University of Helsinki, Department of Social Sciences, 16 May 2012.
The ‘Second Demographic Transition’: What does it mean? How far will it go?
David Coleman
University of Oxford
In the beginning. the standard story: characteristics
of the ‘Western European demographic regime’ (according to Malthus, Wrigley and Schofield, Laslett, Hajnal et al.)
1. Relatively slow, intermittent population growth. 2. Moderate mortality levels. Mostly epidemic, not starvation or
war. e0 35 – 40 years.3.Moderate fertility – ‘low pressure’ regime. TFR 4 – 6.
Parity-specific family planning rare. Illegitimacy usually low – 5% of births or fewer.
4. Central role of late and variable marriage in a feedback system with the economy and population. Cohabitation and divorce unusual.
5. Household mostly based on nuclear family plus non-relatives (husbandry service, lodgers).
6. Possibly a promoting factor in market economy, capitalism, need for formal welfare systems.
England – mean age at first marriage 1600 – 1849.
England - average age at first marriage 1600 - 1849percent
marriage mean age never- marriagecohort men women married cohort
6.3 1556-711600-1649 28.0 26.0 24.1 1601-061650-1699 27.8 26.5 27.0 1651-561700-1749 27.5 26.2 11.2 1704-061750-1799 26.4 24.9 4.9 1751-561800-1849 25.3 23.4 9.6 1801-06
mean of 12 reconsitution studies, and back projections.Wrigley and Schofield 1981 t 7.26, 7.28.
Marriage patterns - East West Contrastspercent never-married at selected ages
men womencountry 20-24 45-49 20-24 45-49
Belgium 1900 85 16 71 17Sweden 1900 92 13 80 19
Bulgaria 1900 58 3 24 1Serbia 1900 50 3 16 1
Turkey 1935 49 3 18 3Japan 1920 71 2 31 2
India 1931 35 4 5 1
Source: Glass 1976.
Index of proportions married (Im), 1900, showing Hajnal’s line.Red= marriage late or avoided, blue = earlier, prevalent marriage
Source: Coale and Watkins 1996.
The end of the old marriage regime in Western Europe after the 1960s
Later or marginalised marriage.
Divorce terminates up to one marriage in two.
Cohabitation becomes ‘normal’.
Up to 60% children born outside marriage.
Childbearing postponed, family size falls.
These are the empirical indicators of the ‘Second Demographic Transition’ (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa)
The end of the ancien regime in marriage: mean age at first marriage in England and Wales 1889 - 2001
Mean age at marriage, bachelors and spinsters, England and Wales 1889 - 2001. Source: ONS Series FM2
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
1889
1893
1897
1901
1905
1909
1913
1917
1921
1925
1929
1933
1937
1941
1945
1949
1953
1957
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
bachelors spinsters
Trend in mean age at first marriage (females), The English-speaking countries 1945 - 2010
Trend in mean age at first marriage, females, 1945 - 2010. English-Speaking countries
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
1945
1948
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
England and Wales
Canada
New Zealand
Australia
USA
Parallel developments throughout Europe.
Mean Age at First Marriage (females), groups of European countries 1960 - 2008. Source: Council of Europe, UNECE
21
23
25
27
29
31
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Scandinavia mean
Southern Europe mean
NW Europe mean
CEE mean
FSU mean
former Yugoslavia mean (ex Bosnia)
Percent ever-married - decline from 1935 to 1960 birth cohorts, selected countries. Source:
Eurostat.
Proportions of women ever-married by 2002, selected European countries, Source: Eurostat.
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Sw
eden
Sw
itze
rlan
d
Fin
land
Aus
tria
Den
mar
k
Fra
nce
Nor
way
Bel
gium
Net
herl
ands
E&
W
Ital
y
1935 birth cohort
1960 birth cohort
High levels of cohabitation instead. Source: Kiernan 2004 table 2.
Partnership status, men and women aged 25 - 34 years, EU countries 2000-2001. Percent, ranked from left by order of percent ever-cohabited.
