaped the aggregate distribution of public support for this
or that policy (p. 312). Alternatively, scholarship suggests Court decisions crys-
talize existing attitudes (Brickman & Peterson, 2006; Franklin & Kosaki, 1989;
Johnson & Martin, 1998), suggesting participants would become even more sup-
portive of their policy positions after reading the experimental vignettes. However,
measurement of posttreatment policy preferences or agreement with the Courts
decision were not included in the survey instrument, limiting the ability to make
any firm conclusions about participants postexperiment policy attitudes.
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Posttreatment agreement with the Courts decision was not utilized in this
experiment since the content of the manipulation might bias responses to the policy
preference measures. The prestimulus measure also prevents opinions from being
influenced by the legitimizing function of the Court. The purpose of this study is
not to determine the Courts power to persuade the public to accept unfavorable
decisions, but to determine the relationship between perceptions of procedural
justice and support toward the Court, independent of policy preferences.
Furthermore, the outcomes of the cases are not experimentally manipulated.
For instance, the Court upheld the three-strikes law in all of the crime vignettes
and opposed Boeings claim that the company was entitled to export subsidies
from the government in all of the economic subsidies vignettes. Therefore, all
participants supporting the three-strikes law prior to reading the Courts decision
are assumed to have a predisposition congruent with the Courts ruling. All
participants opposing the three-strikes law are coded as having a predisposition
incongruent with the Courts decision. The congruence or incongruence of each
participants predisposition with the outcome of the export subsidies case are
determined in the same manner.
The response options to the policy questions are on a 4-point ordinal scale
ranging from favor to oppose with a dont know response option.4 Within
the three-strikes vignette 45% of the participants have a policy predisposition in
the same direction as the Courts ruling, and 54% of participants have a policy
predisposition incongruent with the Courts decision. Within the economic subsi-
dies vignette 44% of participants have a policy predisposition congruent with the
Courts decision, and 55% of participants have a policy predisposition incongruent
with the Courts decision.
Procedural justice treatment. The procedural justice variable is manipulated
by altering how the Court proceedings are depicted in the fictitious newspaper
article. Half of the participants read an article where the vignette portrays the
Supreme Courts procedures as being fair. The other half read articles where the
vignette portrays the Supreme Courts procedures as unfair.
In the fair or baseline condition, the vignette describes the Supreme Courts
processes as objective, trustworthy, and inclusive. Comments from spokespersons
on each side of the debate are provided indicating each had an equal and influential
voice prior to the Supreme Courts decision. Unidentified eyewitnesses report the
justices listened carefully to arguments on both sides of the debate before retiring
to their chambers to deliberate on the pros and cons of each argument. Court
commentators emphasize their satisfaction with procedural aspects of the decision.
Finally, the vignettes highlight the Supreme Courts objectivity and ability to use
legal precedent and principles instead of being politically motivated in formulating
their decision.
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Participants in the unfair condition read vignettes describing the Court as
untrustworthy, unrepresentative, and biased. These are the three procedural dimen-
sions indicated by Tyler (1988) to be important in how individuals evaluate
decision-making organizations. The lack of representation of the Court is manipu-
lated by mentioning that the Supreme Court makes its decisions without jury
deliberations and its justices are not elected by the public. The trustworthiness
of the Court justices is called into question when the article mentions one justices
interaction with special interest groups associated with the case and vote switching
by another justice. Finally, the objectivity or legal image of the Court is challenged
by Court commentators tired of seeing the U.S. Supreme Court becoming politi-
cally involved in this issue.5
The contents from the unfair vignettes are an adaptation and amalgamation of
actual published accounts of the procedural activities of the Court (Biskupic, 1997;
Lazarus, 1998; Lane, 2004), but are not associated with the cases described above.
