Post on 27-Jun-2020
CHAPTER-6
CIVIL WAR IN TAJIKISTAN
Twentieth century witnessed a two phased decolonization process one after the end of
Second World War in the mid twentieth century and second after the end of Cold War in
1990s. Occurrence of ethnic war, after the departure of colonial power, has become a
customary norm for the third world countries that was repeated in both the phases. Tajikistan
is no exception.
In trying to explain why ethnic definitions of identity are stronger in some times and
place than in others, has been argued that such identities are rendered salient by such socio-
historical process as industrialization and modernization. The Cold War period sidelined the
ethnic self-identification, which erupted immediately after its end. As after First World War
the concept of self-identification formed the strong ground in the formation of states based on
Wilsonian principles (Gellner 1983).
Tajikistan attained its sovereign status on September 8, 1991, after the dissolution of
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR or the Soviet Union). It was for the first time in
the history of Tajikistan that it became a self-governing unit. Immediately following
independence, Tajikistan came under intense civil unrest caused due to domestic and
international factors that delineate the fragile social, political and economic state of affairs.
The dress rehearsal of the civil war started in May 1989 with the rumor about the
arrival of Armenians who were to be housed in the new homes. In addition, the Armenians
were also attacked in Azerbaijan. Tajikistan itself was trying to cope with the natural
calamity it has been suffering due to a massive earthquake that hit Dushanbe suburbs leaving
thousands of people homeless in Hissar district on January 23, 1989. Sharara village of the
district was buried under a 17 meter landslide. All 600 inhabitans of Sharara died. An earlier
quake hit Armenia killing an estimated 25000 people. Moscow was trying to accommodate
thousands of Armenian homeless throughout the Soviet Union. Thus, the Armenian refugees
were intruding the rights of the native inhabitants who had been waiting for their turn79
(fajikistanweb 2(08)
79 On II th February 1990, an unofficial rally was organized outside the CP of Tajikistan Central Committee, mainly by young people, who shouted the slogans "Down with Armenians!" and demanded that Armenians should return back to their homes and were demanding microphones.
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The shortage of bread and a complete standstill of city transport made the situation in
Dushanbe more complicated as the cities inhabitants had to go home on foot. Along the
streets they ran into hooligans and threw stones at the law enforcement bodies. In addition
fighters from rayon's were clashing in the city. Self-defence groups, consisting of workers
and soldiers who had fought in Afghanistan, were assisting the law enforcement bodies that
were taking measures to prevent mass disturbances.8o Many people claimed that Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVO) workers knew of the impending attack on the CP of Tajikistan
Central Committee building but despite that they did not take effective measures. They were
even blamed for being involved in collaborating in kidnapping and were aware of the so-
called "informal prisons".
Subsequently, a few days before the elections, Dushanbe witnessed conflict, pogroms,
excesses and robberies from 11-14 February 1990. Dodadzhon Ismailov, head of the Tajik
State University said that, "The Tajik people have always been known for their friendliness
and hospitality. It is impossible to believe that the arrival of a few refugees from the
Caucasus could cause such a stormy reaction." He further maintained that "there were
organizers behind crowd and its actions are being directed by someone. There is no doubt
that these people want to force their way into power this way. As there was no coincidence
that such events developed precisely on the eve of the republic's Supreme Soviet elections.
That would hinder the electoral process. Such justifications were supported by D.Karimov,
the then First Secretary of the City Party Committee, who admitted that an year ago the city's
inhabitant welcomed cordially and with traditional hospitality the refugees from the I
earthquake regions in Annenia and gave them temporary shelters" (SWB, SU/0690, 1990).
In another report, the Annenians who returned from Dushanbe told at the Zvartnots
airport that the events of Tajikistan followed the same notorious scenario as Sumgait and
Baku. The refugees explained that the Tajik people have always been friendly towards the
Annenians, and in these grave days many of them defended and protected the Armenians and
expressed their indignation at the extremists' actions. The report noted that earlier
representatives of the Azerbaijan Popular Front arrived in Tajikistan to provoke anti-
Annenian sentiments. They distributed large amounts of money and drugs, specifically to
80 According to the minister ofIntemal Affairs, such corpse consisted of 50,~OO people (SWB, SUl0691. 1990)
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young people, and instigated them to expel all foreigners (first the Annenians) topple the
local authorities and create an Islamic state (SWB, SU/0693, 1990).
Yaacov Ro'i quotes "Behind the rioting had stood forces who had sought to use the
peaceful multitude in order to take power into their own hands. 'Corrupt and criminal
elements' had worked in unison with a group of nationally oriented leaders (liferov) and
people who speculated on the religious feelings of believers. Unquestionably, the anti-
socialist, religious-extremist and nationalist moods were a danger for Tadzhik society. And
the situation was made even more complicated by the subversive activities of the armed
Afghan opposition that endeavored 'at the behest of the adversary (protivnik)'s special
organs to instigate hostile manifestations among the [Soviet] popUlation. (Moscovskie
Novosti 1990)
From 15 to 17 February 1990 were declared the days of popular mourning for the
innocent people who were killed during the unrest provoked in Dushanbe. Rallies were
organized at Lenin Square in support of the mourning and putting forward the demands that
included raising the living standard and reconsidering cotton prices. Tajiks, Russians,
Uzbeks, Germans and Tatars who formed a self defence groups not only rallied against
militants and provided security to the people but were also involved in the renovation of the
city.
Soon thousands of people took part and the leaders of the unofficial organizations
renewed their call for political and economic reforms and voiced support for perestroika.
There were banners that read "We are for Garbachev, friendship with the Russians for ever"
and calls were made for the republican leadership to resign. In the meantime, loud speakers
were installed in the streets so that there could be direct transmission of the proceedings of
the extraordinary plenum. In addition to this, there was continuous radio broadcast in which
appeals were made to help the government trace the culprits who provoked against the
Annenian refugees. Though the country sutTered heavy economic losses in February,
government raised the salaries of professionals and prices of goods were reduced to contain
the socio-economic unrest.
In view of the prevailing unrest Makhamov, First Secretary of the CP of Tajikistan
Central Committee submitted his resignation but was rejected on 15 February 1990.
Subsequently, elections were held on 27 February 1990, under the state of emergency. On 25
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May 1990 Kakhar Makhamov was reelected with an absolute majority as a member of
Central Committee, a member of Buro and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
CP of Tajikistan. The informal organizations and DPT were demanding to force a national
referendum for the post of president, stop persecution of members of other political parties
and the free holding of the first DPT congress. Despite of hunger-strike being organized by
the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and other informal organizations Makhamov was elected
the Chairman of the Tajik Supreme Soviet in November 1990.
In an article published by A.Kruhilin, mentioned that in the city hospital, 250 Russian
doctors submitted applications to leave. In addition, the overwhelming majority of those
injured [during the skirmish] were Russians; all those assaulted were Russians; 82 percent of
those who left Tajikistan since the beginning of the year were Russian (SWB, SU/0713,
1990). The mass departure of tlJe non-native population was also because of the language
policy and destabilization of Tajikistan.
Buri Karimov, Chairman of the Planning Committee (who was earlier abused of a
failed coup attempt), and Nur Tabarov, Minister of Culture, were removed from their posts in
March 1990 on charges of their role in the mass disturbances in Dushanbe in February. Thus
Khojand elites openly made an exclusive clan based political and administrative structure . . In March 1991, in an all-Union referendum on the future of the USSR, 90% of the
participating electorate favored a 'renewed federation'. K.Makhamov, and the participants in
the plenum of the republican Central Committee favored preservation of united USSR and
approved the draft treaty on the union of sovereign states. During the parliamentary session
of the Soviet Central Asian republics, Makhamov was elected as the leader of the delegation.
At the same time he did not agree with a number of the draft treaty's articles which, in his
opinion, reduce the sovereignty of the republic. In particular, the article saying that "the
participants in the treaty recognize the borders existing between them at the moment of the
signing of the treaty", since it ignored historically determined borders. In addition Article 13
of the treaty also damages the sovereign rights of the subjects of the future federation. As it
says that, "if a law adopted by the union soviet is not approved in the soviets of the republics
then it is to be examined a second time in the union soviet and comes into force if it receives
two third of the votes of the delegates of the union soviet" (SWB, SUllllO, 1991). Thus
taking away the sovereign rights of the republic.
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On August 19 1991, the day before Garbachev and a group of republican leaders were
due to sign the new treaty, a group calling itself the State Emergency Committee attempted to
seize power in Moscow (Soviet coup Attempt of 1991, 2006). During days of the putsch,
Mahkamov, gave an interview to Pravda in which he expressed his unconditional support for
the organizers of the State Emergency Committee. The governments support to the
Committee was strongly criticized by the Islamic-Democratic opposition. A rally and
meetings was organized in the Dushanbe by the OPT, Rastokhez movement, IRPT, and La'l-i
Badakshan protesting against the government support to the putsch. The aftermath of the
failed coup attempt led to passing of the no confidence motion against Makhamov leading to
his resignation and Kadriddin Aslonov's appointment as the Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet.
It was reported that Tajikistan adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty whereby
it stressed on the right of the republic to leave the USSR according to the procedure
established by the union treaty, declared supremacy of the laws of the Tajik SSR throughout
the republic, suspending USSR legislation which contravenes the republic's sovereign rights
from September 8, 1991. On September 9, 1991 the Supreme Soviet declared the
independence of the renamed Republic of Tajikistan.
The situation in Dushanbe got under the control of opposition for a brief period.
