Las Cajitas de Fósforo: The Solanda Housing...

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LasCajitasdeFósforo:TheSolandaHousingProject

ValeriaVidal1+FrancisGoyes2 1MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology-MIT,SIGUS,Cambridge,MA,valeriav@mit.edu 2MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology-MIT,CenterforAdvancedUrbanism,SIGUS,Cambridge,MA,fgoyes@mit.edu KEYIMAGE

Photo credit: Gabriel Muñoz Moreno

ABSTRACTIn1980,theEcuadoriangovernmentlauncheditsfirsteffortattheprovisionoflarge-scaleaffordablehousingwiththeSolandaHousingProjectinthecountry’scapitalcityofQuito.Consistingof6,211housingunits,Solandaisthelargestaffordablehousingprojectinthecountry’shistory.TheunprecedentedinitiativebroughtforthfourmaininnovationstotheprovisionofaffordablehousinginEcuador:introductionofincrementalhousingmodels,public-privatepartnerships,comprehensivecommunitydevelopmentprograms,andinstitutionalreformsforhousingregulations. Inadditiontoanalyzingthesefourinnovations,thispaperevaluatesthesuccessesandfailuresoftheSolandaHousingProjectthroughthefourmainstakeholders’pointofview:MunicipalityofQuito,EcuadorianHousingBank,UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),andFoundationMarianadeJesús.Additionally,weincludefindings

fromstructuredlongitudinalinterviewswithfamiliesthathavelivedinSolandaandhavecontributedtoitsevolutionforthepast35years.Intheanalysisoftheprojectthroughthesefiveperspectives,weprovideaglimpseattherichhistoryanddevelopmentofSolanda. Bycontemplatingtheinnovationsofthisseminalproject,weintendtodrawlessonsforthefutureofaffordablehousingprovisioninEcuador.Asanincrementalhousingexperiment,theevolutionofSolandaisalsoacelebrationofwhatpeoplearecapableofdesigning,financingandbuilding.OurresearchdoesnotonlyaimtoevaluatetheSolandaproject,butalsolearnfromtheexperienceoffamiliesforthepast35yearstoidentifypositiveandnegativepoliciesthatadvanceordeteraffordablehousingstrategiestoday.

KEYWORDS incremental,large-scale,affordablehousing,housingpolicies,Quito,Ecuador AUTHORBIOGRAPHY: ValeriaVidalisasummerfellowatDalbergGlobalDevelopmentAdvisorsbasedinNewYorkCityandaresearchassistantattheSpecialInterestGroupofUrbanSettlementduringtheschoolyear.ShehasworkedforHarvardLawSchool,theUnitedNationsandthePrimeMinisterofPeruduringthelastfewyears.Additionally,ValeriahasexperienceacrossdifferentsectorsofdevelopmentinLatinAmerica,AsiaandAfrica. FrancisGoyesisanarchitectfromQuito,Ecuador.SheiscurrentlyworkingfortheMunicipalityofQuitoforthedevelopmentofaninformalhousingregularizationpolicy.DuringtheacademicyearsheisaresearchassistantatMIT’sCenterforAdvancedUrbanismandtheResilientCityHousingInitiative,specificallyfocusingonappliedresearchforaffordablehousingprojectsandpolicyinLatinAmerica.ShehascollaboratedinavarietyofprojectsinMexico,Ecuador,Guyana,Jordan,India,andtheUnitedStates.

Introduction

TheSolandaHousingProjectwastheEcuadoriangovernment’sfirsteffortto

constructlow-incomehousingwithcostrecovery.Itwasdesignedtobeanintegrated

shelterandurbanprojectcomprisingofaninitial4,500low-costhousingunits(ultimately

6,211werebuilt),complimentarybasicandsocialinfrastructure,employmentprograms

foreconomicproductivity,andthecreationofcommunityorganizations.Theprojectwas

developedon1,581,33m²oflandthathadpreviouslyservedasthehaciendaofoneofthe

city’swealthiestfamilies.1

Theprojectwasexecutedthroughapartnershipbetweenfivemainstakeholders:

theMunicipalityofQuito,BancoEcuatorianodelaVivienda-BEV(EcuadorHousingBank),

JuntaNacionaldelaVivienda–JNV(NationalHousingBoard),FundaciónMarianadeJesús

–FMJ,andtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment-USAID.Thehousing

unitsweredesignedtobeaffordabletofamiliesbelowthemedianincomeatthetime 1 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 1.

