Operational Resilience Analysis and Capacity Building in ......Operational Resilience Analysis and...

OperationalResilienceAnalysisandCapacityBuildingintheUSVirginIslands

DavidL. Alderson,PhDAssociateProfessor,OperationsResearchDepartment

Director,CenterforInfrastructureDefenseNavalPostgraduateSchool

Workshop:FundamentalsofMicrogrid AnalysisandDesignSandiaNationalLaboratories&UniversityoftheVirginIslands

St.CroixCampus(24Oct2018)&St.ThomasCampus(26Oct2018)Unclassified.Distributionunlimited.Materialcontainedhereinrepresentsthesoleopinionoftheauthoranddoes

notnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseoritscomponents.

NavalPostgraduateSchool(NPS)America'snationalsecurityresearchuniversity

HistoryHighlights1909 Founded at U.S. Naval Academy

1951 Moved to Monterey, CA Operations Research Curriculum

• Facilitiesofagraduateresearchuniversity

• FacultywhoworkfortheU.S.Navy,withclearances

• Studentswithfreshoperationalexperience

FY2017:• 65M.S.and15Ph.D.programs• 612faculty• 1432residentstudentsincludes

(166international/47countries)• 909distributedlearningstudents

• OperationsResearch(OR)isthescienceofhelpingpeopleandorganizationsmakebetterdecisionsusing– mathematicalmodels,statisticalanalyses,simulations– analyticalreasoningandcommonsensetotheunderstandingandimprovementofreal-worldoperations.

• ORoriginatedduringWorldWarII.ThemilitaryusesORatthestrategic,operational,andtacticallevels.

• BiggestusersofOR:moderncorporations– Supplychainlogistics– Manufacturingandproductionplanning– Scheduling

• NPShastheoldestORinstructionalprogramintheU.S.

OperationsResearchatNPS

NPSCenterforInfrastructureDefense(CID)OperationsResearchDepartment

DavidAldersonAssociateProfessor,ORDirector,NPSCenterfor

InfrastructureDefensePh.D.,StanfordUniversity,

GeraldBrownDistinguishedEmeritus

Professor,ORMember,NationalAcademy

ofEngineeringPh.D.,U.C.L.A.,1974

W.MatthewCarlyleProfessor&Chair,OR

Ph.D.,StanfordUniversity,1997

JavierSalmerónAssociateProfessor,OR

Ph.D.,UniversidadPolitécnica (Spain),1998

RobertDellProfessor,OR

Ph.D.,S.U.N.Y.Buffalo,1990

DanielEisenbergResearchAssistant

Professor,OR

Ph.D.,ArizonaStateUniversity,2018

DanNussbaumVisitingProfessor,ORChair,NPSEnergy

AcademicGroup

Ph.D.,MichiganStateUniv.,1971

AlanHowardDeputyDirector,NPSEnergyAcademicGroup

MBA/MIMinInternationalManagement,2000

NPSEnergyAcademicGroup(EAG)JackTempletonProgramManager,NPSEnergyAcademicGroup

MSMDefenseSystemsAnalysis,NPS,2013

WhatisCriticalInfrastructure?• CriticalInfrastructure(CI):“systemsandassets,whetherphysicalorvirtual,

sovitaltotheUnitedStatesthattheincapacityordestructionofsuchsystemsandassetswouldhaveadebilitatingimpactonsecurity,nationaleconomicsecurity,nationalpublichealthorsafety,oranycombinationofthosematters” --Section1016(e)oftheUSAPATRIOTActof2001

CriticalInfrastructureSystems:NPShasauniqueperspectiveandcapability

• Wehavebeenstudyingcriticalinfrastructurefordecades.

• Welookatourowndomesticinfrastructurethroughtheeyesofintelligentadversaries.

• Wehaveconductedover150“redteamanalyses”toplanattacksonourowninfrastructure(anddeterminehowtomounteffectivehardeninganddefensiveefforts)

GoalsForThisSession• 10keyideas forhowtoassessandimproveoperationalresilienceofcriticalinfrastructures

• OngoingworkinapplyingtheseideastotheUSVI

Idea#1:Startbyfocusingondeliveryofservices,not mitigationofhazards/threats

• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse

Whatweneedtodo(operation)

• ExtremeWeather– CoastalFlooding– RainfallFlooding– Wind– Drought

• Humanaccident• Technologicalfailure• Deliberateattack

Whatcangowrong(interdiction)

Idea#2:Avoidgettingstuckonpredefinedthreatscenarios.• SurpriseHappens.Thingswehavenotimagined.• Tunnelvision(onthelastdisaster).Needtobeproactive,notreactive.

