CHAPTER-6

CIVIL WAR IN TAJIKISTAN

Twentieth century witnessed a two phased decolonization process one after the end of

Second World War in the mid twentieth century and second after the end of Cold War in

1990s. Occurrence of ethnic war, after the departure of colonial power, has become a

customary norm for the third world countries that was repeated in both the phases. Tajikistan

is no exception.

In trying to explain why ethnic definitions of identity are stronger in some times and

place than in others, has been argued that such identities are rendered salient by such socio-

historical process as industrialization and modernization. The Cold War period sidelined the

ethnic self-identification, which erupted immediately after its end. As after First World War

the concept of self-identification formed the strong ground in the formation of states based on

Wilsonian principles (Gellner 1983).

Tajikistan attained its sovereign status on September 8, 1991, after the dissolution of

Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR or the Soviet Union). It was for the first time in

the history of Tajikistan that it became a self-governing unit. Immediately following

independence, Tajikistan came under intense civil unrest caused due to domestic and

international factors that delineate the fragile social, political and economic state of affairs.

The dress rehearsal of the civil war started in May 1989 with the rumor about the

arrival of Armenians who were to be housed in the new homes. In addition, the Armenians

were also attacked in Azerbaijan. Tajikistan itself was trying to cope with the natural

calamity it has been suffering due to a massive earthquake that hit Dushanbe suburbs leaving

thousands of people homeless in Hissar district on January 23, 1989. Sharara village of the

district was buried under a 17 meter landslide. All 600 inhabitans of Sharara died. An earlier

quake hit Armenia killing an estimated 25000 people. Moscow was trying to accommodate

thousands of Armenian homeless throughout the Soviet Union. Thus, the Armenian refugees

were intruding the rights of the native inhabitants who had been waiting for their turn79

(fajikistanweb 2(08)

79 On II th February 1990, an unofficial rally was organized outside the CP of Tajikistan Central Committee, mainly by young people, who shouted the slogans "Down with Armenians!" and demanded that Armenians should return back to their homes and were demanding microphones.

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The shortage of bread and a complete standstill of city transport made the situation in

Dushanbe more complicated as the cities inhabitants had to go home on foot. Along the

streets they ran into hooligans and threw stones at the law enforcement bodies. In addition

fighters from rayon's were clashing in the city. Self-defence groups, consisting of workers

and soldiers who had fought in Afghanistan, were assisting the law enforcement bodies that

were taking measures to prevent mass disturbances.8o Many people claimed that Ministry of

Internal Affairs (MVO) workers knew of the impending attack on the CP of Tajikistan

Central Committee building but despite that they did not take effective measures. They were

even blamed for being involved in collaborating in kidnapping and were aware of the so-

called "informal prisons".

Subsequently, a few days before the elections, Dushanbe witnessed conflict, pogroms,

excesses and robberies from 11-14 February 1990. Dodadzhon Ismailov, head of the Tajik

State University said that, "The Tajik people have always been known for their friendliness

and hospitality. It is impossible to believe that the arrival of a few refugees from the

Caucasus could cause such a stormy reaction." He further maintained that "there were

organizers behind crowd and its actions are being directed by someone. There is no doubt

that these people want to force their way into power this way. As there was no coincidence

that such events developed precisely on the eve of the republic's Supreme Soviet elections.

That would hinder the electoral process. Such justifications were supported by D.Karimov,

the then First Secretary of the City Party Committee, who admitted that an year ago the city's

inhabitant welcomed cordially and with traditional hospitality the refugees from the I

earthquake regions in Annenia and gave them temporary shelters" (SWB, SU/0690, 1990).

In another report, the Annenians who returned from Dushanbe told at the Zvartnots

airport that the events of Tajikistan followed the same notorious scenario as Sumgait and

Baku. The refugees explained that the Tajik people have always been friendly towards the

Annenians, and in these grave days many of them defended and protected the Armenians and

expressed their indignation at the extremists' actions. The report noted that earlier

representatives of the Azerbaijan Popular Front arrived in Tajikistan to provoke anti-

Annenian sentiments. They distributed large amounts of money and drugs, specifically to

80 According to the minister ofIntemal Affairs, such corpse consisted of 50,~OO people (SWB, SUl0691. 1990)

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young people, and instigated them to expel all foreigners (first the Annenians) topple the

local authorities and create an Islamic state (SWB, SU/0693, 1990).

Yaacov Ro'i quotes "Behind the rioting had stood forces who had sought to use the

peaceful multitude in order to take power into their own hands. 'Corrupt and criminal

elements' had worked in unison with a group of nationally oriented leaders (liferov) and

people who speculated on the religious feelings of believers. Unquestionably, the anti-

socialist, religious-extremist and nationalist moods were a danger for Tadzhik society. And

the situation was made even more complicated by the subversive activities of the armed

Afghan opposition that endeavored 'at the behest of the adversary (protivnik)'s special

organs to instigate hostile manifestations among the [Soviet] popUlation. (Moscovskie

Novosti 1990)

From 15 to 17 February 1990 were declared the days of popular mourning for the

innocent people who were killed during the unrest provoked in Dushanbe. Rallies were

organized at Lenin Square in support of the mourning and putting forward the demands that

included raising the living standard and reconsidering cotton prices. Tajiks, Russians,

Uzbeks, Germans and Tatars who formed a self defence groups not only rallied against

militants and provided security to the people but were also involved in the renovation of the

city.

Soon thousands of people took part and the leaders of the unofficial organizations

renewed their call for political and economic reforms and voiced support for perestroika.

There were banners that read "We are for Garbachev, friendship with the Russians for ever"

and calls were made for the republican leadership to resign. In the meantime, loud speakers

were installed in the streets so that there could be direct transmission of the proceedings of

the extraordinary plenum. In addition to this, there was continuous radio broadcast in which

appeals were made to help the government trace the culprits who provoked against the

Annenian refugees. Though the country sutTered heavy economic losses in February,

government raised the salaries of professionals and prices of goods were reduced to contain

the socio-economic unrest.

In view of the prevailing unrest Makhamov, First Secretary of the CP of Tajikistan

Central Committee submitted his resignation but was rejected on 15 February 1990.

Subsequently, elections were held on 27 February 1990, under the state of emergency. On 25

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May 1990 Kakhar Makhamov was reelected with an absolute majority as a member of

Central Committee, a member of Buro and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the

CP of Tajikistan. The informal organizations and DPT were demanding to force a national

referendum for the post of president, stop persecution of members of other political parties

and the free holding of the first DPT congress. Despite of hunger-strike being organized by

the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and other informal organizations Makhamov was elected

the Chairman of the Tajik Supreme Soviet in November 1990.

In an article published by A.Kruhilin, mentioned that in the city hospital, 250 Russian

doctors submitted applications to leave. In addition, the overwhelming majority of those

injured [during the skirmish] were Russians; all those assaulted were Russians; 82 percent of

those who left Tajikistan since the beginning of the year were Russian (SWB, SU/0713,

1990). The mass departure of tlJe non-native population was also because of the language

policy and destabilization of Tajikistan.

Buri Karimov, Chairman of the Planning Committee (who was earlier abused of a

failed coup attempt), and Nur Tabarov, Minister of Culture, were removed from their posts in

March 1990 on charges of their role in the mass disturbances in Dushanbe in February. Thus

Khojand elites openly made an exclusive clan based political and administrative structure . . In March 1991, in an all-Union referendum on the future of the USSR, 90% of the

participating electorate favored a 'renewed federation'. K.Makhamov, and the participants in

the plenum of the republican Central Committee favored preservation of united USSR and

approved the draft treaty on the union of sovereign states. During the parliamentary session

of the Soviet Central Asian republics, Makhamov was elected as the leader of the delegation.

At the same time he did not agree with a number of the draft treaty's articles which, in his

opinion, reduce the sovereignty of the republic. In particular, the article saying that "the

participants in the treaty recognize the borders existing between them at the moment of the

signing of the treaty", since it ignored historically determined borders. In addition Article 13

of the treaty also damages the sovereign rights of the subjects of the future federation. As it

says that, "if a law adopted by the union soviet is not approved in the soviets of the republics

then it is to be examined a second time in the union soviet and comes into force if it receives

two third of the votes of the delegates of the union soviet" (SWB, SUllllO, 1991). Thus

taking away the sovereign rights of the republic.

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On August 19 1991, the day before Garbachev and a group of republican leaders were

due to sign the new treaty, a group calling itself the State Emergency Committee attempted to

seize power in Moscow (Soviet coup Attempt of 1991, 2006). During days of the putsch,

Mahkamov, gave an interview to Pravda in which he expressed his unconditional support for

the organizers of the State Emergency Committee. The governments support to the

Committee was strongly criticized by the Islamic-Democratic opposition. A rally and

meetings was organized in the Dushanbe by the OPT, Rastokhez movement, IRPT, and La'l-i

Badakshan protesting against the government support to the putsch. The aftermath of the

failed coup attempt led to passing of the no confidence motion against Makhamov leading to

his resignation and Kadriddin Aslonov's appointment as the Chairman of the Supreme

Soviet.

It was reported that Tajikistan adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty whereby

it stressed on the right of the republic to leave the USSR according to the procedure

established by the union treaty, declared supremacy of the laws of the Tajik SSR throughout

the republic, suspending USSR legislation which contravenes the republic's sovereign rights

from September 8, 1991. On September 9, 1991 the Supreme Soviet declared the

independence of the renamed Republic of Tajikistan.

The situation in Dushanbe got under the control of opposition for a brief period.