Although actual reporting of Court procedures is not as extreme as depicted in
the vignettes (but see Cannon, 2004; Lane, 2006a; Lane, 2006b), the purpose of
the experimental design is to provide a counterfactual of what if citizens were
exposed to heavy-handed procedural information about the Court. The ability of
experimental designs to test counterfactuals or unrealistic occurrences should be
viewed as a virtue instead of a vice (Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002;
Mook, 1983).6
In the posttreatment questionnaire, respondents were asked three questions
regarding their perceptions of procedural justice in the Courts decision-making
process. The three indicators attempt to capture the aforementioned dimensions of
procedural justice (representation, objectivity, and trustworthiness). Measures of
participant perceptions of representation in the Supreme Courts decision are
measured by asking participants, To what extent or amount do you think people
who share your views were given a say in the decision-making process in the
Supreme Court case mentioned above? Responses range on a 5-point scale from
a Great Amount to None at All. Perceptions of the objectivity of the Supreme
Court are measured by asking participants, On the whole, how accurate do you
think it is to say that no one interest or point of view seemed to have more input
and consideration than others in producing the Courts decision? with responses
ranging on a 5-point scale from Very Accurate to Very Inaccurate. Participant
perceptions of the honesty of the individual justices are measured by asking
participants, On the whole, how trustworthy do you think the Supreme Court
5 The unfair vignettes also make reference to the procedural conflict around the votes of the justicespresenting a potential confound to this designan issue taken up in the anlaysis below.
6 The manipulations might lead some to correctly argue the results are not generalizable, however,li bili i i f f h d I i hi h b hi d
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Justices intentions were in coming to their decision? with responses ranging on
a 5-point scale from Very Trustworthy to Very Untrustworthy.
A confirmatory factor analysis demonstrates these individual measures load
on a single dimension of procedural justice.7 These indicators are combined into a
procedural justice variable ranging from one to five with higher values indicating
greater perceptions of procedural justice. Cronbachs alpha (.6) shows the proce-
dural justice index is moderately reliable.
Dependent variable. Traditionally, scholars of the Court have differentiated
between specific and diffuse support (e.g., Easton, 1965; Caldeira & Gibson,
1992). Research also indicates individuals are able to distinguish between political
institutions and the individual members within those institutions (Hibbing &
Theiss-Morse, 1995). Specific support involves attitudes toward the immediate
justices and policy outcomes of the Court and diffuse support involves attitudes
toward the Court as an institution. Previous research shows specific actions or
outcomes of the Court do not influence diffuse support (Caldeira & Gibson, 1992),
but rather influence specific support (Caldeira, 1986). The latter distinction is
important because it means having a policy preference incongruent with a specific
Court ruling might create discontent toward individual justices, but citizens will
nevertheless continue to adhere to the Courts legitimacy. It is possible perceptions
of procedural justice affect attitudes toward the justices and not the Court as an
institution, the reverse, or both.
The dependent variable consists of two indicators of support toward the U.S.
Supreme Court. The first indicator asks participants to rate the Supreme Court as an
institution reading, thinking of the Supreme Court as an institution, do you approve
strongly, approve somewhat, neither approve nor disapprove, disapprove some-
what, or disapprove strongly of the Supreme Court, no matter who the Justices are?
The second question asks participants their attitude toward the individual justices
currently serving on the Supreme Court. Thinking about the people on the Supreme
Court, please tell me if you approve strongly, approve somewhat, neither approve
nor disapprove, disapprove somewhat, or disapprove strongly of the way the nine
justices on the Supreme Court are handling their job? These measures are adapted
from previous research on public support for political institutions (Hibbing &
Theiss-Morse, 1995; Hoekstra, 2003). Each 5-point scale is reflected in the analysis
where higher scores indicate greater levels of support toward the political object
being analyzed. The ordering of these questions is randomly reversed to prevent any
systematic biases in the responses. A difference of means test shows participants
differentiate between evaluations toward the Supreme Court as an institution and the
Supreme Court justices. Support for the institution, M= 3.9, is higher than support
for the members of the Supreme Court,M= 3.4, (t= 8.1,p < .001). The correlation
7 A i l f i d i h h d f i i l i h f l di f 74 f
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between the two measures is .3, providing some support for the assertion that these
indicators measure distinct concepts.
Manipulation check. The procedural justice index provides a means to
observe whether participants in the fair procedural condition perceived the
Supreme Court as being more procedurally representative, objective, and trust-
worthy than participants in the procedurally unfair condition. The results indicate
clear differences between groups receiving procedurally fair versus procedurally
unfair treatments.
