Sponsored Search Markets (from Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World)
House Allocation and Kidney Exchange 1. House allocation problems In some matching markets, only one side of the market has preferences (or we care mostly.
Matching Theory 1. Two-Sided Matching Statement of the problem Two sides of the market to be matched. Participants on both sides care about to whom they.
Matching and Market Design: Introduction, Bipartite Matching N ICOLE I MMORLICA, M ICROSOFT R ESEARCH NE.
Interactions in Networks In part, based on Chapters 10 and 11 of D. Easly, J. Kleinberg, 2010. Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Cambridge University press.
BA thesis – topics in Microeconomics Fall 2011 Info meeting, September 7, 2011 Lars Peter Østerdal, Department of Economics Email: [email protected].
Introduction to Market Design, ECON 285 – 01 Autumn Quarter 2012 Professors Muriel Niederle and Al Roth.
Focus Group Analysis Data
Centre for Market Design - Annual Report 2013