Consequently, public order in the city was still maintained by the militia and self-defence
detachments. Kadriddin Aslonov, supported by Democrats and Islamist, became the acting
president of Tajikistan. immediately banned all activities of the Communist Party on the
territory of Tajikistan and the nationalization of the party's property. The auction of the state
property soon started. Initially it was first the unprofitable and loss making enterprises which
were put under the private sector. But this could not prevent the unstable economy of
Tajikistan. The very next day Aslonov was removed by Supreme Soviet from his post and
Rakhmon Nabievich Nabiev, former first Secretary, was elected as the new leader of
Tajikistan on September 28, 1991. The deputies decided to hold the next elections on
November 27, 1991.
After 14 days in power, Nabiev stepped down because of series of talks between the
republic's officials and the opposition where the council of directors, consisting of leader of
Democratic Party of Russia, Nikolay Travkin, and a group of other USSR people's deputies,
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acted mediators. The pressure of the rallying crowd and the exhaustive debate led to the
suspension of the activities of the Communist Party (known as the Socialist Party from
September 1991 to February 1992), nationalization of its property, lifting of state emergency
and date for presidential elections was fixed for October 27, 1991. According to Ahmed
Rashid, Turajonzoda predicted earlier demise of Nabiev. In his statement Turajonzoda said
that, "Nabiev can not last. He does not have broad support and there are acute divisions
within his own cabinet. People mistrust the communists while we are more united .... .Islam is
strong. Two years ago there were only seventeen mosques in Tajikistan and nineteen
churches. Today there are 2,870 mosques and still only nineteen churches" (Rashid 1994:
174-75).
There were around seventeen candidates proposed their candidatures for the election
of president of Tajikistan. Among them were: Aslonov, former chairman of the Supreme
Soviet; Davlatov, education minister; Abdudzhabbor, chairman of the national Rastokeez
movement; Nabiev, the head of the republican parliament, and Yusupov, leader of the
Democratic Party. The only person who withdrew his nomination was Haji Akbar
Turadzhonzoda, kazi of Muslims of Tajikistan who widely spoke on the creation of a secular
state. After the ban on IRPT was lifted in October 1991, it supported the candidature of
Davlat Khudonazarov, nominated by the supporters of Democratic Party of Tajikistan and
Rastokhez Popular Movement in Tajikistan. Finally there were only eight candidates who
took part in the election that were monitored by independent observers. Nabiev suspended his
tenure of office for the period of the election campaign to ensure the fairness during the
elections. Due to discrepancies in the October elections the presidential elections were again
held on 24 November 1991 as a result of an agreement between Tajikistan's leadership, the
opposition and the representatives of the USSR president. Rakhmon Nabiev who got 58% of
the votes cast was elected as the president of Tajikistan (SWB, SU/1239, 1991). In January
1992 Akbar Mirzoyev, who had previously occupied the post of the chairman of the Kulyab
oblast executive committee, was appointed as the premier of Tajikistan and Safarali
Kedzhayev as chairman of the Supreme Council. People in Gorno Badakshan protested
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against the elections results and demanded resignation of the oblast administration and
recalled the local deputies from the Tajik Supreme Soviet.s1
The onset of civil war in September 1991, where the opposition jointly called
Democratic Front, consisting of Rastokhez Movement, Democratic Party and the Islamic
Rebirth Party organized demonstrations, called for civil disobedience and took part in mass
hunger strikes82 at Azadi (Freedom) Square83 in Dushanbe. People from various parts of
Tajikistan came to Dushanbe to take part in the civil disobedience organized by the
opposition.
Amongst other things, the opposition demanded the dissolution of pro-Communist
parliament, removal of illegally elected Chairman of Tajikistan Supreme Soviet, Rakhmon
Nabiev and reinstating Aslonov as the president until the holding of the nationwide elections
for president, withdrawing criminal proceedings against Maksuda Ikramov84, Mayor of
Dushanbe, for removing the statue of Lenin from Azadi Square, withdrawal of state of
emergency in Dushanbe and changing the name of Lenin Street to Rudaki Street.
The new protests that involved people from all walks of life started when the interior
minister, Navzhuvanov, was dismissed from his post in March 1992, for abusing his position.
His supporters organized rallies and sit-in in Shahidan Square protesting against his dismissal
and demanding the dissolution of parliament and the dismissal of its speaker. 85 They
demanded for adoption of new constitution and establishment of national majlis86 (provincial
state council in the Georgian model), distribution of land to the peasantry, distribution of
81 Davlat Khudonazarov, USSR People's Deputy got just over the quarter of the votes cast. He lodged protest about the electoral malpractice.
82 The participants in the hunger strike included six religious -Muslim figures who joined the hunger strike. The reason these religious figures joined was to gain the support of the masses
83 Earlier it was known as Lenin Square.
84 He was arrested and was released after spending seven months in prison on 4111 October 1992. He later committed suicide in Khujand
85 The opposition consisted of the members of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, IRPT, Rastokhez and Lal-i Badakshan.
86 The local representative authority in the region, towns, and districts is Majils (assembly) of people's deputies, which is chaired by the chairperson who is the key person of the local government and president's main client. The chairperson is appointed by the president thus giving the president a vertical support to the country. The chairperson of the town appoints the chairperson of the jamoat that has to be approved by the jamaot.
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plants and factories to the workers, 50% reduction in the price of all goods produced in
Tajikistan, an end to the persecution of democratic forces. This time the opposition appealed
to the United States to mediate in the confrontation with the government. It is interesting to
note that in the official paper of IRPT, no article ever appeared condemning the U.S.
presence in the Gulf. Strangely, the only article on the Gulf dealt with the idea that the
participation of women in the armed forces is not against Islamic tradition. This article noted
the high number of American women serving as troops (Nejat 2000: 17).
The participants in the rallies and demonstrations included distinguished and popular
personalities like Gulruksor Safiyeva, Tajik poetess, six Sufi religious philosophers and
around 170 United Democratic Front members (SWB, SU/12OO, 1991), and students also
participated in hunger strikes. The opposition also formed special detachments on Azadi
Square in order to maintain order.
Newspaper 'Dzhumkhuriyat' published a report where in reply to the question from
the reporter of the newspaper, Shodmon Yusufov, president of the Democratic Party of
Tajikistan, stated that "If there is any attack on the participants of the rally, the reply will be
swift and decisive and they will use arms" (SWB, SU/1345, 1992). This was the first time
that such bold and open provocative statements were made by political opposition that
authenticated the presence of arms with the local popUlation in the country.
Sensing the situation getting out of control, Tajik President Nabiev called for Major
General Martovitskiy, the Deputy Commander of the Central Asian Border District, and Col.
Zabolotriy, the Commander of Dushanbe garrison for talks in March 1992. Immediately the
Square was surrounded by two rows of militiamen and soldiers armed with rubber batons and
shields. With the worsening of the political and social situation in Tajikistan, Nabiev passed
the law in April 1992, in the absence of Tajikistan's political opposition, making him the
Commander in Chief of the Tajik armed forces with the rank of the Colonel General. It may
be noted that until now Tajikistan did not have their defense forces.
The opposition pressure led to Safarali Kendzhayev's removal as Chairman of
Supreme Soviet and agreement was reached between the government and the opposition that
lead to the victory of the opposition. Among other things Tajik law banning convening of the
rallies, meetings and gatherings was passed and Ikramov (who had removed the statue of
Lenin) was arrested on charges of bribery.
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In April 1992, two simultaneous rallies were organized by the pro-government and
opposition supporters that were separated by several dozens militia cordons to avoid any
clashes. The opposition organized the rallies at Shahidan Square, were many people came
from Badakshan and Tadzhikabad who wore white martyrs' headbands with the letter 'F'
(according to some it meant Freedom) around their head, in support of the opposition, to
celebrate the victory and to continue with the demands for reform within the government
structures and reduction of the administration apparatus under the green banner of Islam.
The pro-government rallies, which received the support of the Khujand and the
Kulyab oblast, where organized at Azadi Square under red banners of Soviet Union. The
participants demanded the reinstatement of Kendzhayev, he was soon appointed as the head
of the republic's national security services, resignation of Haji Akbar Tursunzoda87 (although
the elections to the new head of the Muslim clergy were planned for next month in May
1992) and called for the introduction of Presidential form of government in Tajikistan before
the adoption of a new constitution.
A third neutral rally was organized in Dushanbe at Ayni Square where the students
and residents of certain housing districts decided to set up self-defence detachments to
restore law and order "by their own means" if it is not restored by the government. The mass
rallies led to reintroduction of presidents' rule for six months. The decision was taken in the
absence of the majority of members of the opposition. President Nabiev got right to control
executive, legislative and judicial bodies, to suspend any political party and to ban rallies. He
banned opposition newspapers, like 'Adolat' of Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the 'Sukhan'
(Word) of republic's Union of Journalists, "Dzhavonomi Tojikiston' published jointly by the
editorial st~tT and the republic's youth union, 'Charogi Ruz' published by private individuals
and the Tajik press newspaper, published by private individuals in the Russian language. The
journalist went- in exile and those who published papers from Russia in Russian were
attacked in Moscow.
While the talks between the government and the opposition headed by Muhammed
Sharif Hekmatzade, Chairman of the IRPT, were going on at the President Naiev's residence,
the government dropped the leaflets from the helicopter in the capital, carrying parliamentary
appeals to maintain calm and not to yield to provocations. Another such leaflets were
87 He received letter of support from the believers from Uzbekistan and the president of Afghanistan
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dropped at the Shahidan Square that mentioned that blocking the building of the president's
administration the leaders of the opposition had broken the law and that was a criminai
offence. President Nabiev sent an appeal to the UN Secretary General Butros Butros Ghali to
send a delegation to review the situation in Tajikistan.