Perceptions of procedural justice are higher for participants receiving a
procedurally fair three-strikes vignette, M= 3.80 .06, than participants receiv-
ing the procedurally unfair three-strikes vignette, M= 3.08 .07 (t= 6.87,
p < .001). Perceptions of procedural justice are also higher for participants
receiving a procedurally fair export subsidies vignette, M= 3.72 .06, than
participants receiving the procedurally unfair export subsidies vignette,
M= 2.90 .08 (t= 7.64, p < .001). In addition, the issue domain does not make
a difference in procedural justice evaluations. Perceptions of procedural justice
are not statistically different for participants receiving the crime vignette,
M= 3.4 .06, relative to participants receiving the economic subsidies vignette,
M= 3.3 .06 (t= 1.2, p < .2). These data support the internal validity of the
experimental design.
Additional analysis shows there is no difference between Republicans and
Democrats in their perceptions of procedural justice within the procedurally fair
and unfair conditions. Democrats in the three-strikes condition do have higher
levels of procedural justice perceptions, M= 3.6, than Republicans in the crime
condition, M= 3.4, t(1, 102) = 1.50, p < .07. Although we might expect Demo-
crats to view this issue as more important than Republicans, subsequent testing
did not show perceptions of issue importance influencing procedural justice
perceptions among Democrats in the three-strikes condition. More important,
analysis not reported here shows this difference did not lead to any substantial
differences in the main variable of interestsupport for the Court.
Results
There are several estimators available for analyzing the data. First, I use an
ANOVA to show differences in levels of support for groups assigned to different
conditions. The results demonstrate participants receiving an unfair portrayal of
the Court have less support than participants receiving a fair portrayal of the Court.
Next, a path analysis shows levels of support for the Court differ because the fair
and unfair conditions lead to differences in perceptions of procedural justice.
Finally, an ordered probit analysis shows differences in levels of support for
individuals, while also generating predicted probabilities for substantively inter-
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increase the clarity of the presentation. When the results do differ between issue
domains, these differences are shown.8
A 2 2 between groups ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for both the
procedural condition and opinion-policy congruence with the Courts decision.
Participants in the fair condition have more support for the institution of the
Supreme Court, M= 4.07, than participants in the unfair condition, M= 3.78,
F(1, 225) = 7.85, p < .001, while participants with a predisposition congruent with
the Courts decision have higher levels of support for the institution, M= 4.02,
than participants whose predisposition is incongruent with the Courts decision,
M= 3.83, F(1, 225) = 3.40, p < .06. There are no differences in support for
the Court as an institution when the three-strikes and economic conditions are
analyzed separately. The interaction between participants in the procedural con-
dition and opinion-policy congruence is also statistically insignificant.
I also compared the level of support for the Court as an institution among
participants that chose the dont know response option to the policy preference
question. The mean level of support for the Court as an institution between
subjects choosing the dont know response opinion, M = 3.89, and subjects with
a policy predisposition incongruent with the Courts decision is statistically indis-
tinguishable, M = 3.83, t(1, 154) = 0.36, p < 0.35. The mean level of support for
the Court as an institution between subjects that dont know their policy pref-
erence, M = 3.89, is also statistically equivalent to subjects with a policy predis-
position congruent with the Courts decision, M = 4.02, t(1, 131) = 0.94, p < 0.82.
A separate 2 2 between groups ANOVA also shows a significant main effect
for each factor on support for the Court justices. Participants in the procedurally
fair condition are more supportive of the Court justices,M= 3.67, than participants
in the procedurally unfair condition, M= 3.18, F(1, 225) = 14.88, p < .001.
Having a policy predisposition congruent with the Courts decision also leads to
higher levels of support for the Court justices, M= 3.51, relative to participants
with a policy predisposition incongruent with the Courts decision, M= 3.28,
F(1, 225) = 4.82, p < .001. Participants in the procedurally fair condition who have
a policy predisposition congruent with the Courts decision exhibit marginally
higher levels of support for the Court justices, M= 3.7, than participants in the
procedurally unfair condition with with a policy preference congruent with the
Courts decision, M= 3.5, F= (1, 229) = 3.33, p < .06. Among participants with
policy preferences incongruent with the Courts decision, portraying the Court as
procedurally fair results in substantially higher levels of support, M= 3.6, than
when the Court is portrayed as procedurally unfair, M= 3.0, F= (1, 229) = 3.33,
p < .06. These results suggest exposure to an unfair Court process shapes support
for the Court justices more when the participants policy predisposition is out-of-
8 It was originally believed opinion-policy congruence would matter more on the law and order issuel i h i i i b i f f i l fi b h
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step with the Courts decision, rather than congruent with the decision. The latter
results suggest that even when the publics preferences are incongruent with the
immediate actions of the Court, positive information regarding the Court (i.e., fair
portrayal) can sustain the Courts support.