($233permonth)butbeyondthecapacityoffamiliesearningbelowthe35thpercentile.2

Thereweresixdifferentlow-costincrementalhousingdesignmodels,whichwerechosen

byrecipientfamiliesonaneeds-basis.

Thirty-fiveyearslater,weevaluatethesuccessandfailuresofEcuador’sfirsteffort

attheprovisionofaffordablehousingthattranscendgoesbeyondthestandardevaluation

ofprogressofthebuiltenvironment.Assuch,Solandaservesasacasestudyfor

understandingthesuccessesandfailuresofsiteandservicesprojects,constrictedtothe

underlyingpoliticalandsocio-economicfactorsofitscontext.

MainText Solanda’sFourInnovations

Introductionofofficialincrementalhousingmodel

WhilearchitecturaldesignsfortheSolandahousingunitsexistedasearlyas1980,

modelswerealteredduetotheriseinconstructionmaterialsandlaborcostscausedby

monetaryinflation.3Ultimately,sixdifferenthousingmodelswithvaryingflexibilityfor

incrementalgrowthwerebuiltonlotsizesrangingfrom60m2to123m2:4

1.SanitaryUnit-mostbasichousingmodel,with10m2ofconstructionconsistingof

abathroomandkitchenona60m2lot.

2.Piso-TechoUnit(floor-roof)-builtonlotsrangingfrom60m2to80m2;includeda

bathroom,kitchen,andmulti-purposespacewithnoexteriorwallsbutcovered

withacementroof.

3+4.BasicUnit-includedpriorcomponents,withtheadditionofexteriorwalls

madefrombricks.Thisunitcamewithtworoofvariations:concreteslaband

corrugatedplasticroof.

5.Tri-familyUnit-threeapartments,oneonthefirstfloorwiththeopportunityfor

acommercialstore,asecondfloorapartment,andacontiguoustwo-floor

apartment.Thismodelwasbuiltonthecornersofsquarestopromote

commercialactivity.

2 GAO/NSIAD, The Solanda Housing Guaranty Project in Ecuador (1986), 7. 3 GAO/NSIAD, The Solanda Housing Guaranty Project in Ecuador (1986), 11. 4 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), Annex C, 5.

6.BridgeUnit-leastpopularmodel,createdoverpedestrianwalkwaysand

includedabathroom,kitchenandmulti-purposeroom.5

In2005,over98%ofallthehousingunitshadexpandedbyatleastonefloor,58%

ofhouseholdshadaddedtwofloors,and25%hadaddedthreefloors.6Theestimated

constructedareaincreasedfrom223,259m2to601,416m2,representingatotalbuildoutof

169%.Furthermore,althoughonlythe‘Tri-FamilyUnit’modelwasdesignedfor

commercialactivity,itisestimatedthatover40%ofbuildingshaveabusinessthatiseither

ranbythehomeownersorrented.7Finally,over20%offamiliesrentbetweenoneandfour

roomstothirdparties,significantlyincreasingaffordablerentalunitsintheneighborhood

andcontributingtothemarketsupplyofhousinginQuito.8

Public-PrivatePartnership

TheSolandaProjectwasdesignedwiththeparticipationoffiveinstitutions:the

BancoEcuatorianodeVivienda-BEV(EcuadorianHousingBank),JuntaNacionaldela

Vivienda-JNV(NationalHousingBoard),MunicipalityofQuito,UnitedStatesAgencyfor

InternationalDevelopment-USAID,andtheprivatelyownedFoundationMarianadeJesús

-FMJ.Eachorganizationwaschargedwithfulfillingaseparaterole.TheMunicipalityof

Quitopresidedoverbasicserviceprovision,BEVwasresponsibleforcreatingcost-

recoverypolicies,JNVproducedconstructionmaterials,constructedthehousingunits,

basic,andsocialinfrastructure,USAIDmanagedcontractsforhousing,communityfacilities

andpublictransportation,andFMJdonatedthelandfortheprojectanddevelopedproject’s

socialinfrastructureandprograms.9

Throughthiscollaboration,theprojectaimedtoexertpolitical,procedural,and

institutionalchangesatnationalandlocallevels.Thepartnershipintendedtoimprove

urbandevelopmentintegrationacrosspublicandprivatesectors,withcoordination

improvingtechnicalandfinancialaspectsofprojectdevelopmentthatwouldhave

otherwisebeenimpossible.AsgovernmentalorganizationsreceivedadvicefromUSAID

5 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), Annex C, 6-7. 6 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 4. 7 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 5. 8 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 10. 9 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 28.

