Memories of Dai Do
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Memories of Dai Do (Apr 2004) Marine Corps Gazette Volume 88, Issue 4 Author: William Weise Then: Imagine yourself as an infantry battalion commander with less than 700 Marines going toe to toe against a battle-hardened enemy division of over 7,000. Fair odds-right? But what if you got no reinforcements? What then? Fasten your seat belts as the battalion commander takes us on a wild ride near the Cua Viet River in early 1968. The narrative picks up on the second night of action, as excerpted from the original article (MCG, Sep87). The Night of 1-2 May; Predawn Attack by Echo Company on Dai Do Followed by Hotel Company Attack on Dinh To, 2 May My concern about Golf Company, increased greatly as it started to receive enemy probes. To take the pressure off Golf, I decided to launch Echo Company in a predawn attack on Dai Do. I ordered Hotel Company to be prepared to follow Echo Company. Echo's attack would be northwest from An Lac. We had to move quickly because Golf Company's situation grew worse by the hour. Two large enemy night attacks and several small probes were beaten back. The thunder of Golf's defensive fires muffled the movement of Echo Company as it crossed the line of departure and moved into the rice paddies toward assault positions just south of Dai Do village. Before Echo Company reached its assault positions, the enemy opened up with heavy volumes of small arms and mortar fire. The two forward (assault) platoons received heavy casualties and lost forward momentum. But Capt Livingston immediately committed his reserve platoon, personally leading it forward to penetrate the forward enemy defenses and moved well into Dai Do. The fighting was furious. Although twice wounded by grenade fragments, Livingston continued to move wherever required to encourage his men and to maintain the momentum of the assault. Each enemy position had to be located, pinned down by accurate fire, blinded with white phosphorous, and destroyed by grenades, flamethrowers, satchel charges, and LAAWs (light assault antitank weapons). Casualties were heavy as the assault continued for several hours. Golf Company broke out of its perimeter to assist Echo Company clear Dai Do. Finally, after several hours of heavy fighting and heavy casualties, Dai Do was secured. Col Hull told me it was very important to keep the pressure on the enemy. I told him that we had just about run out of steam. I recommended that several battalions be landed about 10 kilometers north of Dai Do, attack south, and drive the enemy into our positions. I also recommended that the other two battalions of the 3d Marines be moved north of the river and placed on the left and right of [Battalion Landing Team 2/4] (BLT 2/4). BLT 2/4, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, and 1st Amtrac Battalion would form an
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Relive the battle of Dai Do on April 1970's,. The Vietnam charlies in the tree while our alpha warriors fought in the water.
Transcript of Memories of Dai Do
Memories of Dai Do (Apr 2004) Marine Corps Gazette
Volume88,Issue4Author:WilliamWeise
Then:
Imagineyourselfasaninfantrybattalioncommanderwithlessthan700Marinesgoingtoetotoeagainst
abattle-hardenedenemydivisionofover7,000.Fairodds-right?Butwhatifyougotnoreinforcements?
Whatthen?FastenyourseatbeltsasthebattalioncommandertakesusonawildrideneartheCuaViet
Riverinearly1968.Thenarrativepicksuponthesecondnightofaction,asexcerptedfromtheoriginal
article(MCG,Sep87).
TheNightof1-2May;PredawnAttackbyEchoCompanyonDaiDoFollowedbyHotelCompanyAttackon
DinhTo,2May
MyconcernaboutGolfCompany,increasedgreatlyasitstartedtoreceiveenemyprobes.Totakethe
pressureoffGolf,IdecidedtolaunchEchoCompanyinapredawnattackonDaiDo.IorderedHotel
CompanytobepreparedtofollowEchoCompany.Echo'sattackwouldbenorthwestfromAnLac.Wehad
tomovequicklybecauseGolfCompany'ssituationgrewworsebythehour.Twolargeenemynightattacks
andseveralsmallprobeswerebeatenback.
