Post on 24-Jul-2015
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A REIMPLEMENTATION OF NETBSDBASED ON A MICROKERNEL
Andrew S. Tanenbaum
and a team of students and programmers who actually did all the work. Three of them,
Ben Gras, Lionel Sambuc, and Arun Thomas are here!
Vrije UniversiteitAmsterdam, The Netherlands
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GOAL OF OUR WORK: BUILD A RELIABLE OS
Tanenbaum’s definition of a reliable OS:
“An operating system is said to be reliable when a typical user has never experienced even a single failure in his or her lifetime and does not know anybody who has ever experienced a failure.”
In engineering terms, this is probably mean time to failure > 50 years
I don’t think we are there yet
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THE TELEVISION MODEL (BEFORE SMART TVs)
1. You buy the television
2. You plug it in
3. It works perfectly for the next 10 years
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THE COMPUTER MODEL (WINDOWS EDITION)
1. You buy the computer
2. You plug it in
3. You install service packs 1 through 9f
4. You install 18 new emergency security patches
5. You find and install 7 new device drivers
6. You install antivirus software
7. You install antispyware software
8. You install antihacker software (firewall)
9. You install antispam software
10. You reboot the computer
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THE COMPUTER MODEL (2)
11. It doesn’t work
12. You call the helpdesk
13. You wait on hold for 30 minutes
14. They tell you to reinstall Windows
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TYPICAL USER REACTION
The New York Times recently reported that 25% of computer users have gotten so angry at their computerthat they physically hit it.
IS RELIABILITY SO IMPORTANT?
• Annoying
• Lost work• But also think about
– Industrial control systems in factories
– Power grids
– Hospital operating rooms
– Banking and e-commerce servers
– Emergency phone centers
– Control software in cars, airplanes, etc.
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IS THIS FEASIBLE?
• We won’t find out if we don’t try
• Dutch Royal Academy gave me €2 million to try
• European Union gave me €2.5 million to give it a shot
• So, we’re trying
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IS RELIABILITY ACHIEVABLE AT ALL?
• Systems can survive hardware failures!– RAIDs can survive failed disks
– ECC memory can survive parity errors in memory
– TCP/IP can survive lost packets
– CD-ROM drives can correct many simultaneous errors
• We need to be able to survive software failures, too
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A NEED TO RETHINK OPERATING SYSTEMS
• Operating systems research need to be refocused– We have powerful hardware on PC-class machines– Plenty of CPU cycles, RAM, bandwidth– Current software has tons of (useless) features– Consequently, the software is slow, bloated, and buggy
• To achieve the TV model, future OSes, must be– Small– Simple– Modular– Reliable– Secure– Self-healing
BRIEF HISTORY OF OUR WORK
• (1976) John Lions wrote a book on UNIX V6
• (1979) AT&T released V7 and forbade books on it
• (1985) I started to write a UNIX-like OS from scratch
• (1987) MINIX 1 + book for teaching OS classes released
• (1997) MINIX 2 (POSIX) & 2nd edition of book released
• (2000) MINIX 2 license changed to BSD
• (2004) MINIX 3: start of work making a reliable OS
• (2006) 3rd edition of book
• (2008) European grant
• (2010) Focus moved towards embedded systems
• (2013) MINIX 3.3.0 moves to NetBSD “compatibility”12
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INTELLIGENT DESIGN
• Microkernel (13,000 LoC vs. > 15 million for Linux)– Bugs per 1000 LoC: Most S/W (1-10)
– MINIX 3 at least 13 kernel bugs; Linux has > 15,000
– Drivers have 3-7x more bugs than rest of kernel
– About 70% of the code is drivers
• Highly modular
• OS runs as multiple user-mode server processes
AS APPLIED TO OPERATING SYSTEMS
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STEP 1: ISOLATE COMPONENTS
• Move all loadable modules out of the kernel– includes all device drivers, file systems, mem mgt, etc.
• Run each module as a separate process with POLA
(Principle Of Least Authority)
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STEP 2: ISOLATE I/O
• Isolate I/O devices
• Limit access to I/O ports
• Constrain DMA (needs hardware assistance)
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STEP 3: ISOLATE COMMUNICATION
• Limit interprocess communication
• Restrict IPC on a ‘need-to-communicate’ basis
• Restrict kernel calls on a per-component basis
• Make sure faulty receiver cannot hang sender
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ARCHITECTURE OF MINIX 3
Microkernel handles interrupts, processes, scheduling, IPC
Clock
FS 1 FS 2 Proc. Other... ServersUsermode
Disk TTY Net Print Other... Drivers
Shell Make User...