Consequently, public order in the city was still maintained by the militia and self-defence

detachments. Kadriddin Aslonov, supported by Democrats and Islamist, became the acting

president of Tajikistan. immediately banned all activities of the Communist Party on the

territory of Tajikistan and the nationalization of the party's property. The auction of the state

property soon started. Initially it was first the unprofitable and loss making enterprises which

were put under the private sector. But this could not prevent the unstable economy of

Tajikistan. The very next day Aslonov was removed by Supreme Soviet from his post and

Rakhmon Nabievich Nabiev, former first Secretary, was elected as the new leader of

Tajikistan on September 28, 1991. The deputies decided to hold the next elections on

November 27, 1991.

After 14 days in power, Nabiev stepped down because of series of talks between the

republic's officials and the opposition where the council of directors, consisting of leader of

Democratic Party of Russia, Nikolay Travkin, and a group of other USSR people's deputies,

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acted mediators. The pressure of the rallying crowd and the exhaustive debate led to the

suspension of the activities of the Communist Party (known as the Socialist Party from

September 1991 to February 1992), nationalization of its property, lifting of state emergency

and date for presidential elections was fixed for October 27, 1991. According to Ahmed

Rashid, Turajonzoda predicted earlier demise of Nabiev. In his statement Turajonzoda said

that, "Nabiev can not last. He does not have broad support and there are acute divisions

within his own cabinet. People mistrust the communists while we are more united .... .Islam is

strong. Two years ago there were only seventeen mosques in Tajikistan and nineteen

churches. Today there are 2,870 mosques and still only nineteen churches" (Rashid 1994:

174-75).

There were around seventeen candidates proposed their candidatures for the election

of president of Tajikistan. Among them were: Aslonov, former chairman of the Supreme

Soviet; Davlatov, education minister; Abdudzhabbor, chairman of the national Rastokeez

movement; Nabiev, the head of the republican parliament, and Yusupov, leader of the

Democratic Party. The only person who withdrew his nomination was Haji Akbar

Turadzhonzoda, kazi of Muslims of Tajikistan who widely spoke on the creation of a secular

state. After the ban on IRPT was lifted in October 1991, it supported the candidature of

Davlat Khudonazarov, nominated by the supporters of Democratic Party of Tajikistan and

Rastokhez Popular Movement in Tajikistan. Finally there were only eight candidates who

took part in the election that were monitored by independent observers. Nabiev suspended his

tenure of office for the period of the election campaign to ensure the fairness during the

elections. Due to discrepancies in the October elections the presidential elections were again

held on 24 November 1991 as a result of an agreement between Tajikistan's leadership, the

opposition and the representatives of the USSR president. Rakhmon Nabiev who got 58% of

the votes cast was elected as the president of Tajikistan (SWB, SU/1239, 1991). In January

1992 Akbar Mirzoyev, who had previously occupied the post of the chairman of the Kulyab

oblast executive committee, was appointed as the premier of Tajikistan and Safarali

Kedzhayev as chairman of the Supreme Council. People in Gorno Badakshan protested

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against the elections results and demanded resignation of the oblast administration and

recalled the local deputies from the Tajik Supreme Soviet.s1

The onset of civil war in September 1991, where the opposition jointly called

Democratic Front, consisting of Rastokhez Movement, Democratic Party and the Islamic

Rebirth Party organized demonstrations, called for civil disobedience and took part in mass

hunger strikes82 at Azadi (Freedom) Square83 in Dushanbe. People from various parts of

Tajikistan came to Dushanbe to take part in the civil disobedience organized by the

opposition.

Amongst other things, the opposition demanded the dissolution of pro-Communist

parliament, removal of illegally elected Chairman of Tajikistan Supreme Soviet, Rakhmon

Nabiev and reinstating Aslonov as the president until the holding of the nationwide elections

for president, withdrawing criminal proceedings against Maksuda Ikramov84, Mayor of

Dushanbe, for removing the statue of Lenin from Azadi Square, withdrawal of state of

emergency in Dushanbe and changing the name of Lenin Street to Rudaki Street.

The new protests that involved people from all walks of life started when the interior

minister, Navzhuvanov, was dismissed from his post in March 1992, for abusing his position.

His supporters organized rallies and sit-in in Shahidan Square protesting against his dismissal

and demanding the dissolution of parliament and the dismissal of its speaker. 85 They

demanded for adoption of new constitution and establishment of national majlis86 (provincial

state council in the Georgian model), distribution of land to the peasantry, distribution of

81 Davlat Khudonazarov, USSR People's Deputy got just over the quarter of the votes cast. He lodged protest about the electoral malpractice.

82 The participants in the hunger strike included six religious -Muslim figures who joined the hunger strike. The reason these religious figures joined was to gain the support of the masses

83 Earlier it was known as Lenin Square.

84 He was arrested and was released after spending seven months in prison on 4111 October 1992. He later committed suicide in Khujand

85 The opposition consisted of the members of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, IRPT, Rastokhez and Lal-i Badakshan.

86 The local representative authority in the region, towns, and districts is Majils (assembly) of people's deputies, which is chaired by the chairperson who is the key person of the local government and president's main client. The chairperson is appointed by the president thus giving the president a vertical support to the country. The chairperson of the town appoints the chairperson of the jamoat that has to be approved by the jamaot.

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plants and factories to the workers, 50% reduction in the price of all goods produced in

Tajikistan, an end to the persecution of democratic forces. This time the opposition appealed

to the United States to mediate in the confrontation with the government. It is interesting to

note that in the official paper of IRPT, no article ever appeared condemning the U.S.

presence in the Gulf. Strangely, the only article on the Gulf dealt with the idea that the

participation of women in the armed forces is not against Islamic tradition. This article noted

the high number of American women serving as troops (Nejat 2000: 17).

The participants in the rallies and demonstrations included distinguished and popular

personalities like Gulruksor Safiyeva, Tajik poetess, six Sufi religious philosophers and

around 170 United Democratic Front members (SWB, SU/12OO, 1991), and students also

participated in hunger strikes. The opposition also formed special detachments on Azadi

Square in order to maintain order.

Newspaper 'Dzhumkhuriyat' published a report where in reply to the question from

the reporter of the newspaper, Shodmon Yusufov, president of the Democratic Party of

Tajikistan, stated that "If there is any attack on the participants of the rally, the reply will be

swift and decisive and they will use arms" (SWB, SU/1345, 1992). This was the first time

that such bold and open provocative statements were made by political opposition that

authenticated the presence of arms with the local popUlation in the country.

Sensing the situation getting out of control, Tajik President Nabiev called for Major

General Martovitskiy, the Deputy Commander of the Central Asian Border District, and Col.

Zabolotriy, the Commander of Dushanbe garrison for talks in March 1992. Immediately the

Square was surrounded by two rows of militiamen and soldiers armed with rubber batons and

shields. With the worsening of the political and social situation in Tajikistan, Nabiev passed

the law in April 1992, in the absence of Tajikistan's political opposition, making him the

Commander in Chief of the Tajik armed forces with the rank of the Colonel General. It may

be noted that until now Tajikistan did not have their defense forces.

The opposition pressure led to Safarali Kendzhayev's removal as Chairman of

Supreme Soviet and agreement was reached between the government and the opposition that

lead to the victory of the opposition. Among other things Tajik law banning convening of the

rallies, meetings and gatherings was passed and Ikramov (who had removed the statue of

Lenin) was arrested on charges of bribery.

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In April 1992, two simultaneous rallies were organized by the pro-government and

opposition supporters that were separated by several dozens militia cordons to avoid any

clashes. The opposition organized the rallies at Shahidan Square, were many people came

from Badakshan and Tadzhikabad who wore white martyrs' headbands with the letter 'F'

(according to some it meant Freedom) around their head, in support of the opposition, to

celebrate the victory and to continue with the demands for reform within the government

structures and reduction of the administration apparatus under the green banner of Islam.

The pro-government rallies, which received the support of the Khujand and the

Kulyab oblast, where organized at Azadi Square under red banners of Soviet Union. The

participants demanded the reinstatement of Kendzhayev, he was soon appointed as the head

of the republic's national security services, resignation of Haji Akbar Tursunzoda87 (although

the elections to the new head of the Muslim clergy were planned for next month in May

1992) and called for the introduction of Presidential form of government in Tajikistan before

the adoption of a new constitution.

A third neutral rally was organized in Dushanbe at Ayni Square where the students

and residents of certain housing districts decided to set up self-defence detachments to

restore law and order "by their own means" if it is not restored by the government. The mass

rallies led to reintroduction of presidents' rule for six months. The decision was taken in the

absence of the majority of members of the opposition. President Nabiev got right to control

executive, legislative and judicial bodies, to suspend any political party and to ban rallies. He

banned opposition newspapers, like 'Adolat' of Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the 'Sukhan'

(Word) of republic's Union of Journalists, "Dzhavonomi Tojikiston' published jointly by the

editorial st~tT and the republic's youth union, 'Charogi Ruz' published by private individuals

and the Tajik press newspaper, published by private individuals in the Russian language. The

journalist went- in exile and those who published papers from Russia in Russian were

attacked in Moscow.

While the talks between the government and the opposition headed by Muhammed

Sharif Hekmatzade, Chairman of the IRPT, were going on at the President Naiev's residence,

the government dropped the leaflets from the helicopter in the capital, carrying parliamentary

appeals to maintain calm and not to yield to provocations. Another such leaflets were

87 He received letter of support from the believers from Uzbekistan and the president of Afghanistan

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dropped at the Shahidan Square that mentioned that blocking the building of the president's

administration the leaders of the opposition had broken the law and that was a criminai

offence. President Nabiev sent an appeal to the UN Secretary General Butros Butros Ghali to

send a delegation to review the situation in Tajikistan.