On 28 April 1992, Afghanistan fell to the mujahideen and within a few days on 5
May 1992, the first shots were fired in Tajikistan that marked the beginning of the civil war.
The members of the presidents' guards open fired near the village of Leninskiy and Yavan,
20km east from Dushanbe, at the local citizens' picket who were hindering to presidents'
supporters trip from Kulyab88 to Dushanbe. This led to casualties. In reaction the opposition
took control of presidential palace and the local television centre and appealed to stop
bloodshed and reestablish peace and relayed the videotapes of shooting in Lenenskyi and
Yavan districts on the national television. Soon the skirmish spread to Dushanbe and there
were regular reports of shooting in the capitaL It was reported that Nabiev and Kendzhayev
took refuge in the National Security Committee building. Opposition blamed the government
presidents' guards for carrying out terrorist acts where the people dressed in militia and
military uniform were driving around in the city in the ambulance. Overnight armored
vehicle arrived in Dushanbe.
The domestic causes for the civil war can be studied under the following headings: -
History of interaction between ethno-regional groupings
The ethnic history, to a great extent, depends upon the topography of the country.
Tajikistan, being located at a high altitude with harsh mountain terrain discouraged the
intermingling of the people. It has four natural divisions i.e. Sogdh region, Qarategin and
Gissar Valley, Khatlon and the Gorno Badakshan Autonomous Oblast, separated by high
mountains that make the commuting from one region to another quite difficult. This has led
to the development of distinct ethuicity of each region. In addition, the uneven distribution of
popUlation and resources has also discouraged the people from mixing with one another.
Politically, economically and socially regionalism or what Tajiks called mahalgeria deprived
the country to establish a strong Tajik identity.
88 There were numerous attempts in Kulyab to obtain weaponry from the CIS inventory despite of being mined and guarded.
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The marriage pattern in the Tajik society reflects some of the realities where people
prefer to marry within clan. The Ismailis do not marry outside their community because they
not only practiccd different religious beliefs but also speak different language and the Uzbek
girls usually do not marry Tajik boys.
Russians always considered themselves to be belonging to a superior race. Despite of
feeling close to Tajiks than to the Russians of Russia due to their upbringing in Tajikistan,
their affiliation with Tajikistan was notional and not emotional. People of Gharm and
Qarategin valley were more religious. Kyrgyz of northeast i.e. in the Sogdh region and of
south east of Badakshan maintained their separate identity. People of Badakshan have a
stronger Pamiri identity that overrules common Tajik identity.
Soviet legacy
Every colony inherits good and evils of the erstwhile ruler. There is no doubt that
during the Soviet period and particularly under the Russians, Tajikistans society and
economy reached its zenith. Most of the present day society, polity and economy have been
shaped during the Soviet times. Certain policies pursued by Russians like carving out the
boundaries of present day Tajikistan that made Tajiks devoid of its cultural capital's
Samarkand and Bukhara, frequently alteration of demography of Tajikistan and making it
ethnically heterogeneous, passing language law and promotion of Russian language
education, ethnic separatism in line with the usage of the term nationa/'nost used to
categorize the popUlation in terms of their nationality that was supported by Tajik
geographical proximity, Moscow supported the political and administrative recruitment
based on clan based or tribal considerations, discouraged the creation of nation-state. (For
details see Chapter II).
Traditionally the elites of Tajikistan were in a habit of receiving orders from Moscow.
The policies of Tajikistan related to social, economic, administrative, educational, judicial,
executive, etc. were directly controlled by Moscow where Tajiks were only involved in its
implementation. This led to a lack of skilled policy making professionals amongst the Tajiks.
In order to maintain control over the region, Russians adopted a policy of divide and
rule where Russians themselves acted as balancer. Thus, the process of regionalism was
established. The Soviet employed historians and scholars were encouraged to create histories
and ethnographies of the Tajik people, that showed them as distinct ethnic group- a version
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of history that was then disseminated through schools, media and other propaganda channels.
A particularly significant figure in this was the Tajik historian Babadzhan Gafurov, who
wrote several histories of the "Tajik" that became standard reading in schools from 1960s
onwards. This campaign of ethnic "self expression" was, of course, carefully controlled.
Forms ofTajik "nationalism" that undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet state, or attempted
to develop an alternative model of n~tional identity, were immediately curtailed. And at the
same time as encouraging national "self expression", the state was also promoting during
most of the Soviet period a programme of creeping russification: Russian became a
compulsory subject on the school curriculum, and Russian became de facto the language of
most administrative academic and political life (Tett 1996: 29). The policy for the
development ofthe Tajik national identity received a thrust during the Gorbachev's policy of
glasnost when the intellectual elite in Tajikistan rose to assert their Tajik Persian identity
above the Soviet Russian identity. There was an instant euphoria amongst the Tajik
intelligentsia to relate to their Persian brothers in Iran and Afghanistan and rediscover their
glorious Persian past. The cultural organizations soon raised to challenge the political
communist conservative to recognize their Persian and Muslim identity above the atheistic
Soviet communist policy. These organizations took an extreme form when the communist
refused to step down and recognize them as political forces in the country.
Soon after the disintegration of Tajikistan and with the disappearance of the balancer
resulted in the staggered nation building process that facilitated the escalation of the ethno-
regional tendencies. In addition, political elites were not able to look beyond maximizing
their social, political and economic advantages and creating their own secured status rather
than finding a roadmap to nation-building process. The feeble economic, social and political
structure due to its dependence on Russians; absence of common Tajik national identity;
ideological vacuum and inexperience in decision making and handling of state structure
amongst the Tajiks; reluctance of regional leaders to compromise with each other; and
fmally, Tajiks could not come out of their overall dependence on Uzbekistan and Russia this
was true for economic, ideological, political and defence facilities were additional reasons to
their internal weakness.
In addition to this, according to United Nations Secretary General's (UNSG) report of
August 1993, "The conflict in Tajikistan has also been fueled by an abundance of arms.
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Large quantities of arms were left by the Soviet forces when they evacuated from
Afghanistan through the territory of Tajikistan. In addition, after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the southern borders of Tajikistan with Afghanistan (l,387 kilometers in
length) became virtually open and porous to arms smuggling" (S/I993/23611). In an
interview with Monica Whitlock mentioned that 'The Russians sold us their bullets and a few
guns as well. The bullets, naturally, fitted the weapons bought in Afghanistan, as all were of
Soviet provenances. Then we went to the Russian and paid them to come with us in their
tanks and shoot Sangak's men. We used to rent them for an hour or so, for about a million
rubles. Sometimes more.' (A million rubles was worth about a thousand dollars: probably
much smaller sums also changed hands.) The Kulyabi militia did the same. 'The Russians
would shoot at us for up to a week sometimes. Then they would turn around and shoot the
Gharmis,' says Jafar. 'The more they changed sides, the higher they could drive the price'"
(Whitlock 2002: 167).
It should be noted that the arms not sold but coming to Tajikistan from different
countries particularly from Pakistan via Afghanistan funded by Saudi Arabia and US and
Iran.
Rise of Islamic Extremism
In the post-Soviet Tajikistan the Muslim political elite organized themse~ves under
different categories. First were, fundamentalist like the Hizb ut-Tahrir who out rightly rejects
the democratic values and contemporary western liberal culture. They aspire to establish
Islamic law and morality; secondly the traditionalists, which include the mullahs and some
members of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) who seek to establish a
conservative social order. They reject globalization, modernity and any change; third are
modernists, some members of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan come under this
category working towards finding a meeting point between Islam and democracy. Finally, the
secularists, under this category come the president's party (Peoples Democratic Party of
Tajikistan), communists, socialists and democrats. They want to separate religion from the
politics of the country. At the same time they have, on occasion used Islam as a means to
develop nationalism and external relations with other Islamic nations and thus establishing a
united country and being part of Muslim Brotherhood respectively.
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These rising tendencies and political aspirations got the support of Afghanistan and
clandestinely by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran challenging the secular communist
government at the centre. The support had two fold objectives, first was to spread extremist
Islam in the region and second was to find a foothold
Social, political and economic dominance of the regional elites
Traditionally the ruling elite came from Khujand region that got the support of
Uzbekistan and Russia. Khujand, being the ruling capital, was a developed region. They
survived because of their endorsement of strong regional policy and the strong regional
division was quoted under the popular excerpt, "Leninabad governs, Gharm does business,
Kulyab guards, Pamir dances, Qurghonteppa ploughs". In the Soviet times nothing was done
in order to promote regional representation at the centre. The wide gap between the centre
and the peripheral regions led to an acute tension among the groups. The Badakshonis and
particularly the Ismailis, regarded as Kajirs by the Sunni majority Muslims of the region due
to their European and more open lifestyle, were at the subordinate position at the centre. The
other sub-ethnic regional groups had no opportunity to be part of the higher ranks at the
centre.
Soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union, a new fragile security environment
emerged in the region. The regional elites rebelled and made every effort to benefit from the
fragile national and international situation in their favor. The opposition initially did not want
the Khojandis to be marginalized as they realized the economic importance of the region. But
the Khujandi elites were not ready to share the power with the newly emerging political
forces. The incompetence of the Khojandis to keep the opposition in check and the desire to
continue exclusive rule made Khojandis invite Uzbekistan and Russia to intervene in the
internal affairs. This policy of Tajik President Nabiev is seen by many observers as an
important reason for the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan.
