Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S. Supreme Court

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Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S.

Supreme Court

Mark D. Ramirez

This paper examines public support toward the U.S. Supreme Court. Although previous

scholars have rightly focused on policy outcomes in explaining public attitudes toward the

Court, outcome-based theories are unable to explain why support for the Court remains

high despite public disagreement with Court decisions. Some scholars argue the low

visibility of the Court shields it from public scrutiny. The exposure explanation, however, is

inconsistent with the empirical finding that to know the Court is to love it. This paper

reconciles these differences by showing how media coverage of the Court can influence

procedural perceptions and subsequent support for the Court. Expanding on recent studies

examining media coverage of the Court and perceptions of fairness, this study examineshow procedural perceptions mediate support for the Court. An experimental design shows

that the medias portrayal of procedural information as either fair or unfair influences

public evaluations of procedural fairness and subsequently support for the Court as an

institution and the individual justices serving on the Courts bench.

KEY WORDS: procedural justice, Supreme Court, public opinion, political support

Democratic government relies on the support of the public. Although all

political institutions need some public support, public approval of the judiciary,

particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, is especially important. As frequently noted,the Supreme Court does not possess the budgetary power of Congress or the

enforcement power of the President. Instead, low levels of support may reduce

compliance with court decisions (Murphy & Tanenhaus, 1968; Tyler & Rasinski,

1991). Despite the importance of maintaining high levels of public esteem,

the U.S. Supreme Court is not immune from controversy. The Court makes

controversial rulings on important public policy issues ranging from abortion

to affirmative action to school prayer. The nominations of its members are also

highly visible and politicized and controversial events surrounding the Court.

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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is able to maintain the support of the American

public in the face of controversy (e.g., Caldeira & Gibson, 1992; Hibbing &

Theiss-Morse, 1995; Mondak & Smithey, 1997).

An extensive literature examines public support for the Supreme Court.

Scholars have offered numerous theories explaining public esteem for the Court,

including a commitment to basic democratic values (Caldeira & Gibson, 1992)

and a mystique of legality surrounding the Court that predisposes citizens to view

controversies surrounding the Court in a matter that does not threaten the legiti-

macy of the institution (Casey, 1974; Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003; Scheb &

Lyons, 2000).

Other scholarship shows the immediate actions of the Court can weaken its

contemporaneous levels of public support (e.g., Caldeira, 1986; Franklin &

Kosaki, 1989; Hoekstra, 2003). Grosskopf and Mondak (1998) found individuals

disagreeing with two highly visible Supreme Court decisions (Webster v. Repro-

ductive Health Services and Texas v. Johnson) were less likely to have confi-

dence in the Court relative to individuals agreeing with both of the decisions.

Agreement with the decisions, however, failed to increase levels of individual

confidence in the Supreme Court. Although the Court may lose support with

unfavorable decisions, it appears unable to generate support with favorable

decisions. If unpopular decisions only hurt public support for the Supreme

Court, how does the Court maintain high levels of public approval? What keeps

support for the Court from taking a downward spiral upon successive unpopular

decisions?

One explanation is that media coverage of the Court is devoid of political

conflict and bargaining that permeates coverage of other institutions (Hibbing &

Theiss-Morse, 1995). This implies the Supreme Courts secret deliberations, infre-

quent media coverage, and low levels of visible conflict sustain the high levels of

support for the Court because citizens remain unaware of the debate and politi-

cizing within the Court. Therefore, exposure to Court proceedings should decrease

support for the Court. This explanation, however, contrasts with well-known

scholarship that citizens who are more attentive to the activities of the Supreme

Court hold the Court in higher regard in comparison to their inattentive peers

(Adamany & Grossman, 1983; Casey, 1974; Kessel, 1966; Scheb & Lyons, 2000).

This paper argues public support for the Court is not simply a function of the

visibility of Court proceedings, but a function of how information about the Court

is portrayed in the media. In other words, it is the type of information rather than

the volume of information that is important in how the public perceives the Court.

Information that reinforces the legal image of the Court should sustain favorable

attitudes, while information that portrays the Courts decision-making process as

unfair should lead to less favorable opinions. Specifically, media framing of Court

proceedings as fair or unfair should influence perceptions of procedural justice,

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Media Framing, Procedural Perceptions, and Support

The extent and limitations of media framing are becoming widely known

in political science and are being applied to various political domains (e.g.,

Druckman, 2004; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997).

How the media portrays political debates and government proceedings affects

public opinion by making some considerations more important than others

(Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997).

Several important pieces of research show a connection between media cov-

erage of the Court and perceptions of the Court. Nicholson and Howard (2003)

expand the framing literature to show that framing of political institutions and

actors can shape public support toward those attitude objects. They find that

framing the Courts Bush v. Gore decision as a partisan decision reduces the

confidence in justices by activating individuals partisanship and disagreement

with the decision, while framing the decision as an electoral concern decreases the

Courts diffuse or long-term support. Media coverage of the Court has also been

shown to alter perceptions of procedural fairness regarding the Court (Baird &

Gangl, 2006). These authors show experimental subjects had higher perceptions of

procedural fairness when presented with a media story portraying the Court in a

legalistic rather than political frame.

Although this previous work is important, it is still unclear if procedural

perceptions mediate support for the Supreme Court. Why should procedural per-

ceptions be important in how citizens think about political institutions such as the

Supreme Court? Procedural justice theory shows that the procedural components

citizens use in evaluating decision-making organizations are perceptions of citizen

representation, neutrality of the process, and belief in the trustworthiness of

the individual decision makers within an organization (e.g., Gangl, 2003; Tyler,

1988). Although Tylers research is focused on actual litigants experiences, there

is no reason why the theory should not apply to third-party observers of the Court.