consultantsnationalinstitutionalcapacitywasheightened,includingstrengtheningpolicies

foraffordablehousingunitsforlow-incomefamiliesandoverhaulingtechnological

deficienciesingovernmentalprocesses.10

Comprehensivecommunitydevelopment

TheintegratedapproachoftheSolandaProjectcomprisedcommunitydevelopment

programsandsocialinfrastructuretobedevelopedandmanagedbybothpublicand

privateorganizations.Includedinthecommunitydevelopmentprogramswerethecreation

ofneighborhoodassociationsaswellassupportforlocalbusinesscreation.11FJMwas

primarilyinchargeofpromotingandmanagingsuchprogramsuntil1998,whenthese

programsweretransferredtoalocalchurchwithinSolanda.12

PlannedsocialinfrastructureforSolandaconsistedofaday-carecenter,

kindergarten,primaryschool,recreationalfacilities,commercialcenter,andacommunity

spaceforevery1,100families.13Largercommunityfacilitiesincludedahealthclinic,boys’

highschool,culturalcenter,sportsareas,administrativecenter,andlargercommunity-

ownedenterprises.14Asof2005thereweremorethan18daycarecenters,kindergartens

andprimaryschools,eighthighschools,oneadulteducationcenter,twochurches,four

communitycenters,fourhealthcenters,apoliceoffice,afirestation,andapostoffice.15

Publicandrecreationalspacesnowincludealinearnaturepark,neighborhoodstadium,

numerousfootballfields,andrecreationalspaces..

Amajorcommercialstreet,‘LaJota’,organicallydevelopedononeofthemajor

arteriesdividingthesuper-blocks,withstoresrangingfromclothingsupplytobanking

officesandpopularfastfoodchainsopenedpastmidnight.Currently,rentingacommercial

spacein‘LaJota’cancostupto$1,000permonth.Therearetwolargesupermarketchain

storeswithinSolandaandoneofQuito’slargestwholesalemarketsisadjacenttothe

project.ThroughinterviewswithSolandahouseholdswelearnedthataconcernishowthe

10 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 37. 11 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 31. 12 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, May 14, 2016. 13 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 32. 14 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 32. 15 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 2.

presenceofthesupermarketsdrivesbusinessawayfromsmallfamily-ownedstoresin

Solanda.

Institutionalreformsofhousingregulations

Initially,theplanforSolandadesignedbyFMJcalledforcompleteaffordable

housingunitsonlotsover100m2.16Throughnegotiations,USAIDwasabletoconvinceFMJ

andotherpartneringinstitutionstoacceptlowerstandardsforbothhousingandbasic

infrastructure.17Bymodifyingexistingzoninglawstoallowforsmallerlotsizesand

varyingincrementalhousingmodels,6,211unitswerecreatedinsteadofthe4,500that

werefirstplannedforacomparableinvestment.18

Thereductionoflotsizesisinpartthereasonforthetremendousbuildoutin

Solandaduringthelastthirty-fiveyears.Thishasledtostreetlightpolesabsorbedby

houseexpansions,upwardself-builtfloorsofadjacenthouseswithincentimetersof

distancefromeachother,andentirewebsofelectricallinesrunningarray.Additionally,

reducedparkingsuggestedbyUSAIDhascausedsignificantissues,asover40%ofSolanda

residentshaveavehicleandtherearenotenoughspaces,leadingmanyhouseholdsto

encroachoninternalblockgardens.19

LessonsLearned

Thirty-fiveyearsaftertheimplementationoftheSolandaproject,weconducted

interviewswithrepresentativesofthefivemainstakeholderstoreflectonsuccessesand

failuresfromtheirpointsofviews.TheMunicipalityofQuitoseesSolandaasapositive

exampleofintegratedurbanplanninginresponsetoaffordablehousingdeficitinthecity.