“Wewillnotbeabletodeterallterroristthreats,anditisimpossibletodeterorpreventnaturalcatastrophes.Wecan,however,mitigatetheNation’svulnerabilitytoactsofterrorism,otherman-madethreats,andnaturaldisastersbyensuringthestructuralandoperationalresilienceofourcriticalinfrastructureandkeyresources”(p.27)

“Wemustnowfocusontheresilienceofthesystemasawhole– anapproachthatcentersoninvestmentsthatmakethesystembetterabletoabsorbtheimpactofaneventwithoutlosingthecapacitytofunction” (p.28)

U.S.NationalStrategyforHomelandSecurity(2007)

Apolicyshifttoward“operationalresilience”

Most recently: U.S. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013.

“systemasawhole”and“capacitytofunction”

• Alistofassets• Aninterconnected(network)system thatworkstoachieveaparticularfunction

HowtoThinkAboutCriticalInfrastructure(CI)

✖✔

Wewanttomakeouroperations(publicandprivate)resilienttodisruptiveevents.

Weneedourinfrastructuresystemstocontinuetofunctionevenwhen“badthings”happen.

Idea#3:Weneedtothinkintermsofsystems.

• DODDirective3020.40:MissionAssurance(2016)

DODhasrecentlyreorganizeditseffortstoprotectdefense-relatedcriticalinfrastructureunderabroaderprogramofmissionassurance

• Keyrecognition

– Assets worktogetherassystems toprovidefunction

– Functionenablescapability

– Capabilitysupportsmission

• Focusneedstoremainontherelationshipbetweentheinfrastructureassetandthemissionsitsupports

Ashifttoward“operationalresilience”

Idea#3:Weneedtothinkintermsofsystems.

Idea#4:Resilienceisnotaboutwhatyouhave,itsaboutwhatyoudo!Thisisacommonmisperception.(Thinkofsafety asanotherconceptwiththisfeature…)

Idea#5:Takean”operational”perspective

Needtounderstandthedemandsofthepopulation• Demographics• Geography• Populationdensity• Specialneeds

Movegoods/servicesfromareasofsupplytodemands:• Mustincludeinfrastructure

ownersandoperators• Bothpublicand private!

Idea#6:Oftenrepresentedasflows throughnetworks.

Idea#7:Measure performance.Definemissionsuccess.

BUT…SystemsAreComplicated,SometimesComplex

• Interactionsoftennon-additiveandnon-intuitive.

• Aneventinonelocationcanoftenaffectthingsthatarefaraway,anditcanbehardtopredicthowthishappens.

• Thecontribution/importanceofasinglecomponenttosystemfunctionmaydependoninteractionswithothercomponents.

BUT…SystemsAreComplicated,SometimesComplex

• Interactionsoftennon-additiveandnon-intuitive.

• Aneventinonelocationcanoftenaffectthingsthatarefaraway,anditcanbehardtopredicthowthishappens.

• Thecontribution/importanceofasinglecomponenttosystemfunctionmaydependoninteractionswithothercomponents.

Idea#8:Guessingatwhatis“mostcritical”ispronetoerror

• Whendetermininghowbesttoprotectsystems,anaturalquestionis,“Whatcomponentsaremostcritical?”

• Betteryet:Whichcomponents,iflost,wouldbemostdisruptivetosystemfunction?

Definition:Acomponentiscritical iflosingitwouldsignificantlyreducesystemfunction(relativetothereductionfromlosingothercomponents).

Let’suseahistoricalexampletoillustrate…

Idea#8:Guessingatwhatis“mostcritical”ispronetoerror

TheRussianRailNetwork(circa1955)

DatafromFigure7of:Harris,T.E.,andRoss,F.S.(1955),FundamentalsofaMethodforEvaluatingRailNetCapacities(SECRET,

declassified1999),RM-1573,RANDCorp.

WhatisthecapacityoftheUSSRtodelivermaterieltoEuropeviarail?

3W 3E 2S

ORIGIN

originnodesdestinationnodes minimumcapacitycut

3025.04.2018- Alderson- NPS 14

3W 3E 2S

ORIGIN

originnodesdestinationnodes minimumcapacitycut

KeyInsight:Thecapacityofanetworkisequaltothesizeofthesmallestbottleneck.(a.k.a.“max-flow,min-cuttheorem”)

Butwhatarcsare“mostvital”?