Every effort was undertaken to keep the opposition, which drew its support from
other regions, away from the power structure like they were not given any important
positions in the state structure. Instead stringent measures were taken to keep them from
expanding their sphere of influence. When Kulyab government established its control at the
centre the Khojandis were marginalized leading to insecurity amongst the Khojandi clan
leading to the rise of separatist movements in Khujand.
218
Regionalism
According to Oliver Roy, "Everywhere you go the cadres are local, and below the level
of hiikim or president of the soviet district they were virtually unshiftable. They run things
not so much by administrative power as by means of networks and informal meetings. They
themselves operate via logic of networks: if they are suspected of favoritism to their own
people, they have to move fast to smooth things out with the other groups so a~ to avoid
incidents which might be reported back to the authorities at the centre and compromise their
position. Rotation of cadres is a punishment, and therefore temporary" (Roy 2000: 90). He
further explores that "An initial elite was recruited from among the Pamiris (for instance
Shirinshah Shahtimur, born in 1899, who was president of the Soviet from 1933 to 1937).
The explanation of this may have been that the Pamiris, being poor, not very religious,
looked down on by the Sunni and under Russian domination since the 1870s, had played the
Russian card. However, the Pamiris were purged in 1937" (Roy 2000: 113). After that the
Khojend faction formed the ruling elites. This was because the region being more developed,
more Russified and also more 'Uzbekised' than the rest of Tajikistan (Roy 2000: 113).
While the first secretary was always from Leninabad, "the president of the Council of
Ministers was a Kulabi from 1985 onwards (Khayayev between 1985-1990) and the
president of the Assembly (an honorary position) was a Gharmi from Fayzabad, the Gharmi
town closest to the power elites. The war in Afghanistan put the Pamiris back in the saddle,
because Moscow was nervous of possible collusion between the Tajiks and the Afghan
Mujahediin, and decided to give the Pamiris the MVD and part of the KGB. Thus the only
ones to be excluded from power were the Gharmis, and they went on to become politicized
under the banner of Islam" (Roy 2000: 114).
By the end of 1980s, social and political discontent among the Tajiks increased that
led to the development of underground political movements and occasional violent inter-
group conflicts over the allocation of state resources. Some movements had taken a
xenophobic and nationalistic character and slogans like "Tajikistan for the Tajiks" were used
in street demonstrations. These developments contributed to an exodus of ethnic Slave,
Germans and Jews, many of whom had skilled professional and whose departure undermined
the Tajik industrial, educational and health sector (Akiner 2001).
219
The pro-government supporters came from Khujand and Kulyab, where in the Kulyab
camp there were two factions i.e. Kulyabi and from Gissari. Tajik authorities, after Sangak
Safarov's death, decided to set up a Tajik army on the basis of the armed units from Kulyab.
This alienated the Kulyab faction of their support of Gissar, leading to a new struggle for
power between Kulyabis and Gissaries. Despite Mansurov, who was from Gissar, was
appointed the new mayor of Dushanbe the mistrust between the two could not be resolved.
The anti-government supporters came from Kurgan-Tyube, Gharm-Qarategin and
parts of Badakshan. They had their own regional parties and party members. With the
governments repressive policies most of the opposition members were functioning from
Afghanistan, Iran, Moscow, Badakshan and Qarategin.
Ethnic self-consciousness
The independence of Tajikistan was not sought after and was not earned out of some
internal Tajik revolutionary movement. Oliver Roy has analyzed the situation as "on 19th
August 1991, a conservative coup d'etat threatening Mikhail Gorbachev and jeopardized his
reforms of the Soviet Union. Most of the leaders of the Muslim Soviet republics promptly
approved the putsches action. A few days later, these same people went on to declare the
independence of their respective countries, which was then carried through during the next
three months. Out came new flags and new slogans in celebration of independence,
fatherland and nation. Competitions were organized for the writing of national anthems and
the design of national embalms. The communist parties transformed into presidential
parties .. .leaders who in 1991 had come directly from the Soviet nomenclature, and who only
a few months previously had still been repeating Moscow slogans, now became the
mouthpiece of nationalism that was not hostile to Russia and open to the West" (Roy 2000:
vii).
Perestroika revolutionized the entire Soviet republics. There was a sudden spur in the
demands by various republics to revive their native language and culture. According to
K. Warikoo, "New political parties and activist groups that have been established across
Central Asia, are not only promoting the civic, political and religious demands of indigenous
peoples, but are also resorting to anti-Russian/Slav stance" (Warikoo 1995: 18-19). In
Tajikistan the initiative was undertaken by the Rastokhez Popular Movement. The
220
movements and nationalist slogans were used in the streets of Tajikistan, especially during
the Annenian issue.
M.Mirrakhimov, one of the Rastokhez leaders, who stated that the time for persuasion
and discussion, has passed he said, "We will travel around the regions of the republic, meet
with the students in hostels, and rouse them to the struggle against the Russians .... He also
has particular scores to settle with the Uzbeks, whom, according to his 'good words', Tajiks
will be mistaken for when they drive the Russians from the republic" (SWB, SU/0768,
1990).
The over emphasis on language law and revival of Tajik culture and tradition made
the people divert from important point and urgent need to initiate the nation building process
and resolve the economic and social problems arising out of the breakdown of the existing
administrative structure.
Ethnic elections and selections
When Nabiev was fonnally elected after the November 1991 elections, the entire
ministry was dominated by the fonner communists from Khojand-Kulyab regions.
At the Supreme Soviet session in Khujand on December 2, 1992, when the new
cabinet was introduced, the entire ministry came from the Tajik Communist Party and its
members were from Kulyab region with some portfolio allotted to Khojand faction. Soon
after the death of Sangak Safarov, the entire ministry was reshuffled and the entire ministry
was exclusively made up of the Kulyab clan. The head of all the important institutions or
government organization are from Kulyab region or their loyalist. Some of the ministers were
reportedly inexperienced and others had criminal records.
The members of the Popular Front militia, with majority members from Kulyab, were
reinstated in the Tajik regular army. Consequently, only the Kulyab militia earned an official
status but remaining regional mercenaries continued to exist.
Government policies
The policies toward opposition were the main reasons for the continuation of the civil
war. Soon after President Rahmon became the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, in Jan
1993, he instituted a judicial proceedings against the leaders of the opposition parties
including Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, spiritual head of the Tajik Muslims, Mohammed Sharif
221
Himatzoda89 of Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Tohir Abdurjabbor of Rastokhez
Popular Movements, Atobek of Lali Badakshan and Shodmon Yusuf, leader of the
Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and former deputy premier Davlat Usmon, deputy chairman
of the IRPT. They were accused of entering into a criminal collusion in May 1992 for the
purpose of seizing power and overthrowing the lawfully elected leadership of the republic.
They were also charged with committing anti-constitutional actions that called for forcible
overthrow of lawfully governing body, installing defacto leadership of the republic, creating
unlawful armed groups, masterminding combat actions that led to the fratricidal war and
caused causalities and damaging the economy of the country. Finally, on the basis of several
volumes of evidence, including newspaper clips, photographs and video material the decision
was taken against the opposition parties. A few days before the elections of the peoples
deputies organized an open hearing in the Supreme Court of Tajikistan under the Tajik
Procurator General Makhmadnazar Salikhov's appeal to suspend the activities of the bloc of
opposition socio-political organizations, including the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the
Islamic Rebirth Party, the Rastokhez Popular Movement and the Lali Badakshan society. In
fact, the opposition needed to be recognized and not marginalized in order to solve the
conflict. Media control, gross human rights violation and denial of existence of political
opposition further aggravated the situation.
The government called the opposition' Vofchiks', a Russian nickname for Vladimir,
which was slang used for 'Wahhabis'. In response, the government side came to be known as
'Yurchiks' a nickname for Yuri (Wetmanek 369). International efforts were made to establish
peace.
The peace agreement of 1997 made way to the enactment of new constitution that
provides safeguards and 30 percent reservations for opposition in the Parliament. Yet there
were frequent removals of the opposition members thus discouraging them to be part of
political structure. Moreover, they were given an insignificant position in the Ministry. In
fact, the concept of representative democracy, political accommodation and compromise is a
new ideology.
89 Also called 'the Gulbuddin of Central Asia' by his followers (Rashid 1994: 159)
222
\Veakening of the state structure
Inability of government to have centralized control kept the security situation shaky.
Lack of common unifying ideology, constant struggle for power amongst various ethnic
groups, use of "unconstitutional means" to maintain their control, and failure of economy led
to endemic corruption regarded as the legacy of soviet communist system. Consequently the
regional leaders acquired strength and tested their power positions nationally as well as
internationally. The weak state made government conform to unconstitutional and brutal
means to curb all the opposition and establish its firm control at the centre.
Security dilemma or security threat
The security dilemma was the result of weak state and the change in the power
structure. When Safarali Kenjayev became part of the Khujand camp, he targeted the Pamiri
minister of the interior, Naujavanov, who had been in the post since 1987. "This attack (the
reason for which were obscure) soon led to a mobilization among the Pamiris of Dushanbe
(originated into the Lal-i Badakshon 'ruby of Badakshan') party, who feared that they were
again going to be removed from power, 55 years after the purges of 1937" (Roy 2000: 139).