Process
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USER-MODE DEVICE DRIVERS
• Each driver runs as a user-mode process
• No superuser privileges
• Protected by the MMU
• Do not have access to I/O ports, privileged instrs
• They have to ask the microkernel
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USER-MODE SERVERS
• Each server runs as a separate process• Some key servers
– Virtual file server (implements VFS)– Actual file servers (e.g., MINIX FS, EXT2, ISO 9660)– Process manager– Memory manager– Network server– Reincarnation server– Part of the scheduler
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A SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE: DOING A READ
Usermode Servers
Drivers
Users
Kernel
File access when the block is in the FS cache
1
2 3
4
User
Disk
FSFS
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FILE SERVER (2)
File access when the block is NOT in the FS cache
ServersUsermode
Drivers
Users
Kernel
1
2
3
9
4
6
7,85
Notification
FS
User
Disk
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REINCARNATION SERVER
• Parent of all the drivers and servers
• When a driver or server dies, RS collects it
• RS checks a table for action to take e.g., restart it
• RS also pings drivers and servers frequently
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DISK DRIVER RECOVERY
ServersUsermode
Drivers
Users
Kernel
User1
FS
2
DiskdriverX 3. Crash!New
driver
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RSRS
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System is self healing—this is how we hope to make it reliable
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KERNEL RELIABILITY/SECURITY
• Fewer LoC means fewer kernel bugs
• Small kernel (13,000 LoC) means reduced TCB
• NO foreign code (e.g., drivers) in the kernel
• Static data structures (no malloc in kernel)
• Moving bugs to user space puts them in cages
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IPC RELIABILITY/SECURITY
• Fixed-length messages (no buffer overruns)• Rendezvous system was simple
– No lost messages– No buffer management
– We had to add asynchronous messages
• Interrupts and messages are unified
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DRIVER RELIABILITY/SECURITY
• Untrusted code: heavily isolated• Bugs, viruses cannot spread to other modules• Cannot touch kernel data or other drivers/servers• Bad pointers, buffer overruns crash only one driver• Infinite loops detected and driver restarted• Access to I/O ports is restricted• Access to kernel calls is limited and checked• Restricted power to do damage (not superuser)
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OTHER ADVANTAGES OF USER COMPONENTS
• Short development cycle
• Normal programming model
• No down time for crash and reboot
• Easy debugging
• Good flexibility (applies to drivers, file systems, etc.)
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FAULT INJECTION EXPERIMENT
• We injected 800,000 faults into each of 3 drivers• Done on the binary drivers• Examples, change src addr, dest addr, loop condition• 100 faults were injected on each experiment• Waited 1 sec to see if the driver crashed• If no crash, inject another 100 faults and repeat• The driver crashed in 18,038 trials• The operating system NEVER crashed
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PORT OF MINIX 3 TO ARM
• Restructured source tree for multiple architectures• Changed booting to support u-boot for ARM• Rewrote the low-level code dealing with hardware• Changed code for context switching, paging, etc.• Removed x86 segmentation code• Imported NetBSD ARM headers and libraries• Ported build.sh for cross-toolchain support• Wrote drivers for SD card and other Beagle devices
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BBB CHARACTERISTICS
Item BeagleBone Black
CPU ARM v7
Clock 1 GHz
RAM 512 MB
Flash 4 GB
Video HDMI/1080p
GPIO pins 92
Ethernet 10/100 Mbps
USB 1
Open source/documentation Yes
Price (quantity 1) $55
I ADMIT I WAS WRONG
• On 29 Jan 1992 I posted to comp.os.minix this:
• “Don’t get me wrong, I am not unhappy with LINUX. It will get all the people who want to turn MINIX in BSD UNIX off my back.”
• I Apologize. Now I do want to turn MINIX into BSD. It just took me 20 years to realize this.
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MINIX 3 MEETS BSD
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+ =
BSD Daemon is copyright 1988 by Marshall Kirk McKusick and is used with permission.
WHY BSD?
