MAS course - Lect 9
Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, and Moshe Tennenholtz Stanford University.
S. Ceppi, N. Gatti, and N. Basilico DEI, Politecnico di Milano Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria through Support Enumeration Methods in Bayesian Two-Player.
Private capacities in mechanism design Vincenzo Auletta Paolo Penna Giuseppe Persiano Università di Salerno, Italy.
Annual Conference of ITA ACITA 2009 Chukwuemeka D. Emele, Timothy J. Norman, Frank GuerinSimon Parsons Computing Science Department, University of Aberdeen,
1 Almost stable matchings in the Roommates problem David Abraham Computer Science Department Carnegie-Mellon University, USA Péter Biró Department of Computer.
Multiagent Systems1 Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions Daniel Lehman, Liadan Ita OCallaghan and Yoav Shoham @ Journal of.
An Adjusted Matching Market: Adding a Cost to Proposing Joschka Tryba Brian Cross Stephen Hebson.
(Single-item) auctions Vincent Conitzer [email protected] v() = $5 v() = $3.
Slides scse-cat-nat
Slides hec-v3
final presentation
