Private Lives in the Public Sphere: Family-Employment Spillover among

Low-Income Women

Dr. Lucy P. JordanResearch Fellow

University of St Andrews lpj1@st-andrews.ac.uk

Broad Conceptual Framework Dominant social values are reflected in relationships

between families, the market and the state US child care policy strategy as case study

where administrative regulations and practices can influence access and sustainability of receiving public assistance for child care

eligibility restrictions, transaction costs, financial disincentives operate to ration potentially scarce resource—public child care subsidies

Child care subsidies by low-income women may facilitate sustained participation in paid employment with important long-term economic benefits

Child Care & Subsidies

Residualist US Welfare State

Changes in women’s labour market participation

Public child care funding streams were consolidated as result of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 Temporary Aid the Needy Families (TANF) Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) - Individual US

states have broad discretion in design

Employment-family spillover

Spillover can be negative or positive Employment-to-family spillover

scheduled hours, workplace flexibility and social support (Hill et al, 2001, p. 49).

Family-to-employment spillover dependent (child and elder) care difficulties and

other family obligations (Glass & Estes, 1997).

Methods

Quasi-experimental research design Try to address selection bias & endogeneity

Instrumental Variable (IV) approach Select measures of child care subsidy policy

(CCDF) as exogenous variables, primarily to address issues of endogeneity

Data Sources

Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study (Fragile Families) Nationally representative sample of 20 U.S. cities Oversampling of non-marital births Baseline (4,898 mothers) and one-year follow up

(89%) CCDF &TANF policy, local economy controls

Table 3.4: Fragile Families sample descriptives (weighted)

Mean CIMother's Demographics

Married 0.52 [ .48 - .56 ]Black, Non-Hispanic 0.35 [ .32 -.39 ]Other Race, Non-Hispanic 0.06 [ .04 - .09 ]White, Non-Hispanic 0.29 [ .25 - .33 ]Hispanic 0.29 [ .25 -. 33 ]High School Graduate 0.71 [ .68 - .75 ]Immigrant 0.27 [ .23 - .31 ]Age 27.04 [ 26.5 - 27.5 ]Number of Additional Children Less 6 in HH (1-7) 0.70 [ .61 - .79 ]Work year prior to focal child birth 0.66 [ .62 - .70 ]History of TANF receipt prior to focal child 0.29 [ .26 - .33 ]Household poverty category (0 to 6) 2.76 [ 2.38 - 3.21 ]% Ever Receive Subsidy Since Focal Child Birth 4% [ 3.6 - 5.1% ]N 3,849

All Mothers

Policy Context

CCDF Policy Access: local agency, state agency, combined Parent co-payment Monthly reimbursement rate State prioritises TANF recipients

TANF Policy Time limits for participation One time diversion payment Maximum benefit Strictness: Family cap & Duration of sanction

Research Question & Hypotheses How does child care subsidy receipt vary

based on different configuration of policy levers?

Child care subsidy participation will facilitate balance between paid employment and family life

Child care subsidy participation will be associated with lower levels of negative family-employment spillover

Subsidy Receipt

Varies across 20 cities from 3% to 21% of sampled women

Dichotomous measure based on series of questions about ‘Who helps pay for child care’ (relatives, government and other agencies, non-resident parent, employers, other)

Model 1 Model 2Mother's Demographics

Married -0.021 *** -0.022 **( .007) ( .007)

Black, Non-Hispanic 0.01 0.01(.007) (.007)

Hispanic 0.02 + 0.02 +(.013) (.013)

Other Race, Non-Hispanic 0.00 0.00(.001) (.010)

Immigrant -0.01 ** -0.01 **(.005) (.005)

Mom Age 0.00 * 0.00 *(.000) (.000)

First Birth 0.00 0.00(.003) (.003)

Additional Child in HH < 6 0.00 0.00(.002) (.002)

High School Graduate 0.01 + 0.01 *(.003) (.003)

Employed Year Prior to Birth 0.01 * 0.01 +(.003) (.003)

TANF Episode Prior to Birth 0.02 ** 0.02 **(.007) (.006)