Source: Kiernan 2004 table 2.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Sw
eden
Den
mar
k
Fra
nce
Fin
land
Eas
t Ger
man
y
Aus
tria
Gre
at B
rita
in
Net
herl
ands
Lux
embu
rg
Irel
and
Wes
t Ger
man
y
Bel
gium
Spa
in
Gre
ece
Ital
y
Por
tuga
l
Ever married
Unmarried, ever-cohabited
Total First Marriage Rate – a simple synthetic cohort measure of proportions ever-marrying at current
rates.Simple total first marriage rate calculation,
England and Wales 2009females female age-specific
first population first marriage rateage marriages (all marital statuses) per 1000
female population
15-19 3,085 1680500 0.001820-24 32,753 1855700 0.017625-29 66,954 1844800 0.036330-34 41,504 1718100 0.024235-39 18,208 1882100 0.009740-44 7,264 2069800 0.003545-49 3,010 2041700 0.001550-54 1,239 1770000 0.000755-59 504 1605100 0.0003
sum to 60 0.0956*5 0.4780
Implication: at 2009 rates, 48% of women will marry at least once by age 60; 52% will not marry.
‘Gross nuptuality’ – a life-table measure of proportions ever-married implied by current patterns.
Simple marriage table, England and Wales 2009 ('Gross Nuptiality')The 'death rate' mx is the age-specific first marriage rate per 1000 spinsters.
The radix of the table is 10,000 unmarried women age 15 (not 16, for convenience)By age 60, 3890 / 10000 remain unmarried , or 39%, with 61% ever-married.
percent
age mx mx/10000 qx lx ever-married
15 2.2 0.0022 0.0109 10000 020 19.1 0.0191 0.0911 9891 1.125 51.4 0.0514 0.2277 8989 10.130 51.2 0.0512 0.2270 6942 30.635 29.5 0.0295 0.1374 5366 46.340 15.8 0.0158 0.0760 4629 53.745 10.0 0.0100 0.0488 4277 57.250 7.0 0.0070 0.0344 4069 59.355 2.0 0.0020 0.0100 3929 60.760 2.0 0.0020 0.0100 3890 61.1
Trends in Total First Marriage Rate, groups of European countries 1960 - 2002. Source: Council of Europe and
Eurostat. Total First Marriage Rate, groups of European countries 1960 - 2002.
Source: Council of Europe
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Scandinavia mean
Southern Europe mean
NW Europe mean
CEE mean
FSU mean
former Yugoslavia mean (ex Bosnia)
Not as low as it seems? Period measures of total first marriage rate, Austria, Germany and Switzerland, 1970 – 2000, observed and corrected
for postponement etc (left to right), according to Bongaarts and Feeney (BF), Kohler and Philipov (2001, KP) Kohler and Ortega (2002, KO). Source:
Winkler-Dworak and Engelhardt 2004
Trends in Total Divorce Rate, groups of developed countries. Source; Council of Europe, Eurostat.
Total Divorce Rate trends, groups of European countries 1960 - 2003
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Scandinavia
Former Soviet Union
Western Europe
Central and Eastern Europe
Balkans (FR Yugoslavia only)
Southern Europe
Total Divorce Rate, selected countries 1960 – 2003.
TDR trends, selected countries, 1960 - 2003. Source: Council of Europe
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
FinlandEstoniaDenmarkNorwayFranceRomaniaFR Yugoslavia
Total Divorce Rate 1948 – 2011, selected countries. Source: national statistical offices.
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
1945
1948
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
Czech Republic
Austria
Switzerland
Norway
Total Divorce Rate Finland 1970 - 2008
Trends in births outside marriage, groups of
developed countries. Sources: Council of Europe, Eurostat, National statistical yearbooks
Births outside marriage per 1000 live births, European regions and Anglosphere 1955 - 2010. Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national demographic yearbooks.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
Scandinavia 4
English-speaking world outside Europe
Western Europe
Eastern Europe and FSU
Southern Europe
The ‘Second Demographic Transition (SDT)’ theory (van de Kaa, Lesthaeghe 1986)
Explains high levels of cohabitation, extramarital births, retreat from marriage, divorce, ‘lowest- low’ fertility since 1960s.
Driven by spread of new attitudes and values of tolerant, individualistic nature (‘post-materialism’).
‘Inevitable consequence of realisation of higher-order human needs in prosperous, educated, secular, secure welfare societies’ (Maslow, Ingelhart).
Will therefore become a universal attribute of developed societies.
Part of the coherent SDT ‘package’: births outside marriage and the total divorce rate, selected European countries around 2000.
Births outside marriage and Total Divorce Rate, selected European countries 2000. Source: Council of Europe 2002
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Portugal
Norway
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
HungaryGermany
France
Finland
DenmarkBelgiumAustria
y = 0.0052x + 0.1783
R2 = 0.3167
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60Births outside marriage per 100 live births
Tot
al D
ivor
ce R
ate
A hierarchy of human needs. (based on Abraham Maslow, ‘Motivation and Personality’, 1954).