On 28 April 1992, Afghanistan fell to the mujahideen and within a few days on 5

May 1992, the first shots were fired in Tajikistan that marked the beginning of the civil war.

The members of the presidents' guards open fired near the village of Leninskiy and Yavan,

20km east from Dushanbe, at the local citizens' picket who were hindering to presidents'

supporters trip from Kulyab88 to Dushanbe. This led to casualties. In reaction the opposition

took control of presidential palace and the local television centre and appealed to stop

bloodshed and reestablish peace and relayed the videotapes of shooting in Lenenskyi and

Yavan districts on the national television. Soon the skirmish spread to Dushanbe and there

were regular reports of shooting in the capitaL It was reported that Nabiev and Kendzhayev

took refuge in the National Security Committee building. Opposition blamed the government

presidents' guards for carrying out terrorist acts where the people dressed in militia and

military uniform were driving around in the city in the ambulance. Overnight armored

vehicle arrived in Dushanbe.

The domestic causes for the civil war can be studied under the following headings: -

History of interaction between ethno-regional groupings

The ethnic history, to a great extent, depends upon the topography of the country.

Tajikistan, being located at a high altitude with harsh mountain terrain discouraged the

intermingling of the people. It has four natural divisions i.e. Sogdh region, Qarategin and

Gissar Valley, Khatlon and the Gorno Badakshan Autonomous Oblast, separated by high

mountains that make the commuting from one region to another quite difficult. This has led

to the development of distinct ethuicity of each region. In addition, the uneven distribution of

popUlation and resources has also discouraged the people from mixing with one another.

Politically, economically and socially regionalism or what Tajiks called mahalgeria deprived

the country to establish a strong Tajik identity.

88 There were numerous attempts in Kulyab to obtain weaponry from the CIS inventory despite of being mined and guarded.

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The marriage pattern in the Tajik society reflects some of the realities where people

prefer to marry within clan. The Ismailis do not marry outside their community because they

not only practiccd different religious beliefs but also speak different language and the Uzbek

girls usually do not marry Tajik boys.

Russians always considered themselves to be belonging to a superior race. Despite of

feeling close to Tajiks than to the Russians of Russia due to their upbringing in Tajikistan,

their affiliation with Tajikistan was notional and not emotional. People of Gharm and

Qarategin valley were more religious. Kyrgyz of northeast i.e. in the Sogdh region and of

south east of Badakshan maintained their separate identity. People of Badakshan have a

stronger Pamiri identity that overrules common Tajik identity.

Soviet legacy

Every colony inherits good and evils of the erstwhile ruler. There is no doubt that

during the Soviet period and particularly under the Russians, Tajikistans society and

economy reached its zenith. Most of the present day society, polity and economy have been

shaped during the Soviet times. Certain policies pursued by Russians like carving out the

boundaries of present day Tajikistan that made Tajiks devoid of its cultural capital's

Samarkand and Bukhara, frequently alteration of demography of Tajikistan and making it

ethnically heterogeneous, passing language law and promotion of Russian language

education, ethnic separatism in line with the usage of the term nationa/'nost used to

categorize the popUlation in terms of their nationality that was supported by Tajik

geographical proximity, Moscow supported the political and administrative recruitment

based on clan based or tribal considerations, discouraged the creation of nation-state. (For

details see Chapter II).

Traditionally the elites of Tajikistan were in a habit of receiving orders from Moscow.

The policies of Tajikistan related to social, economic, administrative, educational, judicial,

executive, etc. were directly controlled by Moscow where Tajiks were only involved in its

implementation. This led to a lack of skilled policy making professionals amongst the Tajiks.

In order to maintain control over the region, Russians adopted a policy of divide and

rule where Russians themselves acted as balancer. Thus, the process of regionalism was

established. The Soviet employed historians and scholars were encouraged to create histories

and ethnographies of the Tajik people, that showed them as distinct ethnic group- a version

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of history that was then disseminated through schools, media and other propaganda channels.

A particularly significant figure in this was the Tajik historian Babadzhan Gafurov, who

wrote several histories of the "Tajik" that became standard reading in schools from 1960s

onwards. This campaign of ethnic "self expression" was, of course, carefully controlled.

Forms ofTajik "nationalism" that undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet state, or attempted

to develop an alternative model of n~tional identity, were immediately curtailed. And at the

same time as encouraging national "self expression", the state was also promoting during

most of the Soviet period a programme of creeping russification: Russian became a

compulsory subject on the school curriculum, and Russian became de facto the language of

most administrative academic and political life (Tett 1996: 29). The policy for the

development ofthe Tajik national identity received a thrust during the Gorbachev's policy of

glasnost when the intellectual elite in Tajikistan rose to assert their Tajik Persian identity

above the Soviet Russian identity. There was an instant euphoria amongst the Tajik

intelligentsia to relate to their Persian brothers in Iran and Afghanistan and rediscover their

glorious Persian past. The cultural organizations soon raised to challenge the political

communist conservative to recognize their Persian and Muslim identity above the atheistic

Soviet communist policy. These organizations took an extreme form when the communist

refused to step down and recognize them as political forces in the country.

Soon after the disintegration of Tajikistan and with the disappearance of the balancer

resulted in the staggered nation building process that facilitated the escalation of the ethno-

regional tendencies. In addition, political elites were not able to look beyond maximizing

their social, political and economic advantages and creating their own secured status rather

than finding a roadmap to nation-building process. The feeble economic, social and political

structure due to its dependence on Russians; absence of common Tajik national identity;

ideological vacuum and inexperience in decision making and handling of state structure

amongst the Tajiks; reluctance of regional leaders to compromise with each other; and

fmally, Tajiks could not come out of their overall dependence on Uzbekistan and Russia this

was true for economic, ideological, political and defence facilities were additional reasons to

their internal weakness.

In addition to this, according to United Nations Secretary General's (UNSG) report of

August 1993, "The conflict in Tajikistan has also been fueled by an abundance of arms.

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Large quantities of arms were left by the Soviet forces when they evacuated from

Afghanistan through the territory of Tajikistan. In addition, after the disintegration of the

Soviet Union, the southern borders of Tajikistan with Afghanistan (l,387 kilometers in

length) became virtually open and porous to arms smuggling" (S/I993/23611). In an

interview with Monica Whitlock mentioned that 'The Russians sold us their bullets and a few

guns as well. The bullets, naturally, fitted the weapons bought in Afghanistan, as all were of

Soviet provenances. Then we went to the Russian and paid them to come with us in their

tanks and shoot Sangak's men. We used to rent them for an hour or so, for about a million

rubles. Sometimes more.' (A million rubles was worth about a thousand dollars: probably

much smaller sums also changed hands.) The Kulyabi militia did the same. 'The Russians

would shoot at us for up to a week sometimes. Then they would turn around and shoot the

Gharmis,' says Jafar. 'The more they changed sides, the higher they could drive the price'"

(Whitlock 2002: 167).

It should be noted that the arms not sold but coming to Tajikistan from different

countries particularly from Pakistan via Afghanistan funded by Saudi Arabia and US and

Iran.

Rise of Islamic Extremism

In the post-Soviet Tajikistan the Muslim political elite organized themse~ves under

different categories. First were, fundamentalist like the Hizb ut-Tahrir who out rightly rejects

the democratic values and contemporary western liberal culture. They aspire to establish

Islamic law and morality; secondly the traditionalists, which include the mullahs and some

members of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) who seek to establish a

conservative social order. They reject globalization, modernity and any change; third are

modernists, some members of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan come under this

category working towards finding a meeting point between Islam and democracy. Finally, the

secularists, under this category come the president's party (Peoples Democratic Party of

Tajikistan), communists, socialists and democrats. They want to separate religion from the

politics of the country. At the same time they have, on occasion used Islam as a means to

develop nationalism and external relations with other Islamic nations and thus establishing a

united country and being part of Muslim Brotherhood respectively.

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These rising tendencies and political aspirations got the support of Afghanistan and

clandestinely by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran challenging the secular communist

government at the centre. The support had two fold objectives, first was to spread extremist

Islam in the region and second was to find a foothold

Social, political and economic dominance of the regional elites

Traditionally the ruling elite came from Khujand region that got the support of

Uzbekistan and Russia. Khujand, being the ruling capital, was a developed region. They

survived because of their endorsement of strong regional policy and the strong regional

division was quoted under the popular excerpt, "Leninabad governs, Gharm does business,

Kulyab guards, Pamir dances, Qurghonteppa ploughs". In the Soviet times nothing was done

in order to promote regional representation at the centre. The wide gap between the centre

and the peripheral regions led to an acute tension among the groups. The Badakshonis and

particularly the Ismailis, regarded as Kajirs by the Sunni majority Muslims of the region due

to their European and more open lifestyle, were at the subordinate position at the centre. The

other sub-ethnic regional groups had no opportunity to be part of the higher ranks at the

centre.

Soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union, a new fragile security environment

emerged in the region. The regional elites rebelled and made every effort to benefit from the

fragile national and international situation in their favor. The opposition initially did not want

the Khojandis to be marginalized as they realized the economic importance of the region. But

the Khujandi elites were not ready to share the power with the newly emerging political

forces. The incompetence of the Khojandis to keep the opposition in check and the desire to

continue exclusive rule made Khojandis invite Uzbekistan and Russia to intervene in the

internal affairs. This policy of Tajik President Nabiev is seen by many observers as an

important reason for the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan.

