Thyspunt Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3
Workshop 3 Summary Report September 2012
Compiled by E. Hattingh and A. Graham Contributor: PPRP, TI Leads, J.H.P van der Merwe
and F. Delport
Council of Geoscience Report Number 2012-0188
Rev. 0
CONFIDENTIAL
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DOCUMENT APPROVAL SHEET
REFERENCE:
CGS REPORT
2012-0188
ESKOM
REVISION
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COPY No.
Thyspunt Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3 Workshop 3 Summary Report - September 2012
DATE OF RELEASE:
11 September 2012
CONFIDENTIAL
AUTHORS
COMPILED BY
REVIEWED BY
REVIEWED BY
ACCEPTED BY:
E. Hattingh J.J. Bommer K.J. Coppersmith N. Keyser
COMPILED BY
AUTHORISED BY:
A Graham G. Botha
REVISION DESCRIPTION OF REVISION DATE MINOR REVISIONS APPROVAL
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4
2. Workshop Agenda ..................................................................................................... 6
Day 1: Preliminary GMC Model – Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms ..................... 9
Day 2: GMC Hazard Feedback – Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms ....................10
Day 3: GMC-SSC Interfaces - Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms .........................11
Day 4: Preliminary SSC Model - Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms ......................12
Day 5: SSC Hazard Feedback - Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms ......................13
3. Attendance List .........................................................................................................14
4. Summary of Potential Refinements to Preliminary Models ....................................15
4.1 GMC Model .......................................................................................................15
4.2 SSC Model ........................................................................................................16
5. Participatory Peer Review Panel (PPRP) report ......................................................19
6. TI Leads’ Response...................................................................................................19
7. Presentations ............................................................................................................19
8. Safety .........................................................................................................................19
8.1 Pre-Workshop Safety Checklist .........................................................................20
8.2 Safety Checklist during Workshop .....................................................................23
8.3 Evidence for safety at the hotel and venue ........................................................26
8.3.1 Accessibility ................................................................................................26
8.3.2 Traffic Flow .................................................................................................26
8.3.3 Amenities ....................................................................................................27
8.3.4 Signage ......................................................................................................27
8.3.5 Fire prevention ............................................................................................28
8.3.6 Emergency Procedures ..............................................................................28
8.3.7 First Aid ......................................................................................................29
8.3.8 Electrical .....................................................................................................29
8.3.9 Weather Conditions ....................................................................................30
8.3.10 Security ......................................................................................................30
8.3.11 Safety Presentation ....................................................................................31
8.4 Hotel Health and Safety Talk .............................................................................32
8.4.1 Spier’s Policy entails ...................................................................................32
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8.4.2. Emergency Response ................................................................................32
8.4.3 First Aid & Fire ............................................................................................32
8.4.4. Fire Evacuation Procedure .........................................................................32
8.4.5. Evacuation of Individuals with Disabilities ...................................................33
8.4.6. Guests Rest Rooms ....................................................................................33
8.4.7. Smoking Policy ...........................................................................................33
9. Workshop Satisfaction Survey .................................................................................34
9.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................34
9.2 Survey ...............................................................................................................34
9.3 Results ..............................................................................................................35
9.3.1 Pre-workshop arrangements .......................................................................35
9.3.2 Venue .........................................................................................................36
9.3.3 General .......................................................................................................38
9.4 How did we fare? ...............................................................................................39
9.5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................40
10. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................41
11. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................42
12. References ..............................................................................................................45
Appendix A - Participatory Peer Review Panel’s cover letter and Report .................46
Appendix B - TI Lead’s response to PPRP Report ......................................................47
Appendix C - Workshop satisfaction survey Form ......................................................48
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Road and pedestrian routes clearly separated ..................................................26
Figure 2: Signage to venues clearly marked ....................................................................26
Figure 3: Pedestrian and roads clearly separated ............................................................26
Figure 4: Signage to indicate traffic flow...........................................................................26
Figure 5: Ample clean drinking water available in venue for participants ..........................27
Figure 6: Amenities clearly marked ..................................................................................27
Figure 7: Signage to indicate temporary detour................................................................27
Figure 8: Venues clearly marked .....................................................................................27
Figure 9: Warning signs clearly visible .............................................................................27
Figure 10: Caution signs clearly visible ............................................................................27
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Figure 11: Fire hydrant maintenance certificates in date ..................................................28
Figure 12: Fire hoses clearly marked ...............................................................................28
Figure 13: Exit signs in conference venue clearly marked ................................................28
Figure 14: Emergency assembly point clearly marked .....................................................28
Figure 15: Emergency exit in rooms clearly marked .........................................................28
Figure 16: Emergency exit at pool clearly marked ............................................................28
Figure 17: First aid station clearly marked at conference venue .......................................29
Figure 18: First aid boxes clearly marked at conference venue ........................................29
Figure 19: Fire blanket clearly marked at conference venue ............................................29
Figure 20: Substation clearly marked ...............................................................................29
Figure 21: Evidence of maintenance being undertaken ....................................................29
Figure 22: Golf carts, with sides can be used in unfavorable conditions ...........................30
Figure 23: Temperature gauge is clearly visible at reception ............................................30
Figure 24: Each room is equipped with an umbrella for unfavorable weather ...................30
Figure 25: CCTV camera overlooking the day participant car park...................................30
Figure 26: Security guard station in the day participant car park ......................................30
Figure 27: Each room is equipped with a safe .................................................................31
Figure 28: Car guard at the hotel car park ........................................................................31
Figure 29: Spier’s safety presentation ..............................................................................31
Figure 30: Satisfaction of pre-workshop arrangements ....................................................35
Figure 31: Satisfaction - venue (satisfied) ........................................................................36
Figure 32: Satisfaction –venue (room for improvement) ...................................................37
Figure 33: Satisfaction –venue (mostly not applicable) ....................................................37
Figure 34: Satisfaction - general ......................................................................................38
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1. INTRODUCTION The selected methodology for the Thyspunt Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) will be
consistent with the requirements for a SSHAC Level 3 study (SSHAC, 1997). According to this
process, a minimum of three workshops must be held facilitated by the Technical Integrator (TI)
Leads (NUREG-2117, 2012) and with the participation of the TI Teams, each with the following
purposes:
• Identification of hazard-significant issues and the identification of available data or other
pertinent information that could be used for the assessments;
• Alternative interpretations of available data: this workshop brings together proponents of
alternative points of view in order to understand uncertainties and the range of views within the
informed technical community;
• Feedback: after development of preliminary assessments, a workshop is held to present the
sensitivity of the hazard results to different branches of the logic-tree; the workshop is also an
opportunity for the TI Teams to discuss and debate the assessments and their associated
uncertainties, and for the PPRP to question the TI Teams about the models
The Thyspunt Workshop WS3: Presentation of Models and Hazard Sensitivity Feedback, was held
at Spier Hotel, Stellenbosch, South Africa from 27 to 31 August 2012.
This report is a summary of the third workshop for Thyspunt. The goals of this workshop were:
• For the TI Teams to present the preliminary SSC and GMC models, including a summary of the
evaluation of the available data, methods and models undertaken by the TI Teams and the
technical bases for the logic-trees produced through the integration process
• For the TI Teams to receive and consider feedback on their preliminary models in the form of
hazard sensitivity analyses and comments from the PPRP
• For the PPRP to ask questions of the TI Teams regarding the elements of the preliminary
models, their technical bases, and the degree to which these capture the centre, the body, and
the range of technically-defensible interpretations of the available data; the PPRP may also
question the TI Teams with regard to the degree to which the full range of available data,
methods and models within the broader technical community have been considered
• For the TI Teams to see and discuss hazard sensitivity feedback, to identify the relative
contributions of different elements of the preliminary models to the total hazard estimate and, in
particular, the main contributions to the overall uncertainty
• For the TI Teams to identify those elements of the preliminary models requiring additional
analysis and consideration in order to be refined in the final models to be developed after the
Workshop
• For the TI Teams to identify those elements of the preliminary models that require additional
technical justification and support
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• For the TI Teams to identify and discuss critical interface issues between the SSC and GMC
models, and where the models may need refining in view of these interfaces
• To discuss the details of the way that the hazard calculations are executed in the selected
software, and the implications for the SSC and GMC models and their interfaces
• To discuss the path forward for the Thyspunt PSHA project in terms of developing the final
SSC and GMC models and the conduct of the definitive hazard calculations.
The workshop brought together the Project Management Team, TI Leads and Teams, Hazard
Team and the PPRP. Observers from the client were also present.
This report includes:
(1) the meeting agenda;
(2) list of participants and their contact information;
(3) summary of potential refinements to preliminary models;
(4) the Participatory Peer Review Panel (PPRP) report;
(5) the TI Leads’ response;
(6) all presentations given at the workshop;
(7) safety
(8) satisfaction survey
(9) lessons learned
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2. WORKSHOP AGENDA
Thyspunt SSHAC Level 3 PSHA
Workshop WS3: Presentation of Models and Hazard Sensitivity Feedback
27-31 August 2012
Spier Hotel, near Stellenbosch, South Africa GOALS of the WORKSHOP This is the final of three Workshops that form key elements of the SSHAC Level 3 Probabilistic
Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) for the Thyspunt Nuclear Siting Project (TNSP). The specific
goals of Workshop WS3 are:
• For the TI Teams to present the preliminary SSC and GMC models, including a summary of the
evaluation of the available data, methods and models undertaken by the TI Teams and the
technical bases for the logic-trees produced through the integration process
• For the TI Teams to receive and consider feedback on their preliminary models in the form of
hazard sensitivity analyses and comments from the PPRP
• For the PPRP to ask questions of the TI Teams regarding the elements of the preliminary
models, their technical bases, and the degree to which these capture the centre, the body, and
the range of technically-defensible interpretations of the available data; the PPRP may also
question the TI Teams with regard to the degree to which the full range of available data,
methods and models within the broader technical community have been considered
• For the TI Teams to see and discuss hazard sensitivity feedback, to identify the relative
contributions of different elements of the preliminary models to the total hazard estimate and, in
particular, the main contributions to the overall uncertainty
• For the TI Teams to identify those elements of the preliminary models requiring additional
analysis and consideration in order to be refined in the final models to be developed after the
Workshop
• For the TI Teams to identify those elements of the preliminary models that require additional
technical justification and support
• For the TI Teams to identify and discuss critical interface issues between the SSC and GMC
models, and where the models may need refining in view of these interfaces
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• To discuss the details of the way that the hazard calculations are executed in the selected
software, and the implications for the SSC and GMC models and their interfaces
To discuss the path forward for the Thyspunt PSHA project in terms of developing the final SSC
and GMC models and the conduct of the definitive hazard calculations.
APPROACH
The goals of the workshop will be accomplished by a series of presentations and discussions that
describe the elements of the preliminary SSC and GMC models, examine their technical bases,
and explore their impact on the hazard estimates for the Thyspunt site and the associated
uncertainty. Each of the 2-day workshops dedicated to the GMC and SSC sub-projects has the
same format: the first day is focused on presenting the preliminary model and its technical bases,
and the second day focuses on hazard sensitivity feedback. The former is intended primarily as a
means of obtaining feedback from the PPRP and the latter as a means for the respective TI Team
to receive hazard sensitivity feedback.
On the first days of both the GMC and SSC sessions, the preliminary models will be presented,
and during these sessions the PPRP are encouraged to ask questions regarding the models and
their technical bases to the TI Teams. Whereas at Workshops 1 and 2 the PPRP had observer
status, in order to maintain the required separation between evaluators and reviewers, at
Workshop 3 the PPRP is actively engaged in posing questions to the TI Teams on all aspects of
their preliminary models. The questions posed by the PPRP may explore the degree to which the
full range of views of the appropriate technical communities have been considered in the evaluation
process, the extent to which the preliminary logic-trees capture the centre, the body, and the range
of technically-defensible interpretations, and the validity of any assumptions made in constructing
the preliminary models. The purpose of providing this opportunity for the PPRP to question the TI
Teams on their models at this stage of the project is to receive feedback on the preliminary models
that will lead to improved final models and stronger technical bases. Doing so will pre-empt
comments and criticisms that would otherwise only arise at the very late stage of when the Panel
reviews the draft final report on the PSHA project.
The hazard sensitivity feedback will constitute a presentation of hazard results focusing on the
contributions of different elements of the logic-trees, including the contributions from the various
seismic sources defined in the SSC model. The feedback will mainly focus on the contributions to
the hazard of individual logic-tree branches (and groups of branches with common features) and is
intended to provide the TI Teams with an indication of which elements of the models, and their
associated uncertainty, exert the largest influence on the results, in order to highlight where efforts
should be focused in refining the models for the final PSHA calculations.
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The common day in the middle of the week is intended to provide both TI Teams the opportunity to
present and discuss key interface issues. The PPRP will also have the opportunity to pose
questions to the Teams on these issues. This session will also include a discussion of the details of
the way that the hazard calculations are executed in the selected software, and the implications for
the SSC and GMC models and their interfaces.
At the end of each day, an opportunity will be provided for observers (including representatives of
Eskom and NNR) to make comments and to raise questions from the floor.
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Day 1 (Monday 27th August): Preliminary GMC Model – Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms
Time Presentations Speaker
08:00-08:03 Safety Briefing Head of Security
08:03-08:08 Welcome Erna Hattingh
08:08-08:16 Objectives of GMC Workshop #3:
Presentation of Models and Hazard Sensitivity Feedback
Julian Bommer
08:16-10:00
Summary of Preliminary GMC Model for Bedrock Motions
and Discussion
Julian Bommer,
TI Team & PPRP
10:00-10:30 Coffee Break – Heidelberg Room
10:30-11:00 Summary of Preliminary GMC Model for Bedrock Motions
and Discussion
Julian Bommer,
TI Team & PPRP
11:00-12:00 Overview of GMPEs used in Visualisation Comparisons
and Discussion
Peter Stafford, TI
Team & PPRP
12:00-13:00 Lunch – Heidelberg Room
13:00-13:45 Comparisons of Median GMC Models and Discussion Frank Scherbaum, TI
Team & PPRP
13:45-15:00 Testing of the Preliminary GMC Model using the Intensity
Database and Discussion
Julian Bommer, TI
Team & PPRP
15:00-15:30 Coffee Break – Heidelberg Room
15:30-16:45 Site Amplification Model and Discussion Ellen Rathje, TI Team
& PPRP
16:45-17:00 Vs-kappa correction factors based on an alternative
disaggregation scenario
Frank Scherbaum, TI
Team & PPRP
17:00-17:20 Feedback from observers Julian Bommer
End of formal Workshop Proceedings
18:15-18:45 Closed meeting – Hotel Boardroom:
PPRP, sponsor, PM, TI Leads
19:00 Dinner
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Day 2 (Tuesday 28th August): GMC Hazard Feedback – Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms
Time Presentations Speaker
08:00-08:45 Preliminary Models for Long-Period Extrapolation of
Response Spectra and V/H Response Spectral Ratios
and Discussion
Julian Bommer, TI
Team and PPRP
08:45-09:20 GMC Model Comparison in Hazard Space and Discussion Frank Scherbaum, TI
Team and PPRP
09:20-10:00 Summary of Preliminary SSC Model and Discussion Kevin Coppersmith,
TI Team and PPRP
10:00-10:30 Coffee Break – Heidelberg Room
10:30–10:50 Summary of preliminary SSC Model and Discussion Kevin Coppersmith,
TI Team and PPRP
10:50-11:50 Hazard Sensitivity to Elements of the Preliminary GMC
Model and Discussion
Julian Bommer, TI
Team and PPRP
12:00-13:00 Lunch – Heidelberg Room
13:00-14:40 Hazard Sensitivity and Disaggregations from Preliminary
SSC and GMC Models and Discussions
J. Bommer, F.
Scherbaum, TI Team
& PPRP
14:40-14:50 Feedback from observers Julian Bommer
14:50 Formal Close of Proceedings
15:45-16:00 Closed meeting – Hotel Boardroom:
PPRP, sponsor, PM, TI Leads
16:15-16:50 Closed PPRP meeting – Manor House PPRP
16:15-18:30 Closed meeting; GMC TI Team Planning for WM4 GMC TI Team
19:00 Dinner
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Day 3 (Wednesday 29th August): GMC-SSC Interfaces - Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms
Time Presentations Speaker
08:00-08:05 Safety Briefing Head of Security
08:05-09:35 Introduction and SSC-GMC Interface Issues Julian Bommer
09:35-09:40 Explanation of Seismic Hazard software and V&V Julian Bommer
9:40-10:00 Hazard calculations in FRISK88 and Discussion Fleur Strasser, TI
Teams and PPRP
10:00-10:30 Coffee Break - Heidelberg Room
10:30-11:00 Hazard calculations in FRISK88 and Discussion Fleur Strasser, TI
Teams and PPRP
11:00-12:00 Hazard calculations in OpenQuake-engine and Discussion Marco Pagani, TI
Teams and PPRP
12:00-13:00 Lunch - Heidelberg Room
13:00-15:00 TNSP Earthquake Catalogue and Discussion Fleur Strasser, TI
Teams and PPRP
15:00-15:30 Coffee Break - Heidelberg Room
15:30-15:50 TNSP Earthquake Catalogue and Discussion Fleur Strasser, TI
Teams and PPRP
15:50-16:00 Review of GMC Workshop Objectives Kevin Coppersmith
16:00-16:15* Feedback from observers Kevin Coppersmith
16:15-17:00 Objectives of SSC Workshop Kevin Coppersmith
17:00 End of formal Workshop Proceedings
17:10-18:00 Closed meeting – Hotel Boardroom:
PPRP, sponsor, PM, TI Leads
19:00 Dinner
* At this point, members of the GMC TI Team may leave the Workshop to catch evening flights out
of Cape Town
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Day 4 (Thursday 30th August): Preliminary SSC Model - Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms
Time Presentations Speaker
08:00-10:00 SSC Global Assessments SSC Preliminary Model and
Discussion
Kevin Coppersmith,
TI Team and PPRP
10:00-10:30 Coffee Break - Heidelberg Room
10:30-12:00 Seismic source zones and Discussion:
• Extended Continental Crust zone (ECC)
• Syntaxis zone (SYN)
Johann Neveling,
Ryan Coppersmith,
TI Team and PPRP
12:00-13:00 Lunch - Heidelberg Room
13:00-15:15 Seismic source zones and Discussion:
• Karoo zone (KAR)
• Namaqua zone (NAM)
• Cedarville-Koffiefontein zone (CK)
Fault sources and Discussion:
• Kango fault (KNG)
• Plettenberg fault (PLET)
• Agulhas fault (AFZ)
• Worcester fault (WOR)
• Gamtoos fault (GMT)
Refilwe Shelembe, TI
Teams and PPRP
Kathryn Hanson,
TI Team and PPRP
15:15-15:45 Coffee Break - Heidelberg Room
15:45-16:50 Fault sources (cont’d.)
Kathryn Hanson, TI
Team and PPRP
16:50-17:00 Update on programme for the final day Kevin Coppersmith
17:00-17:15 Feedback from observers Kevin Coppersmith
17:15 End of formal Workshop Proceedings
17:30-18:30 Closed meeting – Hotel Boardroom:
PPRP, sponsor, PM, TI Leads
19:00 Dinner
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Day 5 (Friday 31st August): SSC Hazard Feedback - Simonsberg and Stellenberg Rooms
Time Presentations Speaker
8:00-08:45 Faults Assessed as Non-Seismogenic and Discussion Ryan Coppersmith,
TI Team and PPRP
08:45-09:00 SSC Model logic tree Elements and Discussion Kevin Coppersmith,
TI Team and PPRP
09:00-10:00 Recurrence calculations SSC Hazard Sensitivity and
Discussion
Fleur Strasser, TI
Team and PPRP
10:00-10:30 Coffee Break - Heidelberg Room
10:30-10:35 Discussion: Implications of hazard sensitivity analyses to
SSC model elements
Fleur Strasser, TI
Team and PPRP
10:35-11:35 Actions to finalize SSC model and Discussion Kevin Coppersmith,
TI Team and PPRP
11:35-11:45 Review of SSC Workshop Objectives Julian Bommer
11:45-13:00 Lunch - Heidelberg Room
13:00-13:15 Way forward Julian Bommer
13:15-13:30 Feedback from observers Julian Bommer
13:30-13:35 Closing comment from Sponsor Andre Nel
13:35 End of formal Workshop Proceedings
14:15 – 15:00 Closed meeting – Hotel Boardroom:
PPRP, sponsor, PM, TI Leads
15:00 – 17:00 Closed PPRP meeting – Hotel Boardroom PPRP
16:00 – 17:00 Closed meeting; SSC TI Team Planning for WM4
19:00 Dinner
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3. ATTENDANCE LIST
PROJECT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE Graham, Gerhard [email protected] Greg Botha [email protected] Hattingh, Erna [email protected] Keyser, Nico [email protected] Neveling, Johann [email protected] Van der Merwe, Jannie [email protected] Delport, Francois [email protected] PPRP Bungum, Hilmar - Chair [email protected] Richard Quittmeyer Richard [email protected] Cotton, Fabrice [email protected] Musson, Roger [email protected] Toro, Gabriel [email protected] TI LEADS Bommer, Julian [email protected] Coppersmith, Kevin [email protected] TI TEAMS Coppersmith, Ryan [email protected] Hanson, Kathryn [email protected] Mangongolo, Azangi [email protected] Neveling, Johann [email protected] Rodriguez-Marek, Adrian [email protected] Rathje, Ellen [email protected] Scherbaum, Frank [email protected] Shelembe, Refilwe [email protected] Stafford, Peter [email protected] Strasser, Fleur [email protected] GIS SPECIALIST Havenga, Marinda [email protected] HAZARD TEAM Strasser, Fleur [email protected] Midzi, Vunganai [email protected] PROJECT ADMINISTRATOR Gouverneur, Michelle [email protected] Chameney Engelbrecht [email protected] WORKSHOP CO-ORDINATOR/PLANNER Graham, Annabel [email protected] Hazard Software Specialist Marco Pagani [email protected]
A number of sponsor observers also attended.
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4. SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL REFINEMENTS TO PRELIMINARY MODELS
4.1 GMC MODEL
GMC Team Action Lead
Preliminary GMC Model in Bedrock:
Three backbone GMPEs remain.
Vs-kappa adjustments: Look into whether K0 of 0.004 and 0.006 plus site response
plus anti-alias filter would still yield the same absence of a corner frequency on
records from ROSN/KROM
Ellen Rathje,
Peter Stafford
Vs-kappa: Produce voxel grids (for 3 stochastic models) showing fluctuations of Vs-
Kappa adjustments with M, R and frequency, possibly using the ‘new’ scenario (M5-
8, 100-0.5 Hz, R: 0-50 km & 0-100 km) – Peter Stafford to provide high-resolution
feature vectors for Drouet, Drouet, Rietbrock & Campbell
Frank Scherbaum
Re-examine disaggregations to infer possible changes in scenario if the ‘leaky
boundaries’ are sealed to keep NAM & CK earthquakes away from Thyspunt
Peter Stafford,
Julian Bommer
Scaling Factors: explore the better intensity data sets looking both at residual trends
and possibly at intensity attenuation equations as well; also combine with exploration
of stress drop values in stochastic models to see if data ‘reject’ any values
Julian Bommer,
Peter Stafford
Scaling Factors: ask Andreas Rietbrock & Stephane Drout the rationale behind their
selected forward modelling stress drops
Peter Stafford
Scaling Factors: look into the extensional regime vs non-extensional ground motions Julian Bommer
Scaling Factors: Will consider widening range in light of voxel showing sensitivity to
M-R scenario for Vs-kappa adjustment
TI Team
Generation of Sammon’s maps for selected M-R-f combinations (relevant to hazard)
to explore degree of coincidence between GMC models and South African stochastic
models
Frank Scherbaum
Non-application of the small-magnitude scaling can be justified in terms of capturing
epistemic uncertainty
TI Team
No distance attenuation correction to be applied because insufficient influence of
distance earthquake contribution
TI Team
Develop proposals for criteria for the selection of appropriate CEUS V/H ratios from
NUREG/CR-6728 (which is based on PGA levels, which are not part of the TNSP
output)
Julian Bommer
Produce some sensitivity plots for long-period extrapolation of the GMRS and
application of V/H ratios
Julian Bommer
Sigma Model:
Explore the 1.15 factor to provide either justification and/or modification
Adrian
Rodriguez-Marek
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GMC Team Action Lead
Preliminary GMC Model in Bedrock:
Explore variability of phi-S2S on Vs30 using hard rock data from Kik-NET Adrian
Rodriguez-Marek
Site Response Analysis:
Update Vs model based on final set of PS logging program Ellen Rathje
Explore sensitivity to randomization of different model parameters; Andreas
Rietbrock to provide input on layering model and Ellen Rathje to look into layering
discretized in terms of slowness; Ellen Rathje to check if the randomized velocity
profiles have the same travel time as the backbone model
Ellen Rathje
Establish exact requirements in terms of bedrock hazard (AFEs, response
frequencies, etc) for input to Approach 3 calculations
Ellen Rathje
Look into potential justifications for higher damping values in fractured rock Ellen Rathje
4.2 SSC MODEL
SSC Team Action Lead
Mmax: Examine the basis for the upper part of the prior distribution: do we have the
structures that could support the larger EQS; should we use just SCR events for the
upper truncation? Consider the bias correction, which should be small.
Kevin
Coppersmith
Look at the issue of leaky vs strict boundaries to the NAM and CK source zones Refilwe
Shelembe
Should there be more uncertainty in the depth distribution because it is being used
as an analogue in RSA? Look at whether there are differences in MESE vs NMESE
in the CEUS
Kevin
Coppersmith
Seismogenic thickness: look at the hazard sensitivity to having a deeper seismogenic
thickness;
Fleur Strasser
Is there some probability of a second bulge (depths of 20-30km); Look at analogues
within SCR (western) Africa
Azangi
Mangongolo
Develop the technical basis for the western boundary of ECC (documentation) Johann Neveling
(in final report)
Document the lack of source boundary at the change in fault trends within ECC
(documentation)
Johann Neveling
Look at the fault types distributions; should there be more frequent normal faulting
within ECC?
Kathryn Hanson
Explore the subdivision of the ECC at the boundary of the completeness zone;
should we assume the same rate density in the southern part as the northern part;
perhaps run hazard sensitivity with same rate density throughout ECC
Kevin
Coppersmith,
Fleur Strasser
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SSC Team Action Lead
SYN: look at the seismicity prior to the 69 Ceres EQ and see if would identify the
zone as elevated seismicity; also look at rates prior to 69
Marinda Havenga
Can we use the Kijko K-S-B approach to incorporate b-value uncertainty in the
likelihood function for the Bayesian Mmax approach;
Fleur Strasser
Assess the orientation of ruptures in NAM and CK; assess how important the
orientation of ruptures is in NAM and CK; look at the recurrence within those zones\
Refilwe
Shelembe, Fleur
Strasser
Consider the subdivision of NAM based on seismicity differences and structure; may
not be significant to hazard
Refilwe
Shelembe
Characteristic EQ vs. exponential: document the decision based on worldwide data
as well as predict the numbers of events that should have occurred if exponential;
also max moment
Kevin
Coppersmith,
Kathryn Hanson,
Fleur Strasser
Document how the standard deviations were assessed to use with the Leonard 2010
rupture relationships; check the limits from these SDs (documentation)
Kevin
Coppersmith
Plot the recurrence intervals of Mchar with the predicted recurrence that comes from
slip rate and the characteristic size distribution model; might also compare with zone
recurrence
Fleur Strasser
Out of cluster; document the behavior that is assumed during the out-of-cluster
period (e.g., very long recurrence intervals that are 10X the intervals during clusters)
and that it is not zero rate (documentation); consider clustered behavior or not
clustered and use long-term rate
Kathryn Hanson
Consider whether we need a broader range of recurrence for the Plettenberg than
the Kango out-of-cluster rates? Since we know less about this feature?
Kathryn Hanson;
Fleur Strasser will
plot Mchar rates
from RI and slip
rates
Revisit the weights on slip rate and RI for the other faults. Should we have more
weight on slip rate in light of the limitations provided by the marine terrace sequence
Kathryn Hanson
Review analogous ancient oceanic fracture zones to look for any possible analogues;
consider the number and length of ancient transforms to support the argument of low
p(S);Contact Uzellman-Neben and Hayley Cawthra, regarding displacement of
Pliocene deposits
Kathryn Hanson
Look at the predicted numbers of earthquakes for the range of slip rates assessed for
the Agulhas FZ;
Fleur Strasser
Get the DeWet bathmetric dataset to further document the assessment of p(S) for
the Gamtoos, Plettenberg, and Cape St.Francis faults
Marinda Havenga
talk to CGS
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SSC Team Action Lead
Document the resolution of the Tg surface relative to possible amounts of fault
displacement; include the assessment of the age of these surfaces and the potential
for seeing cumulative displacements over the age of these surfaces
Ryan
Coppersmith
Look closely at the position taken on p(S) for the Worcester and ensure consistency
in the arguments with that for p(S)=0 faults (documentation)
Kathryn Hanson,
Ryan
Coppersmith
Investigate the use of max likelihood for both counts and the rates and whether they
are negatively correlated; especially for the KAR source; Bob Youngs; ask about
priors on b
Fleur Strasser
send email to Bob
Youngs
Document the basis for not using the N* approach (e.g., not using a consistent
approach to magnitude conversion as was done in CEUS SSC (documentation);
don’t know the behaviour of some of the conversions;
Fleur Strasser (in
final report)
Look at the implied rates of earthquakes at the upper fractiles to see if they are
believable; then focus on the uncertainty in b, Mmax and their implications; consider
other regions and how the 100th percentile is handled
Kevin
Coppersmith talk
to Bob Youngs
Generate simulated catalogues with various b-values to see if matches the observed
catalogue (the entire region); looking at uncertainties in b-value;
Fleur Strasser
Evaluate the change in the b-value on hazard Fleur Strasser
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5. PARTICIPATORY PEER REVIEW PANEL (PPRP) REPORT
The PPRP, composed of individuals from several different countries, met on 1 September 2012 at Spier
Hotel, Stellenbosch, to finalize their report (Appendix A).
6. TI LEADS’ RESPONSE
The TI Leads compiled a response to the PPRP report (Appendix B).
7. PRESENTATIONS
All presentations from the workshop are available on the CD/DVD at the back of this report.
8. SAFETY
To adhere to a Safety Culture, all international participants arrived by lunchtime on the day prior to their
participation in the workshop. Safety checklists for selecting the venue and safety during the venue as well
as the hotel’s safety information follows:
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8.1 PRE-WORKSHOP SAFETY CHECKLIST
Event Name: Workshop 3 – Spier Hotel Date of Assessment: 25 July 2012 Assessed By: Annabel Graham & Jannie van der Merwe
√ Indoor Event □ Outdoor Event
Checked (Ticked)
Event Safety Item Checked Time / Comment
Access and Egress √ Entry / Exit areas are clear and accessible for
staff and expected attendees Yes, signage is visible
√ Entry / Exit areas are adequate for emergency exit and emergency services
Yes, signage is visible
√ Thoroughfares are well defined and clearly marked
Yes, signage is visible
Traffic Flow √ Clearly defined areas for traffic - separate from
pedestrian traffic Yes, roads & walkways are separate
√ Provisions for safe passage of emergency / other vehicles through pedestrian traffic
Yes
√ Controlled traffic flow and adequate signage for traffic erected
Yes, signage is visible.
√ Adequate parking areas to cater for the expected vehicle numbers attending the event
Yes, large car parks
√ Adequate parking supervision Yes, guards & cameras Amenities
√ Adequate provision of toilets and hand washing facilities
Yes, facilities clearly visible
√ Availability of clean fresh water for staff and attendees
Yes, water fountain available for participants in venue
√ Adequate catering facilities for food preparation and clean up
Yes, kitchen at venue and hotel
Signage √ Adequate signage for entries, exits, toilet
facilities, etc. Yes, signage is visible
√ Adequate signage for any hazardous areas or substances
Yes, erected at hazardous sites
√ Clearly signed First Aid and fire extinguisher locations
Yes
Fire Prevention √ Suitable fire extinguishers (e.g. CO, water,
chemical) and blankets are in appropriate areas, tested and in date
Yes, extinguishers in venue check and in date
√ Personnel are trained in extinguisher and blanket use
Yes, first aid courses recently completed
√ Ignition source areas are kept clear at all times and easily accessible
Yes
Emergency Procedures √ Emergency response plan in place Yes, venue and in rooms √ Emergency response team trained to carry out
plan Yes, intercom system & panic button system in banqueting office
√ Current site maps available to all staff, Part of induction if not familiar with site
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emergency services and other relevant parties First Aid
√ First aid stations are suitably located, clearly signed and easily accessible for everyone
Yes, at the venue and reception
√ First aid facilities are adequate for the type of event being held
Yes, trained first aiders are on site
√ Good means of communication provided between personnel and first aid stations
Yes, staff trained annually
Electrical / Backup Power x All portable electrical equipment including leads
are tested No register
√ Adequate protection of the public from electrical shock and any trip hazards from cords are minimised
Yes, electrical cables are taped down
√ All leads, lugs, etc. are protected from weather and other environmental conditions (e.g. water)
Yes, no external leads
√ Evidence of electrical safety can be provided upon request from an authorised person
Yes, available in Facilities Office (spoke to Danie)
√ Backup power is available in venue Yes Lighting
√ Adequate natural light or artificial lighting provided for setting
Yes
√ Portable lighting is tested and in date Yes, generator in place (& maintenance team)
√ Suitable emergency lighting is in place Yes Manual Handling
√ All staff and volunteers are trained to assess each task and use safe technique when lifting or carrying
Yes, monthly H&S meetings & quarterly management meetings
√ Loads are delivered as close as possible to area using vehicle or mechanical aid (e.g. trolleys)
Yes
√ Light, small loads and physical aids (assistance from second person or team lift where needed) are used
Yes, chair & delivery trolley
√ Staff and volunteers are trained in and used the S-M-A-R-T Lifting technique where possible and appropriate □ S – size up the load □ M – move in close □ A – always bend the knees □ R – raise object using your legs □ T – turn using your feet
Yes, from monthly safety meetings
Weather Conditions √ Weather conditions planned for and monitored
e.g. partitions, displays and signage well secured for windy conditions, and shade and sunscreen and water provisions for heat
Yes, umbrellas in rooms & catering indoors
Security √ Appropriate security is available at the venue Yes, security guards visible
Accessibility √ Ramps are in place to provide access to
buildings Yes
√ Parking is available close to the event Yes √ The event is easily accessible (e.g. for patrons
in wheelchairs, with prams, using walking aids, etc.)
Yes
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√ Entry / Exit area is easily accessible (e.g. for patrons in wheelchairs, with prams, using walking aids, etc.)
Yes
Reference: SafeWork SA – safe, fair, productive, working lives (www.safework.sa.gov.au)
25 July 2012 A Graham Date TNSP: Workshop Coordinator
J van der Merwe 25 July 2012 TNSP: Project Quality Officer Date
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8.2 SAFETY CHECKLIST DURING WORKSHOP
Event Name: Workshop 3 – Spier Hotel
Date of Assessment: 27 August 2012
Assessed By: Francois Delport – TNSP: Project Safety Officer
x Indoor Event □ Outdoor Event
Checked (Ticked)
Event Safety Item Checked Time / Comment
Access and Egress √ Entry / Exit areas are clear and accessible for
staff and expected attendees Clearly and understandable signs are in place to guide participants
√ Entry / Exit areas are adequate for emergency exit and emergency services
Emergency vehicle will be able to get to all areas to attend to emergencies
√ Thoroughfares are well defined and clearly marked
Yes
Traffic Flow √ Clearly defined areas for traffic - separate from
pedestrian traffic Pedestrian walkways and vehicle travel paths are separated (see attached photos)
√ Provisions for safe passage of emergency / other vehicles through pedestrian traffic
In the event of such emergencies, the hotel staff will also take special care to guide emergency vehicles to needed points
√ Controlled traffic flow and adequate signage for traffic erected
Sufficient road marking for vehicles are in place, i.e. parking, stop signs, etc.
√ Adequate parking areas to cater for the expected vehicle numbers attending the event
Yes, see attached photo
√ Adequate parking supervision Parking area is under constant security supervision (CCTV cameras and foot patrol)
Amenities √ Adequate provision of toilets and hand washing
facilities Amenities were also covered during the safety talk of the Hotel safety officer
√ Availability of clean fresh water for staff and attendees
Fresh drinking water were placed on the meeting venue tables in the morning and every tee or lunch break
√ Adequate catering facilities for food preparation and clean up
A kitchen is in close proximity of the workshop venue and proper tables were in place when food was put out for serving – dining venue was always neat and clean.
Signage √ Adequate signage for entries, exits, toilet
facilities, etc. Proper sign are in place and these matters were also dealt with during the safety briefing at the beginning of the workshop and days 3 and 4.
√ Adequate signage for any hazardous areas or substances
Hazardous area is enclosed and restricted signs are displayed.
√ Clearly signed First Aid and fire extinguisher locations
Yes, also see photos taken in venue
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Fire Prevention √ Suitable fire extinguishers (e.g. CO, water,
chemical) and blankets are in appropriate areas, tested and in date
See photos taken in the venue regarding the serviceability of these items
√ Personnel are trained in extinguisher and blanket use
√ Ignition source areas are kept clear at all times and easily accessible
The use of burners to keep food warm was limited. In the venues where such facilities were utilised, fire extinguisher are installed in the rooms
Emergency Procedures √ Emergency response plan in place Displayed in venue and in rooms √ Emergency response team trained to carry out
plan This was also covered during the safety briefing on the first day
√ Current site maps available to all staff, emergency services and other relevant parties
Maps are displayed all over the Hotel indicating various locations
First Aid √ First aid stations are suitably located, clearly
signed and easily accessible for everyone These facilities are available at the venue and reception
√ First aid facilities are adequate for the type of event being held
Sufficiently trained first aiders are on site
√ Good means of communication provided between personnel and first aid stations
Training is conducted as legally mandated
Electrical / Backup Power x All portable electrical equipment including leads
are tested None were seen at the venue
√ Adequate protection of the public from electrical shock and any trip hazards from cords are minimised
All power cables is properly installed away from areas where the public may occur
√ All leads, lugs, etc. are protected from weather and other environmental conditions (e.g. water)
The event is mainly an indoor event
√ Evidence of electrical safety can be provided upon request from an authorised person
Electrical certification is available on request
√ Backup power is available in venue Back up diesel generators are on site Lighting
√ Adequate natural light or artificial lighting provided for setting
Artificial light is sufficient in the venue and in the rooms. Partitions can be opened if natural light is needed in the meeting venue
√ Portable lighting is tested and in date Yes √ Suitable emergency lighting is in place The meeting venue has suitable
emergency lighting Manual Handling
√ All staff and volunteers are trained to assess each task and use safe technique when lifting or carrying
Staff used trolleys and other transport measures to move items, i.e. food trolleys, etc.
√ Loads are delivered as close as possible to area using vehicle or mechanical aid (e.g. trolleys)
Access ways also allow for the use of trolleys
√ Light, small loads and physical aids (assistance from second person or team lift where needed) are used
Hotel staff are trained to use the correct methods
√ Staff and volunteers are trained in and used the S-M-A-R-T Lifting technique where possible and appropriate □ S – size up the load □ M – move in close □ A – always bend the knees
As seen above
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□ R – raise object using your legs □ T – turn using your feet
Weather Conditions √ Weather conditions planned for and monitored
e.g. partitions, displays and signage well secured for windy conditions, and shade and sunscreen and water provisions for heat
The event was mainly indoors
Security √ Appropriate security is available at the venue CCTV cameras and roaming security
personnel is on the premises Accessibility
√ Ramps are in place to provide access to buildings
These ramps are part of the construction of the building
√ Parking is available close to the event See photos √ The event is easily accessible (e.g. for patrons
in wheelchairs, with prams, using walking aids, etc.)
No patrons would be restricted in their movement
√ Entry / Exit area is easily accessible (e.g. for patrons in wheelchairs, with prams, using walking aids, etc.)
See above
Reference:
SafeWork SA – safe, fair, productive, working lives (www.safework.sa.gov.au)
30 August 2012
F A Delport Date
TNSP: Project Safety Officer
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8.3 EVIDENCE FOR SAFETY AT THE HOTEL AND VENUE
8.3.1 Accessibility
Figure 1: Road and pedestrian routes clearly separated
Figure 2: Signage to venues clearly marked
8.3.2 Traffic Flow
Figure 3: Pedestrian and roads clearly separated
Figure 4: Signage to indicate traffic flow
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8.3.3 Amenities
Figure 5: Ample clean drinking water available in venue
for participants
Figure 6: Amenities clearly marked
8.3.4 Signage
Figure 7: Signage to indicate temporary detour
Figure 8: Venues clearly marked
Figure 9: Warning signs clearly visible
Figure 10: Caution signs clearly visible
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8.3.5 Fire prevention
Figure 11: Fire hydrant maintenance certificates in date
Figure 12: Fire hoses clearly marked
8.3.6 Emergency Procedures
Figure 13: Exit signs in conference venue clearly marked
Figure 14: Emergency assembly point clearly marked
Figure 15: Emergency exit in rooms clearly marked
Figure 16: Emergency exit at pool clearly marked
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8.3.7 First Aid
Figure 17: First aid station clearly marked at conference
venue
Figure 18: First aid boxes clearly marked at conference
venue
Figure 19: Fire blanket clearly marked at conference venue
8.3.8 Electrical
Figure 20: Substation clearly marked
Figure 21: Evidence of maintenance being undertaken
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8.3.9 Weather Conditions
Figure 22: Golf carts, with sides can be used in
unfavorable conditions
Figure 23: Temperature gauge is clearly visible at
reception
Figure 24: Each room is equipped with an umbrella for unfavorable weather
8.3.10 Security
Figure 25: CCTV camera overlooking the day participant
car park
Figure 26: Security guard station in the day participant car
park
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Figure 27: Each room is equipped with a safe
Figure 28: Car guard at the hotel car park
8.3.11 Safety Presentation
Figure 29: Spier’s safety presentation
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8.4 HOTEL HEALTH AND SAFETY TALK
Spier’s concern for Health and Safety, Social and Environmental activities, the sustainability of business
ethics and organization integrity form part of our good corporate governance.
8.4.1 Spier’s Policy entails • Our People are, without doubt the most important asset of this Group.
• Strives to maintain safe working conditions which will minimize risk of injury to the individual, and loss of
company property.
• Complying with all applicable laws, through training, awareness and competence.
• Setting of targets to ensure continual improvement.
• Integrating Health and Safety into our day to day activities in order to recognise risk for the future well-
being of the Group and all its employees.
• Client satisfaction at all times.
8.4.2. Emergency Response The objective of the Emergency Evacuation Plan is to ensure that all building occupants evacuate the
building safely in the event of a fire or any other type of emergency.
8.4.3 First Aid & Fire • An automatic fire detection and warning system together with an automatic fire call point system is
installed throughout the venue.
• The fire alarm will activate in the Security Control Room by Smoke detector, Heat detector, Break
Glass Point, or By phone, using the emergency number ext. 1164 (021 809 1164).
• The Security Control Room, which, is staffed 24 hours a day, will be the Control Point in any incident or
emergency and they are responsible for alerting the Emergency Response team and the relevant
Emergency Services.
• The emergency response team are fire and first aid trained.
• First Aid boxes are available at the Banqueting office, Banqueting Kitchen and Security Office.
• Fire Equipment are situated throughout the venue where indicated by safety signage.
8.4.4. Fire Evacuation Procedure • All delegates are asked to abide by the instructions issued over the PA system by Spier Management
and the emergency services.
• It is the responsibility of the Event Organiser to account for all delegates present at the event and to
report at the Assembly Point. The Event Organiser will have a registered list of attendees and/or
delegates available if requested by the Stellenbosch Fire Chief.
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• Evacuated personnel shall congregate at the Emergency Evacuation assembly point area and remain
there until a decision is reached to re-occupy the building or to send people home. The Emergency
Evacuation assembly point, unless otherwise stated, is on the Bamoo lawn area next to the river. The
event’s organisers and emergency coordinators will then account for their respective individuals. If
someone is missing, the Fire Department must be notified immediately of the possibility that someone
is still in the building and their likely whereabouts.
8.4.5. Evacuation of Individuals with Disabilities Event organisers are required to submit a list of individuals who have physical disabilities or special medical
conditions to the emergency response team (ERT). Two co-workers should be assigned ahead of time to
assist individuals with disabilities during an evacuation. However, event’s organisers, emergency
coordinators, and the Fire Department may also be required to assist disabled individuals during an
emergency evacuation.
Note: Emergency response at Spier is a concerted effort among the members from Banqueting Management,
Facilities and Security. However, it should be remembered that once The Fire Department personnel are on
the scene, they are in command and their instructions must be followed.
8.4.6. Guests Rest Rooms The ladies and gents rooms are situated as you walk into the conference centre on the left hand side in the
following sequence:-
• Disabled
• Ladies
• Gents
8.4.7. Smoking Policy In accordance with the companies smoking Policy no one will be allowed to smoke in the following areas:
• All internal building areas for guests and visitors.
• All common areas, including staircases, waiting rooms, copier rooms, mailrooms, libraries, store-
rooms, reception areas, customer service areas, public toilets and changing rooms;
• Recreational areas.
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9. WORKSHOP SATISFACTION SURVEY
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Thyspunt Workshop 3 was held at Spier Hotel from 27 to 31 August 2012. The workshop was divided into
two sections, each two days long with a central overlap day. A Workshop Satisfaction Survey (Appendix C)
was distributed to all participants at the Workshop. A total of 35 questionnaires were received back from a
total of 49 anticipated participants.
9.2 SURVEY
The Nuclear Geo-hazards Group of the CGS conforms to an Integrated Management System (IMS), which
includes continuous improvement. In order to continually improve the quality of our workshops, we devised
a Workshop Satisfaction Survey which has to be completed at all the workshops. The survey covers a total
of 18 questions divided into three main groups:
• Pre-workshop arrangements (questions 1-4)
1. Were you kept adequately informed regarding the arrangements for the Workshop leading up to the
event?
2. Were the methods of communication adequate (e-mail, newsletters, etc.)?
3. How was your travel arrangements (air ticket and transfers) handled?
4. Upon arrival, how were you received by the organizers and hotel staff?
• Venue (questions 5-14)
5. How would you rate Spier Hotel as a location for the Workshop?
6. If you stayed at Spier Hotel during the Workshop, how would you rate the accommodation?
7. If you live in Cape Town and drove to Spier Hotel, how did you find the parking at the Workshop?
8. On average, how did you find the session room to be in terms of seating and view?
9. How satisfied were you with the technology and multimedia available during the sessions?
10. Were the organizers and hotel staff helpful and courteous throughout the Workshop?
11. How would you rate the venues for the meals?
12. How would you rate the meals and snacks provided during the Workshop?
13. If you had special dietary requirements, were these catered for?
14. Was the safety briefing adequate?
• General (questions 15-18)
15. Was the workshop document pack informative enough?
16. Was the Agenda kept to, and did the sessions begin on time?
17. Were you able to add value to the discussions during the Workshop?
18. Were the objectives you thought should be met, achieved by the Workshop?
Weights were assigned to each question, these are: Excellent = 4; Good = 3; Average = 2; Poor = 1; No
data = 0.
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Unfortunately two questionnaires were not completed in full and as such these were assigned weights of
zero.
9.3 RESULTS
Questionnaires were completed by 35 participants and the following results were obtained (percentages).
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18
Excellent 83 86 71 77 74 51 23 60 74 80 49 51 14 37 63 66 34 83
Good 14 14 6 17 23 14 6 34 23 20 49 40 11 54 34 29 40 9
Average 3 0 0 0 0 6 0 6 0 0 3 9 0 3 0 0 6 3
Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
No data 0 0 23 6 3 29 71 0 3 0 0 0 71 6 3 6 20 6
During our analysis of the results from Workshop #1, it became apparent that the results could be grouped
into three categories, viz. satisfied (excellent out weights good); room for improvement (good out weights
excellent) and not applicable. Not applicable does not mean the question is invalid, it means that the
majority of the participants did not respond to the question, these normally pertain to parking for day visitors
and dietary requirements.
9.3.1 Pre-workshop arrangements
Figure 30: Satisfaction of pre-workshop arrangements
From the results it can be seen that the overall satisfaction was excellent.
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9.3.2 Venue
9.3.2.1 Satisfied
Figure 31: Satisfaction - venue (satisfied)
From the results it can be seen that the overall satisfaction was excellent. Comments relating to the
questions are follows:
Q6: Rooms were not booked as requested. Maintenance issues with many rooms, e.g. windows did not
open or close; room safe was locked prior to arrival. After heavy rain rooms were flooded and not
checked by housekeeping. Internet is too expensive.
Q8: The chairs are uncomfortable for a five day workshop.
Q11: Although the quality of the food was good the lunch time meals were too heavy for such a
workshop. The banqueting and hotel chefs should interact better concerning the menus. Many meal
items were repetitive.
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9.3.2.2 Room for improvement
Figure 32: Satisfaction –venue (room for improvement)
From the results it can be seen that the overall satisfaction was good.
9.3.2.3 Mostly not applicable
Figure 33: Satisfaction –venue (mostly not applicable)
From the few results obtained it can be seen that the overall satisfaction was excellent.
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9.3.3 General
Figure 34: Satisfaction - general
From the results it can be seen that the overall satisfaction was excellent. Comments relating to these
questions are follows:
Q16: Presenters demonstrated their high level of expertise and preparedness. One participant suggested
shorter sessions.
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9.4 HOW DID WE FARE?
Since continuous improvement and quality go hand in hand it is important for us to compare the results of
all three Thyspunt workshops. The table below lists the comparative results (based only on the excellent
results) between all three workshops (percentage).
Question Workshop #1 Workshop #2 Workshop #3
1 78 82 83
2 76 78 86
3 57 60 71
4 70 78 77
5 43 79 74
6 35 66 51
7 16 15 23
8 24 43 60
9 27 48 74
10 57 81 80
11 51 51 49
12 49 55 51
13 14 16 14
14 30 34 37
15 57 57 63
16 78 87 66
17 19 27 34
18 59 51 83
The question numbers have been assigned a colour code to reflect the level of satisfaction; green =
satisfied; red = improvement; orange = mostly not applicable. The graphic representation gives an
indication of where we have improved, slipped or not changed from Workshop 1 to Workshop 2. Due to
Question 7 and 13 not affecting the larger group these questions will not be analyzed further. Question 17
will also not be analyzed any further because if a participant cannot add value due to lack of knowledge
then the area cannot be improved on from a workshop organization point of view.
Taking the other fifteen questions into consideration we can see that there has been a decrease in
satisfaction from Workshop 2 to Workshop 3.
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9.5 CONCLUSIONS
The success of Workshop 3 can mostly be attributed to the venue for the workshop as well as the support
the CGS staff received from the Spier staff. The venue provided a much needed stimulus with its open
space and gardens that the participants needed during such an intense workshop. However, it is important
that communication between the workshop coordinator and the conferencing department is of such a level
that all requests by the CGS are observed.
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10. LESSONS LEARNED
Date Reference Description of action
31 August 2012
WS3-1 Ensure that consultants provide their flight information at least 120 days prior to the workshop to avoid penalties. To be included in future contracts.
31 August
2012
WS3-2 All negotiations with the hotel must be done by the CGS even if Eskom is paying directly
31 August
2012
WS3-3 In future, check with TI teams how many roaming microphones are required
31 August
2012
WS3-4 Menu should be provided to the workshop coordinator as least 15 days prior to the commencement of future workshops
31 August
2012
WS3-5 Lunches should be lighter
31 August
2012
WS3-6 During the safety talk (done by the venue) an evacuation plan should be projected
31 August
2012
WS3-7 Consultant contracts to be amended to include spousal expenses at the Workshops
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11. CONCLUSION
All objectives for Workshop 3 as set out in the project plan were met as evidenced below:
GMC
Objective Evidence
For the TI Teams to receive and consider feedback on their preliminary models in the form of hazard sensitivity analyses and comments from the PPRP such that the models can be revised, improved, and finalized in light of that feedback.
The purpose of the Workshop was fulfilled through 3 days of presentations and engaged discussions.
For TI Team to present a summary of our evaluation of the available data, methods and models.
The GMC evaluation process was summarised by the TI Lead on Day 1.
For the PPRP to ask questions of the TI Team about the extent to which evaluation considered the full range of data, methods and models within the broader technical community.
The PPRP questioned the TI Team regarding the evaluation process, with all members of the TI Team contributing to the responses.
For the TI Team to present a summary of the technical bases for the integration process through which the preliminary GMC logic-tree for motions in the deeper bedrock was developed.
The development of the preliminary model for medians and sigmas in bedrock was presented on Day 1 by the TI Lead.
For the TI Team to present the preliminary site response and its technical bases.
The development of the preliminary site response model was presented by Ellen Rathje on Day 1.
For the PPRP to ask questions of the TI Team regarding the technical bases of elements of the preliminary GMC model and the degree to which it captures the centre, body and range of technically-defensible interpretations.
The PPRP posed many questions to the TI Team during the first two days of the Workshop, which was followed by extensive discussions between the Panel and the TI Team.
For the TI Team to present the proposed models for extrapolating the response spectra from 2.0 to 10.0 s and for V/H ratios to transform the full horizontal response spectra to vertical component spectra.
The TI Team presented proposals for extrapolating the horizontal spectrum to 10 Hz, and for obtaining the vertical spectrum from V/H ratios.
For the PPRP to question the TI Team on the technical bases for the long-period extrapolation and V/H models.
The PPRP questioned the TI Team regarding some aspects of the decision process by which the Team arrived at these proposals.
For the TI Team to identify those elements of the bedrock motion, site response, long-period extension and V/H model requiring additional technical justification and support.
The GMC TI Team has held a meeting on Day 2, and identified a list of activities ahead of the final working meeting in London in October.
For the TI Team to present and to discuss explorations of the preliminary GMC model for bedrock motions, including testing of the models against intensity data.
Presentations were made comparing the models to other equations including South African stochastic models and CEUS models for scenarios (Peter Stafford) and in ground-motion and hazard space (Frank Scherbaum). The TI Lead also presented comparisons with intensity predictions.
For the TI Team to see and to discuss hazard Hazard sensitivity results were shown that identified
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sensitivity feedback (including site response) to identify relative contributions to the total hazard, and also to identify the key GMC contributors to the overall hazard uncertainty.
the influence of individual components of the GMC model and the sources/scenarios that contribute most to the hazard.
For the TI Team to identify those elements of the preliminary model requiring additional analysis and consideration for possible refinement in the development of the final GMC model.
The GMC TI Team has identified the key elements to be explored before building the final model, and work planned to conduct these explorations before WM4.
To discuss details of the way the hazard calculations are executed in the selected software—especially in terms of ‘virtual faults’ in the host source zone—and the possible implications for SSC-GMC interfaces.
Presentations on the modelling of area seismic sources in FRISK88 and OpenQuake were presented, and discussed by the workshop participants, including how both programs calculate the parameters associated with fault ruptures in the host zone.
To identify and discuss critical interface issues between the SSC and GMC models, and in particular to identify elements of the SSC model that may require refinement.
The TI Lead presented an overview of SSC-GMC interface issues and discussed how these have been addressed in the development of the preliminary models.
To discuss the path forward for the Thyspunt PSHA in terms of developing the final GMC model and executing the final hazard calculations.
The GMC TI Team has established a path forward in terms of additional analyses before WM4 to support the development of the final model, and for subsequent activities to produce the documented justification of the final GMC model.
SSC
Objective Evidence
The SSC TI Team to present the preliminary SSC models, including a summary of the evaluation of the available data, methods and models undertaken by the TI Team and the technical bases for the logic-trees produced through the integration process.
The TI Team presented summaries of the various elements of the preliminary SSC model. As part of the presentation, the various data, models, and methods that were evaluated were summarized.
The SSC TI Team to receive and consider feedback on their preliminary models in the form of hazard sensitivity analyses and comments from the PPRP.
Hazard sensitivity results were presented and discussed on Friday. The PPRP provided their comments and perspectives throughout the presentations and during discussion periods.
The PPRP to ask questions of the SSC TI Team regarding the elements of the preliminary models, their technical bases, and the degree to which these capture the centre, the body, and the range of technically-defensible interpretations of the available data.
The PPRP probed and questioned the TI Team regarding the assessments that form the CBR of the TDI as given in the seismic source logic trees. For example, questions were asked regarding whether the range of assessments truly captures the range of epistemic uncertainty in specific parameters.
The PPRP may also question the SSC TI Team with regard to the degree to which the full range of available data, methods and models within the broader technical community have been considered.
The PPRP did, in fact, ask the TI Team regarding whether various methods and approaches had been considered during the Team’s evaluation process.
The SSC TI Team to see and discuss hazard sensitivity feedback, to identify the relative contributions of different elements of the preliminary
Hazard sensitivity was presented in a variety of formats to the TI Team and these analyses provided a basis for extensive discussions regarding the
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models to the total hazard estimate and, in particular, the main contributions to the overall uncertainty.
relative importance of various elements of the SSC model and the influence of the assessments of uncertainty for several parameters and models.
The SSC TI Team to identify those elements of the preliminary models requiring additional analysis and consideration in order to be refined in the final models to be developed after the Workshop.
The interactive discussions in response to hazard sensitivity feedback and questions from the PPRP led to the TI Team identifying a series of additional analyses and explorations that the Team will conduct prior to and at WM4.
The SSC TI Team to identify those elements of the preliminary models that require additional technical justification and support.
During the course of interactions the PPRP, technical positions requiring strong technical justification and support were identified.
The SSC TI Team to identify and discuss critical interface issues between the SSC and GMC models, and where the models may need refining in view of these interfaces.
Extensive discussions occurred with the GMC Team at the interface workshop on Wednesday. At that time, all potential interface issues were identified and plans for addressing the issues by the SSC Team were outlined.
To discuss the details of the way that the hazard calculations are executed in the selected software, and the implications for the SSC and GMC models and their interfaces.
Presentations on the modeling of area and fault sources in FRISK88 and OpenQuake were presented, and discussed by the workshop participants, including how both programs calculate the parameters associated with fault ruptures in the host zone.
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12. REFERENCES
Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC), 1997, “Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic
Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty and the Use of Experts”, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission NUREG/CR 6273, Washington DC.
Practical Implementation Guideline for SSHAC Level 3 and 4 Hazard Studies. 2012. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission NUREG-2117, Washington DC.
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APPENDIX A PARTICIPATORY PEER REVIEW PANEL’S COVER LETTER AND REPORT
(original on CD/DVD at back of report)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................A4
Responsibilities of the PPRP ......................................................................................................................A4
Format of Review Comments ...................................................................................................................A5
Comments on the Project Execution ........................................................................................................A6
Comments on Workshop 3: SSC Sub-project ............................................................................................A7
Comments on Workshop 3: GMC Sub-project ..........................................................................................A8
Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................................A9
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INTRODUCTION This is the third report of the Participatory Peer Review Panel (PPRP) for the project titled SSHAC Level
3 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) for the Thyspunt Nuclear Siting Project (TNSP). This
report provides our comments on Workshop 3 (WS3), which was held August 27th through 31th 2012, at
the Spier Hotel and Conference Centre, Stellenbosch, South Africa. The workshop was focused on
presentation of the Technical Integration (TI) Teams’ models and hazard sensitivity feedback based on
those models. This focus is consistent with the guidelines for a Level 3 study as described in U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) NUREG/CR-63721 (also known as the “SSHAC Guidelines”)
and NUREG-21172.
Within the SSHAC process, the general goal of WS3 is to present and discuss the preliminary ground
motion characterization (GMC) and seismic source characterization (SSC) models in a forum that
provides the opportunity for feedback to the TI Teams. Feedback is facilitated through presentation of
hazard sensitivity results based on the preliminary models and also through interactions with the PPRP.
Detailed goals of the workshop are outlined on page 2 of the workshop agenda.
All five members of the PPRP attended the workshop and were able to fully observe all aspects of the
formal sessions. This is a consensus report written immediately following the workshop. The review
contained in the document is based on the presentations and discussions that took place at WS3. This
review is also informed by the project activities to date, including WS1 and WS2 and formal Working
Meetings (WM) of the GMC and SSC TI Teams, which members of the PPRP have attended as
observers. Our review is also informed by interim documentation received from the Project.
The PPRP would like to recognize and thank Dr. Leon Reiter, who retired from the PPRP following WS1,
and Dr. Annie Kammerer, who retired from the PPRP following WS2, for their contributions to the work of
the PPRP.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PPRP The PPRP’s role is focused on two areas: technical review and process review. In terms of technical
review, the PPRP is charged with ensuring that the full range of data, models, and methods have been
duly considered in the assessment, and also that all technical decisions are adequately justified and
documented. The PPRP must assure that the centre, body, and range of the technically defensible
interpretations (CBR of the TDI) are captured. Undertaking process review means ensuring that the
1Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC), 1997, “Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis:
Guidance on Uncertainty and the Use of Experts”, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG/CR 6273, Washington
D.C.
2USNRC, 2012, “Practical Implementation Guidelines for SSHAC Level 3 and 4 Hazard Studies,” United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, NUREG-2117, Washington, D.C.
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project conforms to the requirements of the selected SSHAC Level 3 process. Collectively, these two
roles imply oversight and assurance that the evaluation and integration aspects of the TI Teams’
assessments have been performed appropriately.
In more detail, the responsibilities include the following:
• to provide clear and timely feedback to the Project Technical Integrator (PTI) and Technical
Integrator (TI) Leads, through the Project Manager (PM)
• to ensure that any technical deficiencies or violations of process are corrected at the earliest
possible stage
• to highlight any data, models, or methods (and their proponents) that should be considered
• to judge adequacy of the justification provided by the TI Teams for the models (included or
excluded), and for the weights applied to the logic-tree branches; but not to judge the specific
values chosen for the logic-tree weights.
To achieve the above, the attributes of the PPRP are defined in collective terms for all of the members of
the panel as a group. Each member of the group should have an understanding of and commitment to
the principles of the SSHAC process. The members of the panel must collectively cover all technical
aspects of building seismic source characterization (SSC) and ground motion characterization (GMC)
models and of conducting a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). Membership of the PPRP is
always on an individual basis and not as an affiliate of any organization; the members represent only
themselves, as experts in the field.
FORMAT OF REVIEW COMMENTS The scope of this report differs from the PPRP Reports following WS1 and WS2 on account of the
different character of WS3. Specifically, the interaction between the PPRP and the TI Teams during WS3
means that most of the technical points of concern to the PPRP have already been raised and have been
noted for action by the TI Teams. The PPRP does not consider it necessary to repeat these points in the
present report.
We have organized our review comments using a numbering scheme as shown in the box below. This is
a simplification of the schemes used in the PPRP Reports from WS1 and WS2. First the comments are
broken into three general categories that follow the organization of the project: Project-wide comments,
SSC-related comments, and GMC-related comments. Each of the comments is given a sequential
number, which has been continued from the WS1 and WS2 PPRP Reports, to avoid confusion.
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COMMENTS ON THE PROJECT EXECUTION PRJ-33 As noted in Comment PRJ-25 from the PPRP Report for WS2, the PPRP finds that observing TI Team
WMs greatly facilitates its understanding of the technical evaluation and integration that takes place
within each team. It also allows the PPRP to better assess that the full range of technically defensible
interpretations and data are being considered. Also, the Project decision to share internal TI Team
working documents and summary sheets with the PPRP in advance of WS3, made it possible for the
PPRP to provide more useful feedback at the workshop.
PRJ-34 In implementing the SSHAC Level 3 process, the TNSP has included the innovation of having the PPRP
formally question and comment on the SSC and GMC preliminary models and hazard sensitivity results
during WS3. The goal of this approach is to ensure that key PPRP concerns are raised, understood, and
discussed prior to finalization of the models. The PPRP found this approach to be highly beneficial and
notes that it was successfully implemented during WS3.
PRJ-35 In the PPRP Report for WS2, Comment PRJ-28 noted that not all SSC TI Team members participated
equally in interactions with the Proponent and Resource Experts to ascertain the technical basis and
limitations of interpretations and data sets. PPRP members observed a similar lack of balance in
discussions during SSC WMs. At WS3, there was a broader participation in the form of presentations of
the preliminary model, but discussions of hazard feedback, and responses to PPRP questions, continued
to be dominated by a few of team members. We note this with respect to inclusion in lessons learned
from the Project.
PRJ-36 WS3 was successful in identifying, from hazard sensitivity studies, problems in the preliminary model
requiring investigation and correction. The PPRP would like to emphasise the issue of unintended
consequences. Hazard models compiled with the best intentions sometimes accidentally include
branches that are unfeasible. Great care should be taken that the final model does not include, by some
combination of factors, behaviour that is physically, geologically or seismologically unrealistic.
Format for Numbered Comments: X-N
Basic Numbering (X-N)
X PRJ (Project-wide)
SSC (Seismic Source Characterization)
GMC (Ground Motion Characterization)
N Sequence Number (1,2,…,n) as continued from Workshops 1 and 2.
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COMMENTS ON WORKSHOP 3: SSC SUB-PROJECT SSC-35 A large number of SSC issues that were raised by the PPRP during WS3 have been noted as actions by
the SSC TI Team. The PPRP do not feel it necessary to itemise these in the present report. We are
confident that these issues will receive adequate attention at SSC WM4 and we expect to see them fully
documented in the final report.
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COMMENTS ON WORKSHOP 3: GMC SUB-PROJECT GMC-27 Following the completion of WS3, the PPRP was provided with an Action Item list developed by the GMC
TI Team. In addition to the points raised on that list, the PPRP would like to draw attention to the issues
contained in the following comments.
GMC-28 In their preliminary model, the GMC TI Team has decided to implement a Vs-kappa correction to ground
motion predictions based on a single scenario earthquake and a given Q model. The PPRP notes that the
project documentation needs to provide sufficient justification that this approximation provides an
adequate representation of the ground motion amplitudes in the magnitude and distance ranges that are
important to hazard.
GMC-29 As noted in Comment GMC-23 from the PPRP Report for WS2, in quantifying epistemic and aleatory
uncertainties in ground motion, it is important to avoid double counting or underestimating uncertainties.
It is important to justify how the logic tree is accounting for different uncertainty contributions. For
example, if a single scaling factor takes into account multiple types of uncertainty (in mean stress drop, in
Vs-kappa adjustment, etc.) it will be difficult to distinguish how each is treated.
GMC-30 Because the single station sigma approach adopted by the TI Team represents the cutting edge in
practice and research, it is important that this phase of the work be documented thoroughly. In particular,
the rationale for the decision not to use distance- or magnitude-and-distance-dependent phi should be
clearly justified.
GMC-31 The PPRP welcomed the use of Sammon’s maps to illustrate the epistemic uncertainty expressed in the
GMC model. It was notable that some of the South African stochastic models fell outside the range of the
GMC model space. The reasons for this should be considered and documented.
GMC-32 At WS3, there was some discussion on the subject of testing the GMC model. The PPRP considers that
tests should have predefined conditions that would constitute success or failure. The PPRP would like to
identify this as a desirable item in the project documentation.
GMC-33 The explorations of the use of the intensity database contained a circularity in that the GMC model was
used to evaluate GM/intensity conversions, that were to be used to evaluate the GMC model. While this
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may be unavoidable, the limitation thus imposed on interpretation of the results should be clearly
indicated in the final report.
GMC-34 The approach for the characterization of uncertainty in site response, as presented at WS3, appears to
include only parametric uncertainty. It is important that modelling uncertainty be also addressed.
GMC-35 In incorporating site response with hazard results for the reference rock condition to obtain results at the
surface, it should be documented that the ground motion range over which site response is calculated is
sufficient to capture the hazard at the surface.
CONCLUDING REMARKS The agenda for the workshop was well developed and covered the necessary and appropriate topics to
meet the workshop objectives. The workshop was well organized and well conducted. The high quality of
the logistical organization of the workshop contributed greatly to its success, and we would like to express
our appreciation to the CGS staff.
The technical quality of the presentations was very high throughout the workshop.
It is the judgment of the PPRP that the workshop was successful in its adherence to principles, goals, and
requirements of a SSHAC Level 3 process.
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APPENDIX B - TI LEAD’S RESPONSE TO PPRP REPORT (original on CD/DVD at back of report)
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SSHAC Level 3 PSHA for the Thyspunt Nuclear Siting Project
Workshop 3: Presentation of Models and Hazard Sensitivity Feedback
TI Lead Responses to PPRP Report INTRODUCTION
The TI Leads would like to once again express our gratitude to the five members of the Participatory Peer
Review Panel (PPRP) for their time and effort throughout the Workshop, especially in view of the fact that
this involved 7 full working days for Panel.
The feedback provided to us, both verbally during the Workshop and now in writing in their third report,
continues to be very valuable. In particular, we share the PPRP’s view that the format for Workshop #3,
consistent with the specifications of NUREG-2117, that allowed the members of the Panel to directly
question the TI Teams regarding the preliminary SSC and GMC models, worked very well. Most
significantly, it has enabled many issues and concerns to be raised in time to be taken on board by the TI
Teams during the development of the final models, and in the documentation of the project.
We would also like to note that we are very pleased that the PPRP has once again clearly identified and
confirmed its role and responsibilities in this project, and emphasised the importance of Panel members
participating in their individual capacity.
RESPONSES TO INDIVIDUAL COMMENTs Each comment in the PPRP report is addressed below; these responses are provided by the TI Leads
and will be communicated to the members of the TI Teams, and others as needed. The PPRP does not
appear to have specifically requested written responses to any of the comments in their report, we have
opted to provide brief responses below for completeness and also to establish our plans for taking these
comments into account in the next stages of the project. We use the same numbering system as adopted
by the PPRP in their report.
PRJ-33 We concur with this comment in its entirety, and have also found the experience of having PPRP
observers present at the TI Team Working Meetings very valuable. We are pleased that the
documentation provided ahead of the Workshop was helpful to the PPRP in making preparations for the
meeting.
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PRJ-34 We also concur on this point and believe that the experience of TNSP Workshop #3 vindicates the advice
of NUREG-2117 to allow the PPRP to participate in this final workshop actively rather than maintaining
the status of observers from the previous workshops.
PRJ-35 We agree that the participation in verbal discussions at the workshops has not been evenly divided
across the members of the SSC TI Team. We also agree that a broader range of participation is a goal
toward which the project has strived and has made strides through the course of the working meetings
and workshops. Acknowledging these goals and results, we also note that an issue identified in the
lessons learned from previous SSHAC studies (Hanks et al., 2009, p. 242) is the need to involve young
professionals in each new SSHAC project. It is in this way that the pool of participants in future SSHAC
studies will increase with time, rather than decrease as the current pool moves into retirement. Consistent
with this recommendation, the SSC Team includes young professionals with strong credentials in SSC-
related technical disciplines, but who have relatively lesser experience in SSHAC projects or in similar
studies that involve a high degree of regulatory scrutiny in a public forum. We feel that the technical
contribution of all members of the Team has been strong, especially during the data evaluation and
preliminary SSC model development activities. In addition, the public contribution of the various members
of the Team has improved throughout the course of the project.
We do note that while members of the GMC TI Team have shown greater evidence of participation in the
meetings and workshops, it must be borne in mind that all five members have considerable experience
and as academics are well versed in debate and discussion. The two CGS members who have served on
the GMC TI Team, however, did not manage to attain a level of technical participation consistent with the
SSHAC requirements, and the SSC TI Team has successfully brought in relatively young individuals with
less experience and fully integrated them into the evaluation and integration processes undertaken.
We do agree, however, that the documenting this issue as a lesson learned, from the experience of both
teams, would be of value to future such studies.
PRJ-36 We appreciate and agree with these observations, and would state that the experience of Workshop #3,
in which preliminary, but nonetheless well matured, SSC and GMC models have been used to generate
2 Hanks, T.C., Abrahamson, N.A., Boore, D.M., Coppersmith, K.J. and Knepprath, N.E. (2009). “Implementation of the SSHAC
Guidelines for Level 3 and 4 PSHAs – Experience Gained from Actual Applications”, USGS Open-File Report 2009-1093, US
Geological Survey, Reston VA.
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hazard sensitivity feedback, was extremely valuable. Lessons were learned from this experience, and
hazard sensitivity calculations and other checks will be performed ahead of the Working Meetings in
October, and, as identified in the final presentation of the workshop, when the draft final HID is
implemented in early November, to ensure that there are no unintended or unphysical outcomes.
SSC-35 The list of actions developed by the SSC TI Team includes technical analyses that will be conducted prior
to WM4, as well as a number of issues and assessments that will require complete documentation in the
project report. In many cases, the development of this list was greatly facilitated by the interactions with
the PPRP during the course of the workshop.
GMC-27 We are grateful to the PPRP for taking into account the commitment of the GMC TI Team to undertake a
number of activities following the Workshop, and for providing additional guidance and suggestions.
GMC-28 As noted in the GMC post-WS actions, analyses will be performed prior to GMC WM4 to explore the
sensitivity of approximation of the Vs-kappa adjustments anchored to a single scenario applied to all
magnitude-distance combinations making significant contributions to the hazard. These will be discussed
at WM4, and if necessary the uncertainty bounds on the logic-tree may be adjusted to accommodate the
differences. This aspect of the model will be fully documented and justified in the final report.
GMC-29 The point made by the PPRP regarding clear identification of each element of aleatory variability and
epistemic uncertainty is well taken. The GMC TI Team will ensure that the individual contributions to
overall uncertainty are clearly identified, and care will be taken to ensure that there is neither double-
counting nor negligence of important elements of variability or uncertainty.
With regards to the specific examples cited by the PPRP, however, the scaling factors associated with Vs-
kappa adjustments and with stress drop differences were developed independently, as was clearly
demonstrated in the presentation of the preliminary GMC model on the first day of the Workshop. The
fact that these both lead to scaling factors that are ultimately multiplied does not conceal or confuse the
relative contributions of each source of uncertainty, and this will be clearly laid out in the final
documentation.
GMC-30 The GMC TI Team acknowledges that although the single-station sigma concept is gaining widespread
acceptance, its application to projects still represents an innovation. For this reason, we accept that the
adoption of single-station sigma will require particularly complete justification in the final documentation,
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as will the particular single-station sigma model (with magnitude dependence but not varying with
distance) that has been adopted for the Thyspunt PSHA.
GMC-31 The GMC TI Team fully agrees with this observation, but before documenting possible reasons for this
feature, additional Sammon’s maps will be generated for particular magnitude-distance-frequency
combinations relevant to the hazard to see if the GMC models and the South African stochastic equations
continue to occupy difference ground-motion space.
GMC-32 This point is well taken, and before conducting the final ‘tests’—to the extent that the models can really be
tested with the data available for South Africa—the Team will establish the criteria constituting a positive
or negative test outcome, and these will be fully documented.
GMC-33 The TI Team agrees that there is a degree of circularity in the use of well-observed events to select the
GMICE that is then employed in the comparisons of the GMC model with the intensity database. There
are, however, good reasons to select the chosen GMICE by Dangkua & Cramer (2011), and these will be
carefully documented. The final report will also include the initial comparisons, acknowledging the
inherent circularity, and explain how these initial trials not so much confirmed the choice of the Dangkua
& Cramer (2011) Californian GMICE, but rather showed that neither of the other available models yielded
values that would make any kind of testing viable.
GMC-34 This observation is well taken. We understand modelling uncertainty to represent the misfit between
model predictions and recorded motions from previous earthquakes (Toro et al. 19973, NUREG/CR-
67284). As noted in NUREG/CR-67695, modelling uncertainty for one-dimensional site response
analysis has not been well quantified. Nonetheless, some level of modelling uncertainty should be
included in our site response model and its integration into the hazard calculation. Various approaches to
include modelling uncertainty will be explored for the final hazard calculations. The considered
3 Toro, G.R., Abrahamson, N.A., and Schneider, J.F. (1997). “Models of strong ground motions from earthquakes in central and
eastern North America”, Seismological Research Letters 68(1), 41-57.
4 McGuire, R.K., Silva, W.J., and Costantino, C.J. (2001). “Technical basis for revision of regulatory guidance on design ground
motions: Hazard- and risk-consistent ground motion spectra guidelines”, NUREG/CR-6728, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington D.C.
5 McGuire, R.K., Silva, W.J., and Costantino, C.J. (2002). “Technical basis for revision of regulatory guidance on design ground
motions: Hazard- and risk-consistent seismic spectra for two sites”, NUREG/CR-6769, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington D.C.
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approaches will take guidance from the NUREG/CR-6728 and NUREG/CR-6769, as well as work
currently taking place at the University of Texas under the direction of Professor Rathje using downhole
data from the KIK-net array in Japan.
GMC-35 The identification of ground-motion amplitudes to be used as input to the site response analyses will be
based on the hazard results in the bedrock target horizon, following standard practice in the application of
NRC Approach 3 consistent with NUREG/CR-6728 and RG 1.208 in terms of the specified response
frequencies and annual frequencies of exceedance. This will ensure adequate coverage of the ground
motion range in a manner consistent with best international practice in the nuclear industry.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, we would like to note our grateful and satisfaction with regards to the overall endorsement
that the PPRP has given for Workshop #3 having been successfully conducted and having conformed to
the principles, goals and requirements of a SSHAC Level 3 process.
We trust that the Panel will be satisfied by the responses recorded in this document, and would ask that
any outstanding concerns be communicated as soon as possible to the Project Manager.
We look forward to the interactions with individual members of the PPRP who will act as observers at our
final Working Meetings in October, and subsequently to the review of our final report. In the meantime, as
agreed at the Workshop, we shall provide documentation to the PPRP as and when it becomes available,
to facilitate the review process.
In closing, we once again thank the PPRP for their energetic commitment to this project, their
encouragement for the work being undertaken, and their willingness to engage in very open and frank
exchanges during the course of Workshop. We continue to benefit considerably from the very valuable,
insightful and constructive comments and suggestions made by the Panel.
Julian J Bommer Kevin J Coppersmith
PTI/GMC TI Lead SSC TI Lead
4 September 2012
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APPENDIX C - WORKSHOP SATISFACTION SURVEY FORM
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Thyspunt Workshop 3:- Presentation of Models and Hazard Sensitivity Feedback
27 – 31 August 2012 Workshop Satisfaction Survey
Pre-Workshop Arrangements
1. Were you kept adequately informed regarding the arrangements for the Workshop leading up to the event?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
2. Were the methods of communication adequate (e-mail, newsletters, etc.)? ○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
3. How was your travel arrangements (air ticket and transfers) handled? ○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
4. Upon arrival, how were you received by the organizers and hotel staff? ○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
Venue
5. How would you rate Spier Hotel as a location for the Workshop?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
6. If you stayed at Spier Hotel during the Workshop, how would you rate the accommodation?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
7. If you live in Cape Town and drove to Spier Hotel, how did you find the parking at the Workshop?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
8. On average, how did you find the session room to be in terms of seating and view?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
9. How satisfied were you with the technology and multimedia available during the sessions?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
10. Were the organizers and hotel staff helpful and courteous throughout the Workshop?
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○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
11. How would you rate the venues for the meals?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
12. How would you rate the meals and snacks provided during the Workshop?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
13. If you had special dietary requirements, were these catered for?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
14. Was the safety briefing adequate?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
General
15. Was the workshop document pack informative enough?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
16. Was the Agenda kept to, and did the sessions begin on time?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
17. Were you able to add value to the discussions during the Workshop?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
18. Were the objectives you thought should be met, achieved by the Workshop?
○ Excellent ○ Good ○ Average ○ Poor
General comments regarding, or ways on improving the Workshop
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