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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
OVERVIEW OF IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Overview
History
Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
February 2007 Report
May 2007 Report
November 2007 report
February 2008 report
May 2008 report
September 2008 report
February 2010 Report
May 2010 Report
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Chapter 4
IRAN WORK ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM
United States
May 2012 Baghdad negotiations
Chapter 5
NUCLEAR DECLARATION
Tehran Nuclear Declaration
Attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists
Nuclear power as a political issue
Iran's nuclear program and the NPT
Iranian statements on nuclear deterrence
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Mideast
REFERENCES
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The nuclear program of Iran was launched in the 1950s with the help of
the United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The participation
of the United States and Western European governments in Iran's nuclear
program continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah
of Iran.
After the 1979 revolution, the clandestine research program was disbanded
by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had serious religious reservations
about nuclear weapons, which he considered evil in terms of Muslim
jurisprudence. Small scale research restarted during the Iran-Iraq War, and
underwent significant expansion after the Ayatollah's death in 1989. Iran's
nuclear program has included several research sites, two uranium mines, a
research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known
uranium enrichment plants.
Iran's first nuclear power plant, Bushehr I reactorwas complete with major
assistance of Russian government agency Rosatom and officially opened on
12 September 2011. Iran has announced that it is working on a new 360 MW
nuclear power plant to be located in Darkhovin. The Russian engineering
contractorAtomenergoprom said the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant would
reach full capacity by the end of 2012. Iran has also indicated that it will
seek more medium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the
future.
In November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board
of Governors rebuked Iran following an IAEA report indicating Iran had
undertaken research and experiments geared to developing a nuclear
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weapons capability. For the first time, the IAEA report outlines, in depth, the
countrys detonator development, the multiple-point initiation of high
explosives, and experiments involving nuclear payload integration into a
missile delivery vehicle. Iran rejected the details of the report and accused
the IAEA of pro-Western bias and threatened to reduce its cooperation with
the IAEA
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Chapter 2
OVERVIEW OF IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Overview
The controversy over Iran's nuclear programs centers in particular on Iran's
failure to declare sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Enrichment can be used to
produce uranium for reactor fuel or (at higher enrichment levels) forweapons. Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful, and has enriched
uranium to less than 5%, consistent with fuel for a civilian nuclear power
plant. Iran also claims that it was forced to resort to secrecy after US
pressure caused several of its nuclear contracts with foreign governments to
fall through. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's
noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the UN Security Council,the Council demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities
while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has argued that the
sanctions are "illegal," imposed by "arrogant powers," and that Iran has
decided to pursue the monitoring of its self-described peaceful nuclear
program through "its appropriate legal path," the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
After public allegations about Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities,
the IAEA launched an investigation that concluded in November 2003 that
Iran had systematically failed to meet its obligations under its NPT
safeguards agreement to report those activities to the IAEA, although it also
reported no evidence of links to a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA
Board of Governors delayed a formal finding of non-compliance until
September 2005, and reported that non-compliance to the UN Security
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Council in February 2006. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported
Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the United Nations
Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment
programs. The Council imposed sanctions after Iran refused to do so. A May
2009 U.S. Congressional Report suggested "the United States, and later the
Europeans, argued that Iran's deception meant it should forfeit its right to
enrich, a position likely to be up for negotiation in talks with Iran."
In exchange for suspending its enrichment program, Iran has been offered "a
long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the
development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect
and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's nuclear program." However, Iran has consistently refused to
give up its enrichment program, arguing that the program is necessary for its
energy security, that such "long term arrangements" are inherently
unreliable, and would deprive it of its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear
technology. In June 2009, in the immediate wake of the disputed Iranianpresidential election, Iran initially agreed to a deal to relinquish its stockpile
of low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a medical research reactor, but
then backed out of the deal. Currently, thirteen states possess operational
enrichment or reprocessing facilities, and several others have expressed an
interest in developing indigenous enrichment programs. Iran's position was
endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which expressed concern about thepotential monopolization of nuclear fuel production.
To address concerns that its enrichment program may be diverted to non-
peaceful uses, Iran has offered to place additional restrictions on its
enrichment program including, for example, ratifying the Additional
Protocol to allow more stringent inspections by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, operating the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as a
multinational fuel center with the participation of foreign representatives,
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renouncing plutonium reprocessing and immediately fabricating all enriched
uranium into reactor fuel rods. Iran's offer to open its uranium enrichment
program to foreign private and public participation mirrors suggestions of an
IAEA expert committee which was formed to investigate the methods to
reduce the risk that sensitive fuel cycle activities could contribute to national
nuclear weapons capabilities. Some non-governmental U.S. experts have
endorsed this approach. The United States has insisted that Iran must meet
the demands of the UN Security Council to suspend its enrichment program.
In every other case in which the IAEA Board of Governors made a finding
of safeguards non-compliance involving clandestine enrichment or
reprocessing, the resolution has involved (in the cases of Iraq and Libya) or
is expected to involve (in the case of North Korea) at a minimum ending
sensitive fuel cycle activities. According to Pierre Goldschmidt, former
deputy director general and head of the department of safeguards at the
IAEA, and Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center, some other instances of safeguards noncompliancereported by the IAEA Secretariat (South Korea, Egypt) were never reported
to the Security Council because the IAEA Board of Governors never made a
formal finding of non-compliance. Though South Korea's case involved
enriching uranium to levels near weapons grade, the country itself
voluntarily reported the isolated activity and Goldschmidt has argued
"political considerations also played a dominant role in the board's decision"to not make a formal finding of non-compliance.