Support for the justices among participants choosing the dont know option
to the relevant policy preference question show participants choosing dont
know, M = 3.6, have higher levels of support for the justices currently serving
on the Court than subjects with a policy predisposition incongruent with the
Courts decision, M = 3.2, t(1, 154) = 2.17, p < 0.01. None of the other compari-
sons with dont know participants are statistically significant. Analysis of
support for the justices within each issue condition indicates participants in the
crime condition with policy preferences incongruent with the Courts decision
have lower levels of support for the justices, M = 3.0, compared to subjects in
the economic condition with policy preferences incongruent with the Courts
decision, M = 3.5, t(1, 126) = 3.08, p < .01. It seems support for the Justices is
more sensitive to the issue domain than evaluations of the institution, but no other
important difference across issue domains are observed in these data.
Path Analysis
The previous results demonstrate support for the Court is higher when
participants receive procedural fair rather than unfair information regarding the
Courts decision-making process. Furthermore, this relationship holds when
controlling for the congruence of the participants policy predisposition with the
Courts ruling. The results, however, fail to demonstrate the precise mechanism
that mediates support for the Court. If the procedural theory is correct, support for
the Court is not a function of simply being exposed to a procedural fair or unfair
account of a Court case (e.g., media framing effects). Instead, the theory argues it
is how those portrayals alter perceptions of procedural justice regarding the
Courts decision-making process that influences Court approval. Therefore,
perceptions of procedural justice should have a positive and significant relation-
ship with support for the Court independent of the procedural condition and
opinion-policy congruence.
Estimating the influence of procedural justice perceptions while controlling
for the procedural justice condition also controls for the length of the vignettes and
potential confounds within the vignettes. The unfair condition contains more
information than the fair condition. To ensure it is not the amount of information
but the type of information that influences Court approval, the following models
estimate the influence on procedural justice perceptions on support for the Court
while controlling for the procedural condition.
A path analysis can also help control for other potential confounds in
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procedural justice or because of potential confounds in the vignettes. If something
about the issue portrayed in the vignettes is shaping support, then opinion-policy
congruence should measure some of this effect. Even more important, controlling
for procedural condition (fair vs. unfair) should account for any other systematic
factor within the vignettes that are influencing support for the Court, independent
of procedural justice. The path analysis shows subjects in the fair or unfair
conditions have different levels of support because of differences in their percep-
tions of procedural justice and not because of anything else inherent in the
conditions since there is no main or direct effect of procedural condition on
support.
For ease of presentation, a single path analysis is estimated for support for the
Supreme Court as an institution and for the members on the Courts bench.9
Perceptions of procedural justice are measured using the procedural justice index
where higher values indicate a greater perception of procedural justice. In addition,
a new opinion-policy congruence variable is created that uses the complete
responses to each participants policy predisposition question where 1 = oppose,
2 = somewhat oppose, 3 = somewhat favor, and 4 = favor. The variable is
coded where higher values indicate a predisposition more consistent with the
Supreme Courts ruling.
Figure 1 shows standardized regression coefficients for the path analysis
for support for the Supreme Court. Solid lines indicate statistically significant
coefficients. A standardized regression coefficient of .80 between the procedural
condition and perceptions of procedural justice confirms that exposure to a pro-
cedurally fair vignette increases positive perceptions of procedural justice. Further,
the results fail to show a relationship between opinion-policy congruence and
perceptions of procedural justice. This suggests that perceptions of procedural
justice were not influenced by participants policy predisposition. Other studies do
find agreement with the Courts decision does influence perceptions of procedural
fairness (Baird & Gangl, 2006; Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003). However,
these studies dealt with a case on civil liberties and the 2000 presidential election,
respectively, that should be more important to respondents than the cases selected
here. It is possible that cases more important to the public may result in policy
preferences having a larger influence on how they perceive procedural aspects of
the Court.
