Memories of Dai Do (Apr 2004) Marine Corps Gazette

Volume88,Issue4Author:WilliamWeise

Then:

Imagineyourselfasaninfantrybattalioncommanderwithlessthan700Marinesgoingtoetotoeagainst

abattle-hardenedenemydivisionofover7,000.Fairodds-right?Butwhatifyougotnoreinforcements?

Whatthen?FastenyourseatbeltsasthebattalioncommandertakesusonawildrideneartheCuaViet

Riverinearly1968.Thenarrativepicksuponthesecondnightofaction,asexcerptedfromtheoriginal

article(MCG,Sep87).

TheNightof1-2May;PredawnAttackbyEchoCompanyonDaiDoFollowedbyHotelCompanyAttackon

DinhTo,2May

MyconcernaboutGolfCompany,increasedgreatlyasitstartedtoreceiveenemyprobes.Totakethe

pressureoffGolf,IdecidedtolaunchEchoCompanyinapredawnattackonDaiDo.IorderedHotel

CompanytobepreparedtofollowEchoCompany.Echo'sattackwouldbenorthwestfromAnLac.Wehad

tomovequicklybecauseGolfCompany'ssituationgrewworsebythehour.Twolargeenemynightattacks

andseveralsmallprobeswerebeatenback.

ThethunderofGolf'sdefensivefiresmuffledthemovementofEchoCompanyasitcrossedthelineof

departureandmovedintothericepaddiestowardassaultpositionsjustsouthofDaiDovillage.Before

EchoCompanyreacheditsassaultpositions,theenemyopenedupwithheavyvolumesofsmallarmsand

mortarfire.Thetwoforward(assault)platoonsreceivedheavycasualtiesandlostforwardmomentum.

ButCaptLivingstonimmediatelycommittedhisreserveplatoon,personallyleadingitforwardto

penetratetheforwardenemydefensesandmovedwellintoDaiDo.Thefightingwasfurious.Although

twicewoundedbygrenadefragments,Livingstoncontinuedtomovewhereverrequiredtoencouragehis

menandtomaintainthemomentumoftheassault.Eachenemypositionhadtobelocated,pinneddown

byaccuratefire,blindedwithwhitephosphorous,anddestroyedbygrenades,flamethrowers,satchel

charges,andLAAWs(lightassaultantitankweapons).

Casualtieswereheavyastheassaultcontinuedforseveralhours.GolfCompanybrokeoutofitsperimeter

toassistEchoCompanyclearDaiDo.Finally,afterseveralhoursofheavyfightingandheavycasualties,

DaiDowassecured.

ColHulltoldmeitwasveryimportanttokeepthepressureontheenemy.Itoldhimthatwehadjust

aboutrunoutofsteam.Irecommendedthatseveralbattalionsbelandedabout10kilometersnorthof

DaiDo,attacksouth,anddrivetheenemyintoourpositions.Ialsorecommendedthattheothertwo

battalionsofthe3dMarinesbemovednorthoftheriverandplacedontheleftandrightof[Battalion

LandingTeam2/4](BLT2/4).BLT2/4,1stBattalion,3dMarines,and1stAmtracBattalionwouldforman

anvilagainstwhichtheheliliftednorthernbattalionswouldhammertheenemy.Ibelievedthatwecould

annihilateorcapturemostofthe320th[NorthVietnameseArmy](NVA)Division.

ColHulldidn'thavetheassetsorauthoritytocarryoutsuchaplan.Hecouldnotevenmovehisothertwo

battalionsfromtheirpositionswithoutpermission.Onlythecommandinggeneral,3dMarineDivision

couldreactinthemannerIsuggested.

LostopportunitiesnotwithstandingIstillhadtocarryoutmyorders:keeppressureontheenemy.Icalled

uponHotelCompany,orderingLtPrescotttopassthroughDaiDoandEchoCompany,attacknorth,guide

onthestreamtotheleft,andseizeDinhTo.*HotelcrossedthelineofdepartureonthenorthwestofDai

DoandenteredDinhTo,receivinglightenemysmallarmsfireintheprocess.Astheadvancecontinued,

enemyfireincreased,reinforcedwithmortars,rockets,andartillery.Aboutone-thirdthroughDinhTo,

theenemyfirebecamesogreatthatithaltedHotel'sassault.

