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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASONAuthor(s): Roger J. SullivanReviewed work(s):Source: The Monist, Vol. 66, No. 1, Right Reason in Western Ethics (JANUARY, 1983), pp. 83-105Published by: Hegeler InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902789 .
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON
In this essay I will examine several features of the dominant contem
porary view about the nature and functions of practical reason, a view findingitsmost natural home indeontological theorieswithin theKantian tradition.1
I will suggest that such theories are quite wrong inholding that public
morality is the whole of ourmoral life. I will argue that insofar as they denythere is or can be such a thing as a privatemoral life, they tend both tomis
represent and to undermine the nature of human moral life. Some ofmycritical remarks on these points will apply, mutatis mutandis, to utilitarian
theories as well.
My criticism will be made fromwhat, in themain, can be called an
Aristotelian position, which holds that practical reason has both public (butnot wholly public) and private (but not wholly private) functions, and that
each function has its own distinctiveness.2 On this account, practical wisdom
is right reasoning aimed at thegood of the individual and political wisdom is
right reasoning aimed at the common good of the community. Althoughneither function nor neither good can exist without the other, neither shouldone be collapsed into the other. I will not have the space to delineate the
Aristotelian view in any detail, but throughmy comments on the Kantian
view Iwill at least give some indications about how such a view of practicalreason and morality can be constructed.3
I.
Today it is almost a truism that thedelineation of rightpractical reason
inWestern philosophy has been made dependent on theway inwhich practical reason has been related to or contrasted with theoretical reason.
According to a long and illustrious tradition dating back to Plato, the
best and perhaps the only genuine exercise of reason is theoretical. Whetherthe gfound for the claim has been located in the structure of theoreticalreason or in its objects or inboth, such reason has been portrayed as capableof attaining knowledge closely approximating divine knowledge innecessity,
consistency, and universality. Even today this formalistic view of theoreticalreason survives as a philosophic ideology, determiningwhat should and what
should not count as rational explanation and justification. On this view,
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84 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
rationality consists in laws which have the same necessity found inmathematical or deductive reasoning; laws which hold universally, with no
recognizable limits to their scope and with few or no qualifications; and laws
which are both internallyconsistent and consistent with one another. Reason
still tends to be conceived of as paradigmatically demonstrative incharacter,
consisting of inferencesmade according to the rules of a systemwhich is com
plete and internallyconsistent, inferences leading necessarily and impersonal
ly to conclusions in a manner which is subjective only to the extent that
various
strategiesmay remain
optional.4By contrast, practical reason is problematic, and the claim thatwe can
have practical knowledge tenuous. For one thing itdeals with the changeablerather than the immutable, so that it is not clear itcan offerus either neces
sityor universality. For another, practical reason seems to introduce an element of ineluctable subjectivitywhich tends to undermine theverypossibilityof objectivity and consistency. Theoretical thinking is the activity of a spectator who seeks only to understand reality and who therefore stands, as. it
were, apart from theworld and his personal engagements with it. Individual
characteristics and personal interests of theoreticians are essentially irrelevant to their
activity,and insofar as
theyhave attained
knowledge, theyare
indistinguishable from one another. Theoretical thinking, consequently, hasan impersonality about itwhich promises objectivity and impartiality. It is a
thoroughly rational activity, an activity, as itwere, of pure reason.
Practical thinking,by contrast, is done by a person who is not somuch
concerned with what is or is not the case as with what ought or ought not to
be the case. "Thought (dianoia) moves nothing," Aristotle wrote,5 and
almost everyone after him has agreed that practical thinking requires the
presence of desires to provide its specific dunamis. But desires also are the
chief competitors with and antagonists to rationality, and even iftheycan be
brought under the dominion of reason and made amode of rationality, theirvery presence puts the purity and objectivity of practical thinking in serious
question. It is unclear how practical reasoning, however, it is done, can ever
attain any of the standards of theoretical thought.Ifwe accept thishistorically-sanctioned strategy of comparing practical
reason with a prior view of theoretical reason, we now have a choice betweentwo alternatives.
One possibility is to admit that theoretical or deductive reason has
qualities which othermodes of reasoning may lack, but still to hold there are
other sorts of reasoning, more appropriate to their subject matter than the
kind of reasoning we find indemonstrative inferences. In general, thiswas theway Aristotle took when he described rational activity as including intuition,
induction, and dialectical or analytical reasoning; and it is theway most logicians and mathematicians think today.
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 85
The other possibility is to regard rule-governed theoretical thought as
exemplifying our only rational way of dealing with the world. Then we are
leftwith two radically differentways of regarding 'practical reason'. We
might claim that it is simply a misnomer: what rationality there is in such
thought is supplied by theoretical reason, and it ismade practical only insofaras we calculate about how to satisfyour desires, which are subjective and ir
rational surds.Generally speaking, thishas been theway taken bymany em
piricists, particularly positivists and emotivists; and it also was the stance
taken by Kant in his analysis of the rationality present inwhat he called
technical practical propositions. However, because he was unwilling to yieldto the empiricist attack on thepossibility ofmoral knowledge, Kant also took
the second way, which, by modelling moral-practical reason on theoretical
reason, delineates morally right practical reason so that it can achieve the
theoretical standards of necessity, consistency, and universality.
Doing so requires attributing the ground for those standards to reason
alone rather than to itsobjects, and this is a fundamental presupposition to
day of all those contemporary moral philosophers who stand within theKan
tian tradition. To retain the formalism characteristic of demonstrative
reasoning,this
typeof moral
theorizing legislatesthe
contingentand
particular out of consideration by regarding them as morally irrelevant.To re
tain the impartiality and objectivity of theoretical reason, Kantians presentthe practical reasoner in terms like that of the theoretical reasoner: the
rational agent stands outside of practice in the sense of setting aside all in
fluence of personal practical concerns. Finally, just as the theoretician aims
at enunciating law-like judgments about what is the case, so themoral
practical reasoner aims at law-like judgments about what ought to be the
case. All such judgments must be public in the sense that they are publiclydefensible and can be assented to by all other rational agents who also reason
impartiallyand
objectively.The
primaryfunction of
rightmoral reason,
then, emerges as mainly legislative, the enactment of laws of conduct. Other
functions of practical reason?deliberation and execution?are not totally ig
nored; they simply do not have the prominence of the legislative function.
It is time now to examine in some detail one example of this latter typeof moral theory, an example which clearly shows how the delineation of
moral-practical reason is modelled after theoretical reason.
II.
In his article, "On Taking theMoral Point ofView," Paul W. Taylorsets out the essential features of a contemporary moral theorywithin the
Kantian tradition.6 Other authorswithin that tradition, such as Baier, Rawls,and Richards, may analyze the relationships between the various concepts
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86 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
somewhat differentlythanTaylor, but they all subscribe to substantially the
same fundamental doctrines. I trust, then, that itwill not be unfair forme to
take Taylor's presentation as representative of that tradition.