However, there is evidence that more visible cases might not alter the effect of
the Courts policy decisions on support for the Court. Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence (2003) find views of the outcome of the election [Bush v. Gore] influence
judgements of decisional fairness, but have little impact on institutional loyalty
(p. 549). These authors also add that support is insulated from contemporary
events. Given the high profile of this Supreme Court case in their study, their
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research provides stronger evidence that the relationship between policy and
support would be similar to the findings in these data even if the cases were of
higher importance. When scholars have found Court decisions influencing support
for the Court, it has been among subgroups who we might believe are more
affected by the outcomes of the case (Hoekstra, 2003).
The standardized regression coefficient between perceptions of procedural
justice and support for the Court is .22, demonstrating support for the Court
increases as perceptions of procedural justice increase. Furthermore, the proce-
dural condition variable does not have a direct effect on support when controlling
for perceptions of procedural justice, providing evidence the amount of informa-
tion or any potential confounds within the vignettes are not shaping support for the
Court. Differences in support for the Supreme Court among individuals are not
because the participant was simply included in the procedurally unfair or fair
condition. Inclusion in the procedurally fair or unfair condition shapes support for
the Supreme Court because it creates differences in perceptions of procedural
justice. Finally, the standardized coefficient of .12 between opinion-policy con-
Procedural
Justice
Condition
Agreement
with
Decision
Supreme
Court
Support
Procedural
Justice
Perception.06
.19
.12
-.006
.80
.22
R
.82
R
.92
Figure 1. Procedural justice perceptions as a mediator of experimental condition and support of theSupreme Court.
Note: Path coefficients are equivalent to standardized regression coefficients. Experimental conditionis a dummy coded such that participants in the procedurally fair condition = 1 and participants in the
procedurally unfair condition = 0. Procedural justice is a three item index coded so higher values indi-cate greater perceptions of procedural justice. Agreement with the decision is coded where higher
values indicate greater agreement with the Supreme Courts decision. Residual variance is indicatedby R. Solid lines indicate statistically significant coefficients, p < .01 (n = 233).
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The path analysis shows subjects in the fair or unfair conditions have different
levels of support because of differences in their perceptions of procedural justice
and not because of anything else inherent in the conditions. There is no direct
effect of procedural condition on support. Instead, the effect is mediated through
procedural justice perceptions. If there was something else within the vignettes not
accounted for by procedural justice perceptions that was systematically influenc-
ing the Court, we would expect the procedural condition variable to influence
support directly. It does not.
Substantive Interpretations
The predicted probabilities of the different levels of support for the Court is
estimated using Clarify (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2001). Table 1 shows the
results of an ordered probit analysis with the same specification as the path
analysis models for support for both the Court as an institution and the Court
justices. Wald tests for parameter equivalency suggest no difference between
models of support within participants in the crime and economic conditions. Both
perceptions of procedural justice and opinion-policy congruence are statistically
significant in both models. The ordered probit analysis is used to simulate
predicted probabilities of support for the Court. Of particular interest is the
relationship between procedural justice and support when the participant agrees
with the Courts ruling. A policy predisposition congruent with the Courts ruling
should sustain positive support for the Court. The theory suggests, however,
support for the Court will decrease when perceptions of procedural justice
decrease, despite a participant having a predisposition congruent with the Courts
Table 1. Ordered probit estimates of support for the Supreme Court as an institutionand the Court justices
Variable Institution s.e. Justices s.e.
Procedural condition .19 (.17) .34 (.17)
Procedural justice index .26* (.12) .46* (.10)
Opinion-policy congruence .15* (.07) .19* (.07)
cut 1 -.64 (.42) -.59 (.43)
cut 2 .67 (.41) .63 (.40)
cut 3 2.1 (.42) 1.7 (.41)
cut 4 3.2 (.44)
Log Likelihood -250.59 -279.78
Note: n = 233, *p < .05. No participants Strongly disapprove of the Supreme Court as an
institution. The procedural justice condition is a dummy variable indicating if the vignette receivedby the subject depicts the Courts process as fair = 1 or unfair = 0. The procedural justice index
consists of indicators of representation objectivity and trustworthiness and ranges from
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substantive decision. Holding the opinion-policy congruence variable constant at
its maximum value, the procedural justice variable is changed from its maximum
to its minimum value. Additionally, the procedural condition variable is held at 0
to simulate what happens when people receive an unfavorable account of a
Supreme Court case.