Every effort was undertaken to keep the opposition, which drew its support from

other regions, away from the power structure like they were not given any important

positions in the state structure. Instead stringent measures were taken to keep them from

expanding their sphere of influence. When Kulyab government established its control at the

centre the Khojandis were marginalized leading to insecurity amongst the Khojandi clan

leading to the rise of separatist movements in Khujand.

218

Regionalism

According to Oliver Roy, "Everywhere you go the cadres are local, and below the level

of hiikim or president of the soviet district they were virtually unshiftable. They run things

not so much by administrative power as by means of networks and informal meetings. They

themselves operate via logic of networks: if they are suspected of favoritism to their own

people, they have to move fast to smooth things out with the other groups so a~ to avoid

incidents which might be reported back to the authorities at the centre and compromise their

position. Rotation of cadres is a punishment, and therefore temporary" (Roy 2000: 90). He

further explores that "An initial elite was recruited from among the Pamiris (for instance

Shirinshah Shahtimur, born in 1899, who was president of the Soviet from 1933 to 1937).

The explanation of this may have been that the Pamiris, being poor, not very religious,

looked down on by the Sunni and under Russian domination since the 1870s, had played the

Russian card. However, the Pamiris were purged in 1937" (Roy 2000: 113). After that the

Khojend faction formed the ruling elites. This was because the region being more developed,

more Russified and also more 'Uzbekised' than the rest of Tajikistan (Roy 2000: 113).

While the first secretary was always from Leninabad, "the president of the Council of

Ministers was a Kulabi from 1985 onwards (Khayayev between 1985-1990) and the

president of the Assembly (an honorary position) was a Gharmi from Fayzabad, the Gharmi

town closest to the power elites. The war in Afghanistan put the Pamiris back in the saddle,

because Moscow was nervous of possible collusion between the Tajiks and the Afghan

Mujahediin, and decided to give the Pamiris the MVD and part of the KGB. Thus the only

ones to be excluded from power were the Gharmis, and they went on to become politicized

under the banner of Islam" (Roy 2000: 114).

By the end of 1980s, social and political discontent among the Tajiks increased that

led to the development of underground political movements and occasional violent inter-

group conflicts over the allocation of state resources. Some movements had taken a

xenophobic and nationalistic character and slogans like "Tajikistan for the Tajiks" were used

in street demonstrations. These developments contributed to an exodus of ethnic Slave,

Germans and Jews, many of whom had skilled professional and whose departure undermined

the Tajik industrial, educational and health sector (Akiner 2001).

219

The pro-government supporters came from Khujand and Kulyab, where in the Kulyab

camp there were two factions i.e. Kulyabi and from Gissari. Tajik authorities, after Sangak

Safarov's death, decided to set up a Tajik army on the basis of the armed units from Kulyab.

This alienated the Kulyab faction of their support of Gissar, leading to a new struggle for

power between Kulyabis and Gissaries. Despite Mansurov, who was from Gissar, was

appointed the new mayor of Dushanbe the mistrust between the two could not be resolved.

The anti-government supporters came from Kurgan-Tyube, Gharm-Qarategin and

parts of Badakshan. They had their own regional parties and party members. With the

governments repressive policies most of the opposition members were functioning from

Afghanistan, Iran, Moscow, Badakshan and Qarategin.

Ethnic self-consciousness

The independence of Tajikistan was not sought after and was not earned out of some

internal Tajik revolutionary movement. Oliver Roy has analyzed the situation as "on 19th

August 1991, a conservative coup d'etat threatening Mikhail Gorbachev and jeopardized his

reforms of the Soviet Union. Most of the leaders of the Muslim Soviet republics promptly

approved the putsches action. A few days later, these same people went on to declare the

independence of their respective countries, which was then carried through during the next

three months. Out came new flags and new slogans in celebration of independence,

fatherland and nation. Competitions were organized for the writing of national anthems and

the design of national embalms. The communist parties transformed into presidential

parties .. .leaders who in 1991 had come directly from the Soviet nomenclature, and who only

a few months previously had still been repeating Moscow slogans, now became the

mouthpiece of nationalism that was not hostile to Russia and open to the West" (Roy 2000:

vii).

Perestroika revolutionized the entire Soviet republics. There was a sudden spur in the

demands by various republics to revive their native language and culture. According to

K. Warikoo, "New political parties and activist groups that have been established across

Central Asia, are not only promoting the civic, political and religious demands of indigenous

peoples, but are also resorting to anti-Russian/Slav stance" (Warikoo 1995: 18-19). In

Tajikistan the initiative was undertaken by the Rastokhez Popular Movement. The

220

movements and nationalist slogans were used in the streets of Tajikistan, especially during

the Annenian issue.

M.Mirrakhimov, one of the Rastokhez leaders, who stated that the time for persuasion

and discussion, has passed he said, "We will travel around the regions of the republic, meet

with the students in hostels, and rouse them to the struggle against the Russians .... He also

has particular scores to settle with the Uzbeks, whom, according to his 'good words', Tajiks

will be mistaken for when they drive the Russians from the republic" (SWB, SU/0768,

1990).

The over emphasis on language law and revival of Tajik culture and tradition made

the people divert from important point and urgent need to initiate the nation building process

and resolve the economic and social problems arising out of the breakdown of the existing

administrative structure.

Ethnic elections and selections

When Nabiev was fonnally elected after the November 1991 elections, the entire

ministry was dominated by the fonner communists from Khojand-Kulyab regions.

At the Supreme Soviet session in Khujand on December 2, 1992, when the new

cabinet was introduced, the entire ministry came from the Tajik Communist Party and its

members were from Kulyab region with some portfolio allotted to Khojand faction. Soon

after the death of Sangak Safarov, the entire ministry was reshuffled and the entire ministry

was exclusively made up of the Kulyab clan. The head of all the important institutions or

government organization are from Kulyab region or their loyalist. Some of the ministers were

reportedly inexperienced and others had criminal records.

The members of the Popular Front militia, with majority members from Kulyab, were

reinstated in the Tajik regular army. Consequently, only the Kulyab militia earned an official

status but remaining regional mercenaries continued to exist.

Government policies

The policies toward opposition were the main reasons for the continuation of the civil

war. Soon after President Rahmon became the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, in Jan

1993, he instituted a judicial proceedings against the leaders of the opposition parties

including Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, spiritual head of the Tajik Muslims, Mohammed Sharif

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Himatzoda89 of Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Tohir Abdurjabbor of Rastokhez

Popular Movements, Atobek of Lali Badakshan and Shodmon Yusuf, leader of the

Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and former deputy premier Davlat Usmon, deputy chairman

of the IRPT. They were accused of entering into a criminal collusion in May 1992 for the

purpose of seizing power and overthrowing the lawfully elected leadership of the republic.

They were also charged with committing anti-constitutional actions that called for forcible

overthrow of lawfully governing body, installing defacto leadership of the republic, creating

unlawful armed groups, masterminding combat actions that led to the fratricidal war and

caused causalities and damaging the economy of the country. Finally, on the basis of several

volumes of evidence, including newspaper clips, photographs and video material the decision

was taken against the opposition parties. A few days before the elections of the peoples

deputies organized an open hearing in the Supreme Court of Tajikistan under the Tajik

Procurator General Makhmadnazar Salikhov's appeal to suspend the activities of the bloc of

opposition socio-political organizations, including the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the

Islamic Rebirth Party, the Rastokhez Popular Movement and the Lali Badakshan society. In

fact, the opposition needed to be recognized and not marginalized in order to solve the

conflict. Media control, gross human rights violation and denial of existence of political

opposition further aggravated the situation.

The government called the opposition' Vofchiks', a Russian nickname for Vladimir,

which was slang used for 'Wahhabis'. In response, the government side came to be known as

'Yurchiks' a nickname for Yuri (Wetmanek 369). International efforts were made to establish

peace.

The peace agreement of 1997 made way to the enactment of new constitution that

provides safeguards and 30 percent reservations for opposition in the Parliament. Yet there

were frequent removals of the opposition members thus discouraging them to be part of

political structure. Moreover, they were given an insignificant position in the Ministry. In

fact, the concept of representative democracy, political accommodation and compromise is a

new ideology.

89 Also called 'the Gulbuddin of Central Asia' by his followers (Rashid 1994: 159)

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\Veakening of the state structure

Inability of government to have centralized control kept the security situation shaky.

Lack of common unifying ideology, constant struggle for power amongst various ethnic

groups, use of "unconstitutional means" to maintain their control, and failure of economy led

to endemic corruption regarded as the legacy of soviet communist system. Consequently the

regional leaders acquired strength and tested their power positions nationally as well as

internationally. The weak state made government conform to unconstitutional and brutal

means to curb all the opposition and establish its firm control at the centre.

Security dilemma or security threat

The security dilemma was the result of weak state and the change in the power

structure. When Safarali Kenjayev became part of the Khujand camp, he targeted the Pamiri

minister of the interior, Naujavanov, who had been in the post since 1987. "This attack (the

reason for which were obscure) soon led to a mobilization among the Pamiris of Dushanbe

(originated into the Lal-i Badakshon 'ruby of Badakshan') party, who feared that they were

again going to be removed from power, 55 years after the purges of 1937" (Roy 2000: 139).