Citizens want to believe they have a voice in the decision-making process of

organizations that can potentially shape their personal affairs. Although individu-

als do not have the opportunity to communicate their opinion directly to the

Supreme Court, it is important they are able to identify with individuals involved

in the decision-making process who symbolize their interests. Furthermore, the

process is expected to be neutral. It is important that the institutional structure,

norms, and rules ensure no single point of view dominates the decision-making

process. Finally, citizens need to trust the individual members serving on the

Court. People expect Court justices to derive their decisions from legal precedent

instead of political or personal interests. Individuals presume the Court justices to

be neutral interpreters of the law and Constitution. They should not be influenced

by political or special interest group pressure or decide cases according to their

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challenged, the Supreme Court should be able to sustain high levels of public

support. If citizens receive information portraying the Supreme Court as proce-

durally unfair, however, support for the Court should decline.

Procedural justice theory provides a solution to the puzzle between expo-

sure and support for the Supreme Court. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995)

assume greater exposure to the Courts decision-making process will increase

perceptions of procedural conflict and inherent biases within the Court. Although

citizens dislike the conflict associated with political bargaining (Hibbing &

Theiss-Morse, 2002), perceptions of procedural fairness of the Court are related

to perceptions of legality rather than mere bargaining and deliberation (Baird &

Gangl, 2006). Media coverage of the Court tends to focus on legitimizing

symbols (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003) and legal jargon (Slotnick & Segal,

1998). One recent theory accounting for the stability of support for the Court is

that the Court experiences a positivity bias where the most prevalent infor-

mation about the Court is framed in symbols and language that promote the

legality and procedural fairness of the Court (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence,

2003). These legal symbols perpetuate the perception of objectivity and neutral-

ity surrounding the Court, sustaining positive procedural perceptions among the

public and subsequently the institutions support. In addition to the publics

support for democratic principles, these positive procedural frames should con-

tribute in sustaining the publics positive perceptions of the Court. Conversely,

when citizens receive information about the Congress or executive branch, it

typically concerns partisan debate and procedural conflict. Therefore, it is not

exposure per se that influences evaluations toward the Court, but how the por-

trayal of the Courts decision-making process influences procedural perceptions

that shapes how citizens evaluate the Court. When the media portrays the Court

as procedurally fair, support for the Court should be higher relative to when the

media portrays the Court as procedurally unfair because media frames alter per-

ceptions of procedural justice.

Research Design

A 2 2 between groups experimental design is employed to test the preceding

hypotheses. The experimental factors are the portrayal of procedural justice as

either fair or unfair and issue domain (criminal justice or economic policy). The

design also includes a nonexperimental factorwhether or not a subjects policy

predisposition is congruent with the policy outcome of the Courts decision.

The study was conducted in the Spring of 2005 at a large research university in

Texas.Two hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students participated in the study.1

1 A i l 75% f h d i h l h i i i h d Th l

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for research and development costs from the U.S. government. The Court decided

against Boeing, making headlines primarily in business and trade publications.

Neither of the Court rulings are misrepresented in the vignettes nor are the

outcomes manipulated within experimental conditions.

Opinion-policy congruence. Prior to their exposure to the experimental stimu-

lus, participants answered a series of questions concerning their policy preferences

on several political issues in addition to basic political questions ranging from

partisanship to political interest. Subjects were asked: Some say a law called

three strikes and youre out, which requires that anyone convicted of three

felonies to be automatically sentenced to life in prison without parole, targets

career criminals. Others claim the law is too severe for minor felonies like petty

theft. In general, do you favor or oppose this law, or havent you thought about it

much? and Some people believe the U.S. government should provide private

U.S. companies with export subsidies to help them support private competition.

Other people believe the U.S. government should not support private companies

with tax revenue. In general, do you favor or oppose export subsidies, or havent

you thought about it much? The questions attempt to match the specific cases in

the vignettes; however, there is some discrepancy between the deterministic three-

strikes law in the opinion measure and the discretion of the justices of upholding

the sentence presented in the vignettes.3

I assume the Courts decision in the case is congruent with each subjects

predisposition if the subjects prestimulus response to the relevant policy prefer-

ence measure is in the same direction as the Courts decision. A policy predispo-

sition in the opposite direction of the policy outcome in the vignette is assumed to

be incongruent with the Courts decision. This measurement scheme is consistent

with the opinion-policy congruence measures in the representation literature

(Miller & Stokes, 1963; Monroe, 1983; Weissberg, 1976), but also subject to the

same limitations as these measures (Achen, 1977; Stone, 1979).

Support for a specific policy position does not automatically mean the subject

agrees or disagrees with the Courts decision. The Court may be able to persuade

the public into changing their views (Dahl, 1957; Hoekstra, 1995), although

Caldeira (1991) notes, [W]e have relatively few well-documented instances when

the Supreme Court has shaped the aggregate distribution of public support for this

or that policy (p. 312). Alternatively, scholarship suggests Court decisions crys-

talize existing attitudes (Brickman & Peterson, 2006; Franklin & Kosaki, 1989;

Johnson & Martin, 1998), suggesting participants would become even more sup-

portive of their policy positions after reading the experimental vignettes. However,

measurement of posttreatment policy preferences or agreement with the Courts

decision were not included in the survey instrument, limiting the ability to make

any firm conclusions about participants postexperiment policy attitudes.