RealizingthatEchoandHotelcouldnotholdtheirpositioninDinhTo,Itoldbothcompanycommanders

topullbacktoDaiDo.Atthispoint,CaptLivingstonwashitinbothlegsbymachinegunfire.Unableto

move,hewouldnotpermithimselftobedraggedtotherearuntilhewascertainthatallotherwounded

wereevacuated.

EchoandHotelCompaniesbroughtalltheirwoundedandwithdrewtoDaiDowheretheyformeda

perimeterundertheleadershipofMajWarren.Warrenhadearlierbroughtthemain[commandpost]CP

GroupforwardtothesouthernedgeofDaiDo.Woundedwereevacuated.EchoandHotelCompanies

wereresuppliedandreorganized.

Byafternoonon2May,BLT2/4wasweakenedbyheavycasualties,lossofkeyleaders,andfatiguefrom

morethantwodaysofheavyfighting.Equipmentcasualtieswerealsohigh.

Ididnothavemuchchoiceinselectingthecompaniesfortheafternoonattackof2May.Echo,Hotel,and

BravoCompaniesweredecimatedandunsuitableforoffensiveaction.GolfCompany,althoughdownto

about40effectives,including4officers,wasstillaviable,spiritedfightingoutfit,despiteits2-dayordeal.

TheonlyothercompanywasFoxtrot,thestrongestwithabout80effectives,including3officers.

AsIbriefedCaptVargasandFoxtrot'scompanycommanderonthenorthernedgeofDaiDo,wesaw

anotherraresight-largenumbersofenemytroopsintheopenfieldsnorthwestofDaiDo.Wecalledinair,

artillery,andmortarfire.Pilotsintheattackingaircraftwereecstaticatbeingabletostrafeandbomb

enemytroopsintheopen.

IorderedGolfCompanytoleadtheattack,followedcloselyintracebyFoxtrot.Theprincipaldirectionof

attackwasnorthwestfromDaiDo,throughDinhToandThuongDo,guidingonthestreamtoourleftand,

hopefully,maintainingcontactwiththe[ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam](ARVN)battalionmountedin

armoredpersonnelcarriers.Contactbetweenthetwobattalionswasfromlefttoright.Thismeantthat

theARVNbattalionwasresponsibleformaintainingcontactwithBLT2/4.FoxtrotCompany,following

closelybehindGolfCompany,wasresponsibleformaintainingcontactwithGolfandprovidingrear

securityforbothcompanies.

TheattackjumpedofffromDaiDoat1500,asplanned.GolfCompanymovedintoDinhTo.Exceptfor

occasionalsmallarmsfire,therewaslittleenemyopposition.Enemyfightingholesandbunkerswere

checkedoutastheassaultelementsmovedcautiouslyforward.CrossingtheopenareanorthwestofDinh

To,GolfCompanycameunderheavyenemyfirefromthefrontandrightflankasitenteredThuongDo.

Enemymortars,rockets,andartilleryaddedtothetempo.ItoldCaptVargastoholdupandordered

FoxtrotCompanyforward.ButFoxtrotcouldnotmove.Aftersomedelay,IlearnedthatFoxtrotCompany

waspinneddowninthericepaddieseastofDinhToandThuongDo.GolfCompany'srearwashangingin

theair,unprotected!

Aboutthesametime,approximately1700,webeganreceivingheavyautomaticweaponsfirefromthe

west(ourleftflank)wheretheARVNbattalionwassupposedtobe.Thenwesawtroopsmovingtoward

usfromacrossthestreamtoourleft.TheywereclearlyNorthVietnamesesoldiers.Wetried,

unsuccessfully,tocontacttheARVNbattalion.LaterwelearnedthattheARVNbattalionhadsimply

withdrawnwithouttellingus!Webegantoreceivelightsmallarmsfirefromourrearandrealizedthat

someenemyhadslippedinbehindus.Thingswerenotlookinggoodatall.Thenalargegroupofenemy

assaultedfromourfront.Simultaneously,heavyautomaticweaponsfirehitusfromourright(east)flank.

Thingsweregettingworse.

Desperatecircumstancesrequiredesperatemeasures.Vargascalledhistwoassaultunitsbackand

attemptedtodrawhiscompanyintoatightperimeter.Wecalledinartillerysoclosethattheshrapnel

landedamongus.Wecalledfornavalgunfiretoplasterourfrontandaskedforemergencyairsupport.

