Post on 03-Jan-2016
Private Lives in the Public Sphere: Family-Employment Spillover among
Low-Income Women
Dr. Lucy P. JordanResearch Fellow
University of St Andrews lpj1@st-andrews.ac.uk
Broad Conceptual Framework Dominant social values are reflected in relationships
between families, the market and the state US child care policy strategy as case study
where administrative regulations and practices can influence access and sustainability of receiving public assistance for child care
eligibility restrictions, transaction costs, financial disincentives operate to ration potentially scarce resource—public child care subsidies
Child care subsidies by low-income women may facilitate sustained participation in paid employment with important long-term economic benefits
Child Care & Subsidies
Residualist US Welfare State
Changes in women’s labour market participation
Public child care funding streams were consolidated as result of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 Temporary Aid the Needy Families (TANF) Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) - Individual US
states have broad discretion in design
Employment-family spillover
Spillover can be negative or positive Employment-to-family spillover
scheduled hours, workplace flexibility and social support (Hill et al, 2001, p. 49).
Family-to-employment spillover dependent (child and elder) care difficulties and
other family obligations (Glass & Estes, 1997).
Methods
Quasi-experimental research design Try to address selection bias & endogeneity
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach Select measures of child care subsidy policy
(CCDF) as exogenous variables, primarily to address issues of endogeneity
Data Sources
Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study (Fragile Families) Nationally representative sample of 20 U.S. cities Oversampling of non-marital births Baseline (4,898 mothers) and one-year follow up
(89%) CCDF &TANF policy, local economy controls
Table 3.4: Fragile Families sample descriptives (weighted)
Mean CIMother's Demographics
Married 0.52 [ .48 - .56 ]Black, Non-Hispanic 0.35 [ .32 -.39 ]Other Race, Non-Hispanic 0.06 [ .04 - .09 ]White, Non-Hispanic 0.29 [ .25 - .33 ]Hispanic 0.29 [ .25 -. 33 ]High School Graduate 0.71 [ .68 - .75 ]Immigrant 0.27 [ .23 - .31 ]Age 27.04 [ 26.5 - 27.5 ]Number of Additional Children Less 6 in HH (1-7) 0.70 [ .61 - .79 ]Work year prior to focal child birth 0.66 [ .62 - .70 ]History of TANF receipt prior to focal child 0.29 [ .26 - .33 ]Household poverty category (0 to 6) 2.76 [ 2.38 - 3.21 ]% Ever Receive Subsidy Since Focal Child Birth 4% [ 3.6 - 5.1% ]N 3,849
All Mothers
Policy Context
CCDF Policy Access: local agency, state agency, combined Parent co-payment Monthly reimbursement rate State prioritises TANF recipients
TANF Policy Time limits for participation One time diversion payment Maximum benefit Strictness: Family cap & Duration of sanction
Research Question & Hypotheses How does child care subsidy receipt vary
based on different configuration of policy levers?