The opposition armed forces called Nijat-; Mill; (Front for National Salvation), under Davlat

Usman, head of the Front and Shadman Yusuf, chairman of the Democratic Party, was

founded in June 1992 after an attack on pro-Nabiev forces in Kulyab. In Dushanbe the

opposition armed group called Youth of Tajikistan was led by Mulla Khudaidad Abdul

Ghaffur, who was also a member of IRPT and sponsored government in exile in northern

Afghanistan. The fighters of the opposition were well trained in the training camps of

Afghanistan and Pakistan by the professionals against the pro-government not so well trained

and motivated armed personnel. The emergence of the opposition forces as a potential

security threat led the pro-government demonstrators demanding for weapons near the army

check-point in Kulyab. The government increased the border forces to prevent any supply of

anns and ammunition entering into the republic from Afghanistan.

Many efforts were made to resolve the differences between the government and the

opposition like Khorog Peace Agreement of July 1992.90 But such agreements could not be

implemented due to the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the

National Security Committee, and the Defence Committee, as they were the ones responsible

90 For details see 'Civil War Events 1992-1997' later in this chapter

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for carrymg out the objects of the Khorog agreement. Lack of momentum in the

implementation of the decisions taken and the time limit placed for meeting the points of the

agreement also led to its failure. The presence of Russian troops was seen with suspicion by

the opposition because of their direct involvement in internal armed conflict. Khorog Peace

Agreement was an important agreement and the absence of President Nabiev made all side

not only worried towards Nabiev's seriousness towards the peace process but also led

opposition to declare a no-confidence in him that called for public support. Nuri in many of

his statements said that the Russian border troops were one of the causes of tension. He even

criticized the UN for not being able to put pressure on them in order to force them to respect

the Tehran agreement and stop cease-fire violations (SWB, SU/2251, 1995). The opposition

even charged the international community and international organizations for undertaking

biased position in Tajik crisis. Opposition radio Voice of Free Tajikistan had criticized the

UN report by the UN military observers investigating the situation in the Shuroabad section

of the border in southern Tajikistan on the grounds that it only covered the territory held by

the government and not the region held by the IRPT despite of UN assurance of checking the

areas under the opposition control before sending their report to UN headquarters in New

York (SWB, SU/2515, 1996). In another incidence, the opposition objected to a United

Nations peace plan for Tajikistan on the grounds that it does not take opposition interests into

account. Hajik Akbar Turajonzoda was quoted as telling that "We do not tum down their

initiatives, but we are confident they do not offer a solution to the settlement in Tajikistan"

(SWB, SU/2536, 1996). EarlierNuri had criticized the UN Secretary General's special envoy

to Tajikistan, Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, for completely ignoring government violation of cease-

fire agreement during the inter-Tajik talks. Nuri in his letter to Priz-Ballon categorically

mentioned that "Your Excellency is making a one-sided judgment and has not even

mentioned the clashes in Tavildara ...... as you always make one sided judgment, my trust in

you has decreased" (SWB, SU/2486, 1995). Despite of losing faith on international observers

the opposition and the government continued the political dialogue under the UN

supervision.

Government and opposition accused each other for breaking the peace agreements. It

was difficult to analyze which side was acting as an offensive force. Tension and mistrust

between warring factions towards each other prevented implementation of peace agreement

224

as each side feared losing military and psychological advantages. There were frequent

amnesties treaties signed between the government and the warring groups but were never

implemented.

After Imomali Rahmon came to power, the relations between the government and the

opposition were further worsened. There were frequent attacks on the detachments of Kulyab

factions in Kurgan-Tyube from the Afghan border and Shar-Shar pass area. This was because

Kulyabis were trying to consolidate its control over the entire Khatlon region. Kulyabis got

involved in ethnic cleansing of pro-opposition Pamiris and Qarategnies that led to thier

fleeing to their native homeland and Afghanistan. The opposition party was declared illegal

and death sentences and arrest warrants were issued against the opposition leaders that made

them take refuge in Iran, Afghanistan and Moscow.

There were also rumors that led to security predicament. Such as in 1991, there were

rumors about attack on the Russians and Russian speaking population in Gissar that not only

led many Russian and Russian speaking population left the country or migrated to other

towns but also led to active Russian involvement in the Tajik civil war. In May 1992, during

the mass demonstrations there were various rumors claiming that the participants of the pro-

government rallies are against Islam and Sharia'h. There were also rumors about several

thousand Lokaytsy horsemen (an Uzbek ethnic group) who were supporters of the

government, had set out for Dushanbe from Kulyab. The situation got more fragile when the

chief Muslim official of Kulyab, Haidar Sharifzoda, called upon the authorities to give arms

to the pro-government demonstrators in Shahidan Square and that there were rumors about

the loss of weapons from the armories of one of the service units in Kulyab Oblast.

Democratization process

Tajikistan has no experience of democracy and the democracy is only in name. The

concept is imposed from above rather than developing from within the society. Just before

the elections most of the opposition parties are created by the ruling elite in order to maintain

democratic norms. However, often the opposition parties are banned and their leaders

charged with false accusation before the elections. The elections are rigged. Sobotov,

financial manager of an international organization. told that, "on the day of recent

presidential election I asked my wife why I should go to cast my vote when I already know

225

what the result is going to be" (Sobitov 2007). It is widely alleged that sometimes it is

already decided about the total number of votes for a particular candidate.

Sangak Safarov, leader of Peoples Front, in his speech in the parliamentary session,

after Rahmon was appointed the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and pro-government forces

took over Dushanbe, mentioned that "We will cleanse Tajikistan and Russia of the

democratic scum!" (SWB, SU11568, 1992).

There is no room for opposition parties to develop or propagate their ideology. The

opposition parties lack financial resources to work effectively. There is often banning of the

opposition parties like in August 1991 President Makhamov signed a decree banning the

political parties and movements. Again in September 1991 when Aslonov took charge of

Tajikistan he immediately banned the newly formed Socialist Party of Tajikistan earlier

known as Communist Party of Tajikistan, under Shodi Shobdulov.

During the time of civil war, number of prominent figures and journalists were put

behind bar on charges of conspiracy to seize power, using the mass media to stir up civil

disorder, murder, hostage-taking, attacks on state institutions and various other offensives.

According to the Russian radio, Mirbobo Mirrahimov, the former head of the Tajik television

and radio, Jumakhon Azizmamadov, former deputy chief of Dushanbe internal affairs

directorate, Ahmadsho Kalimov, Kaireddin Kosimov and Khurshed Nazarov, all senior

officials of the so-called Popular TV station, and Ajik Aliyev and Rahimjonov, member of

the presidium of IRPT were arrested. Criminal proceedings were initiated against Akbar

Kahorov, leader of the Tajik Kaziyat, Shodmon Yusupov, the Chairman of the Democratic

Party, Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, a prominent member of the IRPT and Davlat

Usmonov, the former deputy premier (SWB, SU/1608, 1993). Abdumalik Abdullojonov,

acting premier from 1992-93 was charged for armed blockade in South regions of the

republic during the armed standoff (SWB, SU12024, 1994). In addition it was reported that

between 1992-94 there were around 35 journalists who were killed and more than 200 had to

flee the country (SWB, SU/2223, 1995). All these acts suggested that no opposition was

tolerated in the republic.

By thwarting the development of democratic institutions, the present leaders of the

Central Asian Republics have eliminated the possibilities of political change being effected

without a convulsion. The unpredictability of succession breeds instability. In all likelihood,

226

the old guard fonner Communist elite that has been in power continuously since the mid or

late 1980s is going to be replaced by a younger generation of nationalists who might be more

emphatically inclined towards the forces representing tradition and religion (radical Islam not

completely out ruled) (Kaushik 2005: 44). He further analyses that, "The Central Asian states

have moved from a single party totalitarian system to a personalized authoritarianism of their

executive presidents" (Kaushik 2005: 43). R.R.Sharma, terms the political system as "fa~ade

democracies" which has been imposed from above, and where democracy has been reduced

to so-called formal elections. Such a system is what he considers is "static and fragile". The

lack of elite-mass linkages and socio-political dialogue is not only retarding socio-economic

development, but also encouraging traditionalist-conservative formations by pushing back

the formation of a healthy civil society (Sharma 2005: 27).

Media

There was no freedom of press and the local media speaks the language of the

government. To a great extent, it was responsible for forming a negative opinion regarding

the opposition movement activists. IRPT and some other organizations did have their own

Radio station and newspapers sometimes published outside e.g. Chirog-e Russ but the

national TV channels and main newspapers were under the control of the government. The

independent journalists or those who wrote against the government were put behind the bars

under false allegations.

It was noted that the Russian Fund for the Protection of glasnost, which works to

promote media freedom, had sent an appeal to the then Russian ambassador to Tajikistan,

Mechislav Senkevich, over the increasing number of cases of interference by the Tajik

authorities in the work of Russian journalists. "The funds cited the example of Tajik Culture

and Information Minister Bobokhon Mahmadov, who personally 'recommended' last May

that Tatyana Lougnov, a journalist from the All-Russian State Television and Radio

Broadcasting Company (who run the Russian TV channel), should not broadcast a report on

the assassination of two leading Tajik academics. The appeal added that a similar

'recommendation' had been received by the Russian NTV correspondent, Oldizhon Ashurov,

a week later. Video tapes have also been confiscated from Russian cameramen and one

Russian newspaper reporter was barred from visiting an area of hostilities in the central

district of Tavildara, the agency said (SWB, SU/2651 , 1996).

227

In the post-Soviet era the newspaper circulation has reduced sharply due to high

expense of material, government pressure and control, refusal to renew license, persecution

of journalists and no opposition newspaper were operating in the run-up to the 2006

presidential elections.