Severalhelicoptergunshipsresponded.Thefightingwascloseandviolent.EveryoneintheGolfCompany

andbattalioncommandgroupsfiredhisweapon.Therewereplentyoftargets,andwedroppedenemy

assaulttroopswithinafewyardsofourpositions.SgtMajMalnarblastedawaywithhis12-gaugeshotgun.

Eventheradiooperatorsfoughtbetweentransmissions.Theenemyfrontalattackwasfinallystopped,

butourlossesweregreat.BigJohnMalnarwaskilledbyarocketround.BothmyradiooperatorsandI

werewounded.AlloftheGolfCompanyradiooperatorswereeitherkilledorwounded.CaptVargaswas

painfullywounded(histhirdwoundinthreedaysandfifthinthreemonths)butmanagedtostayonhis

feetandcontrolthings-infact,hehelpedmovemepartofthewaytotherear.IorderedVargasto

withdraw.Hedid,bringingallthewounded.Itwasafightingwithdrawalbyfireandmaneuver,using

artilleryandhelicoptergunshipstoboxinourfrontandflanks.

IpassedcommandtoMajWarren,whostrengthenedtheperimeteratDaiDoandremainedincommand

ofBLT2/4untilrelievedbythebattalionexecutiveofficer(MajCharlesW.Knapp)thatevening.After

evacuatingthewoundedandreorganizingtheable-bodiedsurvivorsandreplacements,BLT2/4hadfour

riflecompanieswith1officerand40MarineseachattheperimeteratDaiDo.(BravoCompanyremnants

werelocatedatAnLac.)

ThereorganizedBLT2/4spentanactivenighton2-3May.Theperimeterreceivedsomelightprobesand

afewdozenenemymortarandartilleryrounds.Buttheheavyfightingwasover.

DaiDoinRetrospect

Someofficers,notawareoftheferocityofthefighting,haveaskedwhyBLT2/4sufferedsomany

casualties.Hereismyanswer:

*First,wewereattackingawell-trained,well-equipped,well-supportedenemyinexcellentfortified

positions.

*Second,BLT2/4waspiecemealedintothebattle.Whenthebattlebegan,theriflecompanieswere

spreadoutoverawidearea(one,EchoCompany,wasnotevenundermyoperationalcontrol).Ittooktoo

longtogaintherequiredauthoritytomoveeventhoseunitsundermydirectcontrol(GolfCompanyand

3dPlatoon,FoxtrotCompany).Withallfourriflecompaniesreadilyavailable,wecouldhaveseizedDaiDo

immediatelyafterHotelCompanyseizedDongHuan.ToretakeDaiDo,theenemywouldhavehadto

attacktwoorthreewell-dug-inriflecompanies.SubsequentattacksonDinhToandThuongDocouldhave

beenmadeadayearlierbystrongriflecompaniesratherthanbythepitifullyunderstrengthcompanies

wehadtouseon2May.

*Third,BLT2/4wasnotreinforcedduringthebattle,buttheenemycontinuedtoreinforcehisunitsand

toreplacehiscasualties.

*Fourth,abouthalfofourcasualtiesoccurredduringtheafternoonattackof2May.Duringthatattack,

theARVNbattaliononourleftflankwithdrewwithoutnoticeallowingtheenemytomoveinonthat

flank.

*Fifth,ifwehadmorefixed-wingairsupport,especiallyduringthefirst36hours,assaultingenemy

fortifiedpositionswouldhavebeenlesscostly.

*Sixth,weshouldhavebeenreinforcedwithatleast10tanks(wehadonly2)andanequalnumberof

ONTOS(wehadnone).Theheavyfirepower,greatermobility,andshockactionoftheseweaponssystems

wouldhavemadeourassaultsmorerapidandmuchmorepotent.

*Finally,thepossibilityexiststhatthe2dARVNRegiment,whichhadresponsibilityfortheDaiDo

complex,mighthavebeencollaboratingwiththeenemy.

Butdespitenumerousproblemsandpossibletreason,BLT2/4accomplisheditsmission.Asuperior

enemyforcewasdrivenfromtheriverbanks,andthevitalCuaVietandBoDieuRiverswereopenedto

traffic.