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Posttreatment agreement with the Courts decision was not utilized in this

experiment since the content of the manipulation might bias responses to the policy

preference measures. The prestimulus measure also prevents opinions from being

influenced by the legitimizing function of the Court. The purpose of this study is

not to determine the Courts power to persuade the public to accept unfavorable

decisions, but to determine the relationship between perceptions of procedural

justice and support toward the Court, independent of policy preferences.

Furthermore, the outcomes of the cases are not experimentally manipulated.

For instance, the Court upheld the three-strikes law in all of the crime vignettes

and opposed Boeings claim that the company was entitled to export subsidies

from the government in all of the economic subsidies vignettes. Therefore, all

participants supporting the three-strikes law prior to reading the Courts decision

are assumed to have a predisposition congruent with the Courts ruling. All

participants opposing the three-strikes law are coded as having a predisposition

incongruent with the Courts decision. The congruence or incongruence of each

participants predisposition with the outcome of the export subsidies case are

determined in the same manner.

The response options to the policy questions are on a 4-point ordinal scale

ranging from favor to oppose with a dont know response option.4 Within

the three-strikes vignette 45% of the participants have a policy predisposition in

the same direction as the Courts ruling, and 54% of participants have a policy

predisposition incongruent with the Courts decision. Within the economic subsi-

dies vignette 44% of participants have a policy predisposition congruent with the

Courts decision, and 55% of participants have a policy predisposition incongruent

with the Courts decision.

Procedural justice treatment. The procedural justice variable is manipulated

by altering how the Court proceedings are depicted in the fictitious newspaper

article. Half of the participants read an article where the vignette portrays the

Supreme Courts procedures as being fair. The other half read articles where the

vignette portrays the Supreme Courts procedures as unfair.

In the fair or baseline condition, the vignette describes the Supreme Courts

processes as objective, trustworthy, and inclusive. Comments from spokespersons

on each side of the debate are provided indicating each had an equal and influential

voice prior to the Supreme Courts decision. Unidentified eyewitnesses report the

justices listened carefully to arguments on both sides of the debate before retiring

to their chambers to deliberate on the pros and cons of each argument. Court

commentators emphasize their satisfaction with procedural aspects of the decision.

Finally, the vignettes highlight the Supreme Courts objectivity and ability to use

legal precedent and principles instead of being politically motivated in formulating

their decision.



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Participants in the unfair condition read vignettes describing the Court as

untrustworthy, unrepresentative, and biased. These are the three procedural dimen-

sions indicated by Tyler (1988) to be important in how individuals evaluate

decision-making organizations. The lack of representation of the Court is manipu-

lated by mentioning that the Supreme Court makes its decisions without jury

deliberations and its justices are not elected by the public. The trustworthiness

of the Court justices is called into question when the article mentions one justices

interaction with special interest groups associated with the case and vote switching

by another justice. Finally, the objectivity or legal image of the Court is challenged

by Court commentators tired of seeing the U.S. Supreme Court becoming politi-

cally involved in this issue.5

The contents from the unfair vignettes are an adaptation and amalgamation of

actual published accounts of the procedural activities of the Court (Biskupic, 1997;

Lazarus, 1998; Lane, 2004), but are not associated with the cases described above.

Although actual reporting of Court procedures is not as extreme as depicted in

the vignettes (but see Cannon, 2004; Lane, 2006a; Lane, 2006b), the purpose of

the experimental design is to provide a counterfactual of what if citizens were

exposed to heavy-handed procedural information about the Court. The ability of

experimental designs to test counterfactuals or unrealistic occurrences should be

viewed as a virtue instead of a vice (Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002;

Mook, 1983).6

In the posttreatment questionnaire, respondents were asked three questions

regarding their perceptions of procedural justice in the Courts decision-making

process. The three indicators attempt to capture the aforementioned dimensions of

procedural justice (representation, objectivity, and trustworthiness). Measures of

participant perceptions of representation in the Supreme Courts decision are

measured by asking participants, To what extent or amount do you think people

who share your views were given a say in the decision-making process in the

Supreme Court case mentioned above? Responses range on a 5-point scale from

a Great Amount to None at All. Perceptions of the objectivity of the Supreme

Court are measured by asking participants, On the whole, how accurate do you

think it is to say that no one interest or point of view seemed to have more input

and consideration than others in producing the Courts decision? with responses

ranging on a 5-point scale from Very Accurate to Very Inaccurate. Participant

perceptions of the honesty of the individual justices are measured by asking

participants, On the whole, how trustworthy do you think the Supreme Court

5 The unfair vignettes also make reference to the procedural conflict around the votes of the justicespresenting a potential confound to this designan issue taken up in the anlaysis below.

6 The manipulations might lead some to correctly argue the results are not generalizable, however,li bili i i f f h d I i hi h b hi d

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Justices intentions were in coming to their decision? with responses ranging on

a 5-point scale from Very Trustworthy to Very Untrustworthy.

A confirmatory factor analysis demonstrates these individual measures load

on a single dimension of procedural justice.7 These indicators are combined into a

procedural justice variable ranging from one to five with higher values indicating

greater perceptions of procedural justice. Cronbachs alpha (.6) shows the proce-

dural justice index is moderately reliable.