Estimating when Iran might possibly achieve nuclear "breakout" capability,
defined as having produced a sufficient quantity of highly-enriched uranium
to fuel a weapon - if a working design for one existed and the political
decision to assemble it was made - is uncertain. A detailed analysis by
physicists at the Federation of American Scientists concludes that such an
estimate would depend on the total number and overall efficiency of the
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centrifuges Iran has in operation, and the amount of low-enriched uranium it
has stockpiled to serve as "feedstock" for a possible high-enrichment
program. A 23 March 2012 U.S. Congressional Research Service report
quotes the 24 February 2012 IAEA report saying that Iran has stockpiled 240
pounds of 20-percent-enriched uranium - an enrichment level necessary for
medical applications - as an indication of their capacity to enrich to higher
levels. The authoritarian political culture of Iran may pose additional
challenges to a scientific program requiring cooperation among many
technical specialists. U.S. intelligence agency officials interviewed by The
New York Times in March 2012 said they continued to assess that Iran had
not restarted its weaponization program, which the 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate said Iran had discontinued in 2003, although they have
found evidence that some weaponization-related activities have continued.
The Israeli Mossad reportedly shared this belief.
History
1950s and 1960s
The foundations forIran's nuclear program were laid on 5 March 1957, when
a "proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of
atomic energy" was announced under the auspices of Eisenhower's Atoms
for Peace program.
In 1967, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center(TNRC) was established, run
by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was
equipped with a U.S.-supplied, 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, which
was fueled by highly enriched uranium.
Iran signed theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified
it in 1970, making Iran's nuclear program subject to IAEA verification.
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1970s
The Shah approved plans to construct, with U.S. help, up to 23 nuclear
power stations by 2000. In March 1974, the Shah envisioned a time when the
world's oil supply would run out, and declared, "Petroleum is a noble
material, much too valuable to burn ... We envision producing, as soon as
possible, 23,000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants."
Iran had deep pockets and close ties to the West. U.S. and European
companies scrambled to do business in Iran. Bushehr would be the first
plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz. In 1975, the
Erlangen/Frankfurt firm Kraftwerk Union AG, a joint venture of Siemens
AG and AEG, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the
pressurized water reactornuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196
MWe, and was to have been completed in 1981.
The joint stock company Eurodif operating a uranium enrichment plant in
France was formed in 1973 by France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden. In 1975
Sweden's 10% share in Eurodif went to Iran as a result of an arrangement
between France and Iran. The French government subsidiary company
Cogma and the Iranian Government established the Sofidif (Socit franco
iranienne pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium par diffusion gazeuse)
enterprise with 60% and 40% shares, respectively. In turn, Sofidif acquired a
25% share in Eurodif, which gave Iran its 10% share of Eurodif. MohammedReza Shah Pahlavi lent 1 billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in
1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory, to have the right of buying
10% of the production of the site.
"President Gerald Ford signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance
to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extractingplutonium
from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete 'nuclear fuel cycle'."At the time, Richard Cheney was the White House Chief of Staff, and
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Donald Rumsfeld was the Secretary of Defense. The Ford strategy paper said
the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs
of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to
petrochemicals."
ThenUnited States Secretary of StateHenry Kissingerrecalled in 2005, "I
don't think the issue of proliferation came up." However, a 1974 CIA
proliferation assessment stated "If [the Shah] is alive in the mid-1980s ... and
if other countries [particularly India] have proceeded with weapons
development we have no doubt Iran will follow suit."
The Shah also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with South Africa
under which Iranian oil money financed the development of South African
fuel enrichment technology using a novel "jet nozzle" process, in return for
assured supplies of South African (and Namibian) enriched uranium.
Post-revolution, 19791989
Following the 1979 Revolution, most of the international nuclear
cooperation with Iran was cut off. Iran has later argued that these
experiences indicate foreign facilities and foreign fuel supplies are an
unreliable source of nuclear fuel supply.
At the time of the revolution, Iran was a joint owner in the French Eurodif
international enrichment facility, but the facility stopped supplying enriched
uranium to Iran shortly afterwards. Kraftwerk Union stopped working at the
Bushehr nuclear project in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete,and the other reactor 85% complete, and they fully withdrew from the
project in July 1979. The company said they based their action on Iran's non-
payment of $450 million in overdue payments, while other sources claim the
construction was halted under pressure from the United States.
The United States cut off the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel
for the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, which forced the reactor to shutdown for a number of years, until Argentina's National Atomic Energy
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Commission in 198788 signed an agreement with Iran to help in converting
the reactor from highly enriched uranium fuel to 19.75% low-enriched
uranium, and to supply the low-enriched uranium to Iran. The uranium was
delivered in 1993.
In 1981, Iranian governmental officials concluded that the country's nuclear
development should continue. Reports to the IAEA included that a site at
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC) would act "as the center for
the transfer and development of nuclear technology, as well as contribute to
the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain a very
ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel
cycle technology." The IAEA also was informed about Entec's largest
department, for materials testing, which was responsible for UO2 pellet fuel
fabrication and a chemical department whose goal was the conversion of
U3O8 to nuclear grade UO2.
In 1983, IAEA officials were keen to assist Iran in chemical aspects of
reactor fuel fabrication, chemical engineering and design aspects of pilotplants for uranium conversion, corrosion of nuclear materials, LWR fuel
fabrication, and pilot plant development for production of nuclear grade
UO2. However, the U.S. government "directly intervened" to discourage
IAEA assistance in Iranian production of UO2 and UF6. A former U.S.
official said "we stopped that in its tracks." Iran later set up a bilateral
cooperation on fuel cycle related issues with China, but China also agreed todrop most outstanding nuclear commerce with Iran, including the
construction of the UF6 plant, due to U.S. pressure.
In April 1984, West German intelligence reported that Iran might have a
nuclear bomb within two years with uranium from Pakistan. The Germans
leaked this news in the first public Western intelligence report of a post-
revolutionary nuclear weapons program in Iran. Later that year, Minority
Whip of the United States Senate Alan Cranston asserted that the Islamic
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Republic of Iran was seven years away from being able to build its own
nuclear weapon.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the two Bushehr reactors were damaged by
multiple Iraqi air strikes and work on the nuclear program came to a
standstill. Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency of the
blasts, and complained about international inaction and the use of French
made missiles in the attack.