The results in Table 2 show that the predicted probability of strongly approv-
ing of the Supreme Court as an institution decreases by .28 when procedural
justice perceptions shift from their maximum to minimum values. It appears
participants were unwilling to completely disapprove of the Court as an institution,
but negative perceptions of procedural justice do lead individuals to gravitate
toward a more moderate position on the scale by .22 rather than the typical high
levels of support awarded to the Court. Additionally, these changes occur when the
participants policy predisposition is congruent with the Courts decision. When
the procedural justice index is moved from its maximum to minimum value when
the participants attitude is incongruent with the Courts decision, the predicted
probability of strongly approving of the Court as an institution decreases by .19
and the predicted probability of approving of the Court decreases by .14.
Participants become more likely to disapprove of the Court (.11) when their
predisposition is incongruent with the outcome of the case and their perception of
procedural justice decreases. Finally, the predicted probability of strongly
approving of the Court decreases by .13 when opinion-policy congruence is
moved from its maximum congruence to incongruence with the Courts decision,
while perceptions of procedural justice are held at their mean value (3.36).
Table 2. Predicted probabilities of support for the Supreme Court as an institution
Variable Change SD D N A SA
Procedural index max min -.05 .22 .01 -.28 (.03) (.09) (.06) (.13)
Procedural index max min .11 .22 -.14 -.19
(.06) (.22) (.07) (.10)
*Opinion-policy congruence max min .02 .10 .01 -.13
(.01) (.05) (.02) (.06)
Note: n = 233. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The ordered categories are Strongly disapprove,
Disapprove, Neither approve nor disapprove, Approve, and Strongly approve. The
procedural justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while
the procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), and the opinion-policy congruence is set at 4
indicating a policy predisposition in the same direction as the Courts decision. The procedural
justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while the
procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), but the congruence variable is set at 1 indicating a
policy predisposition in the opposite direction as the Courts decision. *The procedural justice index
is set at its mean value (3.36), the procedural condition is set at fair (1), while opinion-policy
congruence is moved from congruent (4) to incongruence (1).
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Supreme Courts decision, as procedural perceptions move from their maximum
to their minimum the predicted probability of strongly approving of the
Supreme Court justices decreases by .25 and the predicted probability ofapproving of the justices decreases by .15. The most substantively interesting
change comes when perceptions of procedural justice are moved from their
maximum to minimum value and participants policy predisposition is incon-
sistent with the Courts decision. In this simulation, approval of the Court
justices decreases by .32 and disapproval of the justices increases by .26.
Perceptions of procedural justice do influence support for the Supreme Court
justices. Negative perceptions of procedural justice decrease the predicted prob-
ability of approving of the Supreme Court justices even when participants were
simulated to favor the policy direction of the Supreme Courts ruling. Theseresults suggest policy matters, but so does how the public perceives the Supreme
Court goes about conducting its business.
Conclusion
This research sought to uncover the psychological mechanism that mediates
media coverage of the Court and subsequent support for the Court. Previous
research has shown that the depiction of Court motives (i.e., legalistic, political,
practical) shaped public support for the Court in its decision in the 2000 presi-
dential election (Nicholson & Howard, 2003) and that media coverage of the
Table 3. Predicted probabilities of support for the Supreme Court justices
Variable Change SD D N A SA
Procedural index max min .02 .15 .23 -.15 -.25(.02) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.08)
Procedural index max min .10 .26 .02 -.32 -.08
(.05) (.09) (.05) (.10) (.04)
*Opinion-policy congruence max min .01 .08 .11 -.11 -.09
(.01) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Note: n = 233. Standard errors are in parentheses. The ordered categories are Strongly disapprove,
Disapprove, Neither approve nor disapprove, Approve, and Strongly approve. The
procedural justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while
the procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), and the opinion-policy congruence is set at 4
indicating a policy predisposition in the same direction as the Courts decision. The procedural
justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while the
procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), but the congruence variable is set at 1 indicating a
policy predisposition in the opposite direction as the Courts decision. *The procedural justice index
is set at its mean value (3.36), the procedural condition is set at fair (1), while opinion-policy
congruence is moved from congruent (4) to incongruence (1).