Taylor lists six characteristics which, he holds, taken together define the
conditions necessary and sufficient for a practical rule to be a moral stan
dard. A standard is a moral standard if and only if it has the following six
characteristics.
1. Itmust begeneral
inform. Itmust contain no references toparticularindividuals or circumstances, but only to general kinds of actions which any
agent (including agents having generally described societal positions or roles)must do or not do in certain generally described kinds of situations.
2. Itmust be universal in scope. Itmust apply to allmoral agents in the
kinds of circumstances to which it ismeant to apply.3. Itmust enjoy absolute priority. It must override both other kinds of
norms and the interests of particular individuals and groups.4. Itmust be disinterested. Although itmay specify that the generally
describe4 interests of a generally described class of agents be promoted or
protected,itmust be intended to
applyto and be
obeyedas amatter of
principle, and not as a policy aimed at promoting or protecting the goals of any
particular individuals or groups. The rulemust be formally impartial, i.e.,
consistently apply to all cases falling under it; itmust rule out exceptionsmade in anyone's favor on grounds not stated in the rule, such as an in
dividual's particular desires, inclinations, and aims.
5. Itmust be public. That is, itmust be a maxim which, as Kant said,the individual can will to be universal law; itmust be worthy to function and
be intended to function as a publicly adopted and publicly recognized norm
by all moral agents.
6. Itmust be substantively impartial. That is, itmust conform toKant'ssecond formulation; every person must be regarded as having inherentworth
and as entitled to equal consideration in the protection and promotion of his
basic interests, simplybecause he isa person. Basic interests includewhatever
is necessary forpreserving a person's autonomy and for promoting his fun
damental goals. This characteristic rules out counting the basic interests of
one person as greater or less than the basic interests of another; it also rules
out sacrificing one person's basic interests for the sake of the nonbasic in
terests of others.
Having determined the characteristics which make a practical principle
amoral principle, Taylor writes thatwe stillneed to set out thenecessary andsufficient condition for saying thatmoral principles are valid, that is, in fact
bind all moral agents.We can do that,he continues, by asking but one question:Will adopting thisnorm be for thegood of everyone alike? The very ask
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 87
ing of this question presupposes a prior commitment to what he calls "the
ideal mutual acknowledgement test," which is a version of Kant's first for
mulation. According to this test, amoral norm is valid ifand only ifitwould
be subscribed to under ideal conditions of freedom, rationality, and factual
knowledge by all autonomous agents as one of theirmoral norms when com
peting claims occur among them.
One final question needs to be asked: Why take themoral point of view
at all? Given the above analysis, this comes down to asking: What reasonscan be given formaking a commitment to the egalitarian position? Taylor'sanswer is that no reasons can be given, either foror against this commitment
(or any other alternative commitment), simply because it isultimate. (One is
reminded of Kant's defense of morality in the third chapter of the
Groundwork.) All we can do is decide what our ultimate attitude toward
persons will be, therebydeciding the kind of life and world we will to have.
III.
Now thatwe have surveyed the basic structure of a formalisticmoral
theory, I wish to point out certain features of such theories.The first characteristic of such theories towhich I wish to call attention
is that they tend to begin with a Hobbesian view of the natural condition ofhumans outside of a morally structured society.7 In one sense that view is
empty of all significance, for the natural condition is contrasted with'social
arrangements in such a way that it becomes tautologically true that itwill be
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." What Hobbes meant to do,however, was to stresswhat he saw as a central problem inboth moral and
political philosophy?how to limit the negative and destructive tendencies ofindividuals so as tomake possible a society within which
people
can live
togetherwith civility. Philosophers within the Kantian tradition shareHobbes' view, and ithas enormous consequences for theway inwhich their theoryofmorality can develop.
One of the consequences is the conviction that, as Kurt Baier has put it,"moral solutions to our practical problems often run counter to an individual's strong inclinations and desires, or conflict with his best interests,and demand sacrifices, sometimes severe. For this reason we believe it isoften difficult and against our nature to do what morality requires."8 Somuch is this view now part of the 'common wisdom' of contemporary think
ingabout
moralityand moral
reasoning,that
Baier could then write:"Indeed, we would find ithard to saywhywe should have amorality ifitwerenot so."9
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88 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
A second consequence is thatKantian use of theHobbesian view blocks
any attempt to justify themoral point of view by claims thatmorality is in a
person's best interest. To the contrary, moral demands will "often run
counter to" what people consider to be in their best interest.
This first characteristic of formalistic moral theories leads to a second:
sincemorality acts as a restrictionon theprivate aims of individuals and since
such restrictionsmust be public, therefore, as Taylor writes, "there are no
privatemoralities" nor can there be.10The contrast here between 'public' and
'private'is
justthat differencewhich Kant delineated between
'morality'and
'prudence'.11 The latterencompasses almost all considerations about our own
welfare and, when they are grounded in desire, about thewelfare of others,which he classified under the rubric of hedonism. Since I will claim later that
theKantian insistence that there is no such thing as private morality is a
serious error, I will review here the main reasons offered on behalf of the
Kantian view.
The first reason depends on combining theHobbesian view with the
Kantian requirement thatmoral rulesmust be worthy to serve as universal
laws. Ifwe accept both doctrines, it then follows thatprivate ends and privatesocial
arrangementsmust tend to be Hobbesian in
nature,characterized
bycompetition and selfishness. Either our individual concerns and private social
unions will incorporate the same laws of justice as a well-ordered society, in
which case they no longer are private; or theywill be either immoral (by
public standards) or amoral and of only secondary importance incomparisonwith morality. The belief that there can be legitimate amoral actions rests on
Kant's contention that, although 'morality' and 'happiness' are radically
heterogeneous concepts, happiness still is a genuine, albeit not an uncon
ditional, good for finite moral agents, which may not be promoted by but
may be tolerated bymorality as long as the quest forhappiness does not con
flictwith the demands ofmorality.There is another argument for conceiving of morality as completely
public, which depends for its force on our accepting theKantian view that
moral-practical reason must conform to the standards of theoretical reason.
It begins by dividing our practical concerns, once again, into concerns about
justice and concerns about welfare. Unfortunately, what we think to be goodand in our best interest is an ideal of the imagination, not of reason. Em
pirical practical reason, therefore,can only deal with probabilities, not neces
sities, with generalities, not universality. Moreover, different people have
conflicting and incommensurable views about what is in their own interest,
and the same person may hold many different views about it during thecourse of his or her life.For this reason, prudential interestsare the source of
inconsistencies, both within each person and between individuals; they
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 89
thereforegenerate conflicts,without also being able to offeruniversally valid
prudential rules for resolving them. The conclusion follows that prudentialreason is radically different fromand inferiorto pure practical reason and its
norms of necessity, consistency, and universality.