ThethunderofGolf'sdefensivefiresmuffledthemovementofEchoCompanyasitcrossedthelineof
departureandmovedintothericepaddiestowardassaultpositionsjustsouthofDaiDovillage.Before
EchoCompanyreacheditsassaultpositions,theenemyopenedupwithheavyvolumesofsmallarmsand
mortarfire.Thetwoforward(assault)platoonsreceivedheavycasualtiesandlostforwardmomentum.
ButCaptLivingstonimmediatelycommittedhisreserveplatoon,personallyleadingitforwardto
penetratetheforwardenemydefensesandmovedwellintoDaiDo.Thefightingwasfurious.Although
twicewoundedbygrenadefragments,Livingstoncontinuedtomovewhereverrequiredtoencouragehis
menandtomaintainthemomentumoftheassault.Eachenemypositionhadtobelocated,pinneddown
byaccuratefire,blindedwithwhitephosphorous,anddestroyedbygrenades,flamethrowers,satchel
charges,andLAAWs(lightassaultantitankweapons).
Casualtieswereheavyastheassaultcontinuedforseveralhours.GolfCompanybrokeoutofitsperimeter
toassistEchoCompanyclearDaiDo.Finally,afterseveralhoursofheavyfightingandheavycasualties,
DaiDowassecured.
ColHulltoldmeitwasveryimportanttokeepthepressureontheenemy.Itoldhimthatwehadjust
aboutrunoutofsteam.Irecommendedthatseveralbattalionsbelandedabout10kilometersnorthof
DaiDo,attacksouth,anddrivetheenemyintoourpositions.Ialsorecommendedthattheothertwo
battalionsofthe3dMarinesbemovednorthoftheriverandplacedontheleftandrightof[Battalion
LandingTeam2/4](BLT2/4).BLT2/4,1stBattalion,3dMarines,and1stAmtracBattalionwouldforman
anvilagainstwhichtheheliliftednorthernbattalionswouldhammertheenemy.Ibelievedthatwecould
annihilateorcapturemostofthe320th[NorthVietnameseArmy](NVA)Division.
ColHulldidn'thavetheassetsorauthoritytocarryoutsuchaplan.Hecouldnotevenmovehisothertwo
battalionsfromtheirpositionswithoutpermission.Onlythecommandinggeneral,3dMarineDivision
couldreactinthemannerIsuggested.
LostopportunitiesnotwithstandingIstillhadtocarryoutmyorders:keeppressureontheenemy.Icalled
uponHotelCompany,orderingLtPrescotttopassthroughDaiDoandEchoCompany,attacknorth,guide
onthestreamtotheleft,andseizeDinhTo.*HotelcrossedthelineofdepartureonthenorthwestofDai
DoandenteredDinhTo,receivinglightenemysmallarmsfireintheprocess.Astheadvancecontinued,
enemyfireincreased,reinforcedwithmortars,rockets,andartillery.Aboutone-thirdthroughDinhTo,
theenemyfirebecamesogreatthatithaltedHotel'sassault.
RealizingthatEchoandHotelcouldnotholdtheirpositioninDinhTo,Itoldbothcompanycommanders
topullbacktoDaiDo.Atthispoint,CaptLivingstonwashitinbothlegsbymachinegunfire.Unableto
move,hewouldnotpermithimselftobedraggedtotherearuntilhewascertainthatallotherwounded
wereevacuated.
EchoandHotelCompaniesbroughtalltheirwoundedandwithdrewtoDaiDowheretheyformeda
perimeterundertheleadershipofMajWarren.Warrenhadearlierbroughtthemain[commandpost]CP
GroupforwardtothesouthernedgeofDaiDo.Woundedwereevacuated.EchoandHotelCompanies
wereresuppliedandreorganized.
Byafternoonon2May,BLT2/4wasweakenedbyheavycasualties,lossofkeyleaders,andfatiguefrom
morethantwodaysofheavyfighting.Equipmentcasualtieswerealsohigh.