Child care subsidy participation will facilitate balance between paid employment and family life
Child care subsidy participation will be associated with lower levels of negative family-employment spillover
Subsidy Receipt
Varies across 20 cities from 3% to 21% of sampled women
Dichotomous measure based on series of questions about ‘Who helps pay for child care’ (relatives, government and other agencies, non-resident parent, employers, other)
Model 1 Model 2Mother's Demographics
Married -0.021 *** -0.022 **( .007) ( .007)
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.01 0.01(.007) (.007)
Hispanic 0.02 + 0.02 +(.013) (.013)
Other Race, Non-Hispanic 0.00 0.00(.001) (.010)
Immigrant -0.01 ** -0.01 **(.005) (.005)
Mom Age 0.00 * 0.00 *(.000) (.000)
First Birth 0.00 0.00(.003) (.003)
Additional Child in HH < 6 0.00 0.00(.002) (.002)
High School Graduate 0.01 + 0.01 *(.003) (.003)
Employed Year Prior to Birth 0.01 * 0.01 +(.003) (.003)
TANF Episode Prior to Birth 0.02 ** 0.02 **(.007) (.006)
Table 4.4 Ever receive subsidy marginal effects (standard errors) from logit models, for all mothers (n=3,849) Policy Environment
Subsidy EligibilityVoucher management agencySubsidy Eligibility -0.010 + -0.088State/county lead agency (.005) (.007)Subsidy Eligibility -0.003 -0.013 **Combined (.004) (.005)Copayment 0.000 + -0.001 *
(.025) (.028)Reirmbursement Rates 0.000 0.000 +
(.025) (.025)Subsidy Commitment 0.011 0.026 +
(.005) (.010)Time Limits -0.015 0.007 *
(.008) (.008)Diversion 0.008 0.001
(.006) (.008)Family Cap -0.001 -0.015 +
(.006) (.009)Sanction Duration 0.000 * 0.000 +
(.003) (.000)Maximum Benefit/100 0.000 0.000 *
(.00) (.000)(.000) (.000)
Region Fixed Effects X
***p <.001 ** p <.01 *p <.05 +p <.10All models control for household poverty and local market conditions
Reference
Key dependent variables
Mean SD Total nMother employed during last year 0.67 [ .63 - .72 ]
Mothers in labor market & using careBREAKDOWN IN CARE ARRANGEMENTS : Approximately, how many times in the past month did you have to make special arrangements because your usual child care arrangement fell through? [none/one or more] 0.22 [ .17 - .29 ] 1,704
All mothers in labor marketEMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE STRESS : My shift and work schedule (cause/caused) extra stress for me and my child [never/all others] 0.46 [ .41 - .50] 2,797
EMPLOYMENT CHILD CARE CONFLICT: Where I (work/worked), it (is/was) difficult to deal with child care problems during working hours [never/all others] 0.31 [ .26 - .35 ] 2,797IRREGULAR SCHEDULE 0.34 [ .29 - .38 ] 2,797
Table 3.3: Spillover between family and employment (weighted)
Mother's DemographicsPr(Subsidy Receipt) 0.725 *** 0.610 *** 0.689 ***
(. 125) (.024) (.027)Married -0.102 + 0.067 * 0.073 *
(.061) (.042) (.034)Black, Non-Hispanic -0.030 -0.041 -0.025
(.061) (.048) (.039)Hispanic -0.035 -0.081 -0.031
(.212) (.053) (.046)Other Race, Non-Hispanic -0.011 -0.177 -0.074
(.109) (.065) (.066)Immigrant 0.044 0.146 + 0.112 *
(.087) (.071) (.051)Mom Age 0.007 0.004 0.005 *
(.005) (.003) (.003)Additional Child in HH < 6 -0.018 -0.024 -0.038 *
(.034) (.025) (.020)High School Graduate -0.004 -0.157 ** -0.118 **
(.048) (.057) (.045)Worked Year Prior to Birth 0.108 ** -0.046 -0.048
(.039) (.050) (.034)TANF Episode Prior to Birth -0.109 + -0.114 * -0.125 ***
(.068) (.041) (.034)Irregular Employment Schedule 0.092 + -0.024 + 0.068
(.051) (.055) (.051)TANF Policy
Diversion 0.179 * 0.025 0.000(.072) (.055) (.050)
Maximum Benefit/100 0.000 + 0.000 0.000 ***(.000) (.000) (.000)
***p <.001 ** p <.01 *p <.05 +p <.10
Note: All models control for household poverty level, city unemployment rate, fair market rent and city job growth, region
Employment-Care Conflict
Mothers reporting work and non-familial careAll mothers reporting work
Table 4.7: Family-Employment spillover marginal effects (standard errors)
Breakdown in careEmployment Schedule Stress
Key Findings
Modest effects of policy variables across all models Access to subsidies: multiple organisations
negative association (compared to local voucher agency
Welfare strictness & TANF time limits as expected TANF diversion
Key Findings
Individual’s prior history of TANF: strong predictor
Single mothers more likely to have subsidy Married mothers more likely to experience
negative employment-family spillover High school graduate less likely to report
negative spillover