However,theybelievethesuccessofSolandawasduetoaveryspecificpoliticalcontext

thatcouldnotbeeasilyreplicatedinthepresenttime,asin1993theEcuadorianState

shiftedfromdirectlysupplyinghousingtoprovidingfinancingmechanismsforlow-income

familiesseekingtobuyahouse.20TheMunicipalitycitedthatmoreattentionhadtobepaid

16 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, December 2015. 17 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 37. 18 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 1. 19 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 10. 20 Guzmán, Alberto, Breves reseñas de las últimas décadas de las políticas de vivienda de Ecuador (2007).

totheincrementalexpansionofhousessoastopreventprecariousinfrastructurefrom

builtout.21

AninterviewwithaformerrepresentativeoftheEcuadorianHousingBankatthe

timeoftheSolandaprojectandconsultationswithhomeownershaveprovedthatthe

financingconditionsprovidedwereoverallpositiveforlow-incomefamilies.22Anintegral

elementofsuccessforcurrentdebt-freeownerswasadebt-forgivenessprogram

introducedbythen-PresidentRodrigoBorja.Thisprogramgavetheoptiontohomeowners

topayaconsiderableone-timepaymentfortheforgivenessoftherestoftheloanowned.23

InthecaseofFundaciónMarianadeJesús,long-termsustainabilityofthesocial

programswithinSolandaremainsakeyissue.WhileFMJwasinitiallyresponsibleforthe

creationandprovisionofsuchprograms,alocalchurchhasnowtakenonthetasksto

upholdthecommunity’ssocialneeds,whichhaveevolvedsincethestartoftheproject.The

transitionfromFMJtoalocalchurchisworthhighlightingasapossibleapproachtosocial

programs’sustainabilityinsimilarprojects.24

Frominterviewswithoriginalhouseowners,wecanconcludethattheirgeneral

consensusisthattheSolandaProjectwasandcontinuestobeasuccess.Nevertheless,

therearesomereservationsabouttwoissuesthathaveresultedfrombothhumanand

economicgrowthinthecommunityinthepastfewyears.Thefirstistheconversionofthe

smallsquaregardensinthemiddleofthehousingblocksintoparkinglots.Thesespaces

havebeenadaptedbyhouseholdsastheireconomicmeanshaveincreasedtoamiddle-

incomeclassthatvaluesprivateownershipofcars

Secondly,manycommunitymembersmentionedtheissueofinsecuritywhichin

theirviewispromptedbytheinfluxofrentersfromboththecityanditssurroundings.Itis

perceivedthatnewresidentsaretoblameforrobberiesandincreaseddrugusewithin

Solanda.Thesetypeofchangeswithinacommunitycanpotentiallydisruptcommunity

cohesionandtrust,asisthecaseinSolanda.Whilemanyoriginalhomeownersexpanded

theirhousestoprovideaspacefortheirchildren’sfuturefamilies,therewereothercases

wherefamiliesdecidedtomovetoanotherpartofthecityandrentthehouse.Residents 21 Rosa Elena Donoso (advisor to Quito’s Secretaría de Territorio, Hábitat, y Vivienda) in discussion with the authors, May 2016. 22 Arq. José Ordoñez Villacreses (Instituto Metropolitano de Planificación Urbana) in discussion with the authors, December 2015. 23 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, December 2015. 24 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, May 2016.

alsobelieveSolandahasbecomeadesirablelocationtolivein,creatinganopportunityfor

familiestomakeprofitfromrentingapartmentsaswellasspaceforcommercialactivities.

WeforecastthattherealestatemarketinSolandawillonlyincreaseinthefutureduetothe

creationofasubwaystationinthecenteroftheneighborhoodthatwillimprove

accessibilitytoandfromtheNorthofQuito.

Lastly,USAIDbelievesthatoneofSolanda’sgreatestfailureswasnotbeingableto

reachthelowestincomegroupsduetothefluctuatinglevelsofinflationEcuadorwhich

reached48%by1983.25AlthoughdemocracyreturnedtoEcuadorin1979afteraperiodof

dictatorship,corruptionwithinthegovernmentwasresponsibleforallottingsomeofthe

housestofriendsandfamilyofofficialsinvolvedintheprojectinsteadoftolow-income

families.Inaddition,Solandadidnotbecometheprecedentforfurtheraffordablehousing

projectsinEcuador,asUSAIDhadhoped.