• MINIX 3 didn’t have enough application software• BSD is a proven, portable, quality product• BSD has better code quality than Linux• Pkgsrc handles packages better than what we had• Thousands of excellent packages available• Active community• License compatibility• Why NetBSD?• Mostly due to its emphasis on portability
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NETBSD FEATURES IN MINIX 3.3.0
• Clang/LLVM compiler• NetBSD build system (build.sh)• ELF file format• Source code tree modeled on NetBSD• Headers and libraries are from NetBSD• Pkgsrc works and builds >4200 NetBSD packages• Nevertheless, built on MINIX 3 kernel & servers• X11 coming back soon (almost there)
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NETBSD FEATURES MISSING IN MINIX 3.3.0
• Kernel threads (we do have userland pthreads)
• Some system calls:– All _LWP*, MSG*, SEM* calls
– CLONE
– Some GET, IOCTL calls
– KQUEUE, KTRACE
– Job control
• Some weird socket options
• Nevertheless, we can build over 4200 packages
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Servers
…
…
…Drivers
Microkernel (this is the only part running in kernel mode)
Net
VFS
TTYDisk USB
FS MM Reincarnat OS
(MINIX)
Clang Pkgsrc (libc) …Pkg 1 Pkg n
Users User- Land(NetBSD)
YOUR ROLE
• MINIX 3 is an open-source project
• I hope some of you will join and help us• Things to do
– Add crucial missing system calls– Port more packages (Java, a browser, etc.)– Write the missing drivers for the Beagle series– Get it running on Raspberry Pi & other platforms– Port Rump– Port required libraries and then port a GUI– Much more
• Get involved!
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MINIX 3 IN A NUTSHELL
• Microkernel reimplementation of NetBSD• Fully open source with BSD license• Highly compatible with NetBSD• Supports both LLVM and gcc• Uses NetBSD pkgsrc• Over 4200 packages build• Live update coming soon• Good security by design (modularity, randomization)• Go get it at www.minix3.org and try it
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POSITIONING OF MINIX
• Show that multiserver systems are – reliable
– secure
– practical
• Demonstrate that drivers belong in user mode
• High-reliability and fault-tolerant applications
• $50 single-chip, small-RAM laptops for 3rd world
• Embedded systems
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MINIX 3 LOGO
• Why a raccoon?– Small– Cute– Clever– Agile– Eats bugs– More likely to visit your house than a penguin
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TRAFFIC TO WWW.MINIX3.ORG
Total visits to the main page since 2004: 2.9 millionTotal visits to the download page since 2004: 1.1 millionActual downloads since 2007: 600,000
Visits to download pageVisits to www.minix3.org
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CONCLUSION
• Current OSes are bloated• MINIX 3 is an attempt at a reliable, secure OS• Kernel is very small (13,000 LoC)• OS runs as a collection of user processes• Each driver is a separate process• Each OS component has restricted privileges• Faulty drivers can be replaced automatically• Live update is possible (not in current release)• Uses NetBSD userland and packages
SURVEY
• Please download from www.minix3.org
• Give it a try
• Fill out the survey on the www.minix3.org page
• We had 14,000 downloads in Sept. but we don’t know who they are or what they are doing
• We are trying to build an active community
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MASTERS DEGREE AT THE VU
• If you are interested in a Masters in systems
• Google me, go to my home page
• Click on the YouTube video there
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THE COST OF DRIVER RECOVERY
• We killed the Ethernet driver every t sec to simulate repeated driver crashes
Driver recovery takes about 360 msec
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RESEARCH: LIVE UPDATE
• We can update almost the entire system on the fly
• How: create new process (driver or server)
• New one contacts old one to get the state
• After state is transferred, third process is created
• It runs the state transfer backwards as a check
• If it is OK, connections are rerouted to the new one
• Applications don’t even notice this has happened
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MUCH BETTER THAN KSPLICE
• KSPLICE can handle only small security patches
• SPLICE patches the running process
• Over time, crud accumulates in the process
• If the update fails, there is no recovery
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RESEARCH: MULTICORE CHIPS
• Network stack has components
• Chips may be heterogeneous
• Where to put each component?
• Experiments scaling frequencies
• Sometimes slower is faster!• Sleep/wakeup is expensive
TCP IP
Ether Kernel
Multicore chip
Core
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RESEARCH: NEW FILE SYSTEM--LORIS
• Better reliabilty
• Better flexibility
• Handles heterogeneity better
• File rather than block oriented
• Uses checksums to detect corruption
VFS
Naming
Cache
Logical
Physical
Driver
Introduces concept of a logical file (1 or more phys files spread or striped over possiblyheterogeneous devices)
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RESEARCH: FAULT INJECTION
Inject fault?
Originalunmodifiedbasic block
Basic blockwith faultinjected
This structure is created automatically by the LLVM compiler