19902002
From the beginning of 1990s, Russia formed a joint research organization
with Iran called Persepolis which provided Iran with Russian nuclear
experts, and technical information. Five Russian institutions, including the
Russian Federal Space Agency helped Tehran to improve its missiles. The
exchange of technical information with Iran was personally approved by the
SVR director Trubnikov. President Boris Yeltsin had a "two track policy"
offering commercial nuclear technology to Iran and discussing the issues
with Washington.
In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards new partners for its nuclear
program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive
U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed.
In 1991, an agreement was found for the French-Iranian disagreement since
1979 (see Post Revolution, 19791989): France refunded more than 1.6
billion dollars. Iran remained shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif, a Franco-Iranian consortium shareholder to 25% of Eurodif. However, Iran refrained
from asking for the produced uranium.
In 1992, following media allegations about undeclared nuclear activities in
Iran, Iran invited IAEA inspectors to the country and permitted those
inspectors to visit all the sites and facilities they asked to see. Director
General Blix reported that all activities observed were consistent with thepeaceful use of atomic energy. The IAEA visits included undeclared
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facilities and Iran's nascent uranium mining project at Saghand. In the same
year, Argentine officials disclosed that their country had canceled a sale to
Iran of civilian nuclear equipment worth $18 million, under US pressure.
In 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy to
resume work on the partially complete Bushehr plant, installing into the
existing Bushehr I building a 915 MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water
reactor, with completion expected in 2009.
In 1996, the U.S. convinced the People's Republic of China to pull out of a
contract to construct a uranium conversion plant. However, the Chinese
provided blueprints for the facility to the Iranians, who advised the IAEA
that they would continue work on the program, and IAEA Director
Mohamed ElBaradei even visited the construction site.
According to a report by the Argentine justice in 2006, during the late 1980s
and early 1990s the US pressured Argentina to terminate its nuclear
cooperation with Iran, and from early 1992 to 1994 negotiations between
Argentina and Iran took place with the aim of re-establishing the threeagreements made in 198788.
20022006
On 14 August 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman for an Iranian
dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran, publicly revealed the
existence of two nuclear sites under construction: a uranium enrichment
facility inNatanz (part of which is underground), and a heavy waterfacilityin Arak. It has been strongly suggested that intelligence agencies already
knew about these facilities but the reports had been classified.
The IAEA immediately sought access to these facilities and further
information and co-operation from Iran regarding its nuclear program.
According to arrangements in force at the time for implementation of Iran's
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Iran was not required to allow IAEAinspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material
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is introduced into that facility. At the time, Iran was not even required to
inform the IAEA of the existence of the facility. This "six months" clause
was standard for implementation of all IAEA safeguards agreements until
1992, when the IAEA Board of Governors decided that facilities should be
reported during the planning phase, even before construction began. Iran was
the last country to accept that decision, and only did so 26 February 2003,
after the IAEA investigation began.
In May 2003, shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, elements of the Iranian
government of Mohammad Khatami made a confidential proposal for a
"Grand Bargain" through Swiss diplomatic channels. It offered full
transparency of Iran's nuclear program and withdrawal of support for Hamas
and Hezbollah, in exchange for security assurances from the United States
and a normalization of diplomatic relations. The Bush Administration did
not respond to the proposal, as senior U.S. officials doubted its authenticity.
The proposal reportedly was widely blessed by the Iranian government,
including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei.France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) undertook a
diplomatic initiative with Iran to resolve questions about its nuclear program.
On 21 October 2003, in Tehran, the Iranian government and EU-3 Foreign
Ministers issued a statement known as the Tehran Declaration in which Iran
agreed to co-operate with the IAEA, to sign and implement an Additional
Protocol as a voluntary, confidence-building measure, and to suspend itsenrichment and reprocessing activities during the course of the negotiations.
The EU-3 in return explicitly agreed to recognize Iran's nuclear rights and to
discuss ways Iran could provide "satisfactory assurances" regarding its
nuclear power program, after which Iran would gain easier access to modern
technology. Iran signed an Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, and
agreed to act as if the protocol were in force, making the required reports to
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the IAEA and allowing the required access by IAEA inspectors, pending
Iran's ratification of the Additional Protocol.
The IAEA reported 10 November 2003, that "it is clear that Iran has failed in
a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear
material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities
where such material has been processed and stored." Iran was obligated to
inform the IAEA of its importation of uranium from China and subsequent
use of that material in uranium conversion and enrichment activities. It was
also obligated to report to the IAEA experiments with the separation of
plutonium. However, the Islamic Republic reneged on its promise to permit
the IAEA to carry out their inspections and suspended the Additional
Protocol agreement outlined above in October 2005.
A comprehensive list of Iran's specific "breaches" of its IAEA safeguards
agreement, which the IAEA described as part of a "pattern of concealment,"
can be found in the 15 November 2004, report of the IAEA on Iran's nuclearprogram. Iran attributes its failure to report certain acquisitions and activities
on US obstructionism, which reportedly included pressuring the IAEA to
cease providing technical assistance to Iran's uranium conversion program in
1983. On the question of whether Iran had a hidden nuclear weapons
program, the IAEA's November 2003 report states that it found "no
evidence" that the previously undeclared activities were related to a nuclearweapons program, but also that it was unable to conclude that Iran's nuclear
program was exclusively peaceful.
In June 2004, construction was commenced on IR-40, a 40 MW heavy water
reactor
Under the terms of the Paris Agreement, on 14 November 2004, Iran's chief
nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its
uranium enrichment program (enrichment is not a violation of the NPT) and
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the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, after pressure from
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the European
Union (EU, known in this context as theEU-3). The measure was said at the
time to be a voluntary, confidence-building measure, to continue for some
reasonable period of time (six months being mentioned as a reference) as
negotiations with the EU-3 continued. On 24 November, Iran sought to
amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the
equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four
days later. According to Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, one of the Iranian
representatives to the Paris Agreement negotiations, the Iranians made it
clear to their European counterparts that Iran would not consider a
permanent end to uranium enrichment:
Before the Paris [Agreement] text was signed, Dr Rohani ... stressed that
they should be committed neither to speak nor even think of a cessation any
more. The ambassadors delivered his message to their foreign ministers prior
to the signing of the Paris agreed text ... The Iranians made it clear to theirEuropean counterparts that if the latter sought a complete termination of
Iran's nuclear fuel-cycle activities, there would be no negotiations. The
Europeans answered that they were not seeking such a termination, only an
assurance on the non-diversion of Iran's nuclear programme to military ends.