Within the Kantian framework, then, it seems completely obvious that
our practical lifemust be conceived dichotomously, and only that kind of
practical reason which is thoroughly rational deserves to be considered
moral; only it can provide the basis for our living together with civility,
responsibility,and
cooperation. Bycontrast the
privaterealm is far too sub
jective and particular. Truly moral maxims are only thosewhich are worthyto be publicly recognized as binding on all; and maxims which remain privatearemerely tolerated within the context of the law, as long as theydo not con
flictwith public duties.
The third characteristic of theorieswithin theKantian tradition follows
from thefirst two: rationality consists in rule-making and rule-following (fol
lowing rules of one's own making). Consequently almost all the attention
within this tradition concerns maxims, principles, and laws?how they come
to be, how moral rules differ fromprudential rules, how each can bind us, and
so on. This characteristic clearly shows how, within the Kantian tradition,right reason is conceived on themodel of theoretical and scientific reason.
Formal explanations in the sciences describe the world as rule-bound;likewise formal moral theorizing holds that actions can be rational and intel
ligible only insofar as they also are rule-governed.12 Just as valid scientific
laws hold necessarily and universally, so also valid moral rulesmust obligefree agents absolutely and universally.
The same theoreticalmodel determines how theKantian conceives of the
moral legislator. In the physical sciences, special characteristics of the in
dividual scientist are irrelevant to the standards of scientific objectivity; so
also in themoral-political realm, the personal characteristics of themorallegislators are irrelevant to their legislation. Those legislators, whether we
think ofRawls's "original position" orTaylor's "ideal mutual acknowledgement test,"must be portrayed in completely impersonal terms, freed of all
characteristics except those intrinsic to the Kantian view of the nature of
moral agency, namely, pure rationality and freedom in theKantian sense,
together with whatever factual knowledge is necessary for the exercise of
rationality.The fourth characteristic ofKantian theories towhich I wish to call at
tention concerns theirunderstanding of the nature ofmoral motivation. Let
us thinkofKant's "kingdom of ends" in termsof an ideal of thepublic order,namely, an ideal state, governed only by public laws as we have seen them
described. Such a state ispossible only ifthe citizens take an interest inobey
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90 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
ing its laws,which restrict theegoism thatmakes social unions impossible. If
we remember that all the citizens are subject to constant temptations to act
egoistically, we wonder what kind ofmotivation can make the legislation of
such a state effective.Within theKantian tradition, only twokinds ofmotives
are available.
Although the private desires of the citizens are conceived of as either ir
relevant to their obeying the law or as tempting them to disobey it, confor
mity might be accomplished by attaching penalties to violations. But those
conformingto the law for fear of
punishment
are
bythat fact not
goodcitizens; they are acting only under coercion. And they stillwill violate the
law when they judge theirpersonal gain greater than the losses extracted bythe law. In a word, theymay observe the legalities,when theydo, but in spirit
they are completely outside the law.
Fortunately, there is another, higher type of civic motivation, that of
dutifulness. A citizen of this ideal state is a good citizen if and only if he or
she obeys its laws just because theyare the law. Despite the fact they all still
have desires which often conflict with the law, good citizens are willing to
frustrate those desires when theymust do so to do theirduty. Penalties for
violatingthe law
(andrewards for
conformingto
it)are irrelevant to dutiful
persons, because they are committed to the law (simply as the law) as more
important than their own welfare.
We already know theKantian explanation forwhy a person will be will
ing to commit himself or herself so completely to duty: each person must
regard himself or herself as the originator of the legislation, which is
thereforenot imposed fromwithout but fromwithin; it is legislation of one's
own reason.
The fifthand final characteristic towhich I wish to call attention is the
Kantian conviction that any alternative proposal for understanding our
moral life is ruled out as mistaken, ahead of any examination of thatproposal. Taylor, for example, writes: "If someone uses other criteria as
grounds foraccepting or rejecting a norm, then I shall say that the individual
is not taking themoral point of view but some other point of view."13 This
could itselfhave been anticipated. For ifan account ofmorality is based on
pure reason, thenwe can know in advance that, insofar as other accounts
diverge from it, theyare tainted by irrationality or plain error.Even the fact
that thehistorical Kantian appeal to ordinarymoral consciousness no longerhas itsoriginal forcewithmany people is an irrelevancy.14That only confirms
how sorely people can be tempted to irrationality by theirdesires and inclina
tions.
Despite the Kantian conviction that I will be engaged in a futile
enterprise, I now will turn to those criticisms which leadme to conclude that
the Kantian mode of theorizing is seriously flawed.
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 91
IV.
What I will mainly be concerned with in this section is to explain and de
fend the view that there is such a thingas privatemorality and, furthermore,thatmorality finds itsprimary locus inour private lives, so that it ispersonal
morality which ultimately provides a crucialmoral support for the justice of
public law. I will not have the space tomake my case completely good, but I
hope to indicate how that case can bemade. The best way to do so, I think, is
to contrast the characteristics of public morality, as Taylor has identified
them,with the characteristics of our private lives.Doing sowill point out theradical differences between the Kantian view ofmorality and what is in the
main an Aristotelian view.
A.
The firstmajor contrast can be made by considering together three of
the characteristics ofmoral rules?the first, second, and fourth?as Taylorhas explained them: moral rulesmust be general in form,universal in scope,and apply disinterestedly, that is,both impersonally and impartially.Once we
understand that these are intended to be characteristics of just laws within ajust state, we can appreciate the rationale behind them. It is neither un
reasonable nor particularly novel to say that in the public forum justiceshould wear her blindfold; favoritism on behalf of any particular known in
dividuals or groups normally does offend our ordinary moral convictions
about how justice should be distributed in public social unions.15
When we attend to our private life,we cannot help but be struckby how
thoroughly different it is from theKantian description of a just public order.
For one thing, the scope of our private life ismuch narrower. It is primarilylimited to oneself and those towhom one is related ina personal way, and it is
not directly concerned, normally, with thewelfare of society as a whole. As a
consequence, a major characteristic of our private life is just its partiality,however that partiality isdistributed.16There we engage inexactly the sortof
discriminatory conduct which would be considered immoral in the publicorder. Parents, for example, normally are most concerned about their own
children, and when people are inneed, we thinkwe normally firstshould takecare of those nearest to us by ties of blood and affection.
Moreover, whereas the lawmay serve justice best by ignoring certain
special characteristics and contingent facts about particular and known in
dividuals, this is justwhat we focus on inour private life: known individuals in
all their particularity. A husband clearly should take into account all those
qualities and characteristics which make his wife exactly and only the in
dividual person she is.What theyare, is indeterminate ahead of time;we can
learn them only by coming to know a person. Therefore, many of themoral
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92 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
considerations within a relationship cannot be known inadvance of all the ex
periences necessary to generate and sustain it.Personal moral considerations
are profoundly dependent on empirical knowledge; personal relationshipscannot be structured ahead of time by purely a priori reasoning.