Howbadlywasthe320thNVADivisionhurtatDaiDo?I'mnotsure,butmuchofitsfightingeffectiveness

wasdestroyed.MajGenRaymondDavis,whobecamecommandinggeneral,3dMarineDivisionafterthe

battleofDaiDo,statedthatthedefeatofthe320thDivisionduringAugustthroughSeptember1968was

hastenedbythepunishmentittookduringAprilandMay.

IhaverefoughttheBatleofDaiDomanytimesinmymindandalwaysreturntothesameconclusion:We

accomplishedourmissionagainstgreatodds.Whatevertheenemyintendedtodo,hedidn't.Whatever

successwehadisatributetotheindividualMarine.Onceagain,IquoteLtVieTaylor,whosaysitwellfor

allofus:

IwaitedandwatchedthoseMarinesabouttogointobattle.Somewerestandingwatch,somereadied

equipment,somesleptorrested,butallwerequiet.Nonervousjabbering,nofalsebravado,nowhining,

nomelodramatics...theywereprofessionals.Mostwereteenagers;manyfarlessthanayearawayfrom

home;buttheywereseasonedbymonthsoffightingwithadeterminedenemy.Despitetheiryouthand

theirrelativelyshorttimeintheCorps,theywereaswillingandprofessionalasanyonewhoeverworea

uniform.Iwasproudtobeamongthem.

Now:

Inrecentcorrespondenceconcerningthebattle,BGenWeisestated,"Theoutstandingartilleryandnaval

gunfire(NGF)supportreallymadeabigdifference.Firefromour105mmand155mmhowitzerswas

continuousthroughoutthebattle.Iwastoldthatthe105satDongHafiredmorethan6,000rounds.Also,

inaninterviewin1999,LtGenTranVanQuan,thecommanderofallenemyforcesinthenortherntwo

provincesofSouthVietnamfrom1965-74,toldmethatMarineCorpsartillerycausedmoreNVA

casualtiesthanNGForair.In1987,then-MajGenDennisMurphy,whohadbeenS-3forColHull's3d

Marines,toldmethattheengineersburied1,568enemybodies3daysafterthebattle."

Intoday'sMarineCorpsespousingexpeditionarymaneuverwarfare,onewouldassumethecommand

andcontrolrestrictionsexperiencedby2/4simplywouldnotoccur.

SemperFidelis

*ForacloselookattheDinhTobattle,seeLtColVicTaylor's"StingofBattle"account,p.71.

William Weise July 2004 Marine Corps Gazette -Seemoreat:https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04/memories-dai-do#sthash.IxDe6kBE.dpuf DaiDoRemembered

*ThisletterreferstoLtCoIVieTaylor's"HotelCompany-DayThree,"(MCG,Apr04).Notmanypeopleknowthisaboutthen-2dLtVieTaylor,andhecertainlywouldnevertell,buthewasn'tsupposedtobepresentatthebattleofDaiDo.Whenthebattlestartedon30April1968,hewasaboardtheUSSIwojima(LPH2)recoveringfromwoundssufferedduringapreviousbattle(TaskForceKilo).Vieheardthemedevacchopperslandingontheflightdeckandhurriedtolearnwhatwasgoingon.alloftheinitialMarinecasualtieswerefromHotelCompany,sufferedduringtheafternoonassaultonDongHuan.Vieneverhesitated.Hescroungedarifle,flakjacket,helmet,andammoandjumpedaboardoneofthe"UglyAngels"H-34helicoptersreturningtopickupmorecasualties.Vie,ofcourse,neveraskedpermissionasheknewitwouldbedenied.HearrivedatDongHuanintimetohelpmoppingupandreconsolidation.

CaptJimWilliams,anoutstandingcompanycommanderandcombatleader,hadbeenseriouslywoundedandmedevacedduringtheDongHuanassault.

IstLtScottyPrescottassumedcommandofthebatteredbutstillfeistyHotelCompany.TwodayslaterScottywouldalsobewoundedandmedevaced,passingcommandto2dLtVieTaylorinthemidstofahorrendousfirelight.YoungVicTaylorwasmorethanequaltotask,andanumberofMarinesarealivetodaybecauseofhisbraveryandsuperbleadership.

ViedidallofthiswhilehewasAWOLfromsickbay!

God,wheredoestheCorpsgetmenlikehim?

BGenWilliamWeise,

USMC(Ret)-Seemoreat:https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/07/letters#sthash.LRx6IsBq.dpuf