In February 2005, Iran pressed the EU-3 to speed up talks, which the EU-3
refused to do so. The talks made little progress because of the divergentpositions of the two sides. In early August 2005, after the June election of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President, Iran removed seals on its
uranium enrichment equipment in Isfahan, which UK officials termed a
"breach of the Paris Agreement" though a case can be made that the EU
violated the terms of the Paris Agreement by demanding that Iran abandon
nuclear enrichment. Several days later, the EU-3 offered Iran a package in
return for permanent cessation of enrichment. Reportedly, it included
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benefits in the political, trade and nuclear fields, as well as long-term
supplies of nuclear materials and assurances of non-aggression by the EU
(but not the US). Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran's atomic
energy organization rejected the offer, terming it "very insulting and
humiliating" and other independent analysts characterized the EU offer as an
"empty box". Iran's announcement that it would resume enrichment preceded
the election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad by several months. The delay
in restarting the program was to allow the IAEA to re-install monitoring
equipment. The actual resumption of the program coincided with the election
of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and the appointment ofAli Larijani as
the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator.
Around 2005, Germany refused to export any more nuclear equipment or
refund money paid by Iran for such equipment in the 1980s. (See European
reactions 197989.)
In August 2005, with the assistance of Pakistan a group of US government
experts and international scientists concluded that traces of bomb-gradeuranium found in Iran came from contaminated Pakistani equipment and
were not evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iran. In
September 2005, IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei reported
that "most" highly enriched uranium traces found in Iran by agency
inspectors came from imported centrifuge components, validating Iran's
claim that the traces were due to contamination. Sources in Vienna and theState Department reportedly stated that, for all practical purposes, the HEU
issue has been resolved.
The IAEA Board of Governors deferred a formal decision on Iran's nuclear
case for two years after 2003, while Iran continued cooperation with the EU-
3. On 24 September 2005, after Iran abandoned the Paris Agreement, the
Board found that Iran had been in non-compliance with its safeguards
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agreement, based largely on facts that had been reported as early as
November 2003.
On 4 February 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted
273 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South
Africa) to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The measure was
sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed
by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China,
agreed to referral only on condition that the council take no action before
March. The three members who voted against referral were Venezuela, Syria
and Cuba. In response, on 6 February 2006, Iran suspended its voluntary
implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary and non-
legally binding cooperation with the IAEA beyond what is required by its
safeguards agreement.
In late February 2006, IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei raised the
suggestion of a deal, whereby Iran would give up industrial-scale enrichment
and instead limit its program to a small-scale pilot facility, and agree toimport its nuclear fuel from Russia (see nuclear fuel bank). The Iranians
indicated that while they would not be willing to give up their right to
enrichment in principle, they were willing to consider the compromise
solution. However, in March 2006, the Bush Administration made it clear
that they would not accept any enrichment at all in Iran.
The IAEA Board of Governors deferred the formal report to the UN SecurityCouncil of Iran's non-compliance (such a report is required by Article XII.C
of the IAEA Statute), until 27 February 2006. The Board usually makes
decisions by consensus, but in a rare non-consensus decision it adopted this
resolution by vote, with 12 abstentions.
On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that
Iran had successfully enriched uranium. President Ahmadinejad made the
announcement in a televised address from the northeastern city ofMashhad,
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where he said "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those
countries which have nuclear technology." The uranium was enriched to
3.5% using over a hundred centrifuges.
On 13 April 2006, after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said (on 12
April 2006) the Security Council must consider "strong steps" to induce
Tehran to change course in its nuclear ambition; President Ahmadinejad
vowed that Iran will not back away from uranium enrichment and that the
world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, saying "Our answer to those who
are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase.
We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger," because "We won't hold talks
with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium."
On 14 April 2006, The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
published a series of analyzed satellite images of Iran's nuclear facilities at
Natanz and Esfahan. Featured in these images is a new tunnel entrance near
the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and continued
construction at the Natanz uranium enrichment site. In addition, a series ofimages dating back to 2002 shows the underground enrichment buildings
and its subsequent covering by soil, concrete, and other materials. Both
facilities were already subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
Iran responded to the demand to stop enrichment of uranium 24 August
2006, offering to return to the negotiation table but refusing to end
enrichment.Qolam Ali Hadad-adel, speaker of Iran's parliament, said on 30 August
2006, that Iran had the right to "peaceful application of nuclear technology
and all other officials agree with this decision," according to the semi-
official Iranian Students News Agency. "Iran opened the door to negotiations
for Europe and hopes that the answer which was given to the nuclear
package would bring them to the table."
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In Resolution 1696 of 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council
demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing related
activities.
In UN Security Council Resolution 1737 of 26 December 2006, the Council
imposed a series of sanctions on Iran for its non-compliance with the earlier
Security Council resolution deciding that Iran suspend enrichment-related
activities without delay. These sanctions were primarily targeted against the
transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies and, in response to
concerns of China and Russia, were lighter than that sought by the United
States. This resolution followed a report from the IAEA that Iran had
permitted inspections under its safeguards agreement but had not suspended
its enrichment-related activities.
2007present
UN Security Council
The UN Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran:
Resolution 1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend its
uranium enrichment activities, invoking Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charterto make that demand legally binding on Iran.
Resolution 1737 (23 December 2006) imposed sanctions after Iran
refused to suspend its enrichment activities, cutting off nuclear
cooperation, demanding that Iran cooperate with the IAEA, and
freezing the assets of a number of persons and organizations linked to
Iran's nuclear and missile programs. It established a committee to
monitor sanctions implementation.