Unlike public morality which, as we have seen, Baier described as
originating in conflict and as virtually justified by itsutility in resolving con
flicts, private morality originates mainly inpossibilities and needs. Conflicts
may arise inour private life,butmost of our private concerns are not intrin
sically competitive, and itwould be amistake to so construe them.Mainly we
are taken up with introducing some coherent shape into an indefinite and
fluid range of possibilities, determining what we should care about, and
responding to legitimate needs, whether our own or those of people with
whom we are personally related.
Throughout, our private moral practice is based on interest,whether
self-interest or the interests of those to whom we are related by love or
friendship.How urgently and legitimately such interests present themselves
to us depends on an indefinitenumber of particular, contingent facts about
ourselves, about others, and about the world. We cannot determine such
thingsahead of time in a
formalistic,a
priorimanner.17
Given the fact that the private sector of our life is limited, partial, par
ticular, empirically conditioned, and based on interest,what can moralitymean in the expression 'privatemorality'? Clearly, it cannot mean what
morality means in the Kantian sense (although it can include a deontic
delineation as morality in an inferioror secondary sense). What moralitymeans here iswhat I think thevastmajority of people infact take to be at the
very center of human moral life: being the kind of person who has those
qualities of character (virtues) which entitle us to say that that person is a
'good person'. Such a person does what is right, because he loves what is
right; and he has learnedto
doso
by learningbothto assume
personal responsibility for his lifeand to initiate and sustain close personal relationships with
others.
In order to describe such a person we need to retrieve and rehabilitate
certain terms?freedom, respect, and autonomy?which have been ap
propriated by the Kantian tradition only by itsdoing violence to theway we
use them in our ordinary discourse. Although the application of these terms
in their non-Kantian sense should not be restricted to describing our personalmoral life,here I can only indicate theirmeaning in that lifeand only in a
very sketchymanner. By freedom Imean the libertywithin our private lifeto
engage in thoughts and behavior which aremoral yet too particular in focusand too dependent on personal interestsand contingent circumstances to be
appropriate to the public forum. By self-respect and respect for others I
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 93
mean, in general terms, the right of each person to critically evaluate and
direct his or her own life,taking intoaccount all the relevant particularities of
that life;and respect for the need and ability of others to do so as well. I shall
saymore about respect in this sense inSection C below, and I shall discuss
the notion of 'private autonomy' in Part V below.
B.
Kant ruled our personal life and affective relationships out of themoral
world, not because he did not understand their distinctive nature, forhe did,but because he was convinced thatmoral-practical reason must be modelled
after theoretical reason. As we have seen, on thatmodel rationality is con
ceived of as rule-bound thought,18 and only certain kinds of practical rules
deserve to be considered moral. According toTaylor's second, third,and fifth
characteristics togetherwith his "mutual acknowlegement test,"moral rules
must be lawlike in form and application, so they can function as absolute
public norms among all rational agents.
By contrast, personal affective human lifecannot be codified into univer
sal, absolute, impersonal, and completely objective practical laws. It is true
that part of that lifemay be stated in rules specifyinggeneralized rightpatternsof behavior, but, as Aristotle rightlysaid, inmatters which admit of "so
great variety and irregularity," practical truthcan hold "only for themost
part."19 Ifwe prefer absolutes, we may feel somewhat uncomfortable with the
way inwhich human moral life recalcitrates the use of neat, absolute rules.
But reflection on that life does tend to support Aristotle's contention that
"although general statements have a wider range of application, statements
on particular points have more truth in them."20
Whether we are concerned onlywith our own lifeorwith others as well,we must take into account a
constantly changing world,like an artist
workingwith materials which never quite duplicate each other. Even when generalrules are right,we feel free to violate themwhen the situation demands it, ustas theaccomplished artist feels free to break the conventions of his craftwhen
that is demanded by the particular materials with which he is working.Private morality is better described by expressions such as "doing what is
suitable, given these circumstances," rather than in terms of absolute laws.21
In our personal relationships, there is justice, but not justice in the sense
of an impersonal and impartial distribution of rights.Rather, it is justice in
the sense of sensitivity towhat contributes to good of those involved, both for
themoment and within the context of theirrelationship.
As aconsequence,what is just will vary according to the relationship and how it is constructed.
The closer the relationship, the greater are the claims of this kind of justice.
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94 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
By contrast, "when people are friends, theyhave no need of justice" in the
sense of public rules of equitable distribution.22
Even when a personal relationship ispartly constituted by public norms,as in the case ofmarriage, toomuch emphasis on the formal legalities, rights,and obligations either indicates the relationship already is in trouble or tends
todestroy its specificallymoral quality, which requires genuine caring and af
fection.
What introducesmorality into our private life and sustains it there isnot
a body of rules but good moral character which leads a person to do what is
right in each situation, not because that is an instantiation of some law, but
because he or she is thatkind of person. Aristotle offersus a crucially important analysis inEth. Nie. 2. 4, where he compares character to knowing how
to use a language.23 Competence in language is not just a matter of knowingall the rules of grammar, for that clearly doesn't guarantee a person will
speak or write well. For one thing,a living language allows toomany exceptions to its rules. For another, the experienced and expert speaker orwriter
may have* forgottenmost of the rules, if indeed he ever knew them,without
that affecting his skill. Such a person does not normally need to attend to
grammaticalor
stylisticrules when he
speaks
or writes, because hesimplyknows how to do so, and how to do so well.
In likemanner, the good person has the kind of character which enables
him both to know and to do justwhat is themorally right thing to do ineach
situation; and knowing that typically is not a matter of knowing 'what the
rules require'. This iswhy Aristotle writes that moral judgment does "not
come under the head of any artwhich can be transmitted by precept."24 It is
no accident that he does not describe themorally good person as, in today'sidiom, 'aman of principle'. The latter applies more accurately toAristotle's
obstinate person, who clings rigidlyand foolishly to his rules evenwhen doingso shows moral
insensitivity. Instead,Aristotle calls the
good person"a law
unto himself."25
C.
I have now completed my examination of the main ways inwhich our
private moral life isdistinctively differentfrom themorality of public social
unions. Within the Kantian context, that verydistinctiveness isused to argue
that, insofar as our life is not completely public, it isnot completely moral in
significance. I have argued, in turn, that it is just our private lifewhich con
tainsmany ofour
most precious moral concerns, and that it is thea
prioricharacter of Kantian ethics which results ina systematic effort tomislead us
into thinking our private lifehas, at best, only indirectmoral significance. I
now wish to turn to another and related deficiency in theKantian approach.
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 95
Let us once more return to Taylor's list of characteristics, particularlyhis fourth and sixth and, once again, his "ideal mutual acknowledgementtest." The fourth states thatmoral rulesmust be impersonal and impartial;
theymust be disinterested and obeyed On principle'. The sixth states theymust be substantively impartial so that each person must be regarded as en
titled to the same consideration as any other in theprotection and promotionof his or her basic interests, simply because he or she is a person. And the test
can be summarized, following Taylor, as a commitment to an egalitarianview of persons. All three restfinally onKant's second formulation, theprin
ciple of respect forpersons as persons, and they show the enormous importance given to the notion of 'person' as the ultimate and overriding norm in
moral theories within the Kantian tradition.My argument is not with the
Tightnessof respecting persons, but with themanner inwhich thisprinciple is
interpretedwithin the Kantian view.