Ididnothavemuchchoiceinselectingthecompaniesfortheafternoonattackof2May.Echo,Hotel,and
BravoCompaniesweredecimatedandunsuitableforoffensiveaction.GolfCompany,althoughdownto
about40effectives,including4officers,wasstillaviable,spiritedfightingoutfit,despiteits2-dayordeal.
TheonlyothercompanywasFoxtrot,thestrongestwithabout80effectives,including3officers.
AsIbriefedCaptVargasandFoxtrot'scompanycommanderonthenorthernedgeofDaiDo,wesaw
anotherraresight-largenumbersofenemytroopsintheopenfieldsnorthwestofDaiDo.Wecalledinair,
artillery,andmortarfire.Pilotsintheattackingaircraftwereecstaticatbeingabletostrafeandbomb
enemytroopsintheopen.
IorderedGolfCompanytoleadtheattack,followedcloselyintracebyFoxtrot.Theprincipaldirectionof
attackwasnorthwestfromDaiDo,throughDinhToandThuongDo,guidingonthestreamtoourleftand,
hopefully,maintainingcontactwiththe[ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam](ARVN)battalionmountedin
armoredpersonnelcarriers.Contactbetweenthetwobattalionswasfromlefttoright.Thismeantthat
theARVNbattalionwasresponsibleformaintainingcontactwithBLT2/4.FoxtrotCompany,following
closelybehindGolfCompany,wasresponsibleformaintainingcontactwithGolfandprovidingrear
securityforbothcompanies.
TheattackjumpedofffromDaiDoat1500,asplanned.GolfCompanymovedintoDinhTo.Exceptfor
occasionalsmallarmsfire,therewaslittleenemyopposition.Enemyfightingholesandbunkerswere
checkedoutastheassaultelementsmovedcautiouslyforward.CrossingtheopenareanorthwestofDinh
To,GolfCompanycameunderheavyenemyfirefromthefrontandrightflankasitenteredThuongDo.
Enemymortars,rockets,andartilleryaddedtothetempo.ItoldCaptVargastoholdupandordered
FoxtrotCompanyforward.ButFoxtrotcouldnotmove.Aftersomedelay,IlearnedthatFoxtrotCompany
waspinneddowninthericepaddieseastofDinhToandThuongDo.GolfCompany'srearwashangingin
theair,unprotected!
Aboutthesametime,approximately1700,webeganreceivingheavyautomaticweaponsfirefromthe
west(ourleftflank)wheretheARVNbattalionwassupposedtobe.Thenwesawtroopsmovingtoward
usfromacrossthestreamtoourleft.TheywereclearlyNorthVietnamesesoldiers.Wetried,
unsuccessfully,tocontacttheARVNbattalion.LaterwelearnedthattheARVNbattalionhadsimply
withdrawnwithouttellingus!Webegantoreceivelightsmallarmsfirefromourrearandrealizedthat
someenemyhadslippedinbehindus.Thingswerenotlookinggoodatall.Thenalargegroupofenemy
assaultedfromourfront.Simultaneously,heavyautomaticweaponsfirehitusfromourright(east)flank.
Thingsweregettingworse.
Desperatecircumstancesrequiredesperatemeasures.Vargascalledhistwoassaultunitsbackand
attemptedtodrawhiscompanyintoatightperimeter.Wecalledinartillerysoclosethattheshrapnel
landedamongus.Wecalledfornavalgunfiretoplasterourfrontandaskedforemergencyairsupport.
Severalhelicoptergunshipsresponded.Thefightingwascloseandviolent.EveryoneintheGolfCompany
andbattalioncommandgroupsfiredhisweapon.Therewereplentyoftargets,andwedroppedenemy
assaulttroopswithinafewyardsofourpositions.SgtMajMalnarblastedawaywithhis12-gaugeshotgun.