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research agenda by showing that differences in support for the Court can be
attributed to how media coverage alters perceptions of procedural justice.
Respondents in the procedurally fair condition have more support for the Court
than respondents in the procedurally unfair condition. Moreover, the differences
in levels of support can be attributed to how the media conditions affected per-
ceptions of procedural justice.
In addition, the results show procedural perceptions influence both support for
the justices and support for the Court as an institution. Although diffuse support for
the Court is relatively high and stable because it is grounded in core democratic
values, the Courts legitimacy appears to be reinforced by a bias in information
that focuses on the legality and fairness in the Courts decison-making process.
Media frames provide one conduit of that information, but surely others exist. For
instance, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003) find that there are multiple path-
ways in which perceptions of the Courts rule by law can influence support. The
results also indicate specific supportor at least support for the justicesis more
malleable than support for the institution. To the extent the latter measure captures
diffuse or long-term support for the Court, it would suggest that frequent exposure
to negative procedural information over an extended period of time would erode
the Courts legitimacy. Since the research design provides participants with a
single exposure, it can only provide limited or suggestive evidence on the question
of diffuse support for the Court. Cross-sectional and experimental data of the type
in this study are also inadequate in addressing how people update their long-term
attitudes about the Court. I leave questions associated with the latter to future
research.
A shortcoming of the research design is the empirical findings are attributed
to all three dimensions of procedural justice equally. Although this is consistent
with Tylers (1988) conceptualization of procedural justice, the dimensions of
procedural justice should be independent of each other. It is conceivable some
people can view the justices as untrustworthy or biased, while at the same time
viewing the Court as representative. One dimension might play a stronger role in
both perceptions of procedural justice and support for the Court.
Additional research should also examine how expectations of the Court
and perceptions of the Courts ability to meet those expectations shape support
for the Court. Functional theories of communication show that information that
directly addresses the psychological motivation(s) of the targeted attitude are
perceived as higher in quality and containing more relevant information (Lavine
and Snyder 1996). Information about the procedural justice should be effective
at shaping citizens judgments about the Court because people perceive proce-
dural justice as an important function of the judicial branch. The Court is
suppose to function as an objective body making decisions based on the law
rather than political or personal considerations. To the extent that perception is
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Appendix
Crime/Fair condition
Below is an article discussing a Supreme Court case concerning an issue that
might appear in a newspaper. Please read the article carefully and, then, respond to
the questions in Survey B that begin on the next page.
U.S. Supreme Court News
Washington D.C.The Supreme Court recently ruled to uphold a California
law allowing judges to sentence three time felony offenders to life imprisonment in
the case Ewing v. California. Eyewitnesses report the justices listened carefully to
arguments on both sides of the debate before retiring to their chambers to deliberate
on the pros and cons of each argument. A spokesman for Mr. Ewing released a
statement prior to the Courts announcement today saying Mr. Ewing felt confident
the U.S. Supreme Court would deliver a fair and neutral decision. The case
originated after Mr. Ewing was sentenced to life in prison under Californias three
strikes and youre out law for stealing three golf clubs. Attorneys for Mr. Ewing
argue the penalty is too severe for the crime, but Californias attorney general argued
the law targets career criminals. The District Court and Court of Appeals agreed to
uphold the law, but Mr. Ewing appealed to the Supreme Court. Ed Lazarus, a law
clerk for Justice Kennedy, reported the justices discussed all the merits of the case
before favoring to uphold Californias three strikes and youre out law. As they
announced their decision, justices from both sides of the political spectrum com-
mented that it was clear the California law is clearly within the bounds of previous
legal precedent. Although I do not agree with the law, one justice commented, it
is not the Courts duty to compose legislation, but interpret and uphold the existing
law. Donald Fagan, a supporter of Mr. Ewing, said that although he did not agree
with the Supreme Courts decision, he applauded the Courts willingness to hear
the case and will continue to fight against the California law. Walter Becker, a
spokesperson for the California legislature, commented on his satisfaction with the
Courts decision, Im thankful that we finally had our day in court and I think the
justices were able to place principles over politics in coming to their decision.