As we have seen, the notion of 'person' is not based on any contingent,
empirical facts about individuals?their biological and physical features,their interests and desires, even theirmoral character.26 In fact, 'respect for
persons' says nothing at all about persons. Unlike merit assessments, ascribe
inginherentworth to persons is not a matter of
applyingstandards at all.
Taylor agrees with J. Feinberg that there simply are no facts about personswhich can serve as the basis forasserting theyall have equal worth.27 In fact,
Taylor writes, "the kinds of entities on which moral agents place inherent
worth need not themselves be moral agents?even potential ones."28 Talk
about persons and respect forpersons, then, isactually away of talking about
an attitude which lies at the base of formalistic moral theories.
What is odd about this doctrine is themanner inwhich a completely
impersonal abstraction has replaced our more ordinary notion of people, with
all theircontingent and individuating characteristics. Flesh-and-blood human
beingsseem to
disappearfrom themoral
world;we seem to be in a Platonic
World of absolute values, but aWorld uninhabited by living,breathing peo
ple. We have only personless Persons, morally indistinguishable tokens to
which we are to give our respect.To illustratemy point, letme repeat a storyMichael Stocker tells of one
person visiting another in thehospital. When the illperson thanks his visitor
for coming, forbeing such a good friend, the visitor responds, he came onlybecause itwas his duty and he always tries to do his duty.29The storypoints
up thedehumanizing character of respect forpersons, just as persons. What
we do for them really has little or nothing to do with them as individuals.
Surely something is deficient in themotive, the onlymotive allowed withintheKantian tradition,which requires us to regard personal feelings as moral
ly insignificant.We might admit that themotive ismoral innature, for it does
motivate us to act dutifully because it is our duty (even in the face of our
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96 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
reluctance to do so). But it is an inferiormoral motive in personal
relationships, for it systematically discounts and excludes exactly what lies at
theirmoral center?the way we care emotionally about people, with all the
special, empirical, contingent facticity thatmakes them to be the individuals
they are.
There also is respect in these relationships, but in varying degrees,
depending upon the persons and qualities we find admirable (as opposed to
qualities we simply like). Moreover, it is a personal respect which regardspersons as valuable and special forjustwhat theyare.Not everyone isdeserv
ing of the same respect; we may have no respect at all for some peoplebecause theyhave a despicable character. This kind of respect is somethingthatmust be earned; unlike theKantian notion of respect, thiskind of respect
clearly depends on merit assessment.
It ispossible to point out the radical deficiency in theKantian notion of
respect in still another way. Ifwe find ourselves having to decide between the
basic interestsof several persons, the egalitarian view allows no rational wayto do so.30As a consequence, the only fair, albeit still non-rational way, to
decide, say, between a woman and her life-threateningfoetus (ifwe regard the
foetus as a person) is to resort to some such strategy as flipping a coin or,
when several persons are involved in a conflict between their basic interests,
holding a lottery.The egalitarian principle leaves such moral decisions to non-rational
luck, because it strips people of all the specialness which makes each a dis
tinctive individual and insists that nothing ismorally relevant but an impersonal attitude. This is the ultimate ironyof the Kantian position. It is based
on the initirllyplausible claim thatmorality requires us to respect persons,but the impersonal manner in which this claim is interpreted imitates too
closely theway in which the theoretician or scientist deals with objects or
things.Individual
personsbecome mere variables under the universal
quantifierof Person.
People sense just thiswhen theyprotest that bureaucracies reduce them
to numbers in a computer. But the use of numbers isnot only often themost
efficientway to administer benefits; it also guarantees complete equality of
treatment.What is it then that people are protesting? That their essential
humanity?their individual personhood?is being ignored. There are two
ways in which to respond to their criticism.We might hold that people are
mistaken inwhat theywant. Just as the public model ofmorality is not ap
propriate to our private life, so, we might say, it also is the case thatwe
should not try to extend personal morality into public life. The secondresponse protests that this is to bifurcate ourmoral life andmake it impossible forus to bring anywholeness or integritybetween our private and public
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THE KANTIANMODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICALREASON 97
life.What this alternative suggests ismore radical: people are right in sensingthat theKantian view is inadequate even inmatters of public morality. Ifwe
think of amoral theoryas organizing forus an ideal view of human life, then
that theory should advocate ways inwhich at least part ofwhat we mean by
friendship can be extended to the public realm in the formof what Aristotle
called 'civic friendship'.
D.
The final criticism Iwish tomake of theorieswithin theKantian tradition concerns Taylor's contemporary statement of theburden ofKant's final
remarks in theGroundwork: no reasons can be given either for or against
taking themoral point of view. Ifwe do not find this shocking, it is onlybecause we are so steeped in theKantian tradition thatwe are accustomed to
believing thatmorality is ultimately rationally unjustifiable.I do not have the space to review all the arguments which lead to the
Kantian position.What Iwish to do, however, is suggest an alternativewhich
offers some better hope of justifyingmorality. My suggestion appeals to the
fact thatwe all necessarily develop some sort ofmoral character. In thiswe
have no choice. (Of course, this is character in theAristotelian sense, a com
plex of dispositional traitsdeveloped from theways we act.) Since we cannot
help but become a person with a definite character, the ultimate basis for
morality may be found by asking such questions as:What kind of a person do
I admire and wish to become? What kind of desires and interests should I
have?We cannot totally avoid asking such questions; they are not optional.Aristotle was right in saying that only an utterly insensitiveperson can be un
aware of the fact that theway he acts determines what kind of a person he is
becoming.Once a
person'scharacter has firmed to the
pointwhere he no
longerwishes to change what he is, such questions do lose their force. (Periods of
great traumamay enable a person to reopen such questioning.) But this is a
loss which experience has already taught us to expect. The main possibilitiesforbecoming moral, when thequestion of justificationmost naturally arises,
lie with children and young adults, before their character has completelyfirmed.Children have an acute ability to recognize various types of character
and they typically choose some person or persons to imitate. By acting like
them, they tend to develop the same sorts of characteristics theyhave learned
to admire in theirmodels.
This is admittedlya
fragile foundation. So much dependson
themoralcharacter of thosewho nurture children, on theenvironment inwhich theyare
reared, and on the kind of persons they learn to admire. However, children
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98 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
are not completely dependent on their familes, nor are families completelyleft to theirown resources. This is exactly why the ideology of a state and its
moral arrangements are so crucially important. If a state is a just state,with
good laws and good institutionsdeveloped through theyears by fundamental
lygood people, then the state will support and sustainmoral education within
the family. Together, theprivate and public sectors can complement and rein
force each other in themoral education of the young.We still will reach an ultimate point?moral disagreements between
those who have developed different kinds of character, and disagreements
between people of like character who happen not to share similar beliefs, say,because of differing religious convictions. But these disagreements most
typcially are not about whether we ought to bemoral; theyare about how we
are to act as moral people. This is a substantial gain. Morality or themoral
point of view no longer needs to be regarded as unjustifiable or as only one
viewpoint among several.