Dependent variable. Traditionally, scholars of the Court have differentiated

between specific and diffuse support (e.g., Easton, 1965; Caldeira & Gibson,

1992). Research also indicates individuals are able to distinguish between political

institutions and the individual members within those institutions (Hibbing &

Theiss-Morse, 1995). Specific support involves attitudes toward the immediate

justices and policy outcomes of the Court and diffuse support involves attitudes

toward the Court as an institution. Previous research shows specific actions or

outcomes of the Court do not influence diffuse support (Caldeira & Gibson, 1992),

but rather influence specific support (Caldeira, 1986). The latter distinction is

important because it means having a policy preference incongruent with a specific

Court ruling might create discontent toward individual justices, but citizens will

nevertheless continue to adhere to the Courts legitimacy. It is possible perceptions

of procedural justice affect attitudes toward the justices and not the Court as an

institution, the reverse, or both.

The dependent variable consists of two indicators of support toward the U.S.

Supreme Court. The first indicator asks participants to rate the Supreme Court as an

institution reading, thinking of the Supreme Court as an institution, do you approve

strongly, approve somewhat, neither approve nor disapprove, disapprove some-

what, or disapprove strongly of the Supreme Court, no matter who the Justices are?

The second question asks participants their attitude toward the individual justices

currently serving on the Supreme Court. Thinking about the people on the Supreme

Court, please tell me if you approve strongly, approve somewhat, neither approve

nor disapprove, disapprove somewhat, or disapprove strongly of the way the nine

justices on the Supreme Court are handling their job? These measures are adapted

from previous research on public support for political institutions (Hibbing &

Theiss-Morse, 1995; Hoekstra, 2003). Each 5-point scale is reflected in the analysis

where higher scores indicate greater levels of support toward the political object

being analyzed. The ordering of these questions is randomly reversed to prevent any

systematic biases in the responses. A difference of means test shows participants

differentiate between evaluations toward the Supreme Court as an institution and the

Supreme Court justices. Support for the institution, M= 3.9, is higher than support

for the members of the Supreme Court,M= 3.4, (t= 8.1,p < .001). The correlation

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between the two measures is .3, providing some support for the assertion that these

indicators measure distinct concepts.

Manipulation check. The procedural justice index provides a means to

observe whether participants in the fair procedural condition perceived the

Supreme Court as being more procedurally representative, objective, and trust-

worthy than participants in the procedurally unfair condition. The results indicate

clear differences between groups receiving procedurally fair versus procedurally

unfair treatments.

Perceptions of procedural justice are higher for participants receiving a

procedurally fair three-strikes vignette, M= 3.80 .06, than participants receiv-

ing the procedurally unfair three-strikes vignette, M= 3.08 .07 (t= 6.87,

p < .001). Perceptions of procedural justice are also higher for participants

receiving a procedurally fair export subsidies vignette, M= 3.72 .06, than

participants receiving the procedurally unfair export subsidies vignette,

M= 2.90 .08 (t= 7.64, p < .001). In addition, the issue domain does not make

a difference in procedural justice evaluations. Perceptions of procedural justice

are not statistically different for participants receiving the crime vignette,

M= 3.4 .06, relative to participants receiving the economic subsidies vignette,

M= 3.3 .06 (t= 1.2, p < .2). These data support the internal validity of the

experimental design.

Additional analysis shows there is no difference between Republicans and

Democrats in their perceptions of procedural justice within the procedurally fair

and unfair conditions. Democrats in the three-strikes condition do have higher

levels of procedural justice perceptions, M= 3.6, than Republicans in the crime

condition, M= 3.4, t(1, 102) = 1.50, p < .07. Although we might expect Demo-

crats to view this issue as more important than Republicans, subsequent testing

did not show perceptions of issue importance influencing procedural justice

perceptions among Democrats in the three-strikes condition. More important,

analysis not reported here shows this difference did not lead to any substantial

differences in the main variable of interestsupport for the Court.

Results

There are several estimators available for analyzing the data. First, I use an

ANOVA to show differences in levels of support for groups assigned to different

conditions. The results demonstrate participants receiving an unfair portrayal of

the Court have less support than participants receiving a fair portrayal of the Court.

Next, a path analysis shows levels of support for the Court differ because the fair

and unfair conditions lead to differences in perceptions of procedural justice.

Finally, an ordered probit analysis shows differences in levels of support for

individuals, while also generating predicted probabilities for substantively inter-

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increase the clarity of the presentation. When the results do differ between issue

domains, these differences are shown.8

A 2 2 between groups ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for both the

procedural condition and opinion-policy congruence with the Courts decision.

Participants in the fair condition have more support for the institution of the

Supreme Court, M= 4.07, than participants in the unfair condition, M= 3.78,

F(1, 225) = 7.85, p < .001, while participants with a predisposition congruent with

the Courts decision have higher levels of support for the institution, M= 4.02,

than participants whose predisposition is incongruent with the Courts decision,

M= 3.83, F(1, 225) = 3.40, p < .06. There are no differences in support for

the Court as an institution when the three-strikes and economic conditions are

analyzed separately. The interaction between participants in the procedural con-

dition and opinion-policy congruence is also statistically insignificant.

I also compared the level of support for the Court as an institution among

participants that chose the dont know response option to the policy preference

question. The mean level of support for the Court as an institution between

subjects choosing the dont know response opinion, M = 3.89, and subjects with

a policy predisposition incongruent with the Courts decision is statistically indis-

tinguishable, M = 3.83, t(1, 154) = 0.36, p < 0.35. The mean level of support for

the Court as an institution between subjects that dont know their policy pref-

erence, M = 3.89, is also statistically equivalent to subjects with a policy predis-

position congruent with the Courts decision, M = 4.02, t(1, 131) = 0.94, p < 0.82.