Resolution 1747 (24 March 2007) expanded the list of sanctioned
Iranian entities and welcomed the proposal by the permanent five
members of the Security Council plus Germany for resolving issues
regarding Iran's nuclear program.
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In resolution 1803 (3 March 2008), the Council decided to extend
those sanctions to additional persons and entities, impose travel
restrictions on sanctioned persons, and bar exports of nuclear- and
missile-related dual-use goods to Iran.
Resolution 1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed the preceding four
resolutions, the only one of the seven not to invoke Chapter VII.
Resolution 1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a complete arms embargo on
Iran, banned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles,
authorized the inspection and seizure of shipments violating these
restrictions, and extended the asset freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
(IRISL). The resolution passed by a vote of 122, with Turkey and
Brazil voting against and Lebanon abstaining. A number of countries
imposed measures to implement and extend these sanctions, including
the United States, the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan,
Norway, South Korea, and Russia. Resolution 1984 (8 June 2011) extended for a further 12 months the
mandate of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1929.
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Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
The IAEA remains unable to draw a conclusion on whether Iran has a secret
nuclear weapons program. It normally draws conclusions about the absence
of undeclared nuclear activities only in countries that have an Additional
Protocol in force. Iran ceased its voluntary and non-legally binding
implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary
cooperation with the IAEA beyond that required under its safeguards
agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors decided to report its
safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006.
The UN Security Council then passed Resolution 1737, invoking
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, obligating Iran to implement the Additional
Protocol. Iran has maintained that the Security Council's engagement in "the
issue of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran" are
unlawful and malicious. In its Safeguards Statement for 2007, the IAEA
found no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in 47 of 82
states that had both NPT safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols in
force, while it was unable to draw similar conclusions in 25 other states. In
August 2007, Iran and the IAEA entered into an agreement on the modalities
for resolving remaining outstanding issues, and made progress in outstanding
issues except for the question of "alleged studies" of weaponization by Iran.
Iran says it did not address the alleged studies in the IAEA work plan
because they were not included in the plan. The IAEA has not detected the
actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies and says
it regrets it is unable to provide Iran with copies of the documentation
concerning the alleged studies, but says the documentation is comprehensive
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and detailed so that it needs to be taken seriously. Iran says the allegations
are based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data, and that it has not
received copies of the documentation to enable it to prove that they were
forged and fabricated.
Since 2011, the IAEA has voiced growing concern over possible military
dimensions to Iran's nuclear program, and has released a number of reports
chastising Iran's nuclear program to that effect.
February 2007 Report
In February 2007, anonymous diplomats at the atomic energy agency
reportedly complained that most U.S. intelligence shared with the IAEA had
proved inaccurate, and none had led to significant discoveries inside Iran.
On 10 May 2007, Iran and the IAEA vehemently denied reports that Iran had
blocked IAEA inspectors when they sought access to the Iran's enrichment
facility. On 11 March 2007, Reuters quoted International Atomic Energy
Agency spokesman Marc Vidricaire, "We have not been denied access at
any time, including in the past few weeks. Normally we do not comment on
such reports but this time we felt we had to clarify the matter ... If we had a
problem like that we would have to report to the [35-nation IAEA
governing] board ... That has not happened because this alleged event did not
take place."
May 2007 Report
On 30 July 2007, inspectors from the IAEA spent five hours at the Arak
complex, the first such visit since April. Visits to other plants in Iran were
expected during the following days. It has been suggested that access may
have been granted in an attempt to head off further sanctions.
August 2007 Report and Agreement between Iran and the IAEA
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An IAEA report to the Board of Governors on 30 August 2007, stated that
Iran's Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz is operating "well below the expected
quantity for a facility of this design," and that 12 of the intended 18
centrifuge cascades at the plant were operating. The report stated that the
IAEA had "been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear
materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran," and that longstanding issues
regarding plutonium experiments and HEU contamination on spent fuel
containers were considered "resolved." However, the report added that the
Agency remained unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and
nature of Iran's nuclear program.
The report also outlined a work plan agreed by Iran and the IAEA on 21
August 2007. The work plan reflected agreement on "modalities for
resolving the remaining safeguards implementation issues, including the
long outstanding issues." According to the plan, these modalities covered all
remaining issues regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities. The
IAEA report described the work plan as "a significant step forward," butadded "the Agency considers it essential that Iran adheres to the time line
defined therein and implements all the necessary safeguards and
transparency measures, including the measures provided for in the
Additional Protocol." Although the work plan did not include a commitment
by Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, IAEA safeguards head Olli
Heinonen observed that measures in the work plan "for resolving ouroutstanding issues go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol."
According to Reuters, the report was likely to blunt Washington's push for
more severe sanctions against Iran. One senior UN official familiar said U.S.
efforts to escalate sanctions against Iran would provoke a nationalistic
backlash by Iran that would set back the IAEA investigation in Iran. In late
October 2007, chief IAEA inspector Olli Heinonen described Iranian
cooperation with the IAEA as "good," although much remained to be done.
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In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the head
of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "no evidence" of
Iran developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaradei as saying "We
have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible
weaponization. That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right
now, because there is still a lot of question marks ... . But have we seen Iran
having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No.
Have we seen an active weaponization program? No." The IHT report went
on to say that "ElBaradei said he was worried about the growing rhetoric
from the U.S., which he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a
nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If
there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said he would welcome seeing it."
November 2007 report
The 15 November 2007, IAEA report found that on nine outstanding issues
listed in the August 2007 workplan, including experiments on the P-2
centrifuge and work with uranium metals, "Iran's statements are consistent
with ... information available to the agency," but it warned that its
knowledge of Tehran's present atomic work was shrinking due to Iran's
refusal to continue voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol, as it
had done in the past under the October 2003 Tehran agreement and the
November 2004 Paris agreement. The only remaining issues were traces ofHEU found at one location, and allegations by US intelligence agencies
based on a laptop computer allegedly stolen from Iran which reportedly
contained nuclear weapons-related designs. The IAEA report also stated that
Tehran continues to produce LEU. Iran has declared it has a right to peaceful
nuclear technology under the NPT, despite Security Council demands that it
cease its nuclear enrichment.