V.
We have seen how profoundly the nature ofmoral theorizing has been
affected by the belief that right practical reason must conform to the
methodology and standards of theoretical reason. The result has been a dis
astrous oversimplification andmisrepresentation of thecomplexities and sub
tleties of human moral life.31 he Kantian tradition does notmerely describe
morality but does it in such a way as to systematically legislatemany of our
most precious moral concerns out of consideration. We need to push our in
quiry furtherand try to explain Kant's insistence onmodelling rightmoral
reason on theoretical reason, despite the cost.32
At least part of the answer can be found, I believe, ifwe attend to the
basic structural outlines of the religious view of themoral world dominant in
theworld inwhich Kant was reared and lived,which he adapted so itwould
conform to theaspirations as well as the strictures of theEnlightenment.33 In
thatChristian view, the responsibilities for themoral world are neatly divided
between God and man. God does the legislating, and the responsibility of
each member is simply to do what God commands. Since God is both om
nipotent and perfectly just, he will see to it that no one is asked to do more
than he can, and justice will be done, ifnot in thisworld, then in the next.
We can easily see theways in which Kant's theory is indebted to its
prototype. Pure reason is now the foundation of themoral world, and ithas
the awesome
responsibilityto formulate and
promulgate
the laws of that
world, theKingdom of Ends?laws which, like the laws of God, apply to
everyone and enjoy absolute precedence. The requirement of universality for
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 99
malizes thismoral duty: when we reason morally, we can and must legislateas ifwe were enacting the formal fabric of the entiremoral world. (Apartfrom its background, such a requirement might simply seem ludicrous.)
Moreover, what is required of us as agents is only thatwe do our duty as
reason reveals it to us, without regard for the consequences. (In the end Kant
had to rely on God to insure distributive justice, and it is onlywhen we un
derstand the original model forKant's theory thatwe can see thatGod and
immortality are more integral to theKantian view thanmany contemporary
proponents are
willing
to admit.)There are other intriguingparallels todraw. Just as God's will provides a
single ultimate moral norm, the source of all more particular moral laws, so
also pure reason must provide a single ultimate moral norm fromwhich it
must be possible to "derive" all particular moral laws. Further, as God's will
is the source of harmony within theChristian moral world, so also, within the
Kingdom of Ends, the ultimate demand of reason, consistency stated as a
categorical imperative, must provide the harmony within that Kingdom.There should be nomoral problems which cannot be settledby appeal to that
norm.
In the Christian delineation, the basicrelationship
between the
originator of themoral law and thosewho obey it is that between creator and
creature, characterized on the side of God by total and comprehensive domi
nion, and on the side ofman by total dependence. Consequently, there is and
can be no area of human life completely private fromGod, no area of
morality which can exist outside of,much less ground,moral rules. In aword,within theChristian moral world there is no room for anything like private
morality. Insofar as itsmembers try to claim there is, they are committingthe ultimate evil of selfish rebellion, putting consideration of their own
welfare ahead of the rule of God and themoral good of the entireworld.
We can understandmore clearly now why itwas thatKantcame
to thinkthatmoral-practical reasonmust be construed in termswhich would enable it
to attain the standards of divine knowledge?necessity, consistency, and un
iversality.We also can see why itwas thatmorality was conceived of as
providing the fundamental structure for an ideally constructed social union
with laws having the same comprehensive and absolute moral dominion over
itsmembers that, in the religious delineation, was given toGod.
I wish now to return to thematter ofmoral motivation. Within the
traditional Christian view we find the basic conception of human nature to
which Kant himself remained faithful: as a result ofAdam's fall, human
nature is irrevocably scarred, so thatwe all tend towhat ismorally evil ratherthan what ismorally good. Morality finds itsplace, then,forus in the conflict
between God's will and our desires. The main moral problem is not with
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100 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
knowing what is rightbut with doing it.The only proper response foraChris
tian is to obey and to obey on principle, on the principle that God's laws
should be obeyed simply because theyareGod's laws.Mere compliance does
not satisfy the requirements ofmorality, nor does obedience based on conse
quential considerations. The spirit of Christian morality requires lovingobedience out of respect for God's will.
What Iwish to suggest is that the term 'autonomy' now functionswithin
Kantian moral theories, with only minor emendations, just as the terms
'obedience', 'holy obedience', and even 'blind obedience' functionwithin the
Christian view.What obedience requires, in the religious view, is awillingnessto obey theDivine Legislator. It sometimes is called 'blind' precisely because
such obedience requires the complete subjugation of all considerations of personal welfare when they conflictwith the demands of God's laws. This is justwhat 'autonomy' signifieswithin theKantian tradition: absolute obedience to
themoral law because it is the law and one's duty; and the setting aside of all
merely prudential considerations when that is necessary. Even theKantian
point thatwe must regard themoral legislation as our own is not completely
novel; forwithin the religious tradition obedience signifies the conformity of
one's own will to the divinelaw,
whichthrough
internalization isaccepted
as
the expression of one's own will.
If this is all the termmeans, we have cause towonder why 'autonomy'seems somuch more attractive to people than does 'obedience' and certainly'blind obedience'. At least a good part of the explanation, I think, lieswith
the fact that 'autonomy' is also often used both as a psychological term andas a moral term in a non-Kantian sense?also referringto a person's abilityto be self-governing and determine one's choices on the basis of one's own
thinking.But this use of the term also extends towhat may be called 'personal autonomy': determining how best to secure one's own welfare and the
welfare of those about whom wecare,
andconforming
or notconforming
to
public moral norms, depending on whether one judges them to be acceptable
personal moral guides. This, of course, isnot autonomy in theKantian sense,
but heteronomy, the always potential antithesis ofmorality. In theKantian
view, therecan be no such thingas private autonomy anymore than there can
be private morality; autonomy means placing public constraints on our
freedom, not just inexercising freedom responsibly.Nonetheless, thepositiveconnotations of thenon-Kantian sense of the termcontinue todistract many
people from the Kantian meaning, however clearly the latter is stated.
My final suggestion is that theKantian transformation of theChristian
moral world into a completely rationalistic ethic has been accomplished onlyat great cost. What Kant and his successors have tried to do is to erect a
secular moral world apart from itsoriginal foundation and head, and without
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 101
the fundamental bond uniting themembers of theChristian moral world with
their head and with one another. The problem consists in trying to
appropriate a particular model of themoral world and being unable to find
adequate substitutes for the basic components of the original. In place of a
loving Person, we are given impersonal reason and its law; inplace of lovingresponse to a Person, we are given submission to an impersonal law; and in
place of bonds of love between members of the church, we are given the
notion of respect fora completely abstract notion of Personhood. Morality is
now merely a "point of view," of all things, lacking the most basic
legitimation, and deprived of everything which in the older version of the
model was held to be the very spirit ofmorality.However we account for it, contemporary secular philosophers?both
rationalists and empiricists (logical empiricists and logical positivists)?stillare committed to an "ideology of reason" which provides a natural home for
formalistic ethical theorizing.34 This ancient view of rationality, brieflydelineated in the opening section of this paper and articulated anew by 17th
and 18th-centurythinkers, regards the highest and best formof reason to be
philosophic thinking done sub specie aeternitatis, apart from the
contaminatinginfluence of emotions and of
any historically-dimensionedlife.