Measuring ‘post-materialism’. Inglehart’s ‘post-materialist’ questionnaire.
Bold = short questionnaire. Blue = ‘materialist’ responses; Green = ‘postmaterialist’ responses
Robert Inglehart (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.
A Maintain order in the nation. B Give people more say in the decisions of the government. C Fight rising prices. D Protect freedom of speech. E Maintain a high rate of economic growth. F Make sure that this country has strong defence forces. G Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community. H Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. I Maintain a stable economy. J Fight against crime. K Move towards a friendlier, less impersonal society. L Move towards a society where ideas count more than money.
‘post materialist’ attitudes and valuesReligiosity and living arrangements respondents 20-29 in
Belgium, France, West Germany and Netherlands 1990Men WomenSingle Cohab Married Single Cohab Marriedwith with
Beliefs (odds ratio) parents parentsBelieves in God 1.0 0.52 1.86 1.0 0.39 1.54Believes in Sin 1.0 0.47 1.48 1.0 0.69 1.35Prays outside church 1.0 0.60 1.07 1.0 0.59 1.85Believes in reincarnation 1.0 3.29 1.03 1.0 0.72 0.35
Thinks never justified (%)Both sexesTaking drugs 70 62 85Cheating taxman 31 22 41Avoiding fares 34 30 48Fighting with police 29 29 44
Littering 59 62 65Lying 13 18 20Drink-driving 56 67 65
Source: Lesthaeghe and Moors 1996
Association between an index of SDT values (SDT2) and an index of family behaviour (SDT1) (not total
fertility). Source: Sobotka 2008, Figure 4.
Other approaches. Heath, Evans and Martin 1993.Libertarian scale. responses to:
‘Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values’.‘Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’.‘People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives’.‘Homosexual relations are always wrong’.‘People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government’.‘Even political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should not be banned’.
Socialist/laissez-fair scale. responses to:‘There is one law for the rich and one for the poor’.‘There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages’.‘It is government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one’.‘Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems’.‘Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership’.
Some problems with the SDT concept
Wrong in respect of fertility.
No so much ‘Second’ but ‘secondary’?
Not really ‘Demographic’?
Not (yet) a ‘Transition’
Imperialistic. Other explanations preferable for demographic change in Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia.
Birth rates can go up as well as down, and the end of ‘lowest-low’ fertility.
Total Fertility trends, industrial higher-fertility countries 1945-2010 Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat and national statistical yearbooks
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1945
1948
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
Denmark
France
NZ
USA
Norway
United Kingdom
An incoherent concept? International comparisons show that national populations most enthusiastic for ‘SDT’ behaviour have the highest, not the lowest
fertility.TFR and extramarital births per thousand live births 2009
USA
UK
Taiwan
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia
Slovakia
SerbiaRussiaRomania
Portugal
Poland
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Montenegro
Moldova
Malta
Luxemburg
Lithuania
Latvia
Korea J apan
Italy
Ireland
Iceland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
Georgia
France
Finland
Estonia
Denmark
Czech Republic
CyprusCroatia
Canada
Bulgaria
Belgium
Belarus
Austria
Australia
y = 346.96x - 223.1
R2 = 0.3713
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
Total fertility
Pro
por
tion
of
bir
ths
outs
ide
mar
riag
e p
er 1
000
The Empty Quarter
Persistent variety - Crude Divorce Rate 2003 . red = high, blue = low.
Council of Europe, recent demographic developments in Europe 2003 map 6
Works better at sub-national level? Spatial distribution of the SDT factor for US counties
(blue= higher STD factor) Lesthaeghe, Neidert and Surkyn 2006
Not ‘Second’ but ‘Secondary’?
A major change in behaviour. But some aspects not without precedent (Cliquet 1991).
Other ‘transitions’ important (e.g 16th C. West European Marriage Pattern)
In some respects a consequence of ‘First Demographic Transition’ or a continuation of it.
Not ‘Demographic’ – does not address the central issues?
Demography deals centrally with birth and death, migration and population
‘SDT’ concept more concerned with sex, changing morals and living arrangements – a sociological transition
Prediction of very low fertility contradicted by international comparative data
Does not address mortality or population growth, decline or ageing.
Has nothing directly to say about migration.
Not a ‘Transition’?
A ‘transition’ is permanent, universal, irreversible?Otherwise a limited set of behaviour.Some take it, some leave it: result is diversity, not uniformity
(so far).Nowhere yet universal, unlike First DT.Will other cultures (e.g.) Muslims adopt it?Some elements traditional in non-European societies (simple
societies, South America)?However, some aspects of SDT behaviour now emerging
more widely (Northern Italy, Japan).