A separate 2 2 between groups ANOVA also shows a significant main effect

for each factor on support for the Court justices. Participants in the procedurally

fair condition are more supportive of the Court justices,M= 3.67, than participants

in the procedurally unfair condition, M= 3.18, F(1, 225) = 14.88, p < .001.

Having a policy predisposition congruent with the Courts decision also leads to

higher levels of support for the Court justices, M= 3.51, relative to participants

with a policy predisposition incongruent with the Courts decision, M= 3.28,

F(1, 225) = 4.82, p < .001. Participants in the procedurally fair condition who have

a policy predisposition congruent with the Courts decision exhibit marginally

higher levels of support for the Court justices, M= 3.7, than participants in the

procedurally unfair condition with with a policy preference congruent with the

Courts decision, M= 3.5, F= (1, 229) = 3.33, p < .06. Among participants with

policy preferences incongruent with the Courts decision, portraying the Court as

procedurally fair results in substantially higher levels of support, M= 3.6, than

when the Court is portrayed as procedurally unfair, M= 3.0, F= (1, 229) = 3.33,

p < .06. These results suggest exposure to an unfair Court process shapes support

for the Court justices more when the participants policy predisposition is out-of-

8 It was originally believed opinion-policy congruence would matter more on the law and order issuel i h i i i b i f f i l fi b h



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step with the Courts decision, rather than congruent with the decision. The latter

results suggest that even when the publics preferences are incongruent with the

immediate actions of the Court, positive information regarding the Court (i.e., fair

portrayal) can sustain the Courts support.

Support for the justices among participants choosing the dont know option

to the relevant policy preference question show participants choosing dont

know, M = 3.6, have higher levels of support for the justices currently serving

on the Court than subjects with a policy predisposition incongruent with the

Courts decision, M = 3.2, t(1, 154) = 2.17, p < 0.01. None of the other compari-

sons with dont know participants are statistically significant. Analysis of

support for the justices within each issue condition indicates participants in the

crime condition with policy preferences incongruent with the Courts decision

have lower levels of support for the justices, M = 3.0, compared to subjects in

the economic condition with policy preferences incongruent with the Courts

decision, M = 3.5, t(1, 126) = 3.08, p < .01. It seems support for the Justices is

more sensitive to the issue domain than evaluations of the institution, but no other

important difference across issue domains are observed in these data.

Path Analysis

The previous results demonstrate support for the Court is higher when

participants receive procedural fair rather than unfair information regarding the

Courts decision-making process. Furthermore, this relationship holds when

controlling for the congruence of the participants policy predisposition with the

Courts ruling. The results, however, fail to demonstrate the precise mechanism

that mediates support for the Court. If the procedural theory is correct, support for

the Court is not a function of simply being exposed to a procedural fair or unfair

account of a Court case (e.g., media framing effects). Instead, the theory argues it

is how those portrayals alter perceptions of procedural justice regarding the

Courts decision-making process that influences Court approval. Therefore,

perceptions of procedural justice should have a positive and significant relation-

ship with support for the Court independent of the procedural condition and

opinion-policy congruence.

Estimating the influence of procedural justice perceptions while controlling

for the procedural justice condition also controls for the length of the vignettes and

potential confounds within the vignettes. The unfair condition contains more

information than the fair condition. To ensure it is not the amount of information

but the type of information that influences Court approval, the following models

estimate the influence on procedural justice perceptions on support for the Court

while controlling for the procedural condition.

A path analysis can also help control for other potential confounds in

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procedural justice or because of potential confounds in the vignettes. If something

about the issue portrayed in the vignettes is shaping support, then opinion-policy

congruence should measure some of this effect. Even more important, controlling

for procedural condition (fair vs. unfair) should account for any other systematic

factor within the vignettes that are influencing support for the Court, independent

of procedural justice. The path analysis shows subjects in the fair or unfair

conditions have different levels of support because of differences in their percep-

tions of procedural justice and not because of anything else inherent in the

conditions since there is no main or direct effect of procedural condition on

support.

For ease of presentation, a single path analysis is estimated for support for the

Supreme Court as an institution and for the members on the Courts bench.9

Perceptions of procedural justice are measured using the procedural justice index

where higher values indicate a greater perception of procedural justice. In addition,

a new opinion-policy congruence variable is created that uses the complete

responses to each participants policy predisposition question where 1 = oppose,

2 = somewhat oppose, 3 = somewhat favor, and 4 = favor. The variable is

coded where higher values indicate a predisposition more consistent with the

Supreme Courts ruling.

Figure 1 shows standardized regression coefficients for the path analysis

for support for the Supreme Court. Solid lines indicate statistically significant

coefficients. A standardized regression coefficient of .80 between the procedural

condition and perceptions of procedural justice confirms that exposure to a pro-

cedurally fair vignette increases positive perceptions of procedural justice. Further,

the results fail to show a relationship between opinion-policy congruence and

perceptions of procedural justice. This suggests that perceptions of procedural

justice were not influenced by participants policy predisposition. Other studies do

find agreement with the Courts decision does influence perceptions of procedural

fairness (Baird & Gangl, 2006; Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003). However,

these studies dealt with a case on civil liberties and the 2000 presidential election,

respectively, that should be more important to respondents than the cases selected

here. It is possible that cases more important to the public may result in policy

preferences having a larger influence on how they perceive procedural aspects of

the Court.