Economic crises and economic discrimination

Soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the economic and socio-political

situation deteriorated not only in Tajikistan but in the entire erstwhile Soviet republics. There

was shortage of food products, drop of agricultural production, closure of factories and

industries, dropping in the salaries of the professionals, and scarcity of electricity and power

supply. The supply of the products from one rayon to the other was also blocked. There was

regular breach of economic agreement between the two oblasts. For example, during the civil

war there was no delivery of meat and cotton from Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube and potato's

from Gharms and Tajikabad to Dushanbe.

The new economic situation and policies were not well taken by the people of

Tajikistan. In one of President Nabiev's visit to Dangara rayon in January 1992, and after

meeting the heads of local soviets, heads of enterprises of the agro-industrial complex, heads

of local trade unions and local intellectuals, he expressed his concern that the people were

showing more and more discontent towards the introduction of price liberalization. The

situation was getting more difficult because in some places officials had not fixed the

maximum limit on regulatory prices. Trade organizations were selling the same goods with

different prices. This caused anger and indignation among the consumers and mistrust

towards law-enforcement bodies.

Opportunistic politicians

The weak state structure and lack of strong political ideology facilitated power-

hungry politicians to use undemocratic means and unsubstantiated reasons to gain and

maintain power. The failure to recognize the real cause that was lying in the rigid local clan

based political contradiction within the society made the situation tensed. The blames and

counter blames, removal of Nabiev or changing the constitutional structure failed to vent out

regional hatred.

Demonstrations were organized with not much knowledge about the reason due to

lack of information and propaganda both by the government and the opposition. The

228

ignorance amongst the people was exploited both by the government and the opposition. For

example in March 1989, several dozen young people gathered for meetings without reason

that got out of control. When tried to find out the motives, who directed them towards

unlawful actions, and what interests and aims they pursue for their demonstration, the third

year students mentioned about the problems like environment, the Arabic script, and NavTUZ.

But when asked whether they were familiar with the resolution of the Tajik Council of

Ministers on the holding ofNavruz or with the Law on the Procedure for Holding Rallies and

Meetings, they said that they had no time for television or the newspapers. Another important

point was that the people who took part in the meeting were of the same nationality, which

caused an alarming and damaging situation in the city (SWB, SU/0450, 1989).

Inadequate safeguards for the minority rights

There were no efforts made by the government to safeguard the rights of the

minorities. The language law that made Tajiki an official language discourage the Russian

and Russian speaking population to live in Tajikistan. Russia itself was in a weak social and

economic position and was not in a prepared to accommodate the migration of a large

population from Central Asian region. So Russia took immediate steps to arrest the shaky

situation in Tajikistan. Other ethnic minorities like Uzbkes, Jews and Bahai community were

also targeted.

Women stake

In October 1992, women from areas around Dushanbe organized mass rally outside

the Supreme Soviet building demanding an immediate end to the fratricidal war. Many

thousand women from Gissar joined "the peace march" in Dushanbe on 8 December 1992

demanding to participate as the third party in the negotiation between Safarali Kendzhayev

forces, occupying a combatant position in Gissar, and representatives of the Gissar

detachments. They aimed to save their husbands and sons from the senseless war.

Political Parties organized along ethno-regionallines

Islamic Rebirth Party (IRPT), officially registered in December 1991, got their main

support from Southwest Tajikistan i.e. Qarategin valley. There were also forces loyal to Haji

Akbar Turajonzoda (chief Islamic cleric of the Republic), known as the leader of Islamic

democrats.

229

The Rastokhez Popular Movement and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT)

were anti-Marxist reformist parties that wanted to establish democracy, market economy and

more evenhanded distribution of power. They were representatives of elite having their

support base in Dushanbe.

La'li- Badakshan, under the leadership of Atobek Amiirbekov, was a party whose

members were primarily Pamiri pe:ople campaigned for greater autonomy for the

mountainous Badakshan region and the political, social, economic and educational

development of the Badakshan. At no point did the people of Badakshan wanted to succeed

from Tajikistan. Though they united with the opposition and took part in several inter-Tajik

negotiations that were held from 1994 to 1997, it left United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in

December 1999. Another party of this region was Nosiri Khusraw a non-political association

of Badakshan region.

Popular Front (PF), know as Sitodi Melli in Tajik, was a party of Kulyabi

paramilitary forces which brought President Rahmon to power.91

During the war the IRPT, DPT and Rastokhez Movement united under a common

banner of United Tajik Opposition.

In 1990, Shodmon Yusuf founded the Democratic Party of Tajikistan that led a

successful mobilization of majority of population in August 1991 against the Communist

Party of Tajikistan (CPT), the majority of the members of the CPT came from the Sogdh and

the Kulyab region.

In late 1996, the people living in the north formed a political opposition party the

National Revival Party (NRP), also called Union for National Reconciliation, under the

leadership of Abdulmalik Abduladjanov, former prime minister of Tajikistan and contested

against Rahmon during 1994 presidential elections. They formed the party due to complete

exclusion of the northern region from the reconciliation process, between the government

and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) that took place from 1994 to 1997.

91 PF emerged in May 1992 during the pro-Communist rally in Dushanbe, when then President Nabiyev created a 'presidential guard' by distributing weapons to the demonstrators. Nabiyev officially disbanded the guards several days later. Many Kulyabis, however, took the Kalashnikovs they received back to Kulob, where they started to organize paramilitary groups. The self-proclaimed Popular Front first appeared in Khatlon province in the summer of 1992 and later surfaced in Gissar province near Dushanbe. Its most prominent leaders were Sangak Safarov and Faizali Saidov. It is believed that in 1992 they received substantial support- including money, weapons and ammunition- from various sources supportive of the Tajik government, including those in Uzbekistan and Russia.

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Lack of or delayed international response to the internal crises of Tajikistan

Repeated appeals were made by President Nabiev to the international organizations to

get involved in the internal crisis of Tajikistan. When the opposition fighters attacked Nurek

Power station, Nabiev appealed to Air force Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov of Russia to

undertake the protection of the key industrial facilities of the republic. The units of

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) called "blue helmets" an allied armed forces,

took over the responsibility. However, the political opposition and the top Muslim clergy

resisted the proposal as they considered that the presence of a "foreign military contingent"

in the conflict zone as interference in Tajikistan's internal affairs.

On his trip to Pyanj in Gorno Badakshon Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in August

1992, Nabiev expressed his concern towards the illegal arms and drug smuggling (for drug

smuggling the old Silk Route was revived to export drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and

Europe through Central Asia) and immigrants coming from Afghanistan. He feared that such

activities could turn Tajikistan into another Afghanistan. He called upon the CIS and Russian

federation to help Tajikistan guard its borders with Afghanistan from arms and drugs

smuggling but not involve themselves in resolving internal crises.

During the war the general conduct of Nabiev and later Rahmon's, came under severe

national and international criticism. Uzbek President Karimov openly criticized Nabiev for

his inefficiency in maintaining law and order.

Initially the international community was disinterested in Tajik crisis as the entire

region has tough terrains. meager of resources, connectivity problem thus discouraging the

international media to expose the internal situation. Tajiks ethnic groups also lacked strong

lobby in the west. In addition to this, events of Tajikistan did not directly effected Europe and

the US. It was only after the radical activities of al-Qaida the US and the western world

started taking interest in Tajikistan. Tajikistan being one of the main transit routes for drugs

further made it a sensitive area.

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RESULTS OF CIVIL WAR

Islamic Extremism: In fact, the rapid politicization of Islam and the emergence of militant

Islamic movement in Tajikistan was the result of Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan. It

dramatically changed the ideological orientation of Tajiks. Azad Beg, the leader of the

Islamic Union of the Northern Province of Afghanistan, influenced the Tajiks in Tajikistan.

Tajiks acted as spies in the Soviet army. During the Soviet operation in Afghanistan the

mujahideen established wide contact with the Tajiks of Tajikistan. The Tajik soldiers in the

Soviet army had crescent on their collars. The active involvement of IRPT in the civil war of

Tajikistan led to the rise of Islamic extremism in Tajikistan. Some of the better and renowned

leaders of IRPT, including Davlat Usman and Muhammad Sharif Himmatzoda, who had

taken refuge in Afghanistan, had a strong influence of the mujahideen. After the end of civil

war the Islamists were able to establish themselves as a legal political force with Islam as

their political ideology. The Islamist's have emerged as a main political opposition in the

country. Other than the IRPT there are other small militant radical Islamist groups like Hizb

ut-Tahrir who have been active in the Ferghana Valley. The post 9/11 incidence has given the

government a chance to undertake repressive policies against any opposition under the name

of threat from Islamic extremist forces.

Refugee crises: Tajiks are known for being stationary people and do not like to move away

from the clan. Their contact with the neighbors was limited to social and trade relations. The

civil war changes this situation. According to Tadjabaksh, during the civil war period over

90,000 people of primarily Gharmi and Pamiri origin fled to Afghanistan to avoid

persecution by pro-government forces and up to 500,000 were internally displaced within the

republic. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1994 helped in the return

of large number from Afghanistan. They were reestablished in their homes (Tadjabaksh

1996: 341).

The end of civil war required the refugees to return homes and contribute to the

countries economy. The returnees often came under attack from the local population, their

homes were taken over or destroyed in their absence, there were no jobs as the factories were

closed and the drought became a regular feature. The refuges not only came under attack

from their people in Tajikistan but they also risked their lives during their return. There were

occasions when Uzbekistan would block the passage to the return of the refugees through its

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territory. On other occasions they came under attack from Afghan authorities. For example in

July 1994 Afghan authorities detained "without the slightest ground" two Uzbek barges

taking Tajik refllgees home from Afghanistan. They were detained on the Afghan port of

Sher Khan on the river Pyandzh, which formed the border between Afghanistan and

Tajikistan (SUI2060, 1994: 0/4). It was also reported that the opposition field commander

Were employing "threats, blackmail and force to hamper return of Tajik refugees to their

homeland" (SWB, SU/1955, 1994). A large section of Tajiks believe that refugees would

become a burden on Tajik economy and in absence of their employment they may indulge in

anti-social activities.