Eventheradiooperatorsfoughtbetweentransmissions.Theenemyfrontalattackwasfinallystopped,
butourlossesweregreat.BigJohnMalnarwaskilledbyarocketround.BothmyradiooperatorsandI
werewounded.AlloftheGolfCompanyradiooperatorswereeitherkilledorwounded.CaptVargaswas
painfullywounded(histhirdwoundinthreedaysandfifthinthreemonths)butmanagedtostayonhis
feetandcontrolthings-infact,hehelpedmovemepartofthewaytotherear.IorderedVargasto
withdraw.Hedid,bringingallthewounded.Itwasafightingwithdrawalbyfireandmaneuver,using
artilleryandhelicoptergunshipstoboxinourfrontandflanks.
IpassedcommandtoMajWarren,whostrengthenedtheperimeteratDaiDoandremainedincommand
ofBLT2/4untilrelievedbythebattalionexecutiveofficer(MajCharlesW.Knapp)thatevening.After
evacuatingthewoundedandreorganizingtheable-bodiedsurvivorsandreplacements,BLT2/4hadfour
riflecompanieswith1officerand40MarineseachattheperimeteratDaiDo.(BravoCompanyremnants
werelocatedatAnLac.)
ThereorganizedBLT2/4spentanactivenighton2-3May.Theperimeterreceivedsomelightprobesand
afewdozenenemymortarandartilleryrounds.Buttheheavyfightingwasover.
DaiDoinRetrospect
Someofficers,notawareoftheferocityofthefighting,haveaskedwhyBLT2/4sufferedsomany
casualties.Hereismyanswer:
*First,wewereattackingawell-trained,well-equipped,well-supportedenemyinexcellentfortified
positions.
*Second,BLT2/4waspiecemealedintothebattle.Whenthebattlebegan,theriflecompanieswere
spreadoutoverawidearea(one,EchoCompany,wasnotevenundermyoperationalcontrol).Ittooktoo
longtogaintherequiredauthoritytomoveeventhoseunitsundermydirectcontrol(GolfCompanyand
3dPlatoon,FoxtrotCompany).Withallfourriflecompaniesreadilyavailable,wecouldhaveseizedDaiDo
immediatelyafterHotelCompanyseizedDongHuan.ToretakeDaiDo,theenemywouldhavehadto
attacktwoorthreewell-dug-inriflecompanies.SubsequentattacksonDinhToandThuongDocouldhave
beenmadeadayearlierbystrongriflecompaniesratherthanbythepitifullyunderstrengthcompanies
wehadtouseon2May.
*Third,BLT2/4wasnotreinforcedduringthebattle,buttheenemycontinuedtoreinforcehisunitsand
toreplacehiscasualties.
*Fourth,abouthalfofourcasualtiesoccurredduringtheafternoonattackof2May.Duringthatattack,
theARVNbattaliononourleftflankwithdrewwithoutnoticeallowingtheenemytomoveinonthat
flank.
*Fifth,ifwehadmorefixed-wingairsupport,especiallyduringthefirst36hours,assaultingenemy
fortifiedpositionswouldhavebeenlesscostly.
*Sixth,weshouldhavebeenreinforcedwithatleast10tanks(wehadonly2)andanequalnumberof
ONTOS(wehadnone).Theheavyfirepower,greatermobility,andshockactionoftheseweaponssystems
wouldhavemadeourassaultsmorerapidandmuchmorepotent.
*Finally,thepossibilityexiststhatthe2dARVNRegiment,whichhadresponsibilityfortheDaiDo
complex,mighthavebeencollaboratingwiththeenemy.
Butdespitenumerousproblemsandpossibletreason,BLT2/4accomplisheditsmission.Asuperior
enemyforcewasdrivenfromtheriverbanks,andthevitalCuaVietandBoDieuRiverswereopenedto
traffic.
Howbadlywasthe320thNVADivisionhurtatDaiDo?I'mnotsure,butmuchofitsfightingeffectiveness
wasdestroyed.MajGenRaymondDavis,whobecamecommandinggeneral,3dMarineDivisionafterthe
battleofDaiDo,statedthatthedefeatofthe320thDivisionduringAugustthroughSeptember1968was
hastenedbythepunishmentittookduringAprilandMay.