As a result,modern ethicists typically begin with some "original position"
having authority independent of any historical conditions and any shared
social lifeand/or end with some supreme principle grounded in reason's pure
judgment on all conditioned reality. This description applies to such
otherwise diverse thinkers asMill, Marx, Rawls, and Nozick. The problem,as Alasdair Maclntyre has pointed out, is that all such variations of the same
ideology tend to end in skepticism.
VI
I will conclude by summarizing what I have tried to argue.I have suggested thatwe should pay particular attention to two historical
influenceswhich have led somany philosophers, particularly thosewithin the
Kantian tradition, to thinkofmoral theorizing as the construction of an ideal
moral world defined by impersonal, public, absolute, and universal laws: the
belief that moral-practical reason should be modelled after a completelyformalistic delineation of theoretical reason; and the lingering influence ofthe Christian model fromwhich modern moral theories evolved.
I have argued that, insofar as Kantian theorizing has ignored the
distinctive features of privatemorality and ruled privatemorality completelyout of themoral world, ithas systematically discounted many of our most
importantmoral considerations?a part ofmorality which exists in varying
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102 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
degrees both within and outside the law, a part of morality which
complements public morality while both sustaining and competing with it.35
The losses have been great. I will mention only three. First, such theories
simply are not helpful to us when we are troubled by many of our most
important moral problems. Second, such theories offer us only a thin,
legalistic account of public morality, an account which is not only overly
simplified but also tends to undermine the spirit of morality in both our
private and public life.Finally, such theories fail to provide the foundation
for an
adequatetheory concerning the development of moral character?
moral education with its roots in private as well as public morality.If but one fundamental error is to be isolated, it lieswith Kant's first
formulation of the categorical imperative. Through ithe promulgated a basic
confusion which has permeated moral philosophy to our own day?theformalistic contention that all morality must be identifiedwith universal
laws, at the cost of themoral significance of thepersonal, the particular, and
thepartial.What Kant saidmay be trueof some laws of a just state, but what
he said is also largely irrelevant to those times in ourmoral lifewhen acting
morally does not mean acting on maxims, much less on maxims we think
should serve as universal laws.
It seems tome thatwe need completely to reconstructmoral theorizingso as adequately to take into account the complexities and subtleties of our
moral life.Aristotle provides us with a way to begin, for he did not fall into
the errors Kant so persuasively enunciated. Although he believed that
rationalitymust be intra-personal and although he believed that theoretical
thinking is amode of rationality superior to practical thinking, stillhe did not
make themistakes of believing that rationality always must be characterized
by universality, impersonality, and formal consistency, or of tryingtomodel
practical reasoning on theoretical thinking. Instead, very early in the
Nicomachean Ethics he points out that "it is themark of an educated personto look for thatdegree of precision in each kind of studywhich the nature of
the subject matter admits."36
Roger J. Sullivan
University of South Carolina, Columbia
NOTES
1.Work on thispaperwas supported inpart by a grant from theCommittee onResearch and Productive Scholarship,University of South Carolina.
2. I realize thatmy claim here flies in the face of an almost overwhelmingconcensus to thecontrary f a long listof eminentscholars,who pointout again and
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 103
again that themorality of a Greek of Aristotle's timewas entirelypublic (but, ofcourse, not in theKantian senseof 'public').However, ithardlyever ismentioned inthisregardthatAristotle tellsus thattheordinary language of his day did distinguish,albeit not completelyclearly,betweenpracticalwisdom and politicalwisdom (seeEth.Nie. 6. 8).Moreover, as a metic,Aristotle himselfhardly could have lived the full
publicAthenian life;he did livea leisured lifefilledwith study nd friendship,ust ashis Ethics recommends.At anothertime hope to show thatthe textualevidence supportsmy interpretation.ut even if werewrong on thispoint, thatwould not affectthefact that thedistinctionforwhich I am arguingfinds ubstantialsupport nour or
dinary moral awareness today.3. In thispaper I will be concerned
primarilywith how contemporaryauthors
within theKantian tradition eal with the issues and only secondarilywith whatKanthimselfheld.
4. In this section I am indebtedtoCh. Perelman, The New Rhetoric and theHumanities (Dordrecht,Holland: D. Reidel, 1971),pp. 26-35. I also wish to thankDonald Livingston forhis criticisms oth of this section and of the restof thepaper.
5. Eth. Nie. 6. 2. 1139a36.
6.Midwest Studies inPhilosophy 3 (1978): 35"?61.7. My use of the term Hobbesian' isused only as a shorthand xpressionfor the
view thatman is naturally selfish.8. "Moral Reasons," Midwest Studies inPhilosophy 3 (1978): 62.9. Ibid.
10. Taylor, p. 46. It also is thecase
that the Kantian traditiongrantssome
minimal, indirectmoral significanceto our private life insofar s the fulfillmentf
personal needs is necessary to supportpublicmoral life.See Gr. 11-13/399.11. To label these concerns 'private' is not to say theycannot be described and
discussed. To thecontrary, ince they re addressed by practical reason, they an beenunciated,and actions followingfrom uch reasoningare inprinciple ustas open toexamination as actions conforming to pure practical reason.
12.An important ritiqueof the view thatrationalityshould be restricted o rule
followingbehavior isgivenbyAndrew Harrison inhisMaking and Thinking:A Studyof IntelligentActivities (Indianapolis: Hackett PublishingCo., 1979).
13. Taylor, p. 40; see also p. 46.14. Ibid., p. 42.
15. Here and throughoutthe restof thepaper, my saying that thepublic orderrequires justice is notmeant to commitme to the claim that justice requires a
deontological justification s itsonly rational ground.16.Within this context of partiality,we may decide it ismoral to be impartial
toward those sharing a similar relationship with us, e.g., to treat several children alike.
But differences ntheir ges and, say, health,will stillmean therewill be differencesndetails of the relationshipsand how theyare structured.
17.Given the limitations f space, there re a numberof crucial questions I cannotdiscuss at any length, .g.,what inourprivate life s notmoral in ny sense?Where dowe draw the linebetweenpublic and privatemorality? In cases ofconflict, ow dowedeterminewhether public or private morality takes precedence? and so on. I aminclinedto think thatanswers to suchquestions can only indicatewhat istruefor the
most part;what, for xample, ismorally relevantinparticular situationsdepends toomuch upon the situations themselves.