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On 18 November 2007, President Ahmadinejad announced that he intended
to consult with other Arab nations on a plan, under the auspices of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, to enrich uranium in a neutral third country, such as
Switzerland.
Israel criticised IAEA reports on Iran as well as the former IAEA-director
ElBaradei. Israel's Minister of Strategic Affairs Avigdor Lieberman
dismissed reports by the UN nuclear watchdog agency as being
"unacceptable" and accused IAEA head ElBaradei of being "pro-Iranian".
February 2008 report
On 11 February 2008, news reports stated that the IAEA report on Iran's
compliance with the August 2007 work plan would be delayed over internal
disagreements over the report's expected conclusions that the major issues
had been resolved. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated that he
would meet with IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei to convince him to
"listen to the West" and remind him that the IAEA is merely in charge of the
"technical side" rather than the "political side" of the issue. A senior IAEA
official denied the reports of internal disagreements and accused Western
powers of using the same "hype" tactics employed against Iraq before the
2003 U.S.-led invasion to justify imposing further sanctions on Iran over its
nuclear program.
The IAEA issued its report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran on
22 February 2008. With respect to the report, IAEA Director Mohammad
ElBaradei stated that "We have managed to clarify all the remaining
outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope
and nature of Irans enrichment programme" with the exception of a single
issue, "and that is the alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran hasconducted in the past."
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According to the report, the IAEA shared intelligence with Iran recently
provided by the US regarding "alleged studies" on a nuclear weaponization
program. The information was allegedly obtained from a laptop computer
smuggled out of Iran and provided to the US in mid-2004. The laptop was
reportedly received from a "longtime contact" in Iran who obtained it from
someone else now believed to be dead. A senior European diplomat warned
"I can fabricate that data," and argued that the documents look "beautiful, but
is open to doubt". The United States has relied on the laptop to prove that
Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons. In November 2007, the United
States National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) believed that Iran halted an
alleged active nuclear weapons program in fall 2003. Iran has dismissed the
laptop information as a fabrication, and other diplomats have dismissed the
information as relatively insignificant and coming too late.
The February 2008 IAEA report states that the Agency has "not detected the
use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it
have credible information in this regard."
May 2008 report
On 26 May 2008, the IAEA issued another regular report on the
implementation of safeguards in Iran.
According to the report, the IAEA has been able to continue to verify the
non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and Iran has provided theAgency with access to declared nuclear material and accountancy reports, as
required by its safeguards agreement.
Iran had installed several new centrifuges, including more advanced models,
and environmental samples showed the centrifuges "continued to operate as
declared", making low-enriched uranium. The report also noted that other
elements of Iran's nuclear program continued to be subject to IAEA
monitoring and safeguards as well, including the construction of the heavy
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water facility in Arak, the construction and use of hot cells associated with
the Tehran Research Reactor, the uranium conversion efforts, and the
Russian nuclear fuel delivered for the Bushehr reactor.
The report stated that the IAEA had requested, as a voluntary "transparency
measure", to be allowed access to centrifuge manufacturing sites, but that
Iran had refused the request. The IAEA report stated that Iran had also
submitted replies to questions regarding "possible military dimensions" to its
nuclear program, which include "alleged studies" on a so-called Green Salt
Project, high-explosive testing and missile re-entry vehicles. According to
the report, Iran's answers were still under review by the IAEA at the time the
report was published. However, as part of its earlier "overall assessment" of
the allegations, Iran had responded that the documents making the
allegations were forged, not authentic, or referred to conventional
applications.
The report stated that Iran may have more information on the alleged studies,
which "remain a matter of serious concern", but that the IAEA itself had notdetected evidence of actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear
weapons or components. The IAEA also stated that it was not itself in
possession of certain documents containing the allegations against Iran, and
so was not able to share the documents with Iran.
September 2008 reportAccording to the 15 September 2008, IAEA report on the implementation of
safeguards in Iran, Iran continued to provide the IAEA with access to
declared nuclear material and activities, which continued to be operated
under safeguards and with no evidence of any diversion of nuclear material
for non-peaceful uses. Nevertheless, the report reiterated that the IAEA
would not be able to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
program unless Iran adopted "transparency measures" which exceeded its
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safeguards agreement with the IAEA, since the IAEA does not verify the
absence of undeclared nuclear activities in any country unless the Additional
Protocol is in force.
With respect to the report, IAEA Director Mohammad ElBaradei stated that
"We have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including
the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment
programme" with the exception of a single issue, "and that is the alleged
weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past."
According to the report, Iran had increased the number of operating
centrifuges at its Fuel Enrichment Plant in Isfahan, and continued to enrich
uranium. Contrary to some media reports which claimed that Iran had
diverted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for a renewed nuclear weapons
program, the IAEA emphasized that all of the uranium hexafluoride was
under IAEA safeguards. This was re-iterated by IAEA spokesman Melissa
Fleming, who characterized the report of missing nuclear material in Iran as
being "fictitious". Iran was also asked to clarify information about foreignassistance it may have received in connection with a high explosive charge
suitable for an implosion type nuclear device. Iran stated that there had been
no such activities in Iran.
The IAEA also reported that it had held a series of meetings with Iranian
officials to resolve the outstanding issues including the "alleged studies" into
nuclear weaponization which were listed in the May 2008 IAEA report.During the course of these meetings, the Iranians filed a series of written
responses including a 117-page presentation which confirmed the partial
veracity of some of the allegations, but which asserted that the allegations as
a whole were based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data, and that
Iran had not actually received the documentation substantiating the
allegations. According to the August 2007 "Modalities Agreement" between
Iran and the IAEA, Iran had agreed to review and assess the "alleged
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studies" claims, as good faith gesture, "upon receiving all related
documents".
Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh, accused the United
States of preventing the IAEA from delivering the documents about the
alleged studies to Iran as required by the Modalities Agreement, and stated
that Iran had done its best to respond to the allegations but would not accept
"any request beyond our legal obligation and particularly beyond the Work
Plan, which we have already implemented."
While once again expressing "regret" that the IAEA was not able to provide
Iran with copies of the documentation concerning the alleged studies, the
report also urged Iran to provide the IAEA with "substantive information to
support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and
individuals" regarding the alleged studies, as a "matter of transparency". The
IAEA submitted a number of proposals to Iran to help resolve the allegations
and expressed a willingness to discuss modalities that could enable Iran to
demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation werenot nuclear-related, as Iran asserted, while protecting sensitive information
related to its conventional military activities. The report does not indicate
whether Iran accepted or rejected these proposals.
The report also reiterated that IAEA inspectors had found "no evidence on
the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a
nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or onrelated nuclear physics studies ... Nor has the Agency detected the actual use
of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies" but insisted that
the IAEA would not be able to formally verify the peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program unless Iran had agreed to adopt the requested "transparency
measures".
February 2010 Report
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In February 2010, the IAEA issued a report scolding Iran for failing to
explain purchases of sensitive technology as well as secret tests of high-
precision detonators and modified designs of missile cones to accommodate
larger payloads. Such experiments are closely associated with atomic
warheads.
May 2010 Report
In May 2010, the IAEA issued a report that Iran had declared production of
over 2.5 metric tons of low-enriched uranium, which would be enough if
further enriched to make two nuclear weapons, and that Iran has refused to
answer inspectors questions on a variety of activities, including what the
agency called the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.
In July 2010, Iran barred two IAEA inspectors from entering the country.
The IAEA rejected Iran's reasons for the ban and said it fully supported the
inspectors, which Tehran has accused of reporting wrongly that some
nuclear equipment was missing.
In August 2010, the IAEA said Iran has started using a second set of 164
centrifuges linked in a cascade, or string of machines, to enrich uranium to
up to 20% at its Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plan.
November 2011 Report
In November 2011 the IAEA released a report stating inspectors had found
credible evidence that Iran had been conducting experiments aimed at
designing a nuclear bomb until 2003, and research may have continued on a
lower rate since that time. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said evidence
gathered by the agency "indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant
to the development of a nuclear explosive device." Iran rejected IAEA's
findings as "unbalanced, unprofessional and prepared with politicalmotivation and under political pressure by mostly the United States." A
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number of Western analysts have pointed out that the IAEA report had been
widely misread by the media.
In November 2011, IAEA officials identified a "large explosive containment
vessel" inside Parchin. The IAEA later assessed that Iran has been
conducting experiments to develop nuclear weapons capability.
The IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution by a vote of 322 that
expressed "deep and increasing concern" over the possible military
dimensions to Iran's nuclear program and calling it "essential" that Iran
provide additional information and access to the IAEA. The United States
welcomed the resolution and said it would step up sanctions to press Iran to
change course. In response to the IAEA resolution, Iran threatened to reduce
its cooperation with the IAEA, though Iranian Foreign MinisterAli Akbar
Salehi played down talk of withdrawal from the NPT or the IAEA.
February 2012 report
On 24 February 2012, IAEA Director General Amano reported to the IAEA
Board of Governors that high-level IAEA delegations had met twice with
Iranian officials to intensify efforts to resolve outstanding issues, but that
major differences remained and Iran did not grant IAEA requests for access
to the Parchin site, where the IAEA believes high-explosives research
pertinent to nuclear weapons may have taken place. Iran dismissed the
IAEA's report on the possible military dimensions to its nuclear program asbased on "unfounded allegations." Amano called on Iran to agree to a
structure approach, based on IAEA verification practices, to resolve
outstanding issues. In March 2012, Iran said it would allow another
inspection at Parchin "when an agreement is made on a modality plan." Not
long after, it was reported that Iran might not consent to unfettered access.
An ISIS study of satellite imagery claimed to have identified an explosive
site at Parchin.
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The February IAEA report also described progress in Iran's enrichment and
fuel fabrication efforts, including a tripling of the number of cascades
enriching uranium to nearly 20% and testing of fuel elements for the Tehran
Research Reactor and the still incomplete IR-40 heavy water research
reactor. Though Iran was continuing to install thousands of additional
centrifuges, these were based on an erratic and outdated design, both in its
main enrichment plant at Natanz and in a smaller facility at Fordow buried
deep underground. "It appears that they are still struggling with the advanced
centrifuges," said Olli Heinonen, a former chief nuclear inspector for the
Vienna-based U.N. agency, while nuclear expert Mark Fitzpatrick pointed
out that Iran had been working on "second-generation models for over ten
years now and still can't put them into large-scale operation". Peter Crail and
Daryl G. Kimball of the Arms Control Organisation commented that the
report "does not identify any breakthroughs" and "confirms initial
impressions that Iran's announcements last week on a series of 'nuclear
advances' were hyped."
Chapter 4
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IRAN WORK ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Interviews and surveys show that the majority of Iranians in all groups favor
their country's nuclear program. Polls in 2008 showed that the vast majority
of Iranians want their country to develop nuclear energy, and 90% of
Iranians believe it is important (including 81% very important) for Iran "to
have a full fuel cycle nuclear program." Though Iranians are not Arab, Arab
publics in six countries also believe that Iran has the right to its nuclear
program and should not be pressured to stop that program. A poll in
September 2010 by the International Peace Institute found that 71 percent of
Iranians favored the development of nuclear weapons, a drastic hike over the
previous polls by the same agency. However, in July 2012, a poll on an
Iranian state-run media outlet found that 2/3 Iranians support suspending
uranium enrichment in return for a gradual easing of sanctions. Meir
Javedanfar, an Iranian-born commentator with the Middle East Economic
and Political Analysis Company, stated that while Iranians may want nuclear
energy, they don't want it at the price the government is willing to pay.