25.04.2018- Alderson- NPS 14

Findingthe“MostVital”Arc(s)isnottrivial!• Itrequiresyoutoconsidernotonlythecurrentpathsthroughthenetworkbutalsoanyalternatepaths

• Because…thesystemcanadjustitsflowsinresponsetoadisruption!

Possible“guessingrules”fordeterminingwhatismostvital(Ahuja,Magnanti,andOrlin,“NetworkFlows”,Prentice-Hall,1993)

• Anarchavingthelargestcapacity• Anarccarryingthelargestflowintheoptimalsolution• Anarchavingthelargestcapacityinaminimum-capacitycut• Anymost-vitalarcisinsomeminimum-capacitycut

Possible“guessingrules”fordeterminingwhatismostvital(Ahuja,Magnanti,andOrlin,“NetworkFlows”,Prentice-Hall,1993)

• Anarchavingthelargestcapacity• Anarccarryingthelargestflowintheoptimalsolution• Anarchavingthelargestcapacityinaminimum-capacitycut• Anymost-vitalarcisinsomeminimum-capacitycut

Ingeneral,noneofthese“guessingrules”work!

counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc

(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

i j(flow, capacity)

(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

i j(flow, capacity) 2minimumcapacitycuts!

(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc

2minimumcapacitycuts!

(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc

arcswithlargestflowinoptimal(maxflow)solution

(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc

arcswithlargestcapacityinmincapacitycut

(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc

arcswithlargestcapacityinmincapacitycut

mostvitalarc

Ingeneral,youcannotreliablyguess.Instead,determiningamostvitalarcrequiressolvinganetworkinterdictionproblem.

Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)

OurApproachinaNutshell1. Usingalimitedbudget,wewanttoinvestsothatwe

stillachievemissionsuccessevenwhenbadthingshappen(operationalresilience)

2. Tolearnhowto“defend”thesesystems,firstfigureouthowtoattack them

3. TolearnhowtoattackCI,firstlearnhowittooperateit(i.e.,howitworks)

WecalltheseAttacker-DefenderandDefender-Attacker-Defendermodels.

•Ithelpstofocusesonsystemoperation.•Ithelpstodiscovervulnerabilities.•Ithelpstouncoverinterdependencies.•Ithelpstothinkaboutmitigation.

Ourexperience:Large-scale,long-terminterruptionsincriticalinfrastructureservicescanbecausedbythingsmuchsmallerthantwoCategory-5hurricanes!

Idea#10:Investingforresiliencecanworkbetterwhenyoutothinkaboutthesystemasawhole.•Hardening(reinforcement)•Redundancy(backups,spares)•Capacityexpansion•Newinfrastructure

Thismeansstudyingmorethanjust“howweactuallydoitnow”.

Itrequireswealsoconsider“howcouldwedoitnow(andinthefuture)”!

Wehaveusedscoresofthesemodelstoassessresilienceforawiderangeofsystems

OperatorModels• Shortest-pathproblems• Max-flowproblems• Min-costnetworkflowproblems• Multi-commodityflowproblems• Projectschedulingproblems• Linearprograms• Integer-Linearprograms• Nonlinearprograms• Nonlinear-Integerprograms

Applications• Electricpower• Potablewater• Fuelpipelines• Roadwaytransportation• Multi-modalshipping• Ports• Supplychains• Telecommunications

– Underseacables– Wirelessnetworkdesign

• Interdependentinfrastructures

These techniques scale up to realistic size and fidelity, and admit a host of standard models, many already in use by system operators.

Case Study: Guam Power Authority

Reference: Salmerón, J., Alderson, D., Brown, G., and Wood, R.K., 2012, Resilience Report: The Guam Power Authority Electric Power Grid: Analyzing Vulnerability to Physical Attack (U), Center for Infrastructure Defense Technical Report NPS-OR-12-002, May. Distribution authorized to DoD and DoD Contractors only due to infrastructure vulnerability analysis (10 May 2012). Other requests for this document must be referred to President, Code 261, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5000 via the Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944, Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218.

Prepared for: Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), Airbase Technologies Division, 139 Barnes Drive, Suite 2, Tyndal Air Force Base, FL 32403-5323.

BothAttacker andDefender Analysis

Guam Power Authority’s transmission system(115-13.8 kV):

~100 buses~50 HV lines~50 transformers10s of substations 10s of generating units:

>550 MW

Case Study: Hawaii

Reference: Salmerón, J., Alderson, D., and Brown, G., 2018, Resilience Report: Analysis of Hawaiian Electric Power Grid to Physical Attack (U), NPS Technical Report NPS-OR-18-001R, February. Restricted distribution (PCII).