However, there is evidence that more visible cases might not alter the effect of

the Courts policy decisions on support for the Court. Gibson, Caldeira, and

Spence (2003) find views of the outcome of the election [Bush v. Gore] influence

judgements of decisional fairness, but have little impact on institutional loyalty

(p. 549). These authors also add that support is insulated from contemporary

events. Given the high profile of this Supreme Court case in their study, their



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research provides stronger evidence that the relationship between policy and

support would be similar to the findings in these data even if the cases were of

higher importance. When scholars have found Court decisions influencing support

for the Court, it has been among subgroups who we might believe are more

affected by the outcomes of the case (Hoekstra, 2003).

The standardized regression coefficient between perceptions of procedural

justice and support for the Court is .22, demonstrating support for the Court

increases as perceptions of procedural justice increase. Furthermore, the proce-

dural condition variable does not have a direct effect on support when controlling

for perceptions of procedural justice, providing evidence the amount of informa-

tion or any potential confounds within the vignettes are not shaping support for the

Court. Differences in support for the Supreme Court among individuals are not

because the participant was simply included in the procedurally unfair or fair

condition. Inclusion in the procedurally fair or unfair condition shapes support for

the Supreme Court because it creates differences in perceptions of procedural

justice. Finally, the standardized coefficient of .12 between opinion-policy con-

Procedural

Justice

Condition

Agreement

with

Decision

Supreme

Court

Support

Procedural

Justice

Perception.06

.19

.12

-.006

.80

.22

R

.82

R

.92

Figure 1. Procedural justice perceptions as a mediator of experimental condition and support of theSupreme Court.

Note: Path coefficients are equivalent to standardized regression coefficients. Experimental conditionis a dummy coded such that participants in the procedurally fair condition = 1 and participants in the

procedurally unfair condition = 0. Procedural justice is a three item index coded so higher values indi-cate greater perceptions of procedural justice. Agreement with the decision is coded where higher

values indicate greater agreement with the Supreme Courts decision. Residual variance is indicatedby R. Solid lines indicate statistically significant coefficients, p < .01 (n = 233).

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The path analysis shows subjects in the fair or unfair conditions have different

levels of support because of differences in their perceptions of procedural justice

and not because of anything else inherent in the conditions. There is no direct

effect of procedural condition on support. Instead, the effect is mediated through

procedural justice perceptions. If there was something else within the vignettes not

accounted for by procedural justice perceptions that was systematically influenc-

ing the Court, we would expect the procedural condition variable to influence

support directly. It does not.

Substantive Interpretations

The predicted probabilities of the different levels of support for the Court is

estimated using Clarify (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2001). Table 1 shows the

results of an ordered probit analysis with the same specification as the path

analysis models for support for both the Court as an institution and the Court

justices. Wald tests for parameter equivalency suggest no difference between

models of support within participants in the crime and economic conditions. Both

perceptions of procedural justice and opinion-policy congruence are statistically

significant in both models. The ordered probit analysis is used to simulate

predicted probabilities of support for the Court. Of particular interest is the

relationship between procedural justice and support when the participant agrees

with the Courts ruling. A policy predisposition congruent with the Courts ruling

should sustain positive support for the Court. The theory suggests, however,

support for the Court will decrease when perceptions of procedural justice

decrease, despite a participant having a predisposition congruent with the Courts

Table 1. Ordered probit estimates of support for the Supreme Court as an institutionand the Court justices

Variable Institution s.e. Justices s.e.

Procedural condition .19 (.17) .34 (.17)

Procedural justice index .26* (.12) .46* (.10)

Opinion-policy congruence .15* (.07) .19* (.07)

cut 1 -.64 (.42) -.59 (.43)

cut 2 .67 (.41) .63 (.40)

cut 3 2.1 (.42) 1.7 (.41)

cut 4 3.2 (.44)

Log Likelihood -250.59 -279.78

Note: n = 233, *p < .05. No participants Strongly disapprove of the Supreme Court as an

institution. The procedural justice condition is a dummy variable indicating if the vignette receivedby the subject depicts the Courts process as fair = 1 or unfair = 0. The procedural justice index

consists of indicators of representation objectivity and trustworthiness and ranges from



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substantive decision. Holding the opinion-policy congruence variable constant at

its maximum value, the procedural justice variable is changed from its maximum

to its minimum value. Additionally, the procedural condition variable is held at 0

to simulate what happens when people receive an unfavorable account of a

Supreme Court case.

The results in Table 2 show that the predicted probability of strongly approv-

ing of the Supreme Court as an institution decreases by .28 when procedural

justice perceptions shift from their maximum to minimum values. It appears

participants were unwilling to completely disapprove of the Court as an institution,

but negative perceptions of procedural justice do lead individuals to gravitate

toward a more moderate position on the scale by .22 rather than the typical high

levels of support awarded to the Court. Additionally, these changes occur when the

participants policy predisposition is congruent with the Courts decision. When

the procedural justice index is moved from its maximum to minimum value when

the participants attitude is incongruent with the Courts decision, the predicted

probability of strongly approving of the Court as an institution decreases by .19

and the predicted probability of approving of the Court decreases by .14.

Participants become more likely to disapprove of the Court (.11) when their

predisposition is incongruent with the outcome of the case and their perception of

procedural justice decreases. Finally, the predicted probability of strongly

approving of the Court decreases by .13 when opinion-policy congruence is

moved from its maximum congruence to incongruence with the Courts decision,

while perceptions of procedural justice are held at their mean value (3.36).