Conclusion Thirty-fiveyearslater,wecansuccinctlyidentifyandanalyzethesuccessesand

failuresofanintegratedaffordablehousingandurbandevelopmentprojectinthecityof

Quito.Theprovisionofincrementalhousingmodelsallowedfor6,211housestobebuilt,

insteadoftheoriginallyplanned4,500(38%more).Families’expansionoftheirhouseshas

madeSolandathehomeofmorethan80,000people,vastlysurpassingtheoriginal

populationof18,000residents.Thus,theincrementalstrategyemployedcontinuesto

provideaffordablehousingforhomeownersandrentersalikeintheneighborhood.

ThesmalllotsizesinSolandaandthelackofenforcementofhousingregulationsat

thetimeofexpansionhavecreatedaprecariouslivingsituationthatcouldbedevastating

whereanaturaldisastertooccur.Wehypothesizethatbuildoutwouldhavebeenlessacute

iflotsizeshadreflectedfamilygrowthtrendsatthetime.Manyfamiliesaccuratelyreferto

housesinSolandaas“cajitasdefósforos”(matchstickhouses)duetotheirsmallsize.

Furthermore,infrastructureissuesresidentsfacecouldhavebeenavoidedhadthe

programprovidedprofessionaltechnicalassistancefromengineersandarchitectsfor

incrementalexpansionsorbyincludingamonitoringandevaluationstageintheyears

whenexpansionoccurred.

25 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015.

ComprehensivebasicandsocialinfrastructurehasmadeSolandaintoan

independentmicro-habitatwithinQuito.Familiesrarelyhavetheneedtoleavetheir

neighborhood,astheyhaveattheirdisposaloneofthelargestmarketsinthecity,

supermarkets,anassortmentofcommercialstores,cornerdelicatessens,policestations,

schools,andparks.Assuch,ownershipofahouseinSolandahasincreasedtheoverall

economicdevelopmentoffamilies,specificallyduetohousingtenurecomplementedwith

comprehensivesocialinfrastructure.26

InSolanda,wecanobservetherolethatpolicyinterventionscanhavetoadvanceor

deteraffordablehousingstrategies.Theincrementalmodelallowedlow-income

householdstopurchaselandinalocationthatcontinuestoincreaseinvalue.Public-private

partnershipssuccessfullyexecutedanintegratedurbanshelterprojectthatthirty-five

yearslateristhrivingwitheconomicdevelopmentandisconnectedtothesurroundingcity

throughbus-rapidtransitandwillsoonhaveasubwaystation.Furthermore,duetothe

government’sdebt-forgivenessprogram,familiesinSolandaaredebt-free.

TheSolandaIntegratedShelterandUrbanDevelopmentProjectintroducedtothe

cityofQuitoanewcomprehensivewayofdesigningandcreatingsustainablecommunities

thatsupplementedthestandardconstructionofhouses.Asdiscussedthroughoutthis

paper,thereareseverallessonslearnedfromthisprojectthatcanserveas

recommendationstotakeintoconsiderationforthefutureorimplementationtoproject

evenafter30years.Disseminatingthelessonslearnedfromthisprojectcancontributeto

theunderstandingofthecapabilitiesofpeopleandtheirprocessofdesigning,financing

andexpandingtheirhouses.

FinalThoughts

Aninsightthatresonatedfromtheconferenceandtheworkthatwedowasthelack

ofinvestmentthatthereisfromgovernmentstoperformorincludelongitudinalstudiesin

theirsocialhousingprojects.Post-evaluationworkisquitelimitedandevenifperformed

byacademiaortheprivatesectordoesnothaveasadirectinfluenceandimpactasifitwas

withinthepublicsector.Fromtheconversationswithotherpractitionersthatattendedthe

conference,thereseemstobeaconcernofthefailureofgovernmenttobetterunderstand

theneedsandusesofspaceofpeoplethroughouttime.Investmentonethnographic

26 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 1.

researchofcommunitiesbeforetheprojectsseemsobviousbutisyetfarfromreality.The

lackofunderstandingoftheusersthenlimitsthemgovernmentbodiesinbettershaping

theprojectdesignanddeliverythatwillsupporttheseprogramstobecomebetterforthe

targetgroup.