Prepared for: Department of Homeland Security, Infrastructure Protection Division.

Attacker, Defender,&SpareParts Analysis

• 10s buses• ~100 high-voltage AC

transmission lines• no DC lines• ~100 transformers• 10s generating units: total

gen. capacity of ~2,500 MW• Total load: ~1,200 MW

• Can a small number of coordinated attacks inflict significant damage for which repair would require considerable reconstitution time? What is the best means of hardening against such attacks?

• How can a limited stockpile of medium- and high-voltage spare transformers contribute most to mitigating vulnerability, i.e., to “increasing system resilience.”

GoalsForThisSession• 10keyideasforhowtoassessandimproveoperationalresilienceofcriticalinfrastructures

• OngoingworkinapplyingtheseideastotheUSVI

Ourresearchispartofabroaderteameffort

OurworkintheUSVI:severalrelatedresearchefforts

Effort1 - Modelingandanalysisofinterdependentcriticalinfrastructuresystems

– Energy(emphasisonelectricpower)– Water(emphasisonpotablestorageanddistribution)– Transportation– Telecommunications

Effort2 - SupportfordevelopmentofanewHazardMitigationandResiliencePlan

– inpartnershipwithUVI/VITEMA

Effort3 - Capacitybuilding&workforcedevelopmentprogram– inpartnershipwithUVI

27Feb2018 ProjectStart(fundsavailable)21Mar remoteparticipationinUSVIEnergyRoundtable26-30Mar 1st NPSsitevisittoSTX,STT11-15Jun 2nd NPSsitevisittoSTX,STT14-15Jun UVI/VITEMAHazardMitigationWorkshop21Sep MSThesisbyLCDRBrendanBunn20Oct Technicalreport(finaldraft)22-26Oct 3rd NPSsitevisittoSTX,STJ,STT

• BunnBB,2018,“AnOperationalModelofInterdependentWaterandPowerDistributionInfrastructureSystems,”M.S.ThesisinOperationsResearch,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,September2018.

• AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).

228proposedinitiativesacrossavarietyofsectors:• ClimateAnalysis(5)• Energy(17)• PrivateSectorComms (14)• PublicSectorComms (11)• Transportation(24)• Water(11)• SolidWaste andWastewater(26)• HousingandBuildings(11)• Health(21)• VulnerablePopulations(12)• Education(20)• Economy(9)• Non-profit,Philanthropy,and

VoluntaryOrganizations(6)• GovernmentResponse(41)

Lotsofproposedchanges!

OpenQuestions:

• Howtoassesstheimpactofthesechanges(good/bad)?

• Howtoprioritize?

https://www.usvihurricanetaskforce.org/

KeyConcept:TheNeedforanOperationalViewofResilience

ReportContributions:1. Explainingthestructure,function,andtensionsassociatedwithcritical

infrastructurethatwerechronicproblemspriortothehurricanes.2. Documentinghurricaneresponse,recovery,andmitigationactivitiesfor

theseinfrastructuresystemsafterthehurricanes.3. Discussingthesechangesinthecontextofpotentialbarrierstoresilience.

AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).

WefaceseveralbarrierstoresilienceBarrier1:Wedon’tfullyunderstandhowvulnerableweare.• owners,operators,orcommunitieswhomanageinfrastructureoftendo

nothavecompleteknowledgeabouttheirvulnerabilities

Barrier2:Wedon’tknowhowbesttocreateresilience.• Tradeoffs/tensionsbetweendifferentmechanismstoachieveresilience• Prioritizationisdifficult

Barrier3:Wedon’thaveincentivestocreateresilience.• Hardtoinvestinmitigatingsomethingthathasneverhappened• Moralhazard:disincentivesforinvestment

Barrier4:Wedon’tknowhowtogovernforresilience.• Rules/regulationsworkagainstimplementationofdesiredchanges• mismatchbetweeninfrastructuregovernanceandinfrastructureoperation

Reference:AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).

Power– WaterInterdependencies

a morerealistic(USVI)waterdistributionsystem

IEEE13-buselectricitydistributionnetwork

BunnBB,2018,“AnOperationalModelofInterdependentWaterandPowerDistributionInfrastructureSystems,”M.S.ThesisinOperationsResearch,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,September2018.

Green CayProsperity

Hams Bluff

Sandy Point

Cramer Park

Hannahs Rest

Frederiksted

Christiansted

State Hwy 66

State Hwy 78

Southside Rd

Southshore Rd

Rte-68

North Shore Rd

Rte-622

Rte-66

State Hw

Carlton Rd

State Hwy 64

Rte-624

State Hw

y 65 Dirth R

State H

River Est

Hogensborg Est

Libanon Hill Est

Hams Bay Est

1st St S

St. Croix MapFeeder/Sector

August 2014

LEGEND

Device TypeRecloser

Closed

Capacitor

FEMA_SectorsSTX, 1

STX, 10

STX, 2

STX, 3

STX, 4

STX, 4A

STX, 5

STX, 6

STX, 7

STX, 7A

STX, 8

STX, 9 Northside Rd

Rte-74

Rte-70

King St

Hill St

East S

Queen S

State Hwy 752

Fisher S

Prince St

Rte-752

West St

State Hwy 811

Strand S

State H

wy 708

Market St

Beeston Hill Est

New St

King Cross St

State H

wy 703

Queen Cross StChurch St

Hospital St

Rte-83

Watergu

Richmond Est

Fangselet Est

Grange Est

Little

Little Princesse Est

Contentment Est

Bulows M

inde Est

Hafensight Est

Orange Grove Est

Peters Farm R

Herman Hill Est

Little

Hospita

North St

Bellvue Est

Golden Rock Est

Consti

tution H

ill Est

Sion Farm Est

Colony Cv

Lobster S

Mill Harbour Condos

Little Princess Est

Lagrande Princesse Est

Club S

t Croi

Harbor View Apartments

Carib V

an Hill E

Fangselet Est

Herman Hill Est

West St

Consti

tution

Constitutio

n Hill Est

Little Princesse Est

tLagrande Princesse Est

Bellvue Est

Golden Rock Est

Constitutio

n Hill Est

Orange Grove Est

Richmond EstOrange G

rove E

Herman Hill Est

Fangselet Est

Little Princess Est

an Hill Est

Little Princess Est

Golden

Constitution H

ill Est

Orange Grove Est

C H R I S T I A N S T E D H A R B O RC H R I S T I A N S T E D H A R B O R

Dr Eller S

field Est

Q U E E N M A R Y H W Y

777A7A

Feeder 8

Feeder LegendFeeder 01, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609

Feeder 02, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609

Ongoingwork:St.Croixelectric+water

Effort2 - SupportfordevelopmentofanewHazardMitigationandResiliencePlan

– inpartnershipwithUVI/VITEMA

Effort3 - Capacitybuilding&workforcedevelopmentprogram– inpartnershipwithUVI

ContactInformation

• Dr.DavidAldersonDirector,CenterforInfrastructureDefenseNavalPostgraduateSchool831-656-1814,dlalders@nps.eduhttp://faculty.nps.edu/dlalders

• NPSCenterforInfrastructureDefensehttp://www.nps.edu/cid

ReferencesandAcknowledgments• Alderson,D.L.,Brown,G.,Carlyle,W.M.,andWood,R.K.,2017,"Assessingand

ImprovingtheOperationalResilienceofaLargeHighwayInfrastructureSystemtoWorst-CaseLosses," TransportationScience,doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2017.0749.

• Alderson,D.L.,Brown,G.,andCarlyle,W.M.,2015,“OperationalModelsofInfrastructureResilience,” RiskAnalysis35(4):562-586(receivedAwardforBestPaperof2015inRiskAnalysis).

• Alderson,D.L.,G.G.Brown,W.M.Carlyle.2014.“AssessingandImprovingOperationalResilienceofCriticalInfrastructuresandOtherSystems.”A.Newman,J.Leung,eds.,TutorialsinOperationsResearch:BridgingDataandDecision.InstituteforOperationsResearchandManagementScience,Hanover,MD,180-215.

• Alderson,D.L.,G.G.Brown,W.M.Carlyle,L.A.Cox.2013.“Sometimesthereisno‘mostvital’arc:assessingandimprovingtheoperationalresilienceofsystems.”MilitaryOperationsResearch18(1)21-37.

• Brown,G.,Carlyle,M.,Salmerón,J.andWood,K.,2006,“DefendingCriticalInfrastructure,” Interfaces,36,pp.530-544.

ThisresearchwassupportedbytheOfficeofNavalResearch,theAirForceOfficeofScientificResearch,andtheDefenseThreatReductionAgency. 19

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