In the south, the villages populated by the mountain people of Oharm - who were

brought in Soviet times to pick cotton in the plains - stayed largely in ruins without any

money to help rebuild them. Many of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who returned

from Afghanistan were living in deep poverty that was made worse by a yearlong drought.

The chaos of the war, as well as the deaths of 50,000 people from a popUlation of six million,

has similarly devastated the economy. Almost nothing remains except a large aluminum

plant, a gold mine and the cotton fields, which are slowly shrinking from the breakdown of

the Soviet-installed irrigation system. Even with the peace agreement, the control of the

government barely reaches beyond the capital, Dushanbe. "In fact, only 30km to the east of

the city one finds a group of armed and irregular troops at a checkpoint on the road who

answer not to the President but to a local warlord called Umar" (Hill 2006: 2001).

Drug and arms trafficking: The border guard and the Noth Atlantic Treaty Organisation

forces have failed to prevent drugs and arms trafficking on the Tajik-Afghan border. Apart

from the trans-border movements and smuggling of arms and ammunition, Afghan

mujahideen leaders openly abetted rise of militancy among the Muslims of Tajikistan. Drug

trafficking is perhaps the largest threat to stability faced by Tajikistan today. Khorog in

Tajikistan, Osh in Kyrgyzstan, Andijan in Uzbekistan, and Almaty in Kazakhstan are some

of the important trade route points of drugs smuggling before it reaches Russia and Europe.

Sugdh region is also one of the major centres for drug smuggling.

In Tajikistan women and children are involved in the drug business. It is because

since July 2003, Tajikistan abolished the death penalty for women. A man can receive a

death penalty for possessing of 5g or more of heroin (tajnet.com, July 30, 2(03). This is also

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because in Pamir region it is the women who do the business. It is hard to see the Tajik men

sitting in the market, particularly in Khorog. Even the small international trade (also referred

to as suitcase trading) is done by the women. From Almaty the drugs are carried in trains by

children and elderly to Russia and from Russia it gets distributed in Europe. Government

agencies charged with stopping the drug flow are reportedly riddled with corruption.

The head of Federal Board Service Col-Gen Konstantin Totskiy told Interfax that

"Since 1993, Russian border guards have seized 10 t of various drugs on the Tajik-Afghan

border, including over a ton of heroin" (SWB, SU/49 1 0, 2000). There were even reports that

the Russian border forces were also involved in the drug smuggling. The drugs that were

internally taken across were usually of vegetable origin i.e. opium, marijuana, hemp and

heroin.

According to Martha Brill Olcott, "The Tajiks introduced their national currency, the

Somani, in 2000 and with it the beginnings of a private banking sector. But there has been

much less transparency here than in Kyrgyzstan, and IMF assistance has been periodically

suspended because of allegations of Tajik officials deliberately manipulating official

statistics. Some of this manipulation was certainly sheer negligence, but the negligence has

helped conceal the economic impact of the narcotics trade, which throughout the 1990s was

presumed to have been equal to between 50 to 100 percent of Tajikistan's GDP, depending

on the size of each years Afghan poppy harvest" (Olcott 2005: 44-45).

It should be noted that the drug smuggling across the Tajik-Afghan border became

much more organized and sophisticated. A routine smuggling operation involving a small

group of men would go in front of armed drug couriers. If they encounter border guards, the

group will draw fire, allowing the smugglers time to escape into Afghanistan; their actions

were well coordinated. It was not uncommon for the border detachments to encounter a

group of smugglers giving battle over several hours, using hand grenades, grenade launchers

and machine guns, fired in different directions (Serebrov, 2002: k36). According to Viktor

Kondrashov, Commander of the Moskovskiy Border detachment, 'it's virtually impossible

for an outsider to get into the gang'" (Serebrov, 2002: k36).

Though the Ismaili spiritual leader has made number of appeals to his followers in

Badakshon region to stay away from narco trade, the economic crisis and the lack of job

opportunities have kept the trade flourishing. It is interesting to note that the average income

234

of a family is not more than US dollars 50. If one visits the home of the local resident's one

will never feel the financial crisis in the family. Everyone is well dressed with proper shoes

in their feet's. Its hard to see that with so little income one can have the luxuries of even

possessing the posh cars. The endemic corruption and parallel narco-economy keep the

families wann and flourishing. At the same time Tajik government's inability to check

trafficking tide is seen as one of the reasons that keep them from attracting foreign

investments.

The head of Panj unit of the Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, Col. Sergy Usenko

noted that "contacts between drug dealers on the Tajik and Afghan sides of the border

resumed after the mass repatriation of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan last year. He noted

that in the majority of cases, the movement of drugs was conducted by 'well armed groups

with modem means of communication'" (SWB, SU/3348, 1998).

Social Implication: "Liberalization of the economy without the proper preparatory work,

severance of economic ties with Russia and other member countries of the CIS, the

undeclared economic blockade by Uzbekistan, the civil war with all conservative effects

brought abrupt decline in living standards of the people, and a catastrophic fall of major

indicators of social development" (ChatteIjee 2001: 44). Tajikistan has the lowest living

standards among the countries of CIS. There has been continuous decline in the income of

the people. The majority of population is not able to pay for its communal services like

electricity, gas, water, sewage, garbage, etc. There is also shortage in the supply of fuel and

gas. It has led to cutting of trees thus leading to environmental disasters.

Outburst of criminal actions like robberies, smuggling, and killing of innocent people

etc., is not only due to easy availability of firearms but also because of the weak state defence

mechanism, economic condition and political stalemate.

The system of education suffered huge problems. The state finance on education was

minimized thus not only discouraging the teachers but also resulted in an underdeveloped

education system. Difficult situation arose due to the outflow of teachers and professionals

for work in other countries or teachers adopting other professions. During an informal

conversation with a taxi driver in Khujand he mentioned "I was a lecturer during the soviet

times. Since I am the only earning member in the family it became difficult to run the family

with the income. It is because of this that I have taken up taxi driving as means of living." In

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addition the weak educational syllabus has resulted in the shortage of experts who can fill in

the required job credentials. There are not many book stores in the country. In the absence of

competitive education, lack of study material available for the students and declining intei~st

of children towards studies is likely to push the extremist forces and illicit activities taking

roots in their minds. According to an international observer, "People see incompetent and

uneducated leaders and their loyalist holding top positions. It is very frustrating for the young

generation and discourages them to take education seriously."

In April 1993, Rahmon intended to submit an amendment to the law on the language

for granting Russian language an equal status with Tajiki thus reducing the dearth of

specialist as the training of the local Tajik to conduct the specialist task would have required

lot of time, infrastructure and funding.

The World Bank along with IMF "focuses on both addressing policy and utilizing

IDA credit funds for investment. The ongoing Education Modernisation Project (Fr03) aims

to upgrade the basic education system through (a) building capacity for change by providing

continued support for strategic changes in curriculum and textbook production and

supporting imprOVed management and finance at the national level; and (b) supporting local

initiatives for infrastructure and quality improvement, support for textbook rental schemes

and book printing, and provision of equipment at the local level. Tajikistan has also received

grant funding from the Education for All (EF A) FITI catalytic fund, administered by the

Bank. Key issues in education, apart from infrastructure rehabilitation and capacity building,

are pay reforms, per capita fmancing and expenditure tracking. Assistance to this sector will

continue through the Programmatic Development Policy Financing (PDPF), multi-donor

education investment program, and PSRP. Bank's involvement also inc1udes ..... budgeting in

the sector through the PDPF' (World Bank 2007: 9).

Deterioration of social and industrial infrastructure and a sharp decline in the social,

health services, lack of heating fuel for schools, homes and hospitals and a sharp drop in the

real income of most families denied them of even their basic needs. The civil war made many

professionals leave the country for Russia and other countries for social and economic

security. The migration also led to demographic imbalance.

According to the Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 "There is no law

on emigration. Persons who wish to emigrate to the former Soviet Union must notify the

236

Ministry of Interior prior to their departure. Persons who wish to emigrate beyond the

borders of the former Soviet Union must receive an immigrant visa from the relevant

country's embassy to obtain their passport. Persons who settle abroad are required to inform

the Tajikistan Embassy or Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian Embassy or

consulate. Labor migration was an important economic factor, and a local research

organization reported that, during the year, more than 600,000 persons left country looking

for a job" (Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003,2004).

In addition, there was land mine problem that requires training of mine awareness,

planning of humanitarian mine clearance and to coordinate, support and develop mine

awareness training of population. Water and sanitation issue is another big problem that

needs an immediate action. Till date there is no clean water in certain parts of Dushanbe and

despite of having a rich river network, Tajikistan's homes suffers from water shortage.

The judicial situation has got out of control. According to the Deputy Internal

Minister, Azimov, over 300 people were arrested in Dushanbe for illegal possession of

weapons and ammunitions in 1993. But criminal proceedings and investigations were

conducted on only half of those arrested, since there was virtually nobody to conduct these

cases because of the departure of some Procurator's Office and Ministry of Internal Affairs

investigators. He further mentioned that "To this day, many of those arrested have been

deprived of legal protection. The charges against journalists and opposition members have

been altered twice: from 'theft of state property', to 'illegal possession of weapons', to

'treason against motherland'. The recent amendments to the Republic of Tajikistan Criminal

Code, which were adopted two months ago, gave the authorities the right to use the most

severe punishments, even including the death penalty" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 1993).