IhaverefoughttheBatleofDaiDomanytimesinmymindandalwaysreturntothesameconclusion:We
accomplishedourmissionagainstgreatodds.Whatevertheenemyintendedtodo,hedidn't.Whatever
successwehadisatributetotheindividualMarine.Onceagain,IquoteLtVieTaylor,whosaysitwellfor
allofus:
IwaitedandwatchedthoseMarinesabouttogointobattle.Somewerestandingwatch,somereadied
equipment,somesleptorrested,butallwerequiet.Nonervousjabbering,nofalsebravado,nowhining,
nomelodramatics...theywereprofessionals.Mostwereteenagers;manyfarlessthanayearawayfrom
home;buttheywereseasonedbymonthsoffightingwithadeterminedenemy.Despitetheiryouthand
theirrelativelyshorttimeintheCorps,theywereaswillingandprofessionalasanyonewhoeverworea
uniform.Iwasproudtobeamongthem.
Now:
Inrecentcorrespondenceconcerningthebattle,BGenWeisestated,"Theoutstandingartilleryandnaval
gunfire(NGF)supportreallymadeabigdifference.Firefromour105mmand155mmhowitzerswas
continuousthroughoutthebattle.Iwastoldthatthe105satDongHafiredmorethan6,000rounds.Also,
inaninterviewin1999,LtGenTranVanQuan,thecommanderofallenemyforcesinthenortherntwo
provincesofSouthVietnamfrom1965-74,toldmethatMarineCorpsartillerycausedmoreNVA
casualtiesthanNGForair.In1987,then-MajGenDennisMurphy,whohadbeenS-3forColHull's3d
Marines,toldmethattheengineersburied1,568enemybodies3daysafterthebattle."
Intoday'sMarineCorpsespousingexpeditionarymaneuverwarfare,onewouldassumethecommand
andcontrolrestrictionsexperiencedby2/4simplywouldnotoccur.
SemperFidelis
*ForacloselookattheDinhTobattle,seeLtColVicTaylor's"StingofBattle"account,p.71.
William Weise July 2004 Marine Corps Gazette -Seemoreat:https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04/memories-dai-do#sthash.IxDe6kBE.dpuf DaiDoRemembered
*ThisletterreferstoLtCoIVieTaylor's"HotelCompany-DayThree,"(MCG,Apr04).Notmanypeopleknowthisaboutthen-2dLtVieTaylor,andhecertainlywouldnevertell,buthewasn'tsupposedtobepresentatthebattleofDaiDo.Whenthebattlestartedon30April1968,hewasaboardtheUSSIwojima(LPH2)recoveringfromwoundssufferedduringapreviousbattle(TaskForceKilo).Vieheardthemedevacchopperslandingontheflightdeckandhurriedtolearnwhatwasgoingon.alloftheinitialMarinecasualtieswerefromHotelCompany,sufferedduringtheafternoonassaultonDongHuan.Vieneverhesitated.Hescroungedarifle,flakjacket,helmet,andammoandjumpedaboardoneofthe"UglyAngels"H-34helicoptersreturningtopickupmorecasualties.Vie,ofcourse,neveraskedpermissionasheknewitwouldbedenied.HearrivedatDongHuanintimetohelpmoppingupandreconsolidation.
CaptJimWilliams,anoutstandingcompanycommanderandcombatleader,hadbeenseriouslywoundedandmedevacedduringtheDongHuanassault.
IstLtScottyPrescottassumedcommandofthebatteredbutstillfeistyHotelCompany.TwodayslaterScottywouldalsobewoundedandmedevaced,passingcommandto2dLtVieTaylorinthemidstofahorrendousfirelight.YoungVicTaylorwasmorethanequaltotask,andanumberofMarinesarealivetodaybecauseofhisbraveryandsuperbleadership.
ViedidallofthiswhilehewasAWOLfromsickbay!
God,wheredoestheCorpsgetmenlikehim?
BGenWilliamWeise,
USMC(Ret)-Seemoreat:https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/07/letters#sthash.LRx6IsBq.dpuf