Table 2. Predicted probabilities of support for the Supreme Court as an institution

Variable Change SD D N A SA

Procedural index max min -.05 .22 .01 -.28 (.03) (.09) (.06) (.13)

Procedural index max min .11 .22 -.14 -.19

(.06) (.22) (.07) (.10)

*Opinion-policy congruence max min .02 .10 .01 -.13

(.01) (.05) (.02) (.06)

Note: n = 233. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The ordered categories are Strongly disapprove,

Disapprove, Neither approve nor disapprove, Approve, and Strongly approve. The

procedural justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while

the procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), and the opinion-policy congruence is set at 4

indicating a policy predisposition in the same direction as the Courts decision. The procedural

justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while the

procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), but the congruence variable is set at 1 indicating a

policy predisposition in the opposite direction as the Courts decision. *The procedural justice index

is set at its mean value (3.36), the procedural condition is set at fair (1), while opinion-policy

congruence is moved from congruent (4) to incongruence (1).

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Supreme Courts decision, as procedural perceptions move from their maximum

to their minimum the predicted probability of strongly approving of the

Supreme Court justices decreases by .25 and the predicted probability ofapproving of the justices decreases by .15. The most substantively interesting

change comes when perceptions of procedural justice are moved from their

maximum to minimum value and participants policy predisposition is incon-

sistent with the Courts decision. In this simulation, approval of the Court

justices decreases by .32 and disapproval of the justices increases by .26.

Perceptions of procedural justice do influence support for the Supreme Court

justices. Negative perceptions of procedural justice decrease the predicted prob-

ability of approving of the Supreme Court justices even when participants were

simulated to favor the policy direction of the Supreme Courts ruling. Theseresults suggest policy matters, but so does how the public perceives the Supreme

Court goes about conducting its business.

Conclusion

This research sought to uncover the psychological mechanism that mediates

media coverage of the Court and subsequent support for the Court. Previous

research has shown that the depiction of Court motives (i.e., legalistic, political,

practical) shaped public support for the Court in its decision in the 2000 presi-

dential election (Nicholson & Howard, 2003) and that media coverage of the

Table 3. Predicted probabilities of support for the Supreme Court justices

Variable Change SD D N A SA

Procedural index max min .02 .15 .23 -.15 -.25(.02) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.08)

Procedural index max min .10 .26 .02 -.32 -.08

(.05) (.09) (.05) (.10) (.04)

*Opinion-policy congruence max min .01 .08 .11 -.11 -.09

(.01) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04)

Note: n = 233. Standard errors are in parentheses. The ordered categories are Strongly disapprove,

Disapprove, Neither approve nor disapprove, Approve, and Strongly approve. The

procedural justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while

the procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), and the opinion-policy congruence is set at 4

indicating a policy predisposition in the same direction as the Courts decision. The procedural

justice index is moved from its maximum value (5) to its minimum value (1.3), while the

procedural justice condition is set at unfair (0), but the congruence variable is set at 1 indicating a

policy predisposition in the opposite direction as the Courts decision. *The procedural justice index

is set at its mean value (3.36), the procedural condition is set at fair (1), while opinion-policy

congruence is moved from congruent (4) to incongruence (1).



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research agenda by showing that differences in support for the Court can be

attributed to how media coverage alters perceptions of procedural justice.

Respondents in the procedurally fair condition have more support for the Court

than respondents in the procedurally unfair condition. Moreover, the differences

in levels of support can be attributed to how the media conditions affected per-

ceptions of procedural justice.

In addition, the results show procedural perceptions influence both support for

the justices and support for the Court as an institution. Although diffuse support for

the Court is relatively high and stable because it is grounded in core democratic

values, the Courts legitimacy appears to be reinforced by a bias in information

that focuses on the legality and fairness in the Courts decison-making process.

Media frames provide one conduit of that information, but surely others exist. For

instance, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003) find that there are multiple path-

ways in which perceptions of the Courts rule by law can influence support. The

results also indicate specific supportor at least support for the justicesis more

malleable than support for the institution. To the extent the latter measure captures

diffuse or long-term support for the Court, it would suggest that frequent exposure

to negative procedural information over an extended period of time would erode

the Courts legitimacy. Since the research design provides participants with a

single exposure, it can only provide limited or suggestive evidence on the question

of diffuse support for the Court. Cross-sectional and experimental data of the type

in this study are also inadequate in addressing how people update their long-term

attitudes about the Court. I leave questions associated with the latter to future

research.

A shortcoming of the research design is the empirical findings are attributed

to all three dimensions of procedural justice equally. Although this is consistent

with Tylers (1988) conceptualization of procedural justice, the dimensions of

procedural justice should be independent of each other. It is conceivable some

people can view the justices as untrustworthy or biased, while at the same time

viewing the Court as representative. One dimension might play a stronger role in

both perceptions of procedural justice and support for the Court.

Additional research should also examine how expectations of the Court

and perceptions of the Courts ability to meet those expectations shape support

for the Court. Functional theories of communication show that information that

directly addresses the psychological motivation(s) of the targeted attitude are

perceived as higher in quality and containing more relevant information (Lavine

and Snyder 1996). Information about the procedural justice should be effective

at shaping citizens judgments about the Court because people perceive proce-

dural justice as an important function of the judicial branch. The Court is

suppose to function as an objective body making decisions based on the law

rather than political or personal considerations. To the extent that perception is

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Appendix

Crime/Fair condition

Below is an article discussing a Supreme Court case concerning an issue that

might appear in a newspaper. Please read the article carefully and, then, respond to

the questions in Survey B that begin on the next page.

