Vulnerable and Loving It(?)
Jim Lafrenz, P.E.
American Concrete Pavement Association5420 Old Orchard RoadSkokie, IL 60077
(847) [email protected]
Which Target Would You Select?
You Cannot Afford Either Option
April 1983 – 63 Deaths
253 Marines – October 1983
1993 – 6 Deaths, 1042 Injuries
19 Deaths – Hundreds Injured
1996
212 Deaths – 4650 Injured
1998
USS Cole – 17 Dead
3600(?) Deaths – Thousands Injured
September 11, 2001
The Response
168 Deaths – 400 Injured
1995
The Terrorist Defined
Foreign– Theological– Cultural– Extremist– Depends Upon Terror
to Make a Statement– Targets Large
Populations– Depends Upon Media
Coverage
Domestic– Targets a Specific
Group or Icon– Extremist– Uses Terror to Subdue
or Avenge
Basic Conclusions
Active Defense Fails– Police– Military– Intelligence
Passive Defense Not Implemented
– Anti Collapse– Controlled Entry
The Target Will Be Defeated
Active Defense Will Continue to Fail
Policy for Passive Defense Will Continue to Lag Events
No Consideration for Minimizing Collateral Damage
Tactics and Threats
Vehicles Attack Stand-Off Ballistics Entry (Forced/Covert) Airborne - Chem/Bio Waterborne - Bio
Threat– Minimum (50 #)– Low(220#)– Medium (500#)– High (1000#)– Special Case
Levels of Protection Tactic Level of
ProtectionPotential Structure Damage Potential Injury
Bombingtactics
Minimum Significant damage, but noprogressive collapse
Majority of personnel sufferserious injuries. There are likelyto be a limited number offatalities
Low Damaged – unrepairableNo collapse, but structuralmembers will requirereplacement
Majority of personnel sufferlacerations and blunt traumainjuries from window glazing andnon-structural elements
Medium Damaged - repairableDamaged structural elementscan be repaired
Mostly minor and some seriouslacerations and blunt traumafrom window glazing and non-structural elements
High Superficial damage Only superficial lacerations andblunt trauma from non-structuralelements
Ballisticstactic
Low Limited - screening Unlikely
High Superficial – hardened None
Stand Off Distance
0 100 200 300 400 500
1000#
500#
220#
50#
MinimumLowMediumHigh
TN
T E
quiv
alen
t
Feet
TNT EQUIVALENCY
Relative Explosive Weights
500 lb. charge 1,000 lb. charge
50 lb. charge 220 lb. chargeAUTOMOBILE: trunk or other
location - easily hidden
AUTOMOBILE: trunk/passenger
compartment - not easily hidden
PICKUP: bed filled TRUCK: 2-1/2 ton truck & larger
back compartment filled
Stand Off Distance
0 100 200 300 400 500
Truck
SUV
Minivan
Car
MinimumLowMediumHigh
Conventional Annealed Glass
Glass With Micro Film
Window Retrofits
Window Width, in.
Ela
stic
Sec
tion
Mod
ulus
, in^
3
Catcher Bar Design Curves
12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 720
2
4
6
8
10
15 m il FRF , fy=35 ksi stee l15 m il FRF , fy=46 ksi stee l12 m il FRF , fy=35 ksi stee l12 m il FRF , fy=46 ksi stee l8 m il FRF , fy=35 ksi stee l8 m il FRF , fy=46 ksi stee l4 m il FRF , fy=35 ksi stee l4 m il FRF , fy=46 ksi stee l
Stan doff, feet
Cha
rge
Wei
ght,
lbs
Fragm ent R etention Film Thickness Selection
10 50 100 500 1,000 5,000 10,00010
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
F R F T h ickn e ss1 5 m il1 2 m il8 m il4 m il
WINDAS
Organizing for Vulnerability
Pa ssive D efense
B u ild in g S tan d ard sP o lice
F ire D ep artm en t
R ecovery
N ation a l G u ard
Active D efense
C IA
N S A
D S A
F B I
Intelligence
Organizing for Defense
P u b licR e la tion s
R isk A n a lys is
S tan d ard s
Tra in in gE d u ca tion
C ounterT errorsim
B u ild in gS tan d ard s
Pa ssive D efense
P olice
F ire
R ecoveryP u b lic H ea lth
N ation a lG u ard
Active D efense Intelligence
Escaping Vulnerability
Plan for Passive (Buildings Kill and Injure - Not Bombs)
Use Active as the interim and not the rule
Logical Analysis– Minimize Cost– Maximum Collateral
Protection
Standoff and Delay Most Effective Techniques– Chance of Discovery
Vulnerability Assessment Tools
Security Engineering Planning Assistant Mil HDBK 1013-10, 12, 14 WINDAS
DoD AT/FP Construction Standards Protective Structures Automated Design
System
Questions
Www.pavement.com
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