Not reversible?
Total First Marriage Rate, selected countries 1960-2002
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Denmark
Germany
France
Iceland
Spain
UK
Finland
‘Sustainable?
Fiscal burdens e.g. divorce adds 15% to UK benefit bill (£15 bn); creates 3 for 2 new households.
Can an economy afford SDT and population ageing? The latter is unavoidable.
Psychosocial externalities. In UK and US at least, some evidence that ‘new living arrangements’ damage childrens’ (social) health and prospects.
Controversial UK social policy (after 2010) aimed at reversing elements of SDT?
Economic recession may be a test.
Underlying theory
SDT good as empirical description of behaviour
Inglehart ‘post-materialism’ an uncertain theoretical foundation : really different from ‘conservativism / liberalism’? Weak test / retest and predictive power?
Plurality of explanations needed for diverse situations (CEE).
Ultimately an Economic model?
Central and Eastern Europe demographic behaviour –a diversity of explanation needed.
Is female education and workforce participation part of the SDT?
Post – communist demographic modernisation after abrupt end to state socialist demographic regime (e.g. early, universal childbearing) ; more crisis than emancipation?
Social dislocation and anomie – predominance of SDT behaviour among poorest, including rural populations
‘Hajnal’s line’ persists into the 21st century – low mean age at first marriage in Eastern Europe around 2002 as a relic of the state socialist
demographic regime . Source: Council of Europe 2003
Trends in rate of union formation (cohabitation and direct marriage, competing risks) 1960 – 2004 in
Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Source Hoem et al 2008.
Rapid ‘modernisation’ of marriage in Central and Eastern Europe post-1989
.Total First Marriage Rate, selected countries 1960-2002
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Denmark
France
Iceland
UK
Finland
Bulgaria
Czech Republic f
Mean age at first marriage 1960 – 2010. Selected countries in Western and Central and Eastern Europe.
Mean Age at First Marriage (females), selected countries 1960-2010. Sources: Council of Europe, UNECE.
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Denmark f
Finland f
Germany f
France f
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
Hungary
Romania
Former Soviet Union, 1956 – 2010, births outside marriage per 1000 live births.
Live births outside marriage, per thousand llive births, former Soviet Union 1955 - 2010
Source: Council of Europe and national statistical yearbooks. Excludes Moldova.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
pe
r th
ou
san
d li
ve b
irth
s
Estonia Georgia Latvia
Russia Lithuania Belarus
Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan
Is Central and Eastern Europe really ‘post-materialist’?
Births outside marriage per 1000, 1970-2001, CEE
0
100
200
300
400
500
60019
70
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Belarus Bulgaria Czech Republic
DDR Estonia 3*Real GDP/NMP in Eastern Europe
3*Real GDP/NMP Baltic States 3Real GDP/NMP CIS
Is some SDT behaviour driven by poverty, not prosperity? some examples
‘UK upper-middle class pioneers in cohabitation’. British Household Panel Survey 1950-62 cohort : ‘More cohabitation with higher father’s social status. Class distinction disappears with 1963-76 cohort, cohabitation normative’. (Ermisch and Francesconi , 2007)
USA: ‘Transitions to marriage especially unlikely among poor women. Cohabitation among poor women a long-term substitute for marriage’. Poor family background, women’s economic resources salient in transitions. (Lichter et al. 2006, Demography)
Sweden: ‘Women of lower socio-economic background more likely to cohabit and have births outside marriage’. (Hoem 1986, EJP)
Russia: ‘Least-educated women have highest birth rates within cohabitation, lower probability of legitimating a nonmarital conception. Nonmarital childbearing in Russia more like pattern of disadvantage in United States than ‘second demographic transition’. (Perelli-Harris 2011,Demography).
USA: ‘Transitions to cohabitation more rapid among working class for practical reasons - financial necessity, convenience, housing need. Middle-class cohabitors more likely to become engaged than working-class cohabitors’. (Sassler 2011, Family Relations)
Association of SDT behaviour with poverty
USA: Most working and lower-middle class cohabitors mentioned lack of economic resources as delaying marriage: insufficient money “to pay the bills,” desire to own a home upon marriage, be debt-free, have a “real” wedding. Stress over money source of conflict for some couples. (Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005).