The opposition armed forces called Nijat-; Mill; (Front for National Salvation), under Davlat
Usman, head of the Front and Shadman Yusuf, chairman of the Democratic Party, was
founded in June 1992 after an attack on pro-Nabiev forces in Kulyab. In Dushanbe the
opposition armed group called Youth of Tajikistan was led by Mulla Khudaidad Abdul
Ghaffur, who was also a member of IRPT and sponsored government in exile in northern
Afghanistan. The fighters of the opposition were well trained in the training camps of
Afghanistan and Pakistan by the professionals against the pro-government not so well trained
and motivated armed personnel. The emergence of the opposition forces as a potential
security threat led the pro-government demonstrators demanding for weapons near the army
check-point in Kulyab. The government increased the border forces to prevent any supply of
anns and ammunition entering into the republic from Afghanistan.
Many efforts were made to resolve the differences between the government and the
opposition like Khorog Peace Agreement of July 1992.90 But such agreements could not be
implemented due to the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the
National Security Committee, and the Defence Committee, as they were the ones responsible
90 For details see 'Civil War Events 1992-1997' later in this chapter
223
for carrymg out the objects of the Khorog agreement. Lack of momentum in the
implementation of the decisions taken and the time limit placed for meeting the points of the
agreement also led to its failure. The presence of Russian troops was seen with suspicion by
the opposition because of their direct involvement in internal armed conflict. Khorog Peace
Agreement was an important agreement and the absence of President Nabiev made all side
not only worried towards Nabiev's seriousness towards the peace process but also led
opposition to declare a no-confidence in him that called for public support. Nuri in many of
his statements said that the Russian border troops were one of the causes of tension. He even
criticized the UN for not being able to put pressure on them in order to force them to respect
the Tehran agreement and stop cease-fire violations (SWB, SU/2251, 1995). The opposition
even charged the international community and international organizations for undertaking
biased position in Tajik crisis. Opposition radio Voice of Free Tajikistan had criticized the
UN report by the UN military observers investigating the situation in the Shuroabad section
of the border in southern Tajikistan on the grounds that it only covered the territory held by
the government and not the region held by the IRPT despite of UN assurance of checking the
areas under the opposition control before sending their report to UN headquarters in New
York (SWB, SU/2515, 1996). In another incidence, the opposition objected to a United
Nations peace plan for Tajikistan on the grounds that it does not take opposition interests into
account. Hajik Akbar Turajonzoda was quoted as telling that "We do not tum down their
initiatives, but we are confident they do not offer a solution to the settlement in Tajikistan"
(SWB, SU/2536, 1996). EarlierNuri had criticized the UN Secretary General's special envoy
to Tajikistan, Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, for completely ignoring government violation of cease-
fire agreement during the inter-Tajik talks. Nuri in his letter to Priz-Ballon categorically
mentioned that "Your Excellency is making a one-sided judgment and has not even
mentioned the clashes in Tavildara ...... as you always make one sided judgment, my trust in
you has decreased" (SWB, SU/2486, 1995). Despite of losing faith on international observers
the opposition and the government continued the political dialogue under the UN
supervision.
Government and opposition accused each other for breaking the peace agreements. It
was difficult to analyze which side was acting as an offensive force. Tension and mistrust
between warring factions towards each other prevented implementation of peace agreement
224
as each side feared losing military and psychological advantages. There were frequent
amnesties treaties signed between the government and the warring groups but were never
implemented.
After Imomali Rahmon came to power, the relations between the government and the
opposition were further worsened. There were frequent attacks on the detachments of Kulyab
factions in Kurgan-Tyube from the Afghan border and Shar-Shar pass area. This was because
Kulyabis were trying to consolidate its control over the entire Khatlon region. Kulyabis got
involved in ethnic cleansing of pro-opposition Pamiris and Qarategnies that led to thier
fleeing to their native homeland and Afghanistan. The opposition party was declared illegal
and death sentences and arrest warrants were issued against the opposition leaders that made
them take refuge in Iran, Afghanistan and Moscow.
There were also rumors that led to security predicament. Such as in 1991, there were
rumors about attack on the Russians and Russian speaking population in Gissar that not only
led many Russian and Russian speaking population left the country or migrated to other
towns but also led to active Russian involvement in the Tajik civil war. In May 1992, during
the mass demonstrations there were various rumors claiming that the participants of the pro-
government rallies are against Islam and Sharia'h. There were also rumors about several
thousand Lokaytsy horsemen (an Uzbek ethnic group) who were supporters of the
government, had set out for Dushanbe from Kulyab. The situation got more fragile when the
chief Muslim official of Kulyab, Haidar Sharifzoda, called upon the authorities to give arms
to the pro-government demonstrators in Shahidan Square and that there were rumors about
the loss of weapons from the armories of one of the service units in Kulyab Oblast.
Democratization process
Tajikistan has no experience of democracy and the democracy is only in name. The
concept is imposed from above rather than developing from within the society. Just before
the elections most of the opposition parties are created by the ruling elite in order to maintain
democratic norms. However, often the opposition parties are banned and their leaders
charged with false accusation before the elections. The elections are rigged. Sobotov,
financial manager of an international organization. told that, "on the day of recent
presidential election I asked my wife why I should go to cast my vote when I already know
225
what the result is going to be" (Sobitov 2007). It is widely alleged that sometimes it is
already decided about the total number of votes for a particular candidate.
Sangak Safarov, leader of Peoples Front, in his speech in the parliamentary session,
after Rahmon was appointed the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and pro-government forces
took over Dushanbe, mentioned that "We will cleanse Tajikistan and Russia of the
democratic scum!" (SWB, SU11568, 1992).
There is no room for opposition parties to develop or propagate their ideology. The
opposition parties lack financial resources to work effectively. There is often banning of the
opposition parties like in August 1991 President Makhamov signed a decree banning the
political parties and movements. Again in September 1991 when Aslonov took charge of
Tajikistan he immediately banned the newly formed Socialist Party of Tajikistan earlier
known as Communist Party of Tajikistan, under Shodi Shobdulov.
During the time of civil war, number of prominent figures and journalists were put
behind bar on charges of conspiracy to seize power, using the mass media to stir up civil
disorder, murder, hostage-taking, attacks on state institutions and various other offensives.
According to the Russian radio, Mirbobo Mirrahimov, the former head of the Tajik television
and radio, Jumakhon Azizmamadov, former deputy chief of Dushanbe internal affairs
directorate, Ahmadsho Kalimov, Kaireddin Kosimov and Khurshed Nazarov, all senior
officials of the so-called Popular TV station, and Ajik Aliyev and Rahimjonov, member of
the presidium of IRPT were arrested. Criminal proceedings were initiated against Akbar
Kahorov, leader of the Tajik Kaziyat, Shodmon Yusupov, the Chairman of the Democratic
Party, Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, a prominent member of the IRPT and Davlat
Usmonov, the former deputy premier (SWB, SU/1608, 1993). Abdumalik Abdullojonov,
acting premier from 1992-93 was charged for armed blockade in South regions of the
republic during the armed standoff (SWB, SU12024, 1994). In addition it was reported that
between 1992-94 there were around 35 journalists who were killed and more than 200 had to
flee the country (SWB, SU/2223, 1995). All these acts suggested that no opposition was
tolerated in the republic.
By thwarting the development of democratic institutions, the present leaders of the
Central Asian Republics have eliminated the possibilities of political change being effected
without a convulsion. The unpredictability of succession breeds instability. In all likelihood,
226
the old guard fonner Communist elite that has been in power continuously since the mid or
late 1980s is going to be replaced by a younger generation of nationalists who might be more
emphatically inclined towards the forces representing tradition and religion (radical Islam not
completely out ruled) (Kaushik 2005: 44). He further analyses that, "The Central Asian states
have moved from a single party totalitarian system to a personalized authoritarianism of their
executive presidents" (Kaushik 2005: 43). R.R.Sharma, terms the political system as "fa~ade
democracies" which has been imposed from above, and where democracy has been reduced
to so-called formal elections. Such a system is what he considers is "static and fragile". The
lack of elite-mass linkages and socio-political dialogue is not only retarding socio-economic
development, but also encouraging traditionalist-conservative formations by pushing back
the formation of a healthy civil society (Sharma 2005: 27).
Media
There was no freedom of press and the local media speaks the language of the
government. To a great extent, it was responsible for forming a negative opinion regarding
the opposition movement activists. IRPT and some other organizations did have their own
Radio station and newspapers sometimes published outside e.g. Chirog-e Russ but the
national TV channels and main newspapers were under the control of the government. The
independent journalists or those who wrote against the government were put behind the bars
under false allegations.
It was noted that the Russian Fund for the Protection of glasnost, which works to
promote media freedom, had sent an appeal to the then Russian ambassador to Tajikistan,
Mechislav Senkevich, over the increasing number of cases of interference by the Tajik
authorities in the work of Russian journalists. "The funds cited the example of Tajik Culture
and Information Minister Bobokhon Mahmadov, who personally 'recommended' last May
that Tatyana Lougnov, a journalist from the All-Russian State Television and Radio
Broadcasting Company (who run the Russian TV channel), should not broadcast a report on
the assassination of two leading Tajik academics. The appeal added that a similar
'recommendation' had been received by the Russian NTV correspondent, Oldizhon Ashurov,
a week later. Video tapes have also been confiscated from Russian cameramen and one
Russian newspaper reporter was barred from visiting an area of hostilities in the central
district of Tavildara, the agency said (SWB, SU/2651 , 1996).
227
In the post-Soviet era the newspaper circulation has reduced sharply due to high
expense of material, government pressure and control, refusal to renew license, persecution
of journalists and no opposition newspaper were operating in the run-up to the 2006
presidential elections.
Economic crises and economic discrimination
Soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the economic and socio-political
situation deteriorated not only in Tajikistan but in the entire erstwhile Soviet republics. There
was shortage of food products, drop of agricultural production, closure of factories and
industries, dropping in the salaries of the professionals, and scarcity of electricity and power
supply. The supply of the products from one rayon to the other was also blocked. There was
regular breach of economic agreement between the two oblasts. For example, during the civil
war there was no delivery of meat and cotton from Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube and potato's
from Gharms and Tajikabad to Dushanbe.
The new economic situation and policies were not well taken by the people of
Tajikistan. In one of President Nabiev's visit to Dangara rayon in January 1992, and after
meeting the heads of local soviets, heads of enterprises of the agro-industrial complex, heads
of local trade unions and local intellectuals, he expressed his concern that the people were
showing more and more discontent towards the introduction of price liberalization. The
situation was getting more difficult because in some places officials had not fixed the
maximum limit on regulatory prices. Trade organizations were selling the same goods with
different prices. This caused anger and indignation among the consumers and mistrust
towards law-enforcement bodies.
Opportunistic politicians
The weak state structure and lack of strong political ideology facilitated power-
hungry politicians to use undemocratic means and unsubstantiated reasons to gain and
maintain power. The failure to recognize the real cause that was lying in the rigid local clan
based political contradiction within the society made the situation tensed. The blames and
counter blames, removal of Nabiev or changing the constitutional structure failed to vent out
regional hatred.
Demonstrations were organized with not much knowledge about the reason due to
lack of information and propaganda both by the government and the opposition. The
228
ignorance amongst the people was exploited both by the government and the opposition. For
example in March 1989, several dozen young people gathered for meetings without reason
that got out of control. When tried to find out the motives, who directed them towards
unlawful actions, and what interests and aims they pursue for their demonstration, the third
year students mentioned about the problems like environment, the Arabic script, and NavTUZ.
But when asked whether they were familiar with the resolution of the Tajik Council of
Ministers on the holding ofNavruz or with the Law on the Procedure for Holding Rallies and
Meetings, they said that they had no time for television or the newspapers. Another important
point was that the people who took part in the meeting were of the same nationality, which
caused an alarming and damaging situation in the city (SWB, SU/0450, 1989).
Inadequate safeguards for the minority rights
There were no efforts made by the government to safeguard the rights of the
minorities. The language law that made Tajiki an official language discourage the Russian
and Russian speaking population to live in Tajikistan. Russia itself was in a weak social and
economic position and was not in a prepared to accommodate the migration of a large
population from Central Asian region. So Russia took immediate steps to arrest the shaky
situation in Tajikistan. Other ethnic minorities like Uzbkes, Jews and Bahai community were
also targeted.
Women stake
In October 1992, women from areas around Dushanbe organized mass rally outside
the Supreme Soviet building demanding an immediate end to the fratricidal war. Many
thousand women from Gissar joined "the peace march" in Dushanbe on 8 December 1992
demanding to participate as the third party in the negotiation between Safarali Kendzhayev
forces, occupying a combatant position in Gissar, and representatives of the Gissar
detachments. They aimed to save their husbands and sons from the senseless war.
Political Parties organized along ethno-regionallines
Islamic Rebirth Party (IRPT), officially registered in December 1991, got their main
support from Southwest Tajikistan i.e. Qarategin valley. There were also forces loyal to Haji
Akbar Turajonzoda (chief Islamic cleric of the Republic), known as the leader of Islamic
democrats.
229
The Rastokhez Popular Movement and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT)
were anti-Marxist reformist parties that wanted to establish democracy, market economy and
more evenhanded distribution of power. They were representatives of elite having their
support base in Dushanbe.
La'li- Badakshan, under the leadership of Atobek Amiirbekov, was a party whose
members were primarily Pamiri pe:ople campaigned for greater autonomy for the
mountainous Badakshan region and the political, social, economic and educational
development of the Badakshan. At no point did the people of Badakshan wanted to succeed
from Tajikistan. Though they united with the opposition and took part in several inter-Tajik
negotiations that were held from 1994 to 1997, it left United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in
December 1999. Another party of this region was Nosiri Khusraw a non-political association
of Badakshan region.
Popular Front (PF), know as Sitodi Melli in Tajik, was a party of Kulyabi
paramilitary forces which brought President Rahmon to power.91
During the war the IRPT, DPT and Rastokhez Movement united under a common
banner of United Tajik Opposition.
In 1990, Shodmon Yusuf founded the Democratic Party of Tajikistan that led a
successful mobilization of majority of population in August 1991 against the Communist
Party of Tajikistan (CPT), the majority of the members of the CPT came from the Sogdh and
the Kulyab region.
In late 1996, the people living in the north formed a political opposition party the
National Revival Party (NRP), also called Union for National Reconciliation, under the
leadership of Abdulmalik Abduladjanov, former prime minister of Tajikistan and contested
against Rahmon during 1994 presidential elections. They formed the party due to complete
exclusion of the northern region from the reconciliation process, between the government
and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) that took place from 1994 to 1997.
91 PF emerged in May 1992 during the pro-Communist rally in Dushanbe, when then President Nabiyev created a 'presidential guard' by distributing weapons to the demonstrators. Nabiyev officially disbanded the guards several days later. Many Kulyabis, however, took the Kalashnikovs they received back to Kulob, where they started to organize paramilitary groups. The self-proclaimed Popular Front first appeared in Khatlon province in the summer of 1992 and later surfaced in Gissar province near Dushanbe. Its most prominent leaders were Sangak Safarov and Faizali Saidov. It is believed that in 1992 they received substantial support- including money, weapons and ammunition- from various sources supportive of the Tajik government, including those in Uzbekistan and Russia.
230
Lack of or delayed international response to the internal crises of Tajikistan
Repeated appeals were made by President Nabiev to the international organizations to
get involved in the internal crisis of Tajikistan. When the opposition fighters attacked Nurek
Power station, Nabiev appealed to Air force Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov of Russia to
undertake the protection of the key industrial facilities of the republic. The units of
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) called "blue helmets" an allied armed forces,
took over the responsibility. However, the political opposition and the top Muslim clergy
resisted the proposal as they considered that the presence of a "foreign military contingent"
in the conflict zone as interference in Tajikistan's internal affairs.
On his trip to Pyanj in Gorno Badakshon Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in August
1992, Nabiev expressed his concern towards the illegal arms and drug smuggling (for drug
smuggling the old Silk Route was revived to export drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and
Europe through Central Asia) and immigrants coming from Afghanistan. He feared that such
activities could turn Tajikistan into another Afghanistan. He called upon the CIS and Russian
federation to help Tajikistan guard its borders with Afghanistan from arms and drugs
smuggling but not involve themselves in resolving internal crises.
During the war the general conduct of Nabiev and later Rahmon's, came under severe
national and international criticism. Uzbek President Karimov openly criticized Nabiev for
his inefficiency in maintaining law and order.
Initially the international community was disinterested in Tajik crisis as the entire
region has tough terrains. meager of resources, connectivity problem thus discouraging the
international media to expose the internal situation. Tajiks ethnic groups also lacked strong
lobby in the west. In addition to this, events of Tajikistan did not directly effected Europe and
the US. It was only after the radical activities of al-Qaida the US and the western world
started taking interest in Tajikistan. Tajikistan being one of the main transit routes for drugs
further made it a sensitive area.
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RESULTS OF CIVIL WAR
Islamic Extremism: In fact, the rapid politicization of Islam and the emergence of militant
Islamic movement in Tajikistan was the result of Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan. It
dramatically changed the ideological orientation of Tajiks. Azad Beg, the leader of the
Islamic Union of the Northern Province of Afghanistan, influenced the Tajiks in Tajikistan.
Tajiks acted as spies in the Soviet army. During the Soviet operation in Afghanistan the
mujahideen established wide contact with the Tajiks of Tajikistan. The Tajik soldiers in the
Soviet army had crescent on their collars. The active involvement of IRPT in the civil war of
Tajikistan led to the rise of Islamic extremism in Tajikistan. Some of the better and renowned
leaders of IRPT, including Davlat Usman and Muhammad Sharif Himmatzoda, who had
taken refuge in Afghanistan, had a strong influence of the mujahideen. After the end of civil
war the Islamists were able to establish themselves as a legal political force with Islam as
their political ideology. The Islamist's have emerged as a main political opposition in the
country. Other than the IRPT there are other small militant radical Islamist groups like Hizb
ut-Tahrir who have been active in the Ferghana Valley. The post 9/11 incidence has given the
government a chance to undertake repressive policies against any opposition under the name
of threat from Islamic extremist forces.
Refugee crises: Tajiks are known for being stationary people and do not like to move away
from the clan. Their contact with the neighbors was limited to social and trade relations. The
civil war changes this situation. According to Tadjabaksh, during the civil war period over
90,000 people of primarily Gharmi and Pamiri origin fled to Afghanistan to avoid
persecution by pro-government forces and up to 500,000 were internally displaced within the
republic. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1994 helped in the return
of large number from Afghanistan. They were reestablished in their homes (Tadjabaksh
1996: 341).
The end of civil war required the refugees to return homes and contribute to the
countries economy. The returnees often came under attack from the local population, their
homes were taken over or destroyed in their absence, there were no jobs as the factories were
closed and the drought became a regular feature. The refuges not only came under attack
from their people in Tajikistan but they also risked their lives during their return. There were
occasions when Uzbekistan would block the passage to the return of the refugees through its
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territory. On other occasions they came under attack from Afghan authorities. For example in
July 1994 Afghan authorities detained "without the slightest ground" two Uzbek barges
taking Tajik refllgees home from Afghanistan. They were detained on the Afghan port of
Sher Khan on the river Pyandzh, which formed the border between Afghanistan and
Tajikistan (SUI2060, 1994: 0/4). It was also reported that the opposition field commander
Were employing "threats, blackmail and force to hamper return of Tajik refugees to their
homeland" (SWB, SU/1955, 1994). A large section of Tajiks believe that refugees would
become a burden on Tajik economy and in absence of their employment they may indulge in
anti-social activities.
In the south, the villages populated by the mountain people of Oharm - who were
brought in Soviet times to pick cotton in the plains - stayed largely in ruins without any
money to help rebuild them. Many of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who returned
from Afghanistan were living in deep poverty that was made worse by a yearlong drought.
The chaos of the war, as well as the deaths of 50,000 people from a popUlation of six million,
has similarly devastated the economy. Almost nothing remains except a large aluminum
plant, a gold mine and the cotton fields, which are slowly shrinking from the breakdown of
the Soviet-installed irrigation system. Even with the peace agreement, the control of the
government barely reaches beyond the capital, Dushanbe. "In fact, only 30km to the east of
the city one finds a group of armed and irregular troops at a checkpoint on the road who
answer not to the President but to a local warlord called Umar" (Hill 2006: 2001).
Drug and arms trafficking: The border guard and the Noth Atlantic Treaty Organisation
forces have failed to prevent drugs and arms trafficking on the Tajik-Afghan border. Apart
from the trans-border movements and smuggling of arms and ammunition, Afghan
mujahideen leaders openly abetted rise of militancy among the Muslims of Tajikistan. Drug
trafficking is perhaps the largest threat to stability faced by Tajikistan today. Khorog in
Tajikistan, Osh in Kyrgyzstan, Andijan in Uzbekistan, and Almaty in Kazakhstan are some
of the important trade route points of drugs smuggling before it reaches Russia and Europe.
Sugdh region is also one of the major centres for drug smuggling.
In Tajikistan women and children are involved in the drug business. It is because
since July 2003, Tajikistan abolished the death penalty for women. A man can receive a
death penalty for possessing of 5g or more of heroin (tajnet.com, July 30, 2(03). This is also
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because in Pamir region it is the women who do the business. It is hard to see the Tajik men
sitting in the market, particularly in Khorog. Even the small international trade (also referred
to as suitcase trading) is done by the women. From Almaty the drugs are carried in trains by
children and elderly to Russia and from Russia it gets distributed in Europe. Government
agencies charged with stopping the drug flow are reportedly riddled with corruption.
The head of Federal Board Service Col-Gen Konstantin Totskiy told Interfax that
"Since 1993, Russian border guards have seized 10 t of various drugs on the Tajik-Afghan
border, including over a ton of heroin" (SWB, SU/49 1 0, 2000). There were even reports that
the Russian border forces were also involved in the drug smuggling. The drugs that were
internally taken across were usually of vegetable origin i.e. opium, marijuana, hemp and
heroin.
According to Martha Brill Olcott, "The Tajiks introduced their national currency, the
Somani, in 2000 and with it the beginnings of a private banking sector. But there has been
much less transparency here than in Kyrgyzstan, and IMF assistance has been periodically
suspended because of allegations of Tajik officials deliberately manipulating official
statistics. Some of this manipulation was certainly sheer negligence, but the negligence has
helped conceal the economic impact of the narcotics trade, which throughout the 1990s was
presumed to have been equal to between 50 to 100 percent of Tajikistan's GDP, depending
on the size of each years Afghan poppy harvest" (Olcott 2005: 44-45).
It should be noted that the drug smuggling across the Tajik-Afghan border became
much more organized and sophisticated. A routine smuggling operation involving a small
group of men would go in front of armed drug couriers. If they encounter border guards, the
group will draw fire, allowing the smugglers time to escape into Afghanistan; their actions
were well coordinated. It was not uncommon for the border detachments to encounter a
group of smugglers giving battle over several hours, using hand grenades, grenade launchers
and machine guns, fired in different directions (Serebrov, 2002: k36). According to Viktor
Kondrashov, Commander of the Moskovskiy Border detachment, 'it's virtually impossible
for an outsider to get into the gang'" (Serebrov, 2002: k36).
Though the Ismaili spiritual leader has made number of appeals to his followers in
Badakshon region to stay away from narco trade, the economic crisis and the lack of job
opportunities have kept the trade flourishing. It is interesting to note that the average income
234
of a family is not more than US dollars 50. If one visits the home of the local resident's one
will never feel the financial crisis in the family. Everyone is well dressed with proper shoes
in their feet's. Its hard to see that with so little income one can have the luxuries of even
possessing the posh cars. The endemic corruption and parallel narco-economy keep the
families wann and flourishing. At the same time Tajik government's inability to check
trafficking tide is seen as one of the reasons that keep them from attracting foreign
investments.
The head of Panj unit of the Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, Col. Sergy Usenko
noted that "contacts between drug dealers on the Tajik and Afghan sides of the border
resumed after the mass repatriation of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan last year. He noted
that in the majority of cases, the movement of drugs was conducted by 'well armed groups
with modem means of communication'" (SWB, SU/3348, 1998).
Social Implication: "Liberalization of the economy without the proper preparatory work,
severance of economic ties with Russia and other member countries of the CIS, the
undeclared economic blockade by Uzbekistan, the civil war with all conservative effects
brought abrupt decline in living standards of the people, and a catastrophic fall of major
indicators of social development" (ChatteIjee 2001: 44). Tajikistan has the lowest living
standards among the countries of CIS. There has been continuous decline in the income of
the people. The majority of population is not able to pay for its communal services like
electricity, gas, water, sewage, garbage, etc. There is also shortage in the supply of fuel and
gas. It has led to cutting of trees thus leading to environmental disasters.
Outburst of criminal actions like robberies, smuggling, and killing of innocent people
etc., is not only due to easy availability of firearms but also because of the weak state defence
mechanism, economic condition and political stalemate.
The system of education suffered huge problems. The state finance on education was
minimized thus not only discouraging the teachers but also resulted in an underdeveloped
education system. Difficult situation arose due to the outflow of teachers and professionals
for work in other countries or teachers adopting other professions. During an informal
conversation with a taxi driver in Khujand he mentioned "I was a lecturer during the soviet
times. Since I am the only earning member in the family it became difficult to run the family
with the income. It is because of this that I have taken up taxi driving as means of living." In
235
addition the weak educational syllabus has resulted in the shortage of experts who can fill in
the required job credentials. There are not many book stores in the country. In the absence of
competitive education, lack of study material available for the students and declining intei~st
of children towards studies is likely to push the extremist forces and illicit activities taking
roots in their minds. According to an international observer, "People see incompetent and
uneducated leaders and their loyalist holding top positions. It is very frustrating for the young
generation and discourages them to take education seriously."
In April 1993, Rahmon intended to submit an amendment to the law on the language
for granting Russian language an equal status with Tajiki thus reducing the dearth of
specialist as the training of the local Tajik to conduct the specialist task would have required
lot of time, infrastructure and funding.
The World Bank along with IMF "focuses on both addressing policy and utilizing
IDA credit funds for investment. The ongoing Education Modernisation Project (Fr03) aims
to upgrade the basic education system through (a) building capacity for change by providing
continued support for strategic changes in curriculum and textbook production and
supporting imprOVed management and finance at the national level; and (b) supporting local
initiatives for infrastructure and quality improvement, support for textbook rental schemes
and book printing, and provision of equipment at the local level. Tajikistan has also received
grant funding from the Education for All (EF A) FITI catalytic fund, administered by the
Bank. Key issues in education, apart from infrastructure rehabilitation and capacity building,
are pay reforms, per capita fmancing and expenditure tracking. Assistance to this sector will
continue through the Programmatic Development Policy Financing (PDPF), multi-donor
education investment program, and PSRP. Bank's involvement also inc1udes ..... budgeting in
the sector through the PDPF' (World Bank 2007: 9).
Deterioration of social and industrial infrastructure and a sharp decline in the social,
health services, lack of heating fuel for schools, homes and hospitals and a sharp drop in the
real income of most families denied them of even their basic needs. The civil war made many
professionals leave the country for Russia and other countries for social and economic
security. The migration also led to demographic imbalance.
According to the Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 "There is no law
on emigration. Persons who wish to emigrate to the former Soviet Union must notify the
236
Ministry of Interior prior to their departure. Persons who wish to emigrate beyond the
borders of the former Soviet Union must receive an immigrant visa from the relevant
country's embassy to obtain their passport. Persons who settle abroad are required to inform
the Tajikistan Embassy or Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian Embassy or
consulate. Labor migration was an important economic factor, and a local research
organization reported that, during the year, more than 600,000 persons left country looking
for a job" (Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003,2004).
In addition, there was land mine problem that requires training of mine awareness,
planning of humanitarian mine clearance and to coordinate, support and develop mine
awareness training of population. Water and sanitation issue is another big problem that
needs an immediate action. Till date there is no clean water in certain parts of Dushanbe and
despite of having a rich river network, Tajikistan's homes suffers from water shortage.
The judicial situation has got out of control. According to the Deputy Internal
Minister, Azimov, over 300 people were arrested in Dushanbe for illegal possession of
weapons and ammunitions in 1993. But criminal proceedings and investigations were
conducted on only half of those arrested, since there was virtually nobody to conduct these
cases because of the departure of some Procurator's Office and Ministry of Internal Affairs
investigators. He further mentioned that "To this day, many of those arrested have been
deprived of legal protection. The charges against journalists and opposition members have
been altered twice: from 'theft of state property', to 'illegal possession of weapons', to
'treason against motherland'. The recent amendments to the Republic of Tajikistan Criminal
Code, which were adopted two months ago, gave the authorities the right to use the most
severe punishments, even including the death penalty" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 1993).
There is gross human rights violation by the government and there is no system of checks
and balances. Many times the cases are secretly conducted and international observers are not
allowed to be part of the judicial proceedings in spite of repeated requests from international
organizations. Sometime the defence lawyers are also allocated by the government and even
the relatives are not allowed to be part of judicial proceedings.
The corruption is endemic. According to combined report by Strategic Research
Centre (SRC) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) there are two types of
corruption practiced one is business take-over and the other is power take-over (SRC 2006:
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1(0). "The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, which, beyond any doubt, is fully
aware of the levels of conuption, repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the process of
democratization has become vulnerable because of the increasing scale of conuption"
(Strategic Research Centre 2006: 8). The President of the Republic of Tajikistan said that
"such a negative phenomenon as corruption is. one is of the gravest obstacles in the
development of our society. We must conduct a comprehensive study and analyze factors and
causes of corruption and mobilize all sound forces of our society to put corruption under
restrain and reduce its lever' (Rakhmonov 2005: 1). The SRC and UNDP recognizes that the
decrease in the living standard and increase in conuption are caused by the synthesized
stratification of the recent civil war and the lack of financial resources that are accompanied
by lack of experience and professionalism in the government of the newly formed sovereign
state, unfavourable economic conditions, lack of understanding and support of some of the
population and lack of political will and fear of critical changes that have been brought about
by the different market reforms (SRC 2006: 8).
Political situation: Fierce political competition between regions alienated the ethnic groups
from each other. In addition weak state structure, civil war and outside interference hampered
the course of reconciliation. Any political opposition is met with harsh punishment. On many
occasions peace talks were postponed and had even led to elimination of the opposition
parties. An important emphasis after the civil war in Tajikistan was on peace, which did not
lead to the desired unity between the two opposing sides. President Rahmon is credited for
bringing peace and opposition is blamed for being responsible for civil war.
The concept of Tajik nationalism, which the Kulyabis promoted, was directed against
the northern part of Tajikistan and the Pamiris. The government was criticized internally and
internationally for its violations of the political and human rights. The political alienation of
opposition and one region rule has made the country sit on the time bomb.
Economic Deterioration: In 1993-94 the total indebtedness on State Credit for Tajikistan
was $127,000,000 that was to be paid by 1996-2000 that was the highest amongst the Central
Asian republics (Business MN 1996: 79 & 92). According to Deputy Minister, Ministry of
Finance Tajikistan, "over the period 1991-1996, the production volume fell to 33.1 % of their
1991 level; in 1997 GDP was down by more than 60010 on 1991; and the standard living fell
sharply (AbibuUaev 2000 105). Industrial Production decreased from -24.2 in 1992 to -30.8
238
in 1994 and agricultural production decreased to -25 percent in 1994 (Ekonomika stran
Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv v 1994, 1995: 107). In addition, the negotiations
between the government and the Intematicnal Monetary Fund (lMF) remained difficult due
to inefficiency of the government to draft the budget plan.
The bread prices decreased due to the huge humanitarian assistance provided by
international community but the problem remains due to acute shortage of hard currency.
Most of the industrial plants remained non-functional due to civil unrest, the local warlords
rather than the Tajik government controlled the key installations, lack of experts due to out-
migration of Russian and other professional elites, non-availability of raw material, the total
expenditure was more than the total production, tax evasion (highest offender was the Tajik
aluminum plant), corruption remained widespread due to feeble judicial system, lacks
transparency at higher levels, low income and absence of anti-corruption strategy, security
crisis at the key installations and non-payment of bank loans discouraged the foreign
investors. As a matter of fact, not all the investor were registered and that there were no
accurate documents to suggest the total imports and exports of the country due to huge
difference in Tajik government figures and the figures by the government of other countries.
There was energy shortage leading to critical enterprise development. Uzbekistan also
stopped the supply of gas and electricity supplies to Tajikistan due to latter's failure to raise
and pay back the necessary revenues, could not collect debts owned by consumers and its
failure to negotiate the prices of the gas and electricity supply with Uzbekistan.
The living condition kept deteriorating particularly in the south and east. The northern
part remained economically much better and accounted for more than half of Tajik economic
production. This was because the northern part of Tajikistan was disconnected from the civil
war that was taking place in the south and southeast.
The inadequate purchasing ability of the population and the low productivity of
agricultural production in rural areas influenced lower consumption of food in the country. It
led to protein and calories deficiency and resulted in retarded development of children both
physically and mentally. The health sector is also in a state of mess due to shortage of
medicines and doctors. The Tajik economy lacks expertise. It produces only a few
agricukural and industrial items. The import and export ration is uneven and is in favour of
imports. The bulk of food, machine, equipments and consumer goods are imported.
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The highest level of development of the economy of Tajikistan was reached in 1989.
After the 1989 the country plunged into economic crisis which affected its economic
conditions. MiIZoev puts down the following reasons for the slowing down of the rate of
socio-economic progress as follows: - inadequate incentive to scientific-technological
development and the negative rate of scientific-technological progress, exhaustion of the
reserves for extensive growth of agriculture in its cotton dominated structure, weak
development of food grain producing branches, insufficient development of labour-intensive
branches of industry, high growth of population and labour resources, insufficient attention to
professional technical-education and to growth of employment potential, higher proportion of
population not engaged in socially productive labour, irrational system of utilization in the
unregulated zone of cultivation, low mobility of agricultural population, disproportion
between the professional qualification level of the labour and needs of modem production.
The situation further aggravated with the shortage of capital investment. There was acute
shortage of workers in the industrial units. The crisis further deepened with idleness of
equipment and other losses of working hours, inadequacy of technology on account of delay
in installation of equipment, and under-utilization of the production capacity and no
reduction in the level of labour use in work place (MiIZoev 1998: 54).
Earlier Moscow used to manage procurement of raw material and machinery from the
erstwhile Soviet Union for functioning of industries, after Tajik became an independent
country it faced with procuring those materials from different sources. In addition, the
production of machine-building products fell sharply. Industrial production outside the
Khujand region is particularly affected by the civil war. The large scale destruction of
factories, lack of transport network and the diversion of many workers from production units
not only hampered functioning of industries but required huge investments and recruitment
of new skilled workers. Due to lack of jobs many Tajiks left the country for better
opportunities. It has resulted not only in lack of labour forces available but has also disturbed
the demographic balance in the region. Though the government had no or little control over
the countries factories, it announced privatization of large state companies into joint-stock
companies with assistance from World Bank. However, cotton was excluded from the
general privatization programme and that 40 percent of cotton production and processing was
held by the State Cotton Production and Marketing.
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The effective salary of the masses decreased and the inflation increased leading to an
abrupt fall in the living standards of the people. The Tajik currency-Simony- devalued in the
international market. Moreover the frequent landslides and earthquakes make the social and
economic situation worse.
One of the worst outcomes of the civil war was that it led to further consolidation of
division of ethno-regional identities.
To conclude, the civil war in Tajikistan was the result of both internal and external
factors. The war was initially fought between the Khujand-Kulyab-Gissar alliance against the
Qarategnis and Pamiris. The Khujand-Kulyab alliance was supported by Uzbekistan and
Russia after the Islamist-democratic alliance government was formed for a brief period in
1992 that was supported by Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Kulyab and Gissar provided
military support to the traditional Khujand ruling elites. The new government that was
formed replaced the old leadership with the Kulyab group forming the government. They
were successful in not only eliminating the substantial political opposition by not only
organizing ethnic persecution and judicially charging the opposition leaders for ethnic
disorder at the country but also refused to share power with their allys i.e. Khojandis and
Gissaris. The government offensive against the opposition made many internally displaced
and many took refuge in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and other CIS countries.
Whenever Tajik government forces came under any kind of opposition pressure the
government had to compromise to some unreasonable demands like demanding resignation
of the members of the ministry, change of the political appointees from the region or freeing
of the captured rebels.
Weak state structure enables the destructive and extremist forces to take advantage
and compel the state to grant them concessions. Anti-social element has also prospered
because of weakness of the authorities. It also prolonged the nation-building process.
Interestingly sometimes small independent militiamen, like Khudoberdiyev and Ibod,
managed to gain prominence and establish their sphere of influence in the region. However,
they failed to gain the status of third force.
The long association with the Afghans and their internal economic crisis has
established a flourishing narco-trade that has its first stop in Tajikistan before it reaches
Russia and Europe. The failure of government to political accommodation, social mingling
241
and revive war tom economy may keep the security situation fragile. The porous borders
between the two nations also facilitated in the spread of Islamic extremism and illegal
weapon trade across the borders.
It was only after the repeated appeal by Tajik president and the official appeal made
by Uzbekistan to the United Nations that it had sent its special envoy to intervene in the Tajik
crisis. He organized rounds of talks between the government and the opposition where
Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Pakistan had observer
status. From April 1994 to June 1997 rounds of talks took place at various venues provided
by the observer countries. While the peace talks were going on the fighting in Tajikistan
between the warring sides continued.
The changing political situation was responsible for the outbreak of civil war in
Tajikistan as well as for the formal establishment of peace. It was after the fall of Najibullah
government and the establishment of mujahideen rule in Afghanistan that was followed by
the eruption of civil war in Tajikistan. The establishment of Taliban rule in Kabul,
Afghanistan forced the warring sides to reach a compromise.
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