There is gross human rights violation by the government and there is no system of checks

and balances. Many times the cases are secretly conducted and international observers are not

allowed to be part of the judicial proceedings in spite of repeated requests from international

organizations. Sometime the defence lawyers are also allocated by the government and even

the relatives are not allowed to be part of judicial proceedings.

The corruption is endemic. According to combined report by Strategic Research

Centre (SRC) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) there are two types of

corruption practiced one is business take-over and the other is power take-over (SRC 2006:

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1(0). "The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, which, beyond any doubt, is fully

aware of the levels of conuption, repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the process of

democratization has become vulnerable because of the increasing scale of conuption"

(Strategic Research Centre 2006: 8). The President of the Republic of Tajikistan said that

"such a negative phenomenon as corruption is. one is of the gravest obstacles in the

development of our society. We must conduct a comprehensive study and analyze factors and

causes of corruption and mobilize all sound forces of our society to put corruption under

restrain and reduce its lever' (Rakhmonov 2005: 1). The SRC and UNDP recognizes that the

decrease in the living standard and increase in conuption are caused by the synthesized

stratification of the recent civil war and the lack of financial resources that are accompanied

by lack of experience and professionalism in the government of the newly formed sovereign

state, unfavourable economic conditions, lack of understanding and support of some of the

population and lack of political will and fear of critical changes that have been brought about

by the different market reforms (SRC 2006: 8).

Political situation: Fierce political competition between regions alienated the ethnic groups

from each other. In addition weak state structure, civil war and outside interference hampered

the course of reconciliation. Any political opposition is met with harsh punishment. On many

occasions peace talks were postponed and had even led to elimination of the opposition

parties. An important emphasis after the civil war in Tajikistan was on peace, which did not

lead to the desired unity between the two opposing sides. President Rahmon is credited for

bringing peace and opposition is blamed for being responsible for civil war.

The concept of Tajik nationalism, which the Kulyabis promoted, was directed against

the northern part of Tajikistan and the Pamiris. The government was criticized internally and

internationally for its violations of the political and human rights. The political alienation of

opposition and one region rule has made the country sit on the time bomb.

Economic Deterioration: In 1993-94 the total indebtedness on State Credit for Tajikistan

was $127,000,000 that was to be paid by 1996-2000 that was the highest amongst the Central

Asian republics (Business MN 1996: 79 & 92). According to Deputy Minister, Ministry of

Finance Tajikistan, "over the period 1991-1996, the production volume fell to 33.1 % of their

1991 level; in 1997 GDP was down by more than 60010 on 1991; and the standard living fell

sharply (AbibuUaev 2000 105). Industrial Production decreased from -24.2 in 1992 to -30.8

238

in 1994 and agricultural production decreased to -25 percent in 1994 (Ekonomika stran

Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv v 1994, 1995: 107). In addition, the negotiations

between the government and the Intematicnal Monetary Fund (lMF) remained difficult due

to inefficiency of the government to draft the budget plan.

The bread prices decreased due to the huge humanitarian assistance provided by

international community but the problem remains due to acute shortage of hard currency.

Most of the industrial plants remained non-functional due to civil unrest, the local warlords

rather than the Tajik government controlled the key installations, lack of experts due to out-

migration of Russian and other professional elites, non-availability of raw material, the total

expenditure was more than the total production, tax evasion (highest offender was the Tajik

aluminum plant), corruption remained widespread due to feeble judicial system, lacks

transparency at higher levels, low income and absence of anti-corruption strategy, security

crisis at the key installations and non-payment of bank loans discouraged the foreign

investors. As a matter of fact, not all the investor were registered and that there were no

accurate documents to suggest the total imports and exports of the country due to huge

difference in Tajik government figures and the figures by the government of other countries.

There was energy shortage leading to critical enterprise development. Uzbekistan also

stopped the supply of gas and electricity supplies to Tajikistan due to latter's failure to raise

and pay back the necessary revenues, could not collect debts owned by consumers and its

failure to negotiate the prices of the gas and electricity supply with Uzbekistan.

The living condition kept deteriorating particularly in the south and east. The northern

part remained economically much better and accounted for more than half of Tajik economic

production. This was because the northern part of Tajikistan was disconnected from the civil

war that was taking place in the south and southeast.

The inadequate purchasing ability of the population and the low productivity of

agricultural production in rural areas influenced lower consumption of food in the country. It

led to protein and calories deficiency and resulted in retarded development of children both

physically and mentally. The health sector is also in a state of mess due to shortage of

medicines and doctors. The Tajik economy lacks expertise. It produces only a few

agricukural and industrial items. The import and export ration is uneven and is in favour of

imports. The bulk of food, machine, equipments and consumer goods are imported.

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The highest level of development of the economy of Tajikistan was reached in 1989.

After the 1989 the country plunged into economic crisis which affected its economic

conditions. MiIZoev puts down the following reasons for the slowing down of the rate of

socio-economic progress as follows: - inadequate incentive to scientific-technological

development and the negative rate of scientific-technological progress, exhaustion of the

reserves for extensive growth of agriculture in its cotton dominated structure, weak

development of food grain producing branches, insufficient development of labour-intensive

branches of industry, high growth of population and labour resources, insufficient attention to

professional technical-education and to growth of employment potential, higher proportion of

population not engaged in socially productive labour, irrational system of utilization in the

unregulated zone of cultivation, low mobility of agricultural population, disproportion

between the professional qualification level of the labour and needs of modem production.

The situation further aggravated with the shortage of capital investment. There was acute

shortage of workers in the industrial units. The crisis further deepened with idleness of

equipment and other losses of working hours, inadequacy of technology on account of delay

in installation of equipment, and under-utilization of the production capacity and no

reduction in the level of labour use in work place (MiIZoev 1998: 54).

Earlier Moscow used to manage procurement of raw material and machinery from the

erstwhile Soviet Union for functioning of industries, after Tajik became an independent

country it faced with procuring those materials from different sources. In addition, the

production of machine-building products fell sharply. Industrial production outside the

Khujand region is particularly affected by the civil war. The large scale destruction of

factories, lack of transport network and the diversion of many workers from production units

not only hampered functioning of industries but required huge investments and recruitment

of new skilled workers. Due to lack of jobs many Tajiks left the country for better

opportunities. It has resulted not only in lack of labour forces available but has also disturbed

the demographic balance in the region. Though the government had no or little control over

the countries factories, it announced privatization of large state companies into joint-stock

companies with assistance from World Bank. However, cotton was excluded from the

general privatization programme and that 40 percent of cotton production and processing was

held by the State Cotton Production and Marketing.

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The effective salary of the masses decreased and the inflation increased leading to an

abrupt fall in the living standards of the people. The Tajik currency-Simony- devalued in the

international market. Moreover the frequent landslides and earthquakes make the social and

economic situation worse.

One of the worst outcomes of the civil war was that it led to further consolidation of

division of ethno-regional identities.

To conclude, the civil war in Tajikistan was the result of both internal and external

factors. The war was initially fought between the Khujand-Kulyab-Gissar alliance against the

Qarategnis and Pamiris. The Khujand-Kulyab alliance was supported by Uzbekistan and

Russia after the Islamist-democratic alliance government was formed for a brief period in

1992 that was supported by Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Kulyab and Gissar provided

military support to the traditional Khujand ruling elites. The new government that was

formed replaced the old leadership with the Kulyab group forming the government. They

were successful in not only eliminating the substantial political opposition by not only

organizing ethnic persecution and judicially charging the opposition leaders for ethnic

disorder at the country but also refused to share power with their allys i.e. Khojandis and

Gissaris. The government offensive against the opposition made many internally displaced

and many took refuge in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and other CIS countries.

Whenever Tajik government forces came under any kind of opposition pressure the

government had to compromise to some unreasonable demands like demanding resignation

of the members of the ministry, change of the political appointees from the region or freeing

of the captured rebels.

Weak state structure enables the destructive and extremist forces to take advantage

and compel the state to grant them concessions. Anti-social element has also prospered

because of weakness of the authorities. It also prolonged the nation-building process.

Interestingly sometimes small independent militiamen, like Khudoberdiyev and Ibod,

managed to gain prominence and establish their sphere of influence in the region. However,

they failed to gain the status of third force.

The long association with the Afghans and their internal economic crisis has

established a flourishing narco-trade that has its first stop in Tajikistan before it reaches

Russia and Europe. The failure of government to political accommodation, social mingling

241

and revive war tom economy may keep the security situation fragile. The porous borders

between the two nations also facilitated in the spread of Islamic extremism and illegal

weapon trade across the borders.

It was only after the repeated appeal by Tajik president and the official appeal made

by Uzbekistan to the United Nations that it had sent its special envoy to intervene in the Tajik

crisis. He organized rounds of talks between the government and the opposition where

Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Pakistan had observer

status. From April 1994 to June 1997 rounds of talks took place at various venues provided

by the observer countries. While the peace talks were going on the fighting in Tajikistan

between the warring sides continued.

The changing political situation was responsible for the outbreak of civil war in

Tajikistan as well as for the formal establishment of peace. It was after the fall of Najibullah

government and the establishment of mujahideen rule in Afghanistan that was followed by

the eruption of civil war in Tajikistan. The establishment of Taliban rule in Kabul,

Afghanistan forced the warring sides to reach a compromise.

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