Edin (2000) low-income mothers women chose cohabitation or single-parenthood due to their partner’s fragile income. “pay and stay rule. USA (Smock et al 2008 Michigan Population Studies Center)
women from more affluent backgrounds more likely to cohabit, but less likely to have a child in cohabitation, middleclass women remain single longer.
First birth within a cohabiting union in Britain more likely when the man unemployed. Women with fathers in unskilled or semi-skilled manual jobs much more likely to become mothers in cohabiting unions.
Cohabiting couples with children are generally more likely to have low socio-economic status compared to childless cohabitants, UK, Morgan 2000 p. 16
‘cohabiting couples with children two or three times as likely to be in the semi-skilled and unskilled groups’ (UK, Kiernan and Estaugh, 1993, p. 16).
Births outside marriage by social class of father, England and Wales 1976 – 2000 (percent).
Source: Maher and Macfarlane 2004, table 2 (from ONS)
Live births outside marriage, percent, by social class of father, England and Wales 1976 - 200
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Social Class 5
Social Class 4
Social Class 3 (Manual)
Social Class 3 (Non-manual)
Social Class 2
Social Class 1
Births outside marriage, percent, England and Wales 2010 according to fathers’ socio-economic category.
Source: ONS. Note: births registered by mother only not included.
Percent of births outside marriage by socio-economic category, England and Wales 2010. Source: ONS
22.319.6
32.5
38.6
45.4
53.3 53.7
61.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1.1 1.2 2 3 4 5 6 7
Per
cen
t of
bir
ths
outs
ide
mar
riag
e
1.1 Large employers and higher managerial1.2 Higher professional2 Lower managerial and professional3 Intermediate4 Small employers and own-account workers5 Lower supervisory and technical6 Semi-routine7 Routine
Another badly-fitting example– trends in marriage and reproduction in East Asia.
Mean age at first marriage, females, in East Asia 1947 – 2010Mean age at first marriage, females, East Asian countries 1945 - 2011
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
1945
1948
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
Korea
Singapore
Taiwan
Japan
Divorces per 100 marriages, calendar years 1930 – 2010, Japan and Korea.
marriage divorces divorces/ 100 marriages
marriage divorces divorces/ 100 marriages
1930 506674 51259 10 180833 8894 51940 666575 48556 7 158271 8151 51950 715081 83689 12 85043 3223 41960 866115 69410 8 186187 7016 41970 1029405 95937 9 295137 11615 41980 774706 141689 18 403031 23662 61990 722138 157608 22 399312 45694 112000 798138 285911 36 334303 119982 362010 730971 257475 35 326100 126900 39
Note: Korea '1940' data are for 1938, '1950' data are for 1949. Japan - '2010' data are 2006
Sources: Population Statistics of Japan 2008, tables 6.1, 6.2, Kim 2004 Table 6.1, Statistics Korea
Marriage and divorce trends Korea and Japan 1930 - 2010
Japan Korea
Proportions of women never-married at ages 30-34, selected East Asian countries and Bangkok, Source: Jones 2003
Table 1; 2012, table 3, Hong Kong census 2011, Population Statistics of Japan 2008 table 6.22. Notes: Blank = no data. Hong Kong '2000' data are for 1996, '2010' data for 2011. Japan '2020' data are 2005. Taiwan - years end in '-1', '2010' data
are 2004.Taiwan-Fuchien demographic fact book
30-34 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Pen. Malaysia (Chinese) 4 10 13 16 18Taiwan 2 7 8 13 22 27Japan 9 7 9 14 27 32Korea 1 1 3 5 11
Singapore (Chinese) 5 11 18 22 22 30Hong Kong 6 6 11 25 27 38Bangkok 12 17 25 29 33
Proportions of women never-married by ages 30-34 , East Asian countries.
Very low levels of birth outside marriage in East Asia – but increasing.
Births outside marriage per 1000 live births, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan 1947 - 2010. Sources: national statistical offices.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1947
1950
1953
1956
1959
1962
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Japan
South Korea
ConclusionsRevolution in sexual behaviour, living arrangements, setting
for childbearing, family building postponement postponement and associated values and attitudes.
This ‘SDT’ behaviour incomplete and limited so far – result is new diversity, not yet a new regime, nor universal.
SDT theory creative, valuable, testable, influential. Facts contradict its predictions on reproduction at national
level.‘Poverty led’ aspects not compatible with theoretical model
of ‘post-materialism’.Negative feedbacks (costs) may limit its scope, especially in
times of economic distress.‘P-M’ is only one of several possible models for empirically
similar behaviour in CEE and East Asia.
Top Related