IAEA IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
THE IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT AND
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Nordic Perspectives of Fukushima Stockholm
12 January 2016
Lyn Bevington Office for Safety and Security Coordination Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
IAEA
OVERVIEW
2
• IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident
• Nuclear Safety
• Emergency Preparedness and Response
• Other relevant activities
• IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety
• The way forward
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KEY FACTS
3
REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL • Executive Summary + Summary Report
• ~200 pages drawn from Technical
Volumes
• 45 key observations and lessons
• Most not new
• IAEA activities + CNS Review Meetings
5 TECHNICAL VOLUMES • 5 Working Groups
• 180 Experts 40 Member States
• Geographical representation
• ~1000 Pages + Annexes
• 102 observations and lessons
• IAEA website
WORKING METHODS • 6 rounds of 5 Working Group meetings
• Consultancy meetings
• Expert missions to Japan
• Bilateral meetings in Japan
• Information received from Japan
• Independent advice
• Safety standards extant in 2011
GENERAL • September 2012 – announcement
by DG Amano
• 3 years work
• September 2015 – report released
• DG Report + 5 Technical Volumes
• What happened + why
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THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT
4
Report by the Director General
Technical Volume 1 Description and Context of the Accident
Technical Volume 2 Safety Assessment
Technical Volume 3 Emergency Preparedness and Response
Technical Volume 4 Radiological Consequences
Technical Volume 5 Post-accident Recovery
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WHAT HAPPENED
6
Description of the events presented in chronological order to highlight the integrated response to a multi-unit accident
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WHY IT HAPPENED
7
• Vulnerability to external events
• The defence in depth concept
• The fundamental safety functions
• Beyond design basis accidents and accident management
• Regulatory effectiveness
• Human and organizational factors
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VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL EVENTS
FINDINGS
• No apparent damage to SSC’s from earthquake
• Tsunami far exceeded design basis causing major damage
• Major conclusion : the treatment of external hazards was not fully in line with international practice
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
• Need for periodic update of external hazards assessment
• Appropriate conservatism to account for uncertainties
• Predictions that challenge current assumptions need prompt corrective actions need to be taken promptly
• Multi-unit and multi-site accidents need to be assessed
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BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS
AND ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
FINDINGS
• Deterministic and probabilistic treatment of beyond design basis accidents was not in line with international best practices
• Limited scope PSA did not identify plant vulnerability to flooding
• PSA results for Fukushima Daiichi NPPs were several orders of magnitude lower than similar plants in other Member States
• Limited scope deterministic analyses contributed to weaknesses in accident management procedures
• Incomplete knowledge of potential accident sequences and consequences led to inadequate procedural guidance
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BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS
AND ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
• Deterministic and probabilistic analyses need to be comprehensive and account of internal + external events
• Extremely low PSA numbers need to be reviewed as they can impact decision making + lead to unidentified plant vulnerabilities
• Accident management provisions need to be clear, comprehensive and well designed
• Training/exercises to be based on realistic accident conditions.
• Regulatory bodies need to ensure that adequate accident management provisions are in place
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REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS
FINDINGS • Complex regulatory system - several different organizations
• Distribution of regulatory authority decision making was unclear
• Some practices were not in line with international best practices
• Inspection program was overly limited in scope and influence
• Periodic safety reviews lacked effective regulatory oversight
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS • Where several bodies have responsibilities for safety, government
coordination is needed
• Clear lines of authority and decision making ability so that all stakeholders understand the process
• Regulator needs an effective inspection program and effective enforcement authority + access to independent technical expertise
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NISA
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HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL
FACTORS FINDINGS
• Basic assumption that plants were safe
• All stakeholders shared and mutually reinforced this belief
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
• Individuals + organizations need to continuously question their basic assumptions and implications on actions that impact safety.
• The need to be prepared for the unexpected
• A systemic approach to safety needs to be taken in event and accident analysis, considering all stakeholders and their interactions over time.
• Regulatory authorities should provide oversight and independent review of safety culture programs
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE
16
• Initial response in Japan to the accident
• Protecting emergency workers
• Protecting the public
• Transition from the emergency phase
• International response
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PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
FINDINGS • The criteria for protective actions were not expressed in terms of
measurable quantities
• No predetermined criteria for relocation
• Evacuees were relocated several times during the first 24 hours
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS • Decisions on urgent protective actions based on predefined plant
conditions or monitoring results
• Protective actions need to do more good than harm
• Medical staff need to be trained in basic medical response to a nuclear emergency and in adequate management of (possibly) contaminated patients
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TRANSITION FROM THE EMERGENCY
PHASE FINDINGS • Specific policies, guidelines, criteria and arrangements for the
transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase were not developed before the accident
• In developing these arrangements, the Japanese authorities decided to apply the latest recommendations of ICRP
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS • Arrangements need to be developed at the preparedness stage for
termination of protective actions and other response actions, and transition to the recovery phase
• Timely analysis of an emergency and the response to it, drawing out lessons and identifying possible improvements, enhances emergency arrangements
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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
FINDINGS • Assistance Convention was not invoked and RANET not used
• Different States either recommended different protective actions for their nationals in Japan in response to the accident
• These differences were generally not well explained to the public and occasionally caused confusion and concern
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS • The implementation of international arrangements for
notification and assistance needs to be strengthened
• There is a need to improve consultation and sharing of information among States on response actions.
• IAEA assessment and prognosis
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THE IAEA ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR
SAFETY
20
KEY FACTS • 12 key actions, 39 sub-actions
• Unanimously adopted in September 2011
• EBP funded projects:
• 52 from Japan
• 10 from USA
• 7 from Russia
• Over 900 activities completed
• ~ 40 Million euro since September 2011
TRANSPARENCY • Mission calendar of peer reviews
• International experts missions reports
• International Experts Meetings reports
Fact-Finding Mission
May 2011
Review Japan Safety Assessments NPPs Jan 2012
Expert Mission Onagawa NPP Aug 2012
Peer Review Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards Decommissioning
2nd Mission
Dec 2013
1st Mission
Apr 2013
Remediation of large contaminated area off-site Fukushima NPP
Follow-up
Oct 2013
1st Mission
Oct 2011
2011 2012 2013 2014
IAEA Action Plan
Sept 2011
Fukushima Accident Mar 2011
Expert visit
Nov 2013
2015
Marine Monitoring Confidence
Building & