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Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor
American Economic Review 2009.
Sharon Loxton
ENV. 379
Katherine Antonio
http://www.geograph.org.uk/profile/6339http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cows_on_Selsley_Common_-_geograph.org.uk_-_192472.jpghttp://www.geograph.org.uk/profile/6339http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cows_on_Selsley_Common_-_geograph.org.uk_-_192472.jpg8/10/2019 Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons
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Research question
Develop a theory of renewable resources management
where the degree to which countries escape the tragedyof the commons (the enforcement of property rights,and hence the efficacy of resource management), is
endogenously determined
assuming de facto property rights regime
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Some Facts Continuous declining of renewable resources stock
(deforestation, capture fisheries are in a state of declineif not collapse).
Carbon emissions continue to grow at rapid rates
Poor environmental quality in many developingcountries
Who is responsible? Role of international trade
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Theory an existing government regulates the use of a renewable
resource by a set of agents who have a right to harvest(fishery, forest stock)
local resource contained within one country
agents may cheat on these allocations and risk punishment
the effective protection is not perfect, even though propertyrights would be perfectly enforced if there was nomonitoring problem
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Dividing into groups resource-rich
economiesHARDIN OSTROM CLARK
SUCCESS IN
REGULATION
Limited relative to
Overcapacity.De facto openaccess .No rents earnedfrom resources
Price low open
access, high theprotection safforded theresourceGenerate somerates. No first best
With High prices
obtain the fist bestWith lower priceseven Clarkeconomiesexhibits openaccess.
Parameters: Resources growth rate, Mortality rate,
Time preferences rates, Technologies.
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Features of the model
The model can explain heterogeneity across countries
and resources in the effectiveness of resourcesmanagement
Predict that change in prices, population, and
technology can cause transitions to better or worsemanagement regimes.
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Model
A. AGENTS
B. TECHNOLOGIES AND ENDOWMENTS
C. RESOURCES MANAGER
DETECTION RATE FINE
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Model
D. INCENTIVE CONSTRAINT
Expected presented value to cheating
Value of non-cheat option
An agent will not cheat when the cost exceed the benefits
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Model
E. STEADY STATE
The steady state is unique. It exhibits either de factoopen access, limited harvesting restrictions, or anoutcome equivalent to that of the unconstrained
first best.
If:
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Three forces determine the successor failure in resources management
The regulators enforcement power,
the extent of harvesting capacity ,
and the ability of the resource to generate competitivereturns without being extinguished
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Country characteristics and
management regime1. Hardin economies will always exhibit de facto open
access in steady state. For any finite relative price p ofthe harvest good, we have L=L0(p) and no rents areearned in the resource sector.
2. If
holds and there is overcapacity in the resource sector,all economies will exhibit open access and zero rents atlow resource prices.
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Applications How the impacts of trade liberalization, technological
progress, and economic growth can differ quiteradically across countries and resources.
Trade liberalization is more favorable for resourceexporting countries, but if market integration alsobrings new technologies these tend to destabilizemanagement systems.
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Conclusions
generated the limiting cases of open access and perfectmanagement as endogenous outcomes, and linkedthese outcomes to primitive country and resource
characteristics
model is highly stylized and focuses on three simpledeterminants of success and failure in resource
management; as such, it surely cannot explain all ofthe variation we observe in resource managementworldwide.
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ConclusionsRESEARCHA welfare maximizing regulator to show how a variety of
outcomes are possible even with a benevolentregulator, extending to allow corruption or political
pressure.Generate poaching or cheating in equilibrium, and
hence generalizing the model to allow forheterogeneous harvesters could yield a richer set of
outcomes.
Using other not a very simple, single-species renewableresource model with the Schaefer harvestingtechnology.
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THANK YOU
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