In explaining why it had left its enrichment program undeclared to the
IAEA, Iran said that for the past twenty-four years it has "been subject to the
most severe series of sanctions and export restrictions on material and
technology for peaceful nuclear technology," so that some elements of its
program had to be done discreetly. Iran said the U.S. intention "is nothing
but to make this deprivation" of Iran's inalienable right to enrichment
technology "final and eternal," and that the United States is completely silent
on Israel's nuclear enrichment and weapons program. Iran began its nuclear
research as early as 1975, when France cooperated with Iran to set up the
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) to provide training for
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personnel to develop certain nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Iran did not hide
other elements of its nuclear program. For example, its efforts at mining and
converting uranium were announced on national radio, and Iran also says
that in consultation with the Agency and member states throughout the
1990s it underlined its plans to acquire, for exclusively peaceful purposes,
fuel enrichment technology. Iran's contracts with other nations to obtain
nuclear reactors were also known to the IAEA but support for the contracts
was withdrawn after "a U.S. special national intelligence estimate declared
that while 'Iran's much publicized nuclear power intentions are entirely in the
planning stage,' the ambitions of the shah could lead Iran to pursue nuclear
weapons, especially in the shadow of India's successful nuclear test in May
1974". In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had failed to meet its obligations
to report some of its enrichment activities, which Iran says began in 1985, to
the IAEA as required by its safeguards agreement. The IAEA further
reported that Iran had undertaken to submit the required information for
agency verification and "to implement a policy of co-operation and fulltransparency" as corrective actions.
The Iranian government has repeatedly made compromise offers to place
strict limits on its nuclear program beyond what the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Additional Protocol legally require of Iran, in order to ensure that the
program cannot be secretly diverted to the manufacture of weapons. These
offers include operating Iran's nuclear program as an internationalconsortium, with the full participation of foreign governments. This offer by
the Iranians matched a proposed solution put forth by an IAEA expert
committee that was investigating the risk that civilian nuclear technologies
could be used to make bombs. Iran has also offered to renounce plutonium
extraction technology, thus ensuring that its heavy water reactor at Arak
cannot be used to make bombs either. More recently, the Iranians have
reportedly also offered to operate uranium centrifuges that automatically
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self-destruct if they are used to enrich uranium beyond what is required for
civilian purposes. However, despite offers of nuclear cooperation by the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, Iran has
refused to suspend its enrichment program as the Council has demanded.
Iran's representative asserted that dealing with the issue in the Security
Council was unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility
because its peaceful nuclear program posed no threat to international peace
and security, and, that it ran counter to the views of the majority of United
Nations Member States, which the Council was obliged to represent.
"They should know that the Iranian nation will not yield to pressure and will
not let its rights be trampled on," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
told a crowd 31 August 2006, in a televised speech in the northwestern
Iranian city ofOrumiyeh. In front of his strongest supporters in one of his
provincial power bases, the Iranian leader attacked what he called
"intimidation" by the United Nations, which he said was led by the United
States. Ahmadinejad criticised a White House rebuff of his offer for atelevised debate with President Bush. "They say they support dialog and the
free flow of information," he said. "But when debate was proposed, they
avoided and opposed it." Ahmadinejad said that sanctions "cannot dissuade
Iranians from their decision to make progress," according to Iran's state-run
IRNA news agency. "On the contrary, many of our successes, including
access to the nuclear fuel cycle and producing of heavy water, have beenachieved under sanctions."
Iran insists enrichment activities are intended for peaceful purposes, but
much of the West, including the United States, allege that Iran is pursuing
nuclear weapons, or a nuclear weapons "capability". The 31 August 2006,
deadline called for Iran to comply with UN Security Council Resolution
1696 and suspend its enrichment-related activities or face the possibility of
economic sanctions. The United States believes the council will agree to
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implement sanctions when high-level ministers reconvene in mid-September,
U.S. Undersecretary of StateNicholas Burns said. "We're sure going to work
toward that [sanctions] with a great deal of energy and determination
because this cannot go unanswered," Burns said. "The Iranians are obviously
proceeding with their nuclear research; they are doing things that the
International Atomic Energy Agency does not want them to do, the Security
Council doesn't want them to do. There has to be an international answer,
and we believe there will be one."
Iran asserts that there is no legal basis for Iran's referral to the United
Nations Security Council since the IAEA has not proven that previously
undeclared activities had a relationship to a weapons program, and that all
nuclear material in Iran (including material that may not have been declared)
had been accounted for and had not been diverted to military purposes.
Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute requires a report to the UN Security
Council for any safeguards noncompliance. The IAEA Board of Governors,
in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions, decided that "Iran'smany failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement" as reported by the IAEA in November 2003
constituted "non-compliance" under the terms of Article XII.C of IAEA
Statute.
Iran also minimizes the significance of the IAEA's inability to verify the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, arguing the IAEA hasonly drawn such conclusions in a subset of states that have ratified and
implemented the Additional Protocol. The IAEA has been able to verify the
non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but not the absence of
undeclared activities. According to the IAEA's Safeguards Statement for
2007, of the 82 states where both NPT safeguards and an Additional
Protocol are implemented, the IAEA had found no indication of undeclared
nuclear activity in 47 states, while evaluations of possible undeclared nuclear
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activity remained ongoing in 35 states. Iran ceased implementation of the
Additional Protocol and all other cooperation with the IAEA beyond that
required under its safeguards agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors
decided to report its safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council
in February 2006. Iran insisted that such cooperation had been "voluntary,"
but on 26 December 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1737,
invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which among other things required
Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, "beyond the formal requirements of
the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol." The IAEA reported on
19 November 2008, that, while it is "able to continue to verify the non-
diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran," it "has not been able to make
substantive progress" on "key remaining issues of serious concern" because
of a "lack of cooperation by Iran." Iran has maintained that the Security
Council's engagement in "the issue of the peaceful nuclear activities of the
Islamic Republic of Iran" are unlawful and malicio