Table 4.4 Ever receive subsidy marginal effects (standard errors) from logit models, for all mothers (n=3,849) Policy Environment

Subsidy EligibilityVoucher management agencySubsidy Eligibility -0.010 + -0.088State/county lead agency (.005) (.007)Subsidy Eligibility -0.003 -0.013 **Combined (.004) (.005)Copayment 0.000 + -0.001 *

(.025) (.028)Reirmbursement Rates 0.000 0.000 +

(.025) (.025)Subsidy Commitment 0.011 0.026 +

(.005) (.010)Time Limits -0.015 0.007 *

(.008) (.008)Diversion 0.008 0.001

(.006) (.008)Family Cap -0.001 -0.015 +

(.006) (.009)Sanction Duration 0.000 * 0.000 +

(.003) (.000)Maximum Benefit/100 0.000 0.000 *

(.00) (.000)(.000) (.000)

Region Fixed Effects X

***p <.001 ** p <.01 *p <.05 +p <.10All models control for household poverty and local market conditions

Reference

Key dependent variables

Mean SD Total nMother employed during last year 0.67 [ .63 - .72 ]

Mothers in labor market & using careBREAKDOWN IN CARE ARRANGEMENTS : Approximately, how many times in the past month did you have to make special arrangements because your usual child care arrangement fell through? [none/one or more] 0.22 [ .17 - .29 ] 1,704

All mothers in labor marketEMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE STRESS : My shift and work schedule (cause/caused) extra stress for me and my child [never/all others] 0.46 [ .41 - .50] 2,797

EMPLOYMENT CHILD CARE CONFLICT: Where I (work/worked), it (is/was) difficult to deal with child care problems during working hours [never/all others] 0.31 [ .26 - .35 ] 2,797IRREGULAR SCHEDULE 0.34 [ .29 - .38 ] 2,797

Table 3.3: Spillover between family and employment (weighted)

Mother's DemographicsPr(Subsidy Receipt) 0.725 *** 0.610 *** 0.689 ***

(. 125) (.024) (.027)Married -0.102 + 0.067 * 0.073 *

(.061) (.042) (.034)Black, Non-Hispanic -0.030 -0.041 -0.025

(.061) (.048) (.039)Hispanic -0.035 -0.081 -0.031

(.212) (.053) (.046)Other Race, Non-Hispanic -0.011 -0.177 -0.074

(.109) (.065) (.066)Immigrant 0.044 0.146 + 0.112 *

(.087) (.071) (.051)Mom Age 0.007 0.004 0.005 *

(.005) (.003) (.003)Additional Child in HH < 6 -0.018 -0.024 -0.038 *

(.034) (.025) (.020)High School Graduate -0.004 -0.157 ** -0.118 **

(.048) (.057) (.045)Worked Year Prior to Birth 0.108 ** -0.046 -0.048

(.039) (.050) (.034)TANF Episode Prior to Birth -0.109 + -0.114 * -0.125 ***

(.068) (.041) (.034)Irregular Employment Schedule 0.092 + -0.024 + 0.068

(.051) (.055) (.051)TANF Policy

Diversion 0.179 * 0.025 0.000(.072) (.055) (.050)

Maximum Benefit/100 0.000 + 0.000 0.000 ***(.000) (.000) (.000)

***p <.001 ** p <.01 *p <.05 +p <.10

Note: All models control for household poverty level, city unemployment rate, fair market rent and city job growth, region

Employment-Care Conflict

Mothers reporting work and non-familial careAll mothers reporting work

Table 4.7: Family-Employment spillover marginal effects (standard errors)

Breakdown in careEmployment Schedule Stress

Key Findings

Modest effects of policy variables across all models Access to subsidies: multiple organisations

negative association (compared to local voucher agency

Welfare strictness & TANF time limits as expected TANF diversion

Key Findings

Individual’s prior history of TANF: strong predictor

Single mothers more likely to have subsidy Married mothers more likely to experience

negative employment-family spillover High school graduate less likely to report

negative spillover

Limitations

State level policy data masks variation at county level, especially in Texas (three cities)

Aggregation on features of employment (occupation, shift hours)

Mode/type of child care (formal or informal/centre based vs. kith or kin)