Combinatorial Auction. Conbinatorial auction t 1 =20 t 2 =15 t 3 =6 f(t): the set X F with the highest total value the mechanism decides the set of winners.
Minimizing Efficiency Loss in Mechanism and Protocol Design Tim Roughgarden (Stanford) includes joint work with: Shuchi Chawla (Wisconsin), Ho-Lin Chen.
A Truthful 2-approximation Mechanism for the Steiner Tree Problem.
Networks and Games Christos H. Papadimitriou UC Berkeley christos.
Combinatorial Auction. A single item auction t 1 =10 t 2 =12 t 3 =7 r 1 =11 r 2 =10 Social-choice function: the winner should be the guy having in mind.
VCG
A Mechanism Design Approach for the Stabilization of Networked dynamical systems
A Truthful 2-approximation Mechanism for the Steiner Tree Problem
Combinatorial Auction
Mechanism Design without Money
Algorithmic Problems in the Internet