18. For aWittgensteinian-based critique of the view that rationalityshould be
equated with rule-following behavior, see John McDowell's "Virtue and Reason,"TheMonist vol. 62. no. 3 (July 1979): 331-50.
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104 ROGER J. SULLIVAN
19. Eth. Nie. 1.3. 1094b21; see 11-27. All further eferences oAristotle are alsofrom th.Nie. While Aristotle refers o themajor premiseof the 'practicalsyllogism'as a universal (katholou), this snot a universalas understood inmodern logicbut onewhich is flexible ratherthanfixed; forAristotle therecan be demonstrationswith
premiseswhichhold only"for themost part."On thisseemyMorality and theGood
Life: A Commentary on Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" (Memphis:MemphisState UniversityPress, 1978),pp. 66?71. Also, J.Owens, "The Ethical Universal in
Aristotle," Studia Moralia (Rome) 3 (1965): pp. 27-47; and "TheGrounds ofEthical
Universality inAristotle,"Man and World vol. 2 no. 2 (1969): 171-93.20. 2. 7. 1107a30-31.
21. In the titleessay
inPublic and PrivateMorality,
StuartHampshire,
ed.
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1978),ProfessorHampshire offers imilar
arguments against what he calls a "rational computational morality."22. 8. 1. 1155a26?27. It is only when people are led to believe thatmorality
consists of rules thatthey ome to think theway to create amoral relationship, .g.,marriage, is by legislatingeven thedaily division of responsibilities n a mutuallyagreed pre-nuptial ontract.Although marriage isa legalcontract,itsspiritresides ina moral relationship involving ove, trust, oyalty,andmutual respect.
23. It probably isunnecessary tomention that,although skillsand character areboth hexeis,Aristotle always is careful to insistthatmoral character is not just amatter of skills.
24. 2. 2. 1104a5?6. It is character in thissensewhich enables us togo beyond the
view thatmorality consists entirelyof rules and which givesmoral meaning to theexpression 'personalautonomy'; and italso is character in thissensewhich providesthesupportfor ustice inthepublic realm.The good citizen isa justperson, that is, a
personwho acts justlybecause he is that kind ofperson.He also knows that the lawsof justice cannot totallyset out everything e shoulddo to support nd promote thecommon welfare.
25. 4. 8. 1128a33.26. Professor Veatch has pointed out thatKant insistedwe should not admire
people for theirgood moral qualities; instead,"all respectfora person isproperlyonly respectforthe law... ofwhich thepersonprovidesan example" (Gr. 17/402; seealso Pr.R. 78). See HenryB. Veatch, "The Rational Justification fMoral Principles:Can There Be Such a Thing?", TheReview ofMetaphysics vol. 29 no. 2 (1975): 231.
27. Taylor, pp. 56-7; J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1973),pp. 90-94.
28. Taylor, p. 57.
29. Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," TheJournal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 462. After I had worked out this criticism of
personhood, I came across essentiallythesame criticism nStocker's article,directed
against hedonisticegoismand utilitarianism.In thesetheories, tockerwrites, "One
person isno different rom,normore important, aluable, or special thanany other
personor evenanyotherthing. he individuals s suchare not important-What is
lacking inthese theories ... is theperson" (pp. 457, 459). Initially tseems odd thattheKantian theory s susceptibleto the same criticismas egoism and utilitarianism.The reason is thatall three ommit theerrorof extending formalistic heory bout
publicmorality to theprivate realm. In itsworst form,egoism also commits thefurther lunder ofadopting theworst possible theory fpublicmorality, tyranny. tcan be argued that letcher's situationalethics (whichadmits ofnoprinciples)and the
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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 105
Golden Rule theory (which admits of only one) apply (inadequately, I believe)primarilyto theprivaterealmand that it samistake toextend themto thoseareas oflifewherewe do need impersonalrules.
30. See Taylor, p. 50. For other argumentsagainst theKantian delineation of
'person',seeS. F. Sapontzis, "A Critique ofPersonhood," Ethics 91 (1981): 607-18.31. Professor PatrickNowell-Smith directs thiscriticismnot just againstKant but
against a general tendency fboth classical and modernwriters to "oversimplify oadisastrous extent." See his "What isAuthority?",Philosophic Exchange 2 (1976):3?15, esp. p. 4.
32. Obviously there remany otherhistorical influences am neglectinghere.One
deserves specialmention, though?Machiavelli's The Prince. ProfessorHampshirehas noted thatno one else has argued so vividlyfor the thesis thatpublic policies affectsomany that it is "irresponsibleandmorally wrong to apply topolitical action themoral standards that re appropriate toprivate life nd topersonal relations" (Publicand Private Morality, p. 49). The natural reaction toMachiavelli was to placeattentionmainly on publicmorality.
33. If this section seems too speculative,we may need to remind ourselves thatKant clearly said that,withinthe limitations f reasondelineated inthefirst ritique,he wished only to setout and defend thatview ofmoralitywhichwas already incur
rency."Who would want to introduce newprincipleofmorality and, as itwere, beits inventer, s iftheworld had hithertobeen ignorantof what duty is or had been
thoroughlywrong about it?" (Pr.R. 5n). I had emphasized the importanceof the
dominantChristian view in thedevelopmentofKant's ethical theory n "The KantianCritique ofAristotle'sMoral Philosophy:An Appraisal" (TheReview ofMetaphysicsvol. 23, no. 1 (1974): 24-53; see esp. pp. 41-42, 50-53). The claim thatwe can onlyunderstandmodern ethical theoriesby examining theirhistorical antecedentscan befound inAlasdair Maclntyre's AfterVirtue (NotreDame: UniversityofNotre Dame
Press, 1981), and J. B. Schneewind's "The Divine Corporation and theHistory of
Ethics," read at The Chapel Hill Colloquium inPhilosophy, 1981; forthcoming.34. I am indebted here to Donald Livingston's forthcomingbook, Humes
Philosophy of Common Life.35. ProfessorRawls now seems to sense theTightness f at least some of theclaims
I have beenmaking, for ina draft he recentlyread he said thatjustice as fairness s
only a political conception and not a comprehensivemoral conception framed to
combine intoone scheme the fullrangeofmoral notions (from"The Right and theGood in theConception of Social Union," read at The Chapel Hill Colloquium in
Philosophy, 1981). Ifmy analysis is in themain correct,it isunclear how an adequatenotion of privatemorality can be developedwithin a Kantian framework,nor howsuch a notion can be incorporatedintoa singlecomprehensiveKantian scheme.
36. 1.3. 1094b23-5. In this aper I have been concernedmainlywith the laim that
morality is identicalwith publicmorality. How Aristotle delineates the complexrelationshipsbetween private and publicmorality, between practical wisdom and
politicalwisdom,must remainthesubjectof anotherpaper, and thebrief referenceshavemade to his analysis obviously requirea good deal of fleshing ut. Even whenthat has been done, it is still n open questionhowmuch of his analysis isacceptable
today.