U.S. Supreme Court News

Washington D.C.The Supreme Court recently ruled to uphold a California

law allowing judges to sentence three time felony offenders to life imprisonment in

the case Ewing v. California. Eyewitnesses report the justices listened carefully to

arguments on both sides of the debate before retiring to their chambers to deliberate

on the pros and cons of each argument. A spokesman for Mr. Ewing released a

statement prior to the Courts announcement today saying Mr. Ewing felt confident

the U.S. Supreme Court would deliver a fair and neutral decision. The case

originated after Mr. Ewing was sentenced to life in prison under Californias three

strikes and youre out law for stealing three golf clubs. Attorneys for Mr. Ewing

argue the penalty is too severe for the crime, but Californias attorney general argued

the law targets career criminals. The District Court and Court of Appeals agreed to

uphold the law, but Mr. Ewing appealed to the Supreme Court. Ed Lazarus, a law

clerk for Justice Kennedy, reported the justices discussed all the merits of the case

before favoring to uphold Californias three strikes and youre out law. As they

announced their decision, justices from both sides of the political spectrum com-

mented that it was clear the California law is clearly within the bounds of previous

legal precedent. Although I do not agree with the law, one justice commented, it

is not the Courts duty to compose legislation, but interpret and uphold the existing

law. Donald Fagan, a supporter of Mr. Ewing, said that although he did not agree

with the Supreme Courts decision, he applauded the Courts willingness to hear

the case and will continue to fight against the California law. Walter Becker, a

spokesperson for the California legislature, commented on his satisfaction with the

Courts decision, Im thankful that we finally had our day in court and I think the

justices were able to place principles over politics in coming to their decision.

Crime/Unfair condition







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their chambers to deliberate on the pros and cons of each argument. A spokesperson

for Boeing released a statement prior to the Courts announcement today saying

the company felt confident the U.S. Supreme Court would deliver a fair and neutral

decision. The case originated after Boeing sought to collect government subsidies

for past research and development costs. The U.S. District Court and the Court of

Appeals disagreed with Boeings claim, but Boeing appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ed Lazarus, a law clerk for Justice Kennedy, reported the justices discussed all the

merits of the case before opposing Boeings attempt to obtain past export subsidies.

As they announced their decision, justices from both sides of the political spectrum

commented that its decision is clearly within the bounds of previous legal precedent.

Although I do not agree with the law, one justice commented, it is not the Courts

duty to compose legislation, but interpret and uphold the existing law. Donald

Fagan, an advocate for Boeing, said that although he did not agree with the Courts

decision, he applauded the Courts willingness to hear the case and will continue to

advocate for corporate export subsidies. Walter Becker, a spokesperson for the U.S.

government, commented on his satisfaction with the Courts decision, Im thank-

ful that we finally had our day in court and I think the justices were able to place

principles over politics in coming to their decision.

Economic/Unfair condition





Washington D.C.The Supreme Court recently ruled by a 5-4 split to uphold

the U.S. governments claim that it does not have to compensate Boeing Airlines

for past export subsides in the case Boeing v. the United States. Eyewitness reports

of the debate describe the oral arguments among the lawyers and justices as fierce.

At one point, one justice appeared ready to argue the case himself for an attorney

who could not answer his questions. A spokesperson for Boeing released a state-

ment prior to the Courts announcement today criticizing the Court, the company

and the citizens of this country are tired of seeing the U.S. Supreme Court

becoming politically involved in this issue. The Los Angeles Times and the

Associated Press have recently been reporting accounts of Supreme Court Justices

accepting vacations from special interest groups associated with the case. One

justice declined requests to voluntarily excuse himself from the case due to a

conflict of interest. The case originated after Boeing sought to collect government

subsidies for past research and development costs. The U.S. District Court and the

Court of Appeals disagreed with Boeings claim, but Boeing appealed to the



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without witness testimony or jury deliberations. After several hours of debate, the

nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices who are not elected by the public announced

their decision on this politically charged topic. Ed Lazarus, a law clerk for Justice

Kennedy, reported the debate in the justices closed chamber was intense.

Kennedy served as the swing vote, ruling against Boeing Airlines after defecting

from a previous alliance within the Court. Lazarus remarked, The switched vote

became so sensitive Kennedy told me to hide his work from other law clerks to

avoid pressure from other justices to change his decision. Donald Fagan, an

advocate for Boeing, said he did not agree with the Courts decision and will

continue to fight for corporate export subsidies. Im appalled to see the Court

succumb to extremist pressure groups, Fagan told reporters. Walter Becker, a

spokesperson for the U.S. government, commented on his satisfaction with the

Courts decision, but expressed disappointment that the U.S. Solicitor General was

only allowed to present oral arguments before the Court for 30 minutes.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 annual meeting

of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Thanks to David A.M.

Peterson, Roy Flemming, Nehemia Geva, Paul Goren, Kim Q. Hill, Mark Peffley,

and B. Dan Wood for comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Correspon-dence concerning this article should be addressed to Mark D. Ramirez, Depart-

ment of Political Science, Texas A&M University, 4348 TAMU, College Station,

TX 77843-4348, Email: [email protected]

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Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S. Supreme Court

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