Mechanism Design Theory
Yang Cai Sep 17, 2014. An overview of today’s class Expected Revenue = Expected Virtual Welfare 2 Uniform [0,1] Bidders Example Optimal Auction.
Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming From the Single-Agent Setting Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department.
Self-interested Automated Mechanism Design and Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions
Truthfulness and Approximation Kevin Lacker. Combinatorial Auctions Goals – Economically efficient – Computationally efficient Problems – Vickrey auction.
![Yang Cai Sep 17, 2014. An overview of today’s class Expected Revenue = Expected Virtual Welfare 2 Uniform [0,1] Bidders Example Optimal Auction.](https://static.fdocuments.us/doc/330x215/56649d025503460f949d58ae/yang-cai-sep-17-2014-an-overview-of-todays-class-expected-revenue-expected.jpg)