Furthermore,itisimportantthatwerefrainfromviewinghousinginavacuum.Like

aconferencespeakersaid,“low-costhousingrequiresno-costtransport”aswellasother

publicservicesandsocialinfrastructure.Despiteitsmultiplesetbacksandfailures,

Solanda’sabilitytointegratetothegreatercitythroughlow-costbus-rapidtransitand

otherpublictransportationwasessentialtoitscontinuedsuccess.Hadweevaluatedthe

project5oreven10yearsafteritscompletion,wewouldnothavefoundittobeas

burstingwithlifeasitis35yearslater.Acityanditscomponentsarelivingorganismsthat

transformwithtime,anditisthereforeessentialtore-thinkthetimelineofevaluationsfor

pastaffordablehousingprojects.

Acknowledgements Firstandforemost,wewouldliketothankProfessorReinhardGoethertforthe

supportandadvicehehasgivenusthroughoutthisprocess.Thisresearchwouldhave

neveroccurredhaditnotbeenforhim.WewouldliketothanktheMassachusettsInstitute

ofTechnologyandtheSchoolofArchitectureandPlanningfortheirsupport,aswellasthe

KellyDouglasTravelGrant.

Wearegratefulforallthesupportwe’vereceivedinQuito,includingCharlyGarcía

andtheFundaciónMarianadeJesús,RobertoCarrión,Arq.JoséOrdoñezVillacresesfrom

theInstitutoMetropolitanodePlanificaciónUrbana,PhD.RosaElenaDonosofromthe

SecretaríadeTerritorio,HábitatyVivienda,andtheMinisteriodeDesarrollorUrbanoy

ViviendadelEcuador.

SpecialthankstoEarlKesslerforhissupportandinvaluableinformation.

Finally,ourgreatestthankyoutothefamiliesofSolanda,thatwelcomedusintotheir

neighborhoodandtheirhomes.Thisresearchisdedicatedtothem.

References CharlieGarcia(projectmanagerforFoundationMarianadeJesús)indiscussionwiththe

authors,May2016.

GAO/NSAID.TheSolandaHousingGuarantyProjectinEcuador.UnitedStatesGeneral

AccountingOffice,1986.

Guzmán,Alberto,Brevesreseñasdelasúltimasdécadasdelaspolíticasdeviviendade

Ecuador,ContratoSocialporlaViviendaDigna,2007.

JoséOrdoñezVillacreses(InstitutoMetropolitanodePlanificaciónUrbana)indiscussionwiththeauthors,December2015.

PADCO,Inc.TheSolandaProjectEvaluationandLuchadelosPobres:AComparisonof

FormalandInformalCommunityDevelopment.PADCO,Inc,1989.

RTIInternational.LACHousingandUrbanUpgradingAssistanceRetrospective:Honduras

andEcuador,1980-2005.RTIInternational,2005.

RosaElenaDonoso(advisortoQuito’sSecretaríadeTerritorio,Hábitat,yVivienda)indiscussionwiththeauthors,May2016.

GraphicWork,Images EconomicActivity

‘LaJota’–Solanda’smajorcommercialstreet

PhotoCredit:GabrielMuñozMoreno

ParkstoParking

Conversionofinternalblockgardenstoparkinglots

Photocredit:GabrielMuñozMoreno

Over-expansion

‘Bridge-Unit’

expandedtofourfloors

Photocredit:FrancisGoyes

Buildout

BuildoutofhousesinSolanda,observeelectriccabledisarray

Photocredit:FrancisGoyes

‘Basic-Unit’inoriginalstate

Photocredit:FrancisGoyes

Initialstate

Solandapriortoincrementalbuildingin1980s

Photocredit:EarlKessler

Solandahousingmodels

Graphiccredit:FrancisGoyes

Graphiccredit:FrancisGoyes

Superblockdesign

Graphiccredit:FrancisGoyes

SolandainQuito

Photo credit: Google Earth, 2016

Solanda Model

Photo credit: Fundación Mariana de Jesús