Testing for collusion in russian oil and gas auctions
Auction Theory Yossi Sheffi Mass Inst of Tech Cambridge, MA ESD.260J/1.260J/15.
Reverse Auctions & Voting Mechanisms. 2 Outline Definitions Auction Types Auction Mechanisms Mechanism Design Revenue Equivalence Mechanism Design (Again)
Chapter 20 Violating Equivalence 1.Preferences for Risk 2.Asymmetric Valuations 3.Relaxing Independence 4.Differential Information 5.Collusion and Entry.
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Eyal Winter Center for the Study of Rationality The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Auctions. Strategic Situation You are bidding for an object in an auction. The object has a value to you of $20. How much should you bid? Depends on auction.
Auction Theory Class 7 – Common Values, Winner’s curse and Interdependent Values. 1.
Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-it Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation Tuomas Sandholm and Andrew Gilpin Carnegie Mellon University.
1 Disappointment Aversion in Internet Vickrey Auctions* Doron Sonsino School of Business Administration College of Management Rishon Lezion, Israel * This.
Intelligent Architectures for Electronic Commerce Part 2.3: Auctions, Reverse Auctions and Voting.
Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 15 Making Decisions with Uncertainty COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation.