Crime/Unfair condition
Below is an article discussing a Supreme Court case concerning an issue that
might appear in a newspaper. Please read the article carefully and, then, respond to
the questions in Survey B that begin on the next page.
U.S. Supreme Court News
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their chambers to deliberate on the pros and cons of each argument. A spokesperson
for Boeing released a statement prior to the Courts announcement today saying
the company felt confident the U.S. Supreme Court would deliver a fair and neutral
decision. The case originated after Boeing sought to collect government subsidies
for past research and development costs. The U.S. District Court and the Court of
Appeals disagreed with Boeings claim, but Boeing appealed to the Supreme Court.
Ed Lazarus, a law clerk for Justice Kennedy, reported the justices discussed all the
merits of the case before opposing Boeings attempt to obtain past export subsidies.
As they announced their decision, justices from both sides of the political spectrum
commented that its decision is clearly within the bounds of previous legal precedent.
Although I do not agree with the law, one justice commented, it is not the Courts
duty to compose legislation, but interpret and uphold the existing law. Donald
Fagan, an advocate for Boeing, said that although he did not agree with the Courts
decision, he applauded the Courts willingness to hear the case and will continue to
advocate for corporate export subsidies. Walter Becker, a spokesperson for the U.S.
government, commented on his satisfaction with the Courts decision, Im thank-
ful that we finally had our day in court and I think the justices were able to place
principles over politics in coming to their decision.
Economic/Unfair condition
Below is an article discussing a Supreme Court case concerning an issue that
might appear in a newspaper. Please read the article carefully and, then, respond to
the questions in Survey B that begin on the next page.
U.S. Supreme Court News
Washington D.C.The Supreme Court recently ruled by a 5-4 split to uphold
the U.S. governments claim that it does not have to compensate Boeing Airlines
for past export subsides in the case Boeing v. the United States. Eyewitness reports
of the debate describe the oral arguments among the lawyers and justices as fierce.
At one point, one justice appeared ready to argue the case himself for an attorney
who could not answer his questions. A spokesperson for Boeing released a state-
ment prior to the Courts announcement today criticizing the Court, the company
and the citizens of this country are tired of seeing the U.S. Supreme Court
becoming politically involved in this issue. The Los Angeles Times and the
Associated Press have recently been reporting accounts of Supreme Court Justices
accepting vacations from special interest groups associated with the case. One
justice declined requests to voluntarily excuse himself from the case due to a
conflict of interest. The case originated after Boeing sought to collect government
subsidies for past research and development costs. The U.S. District Court and the
Court of Appeals disagreed with Boeings claim, but Boeing appealed to the
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without witness testimony or jury deliberations. After several hours of debate, the
nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices who are not elected by the public announced
their decision on this politically charged topic. Ed Lazarus, a law clerk for Justice
Kennedy, reported the debate in the justices closed chamber was intense.
Kennedy served as the swing vote, ruling against Boeing Airlines after defecting
from a previous alliance within the Court. Lazarus remarked, The switched vote
became so sensitive Kennedy told me to hide his work from other law clerks to
avoid pressure from other justices to change his decision. Donald Fagan, an
advocate for Boeing, said he did not agree with the Courts decision and will
continue to fight for corporate export subsidies. Im appalled to see the Court
succumb to extremist pressure groups, Fagan told reporters. Walter Becker, a
spokesperson for the U.S. government, commented on his satisfaction with the
Courts decision, but expressed disappointment that the U.S. Solicitor General was
only allowed to present oral arguments before the Court for 30 minutes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 annual meeting
of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Thanks to David A.M.
Peterson, Roy Flemming, Nehemia Geva, Paul Goren, Kim Q. Hill, Mark Peffley,
and B. Dan Wood for comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Correspon-dence concerning this article should be addressed to Mark D. Ramirez, Depart-
ment of Political Science, Texas A&M University, 4348 TAMU, College Station,
TX 77843-4348, Email: mdramir@politics.tamu.edu
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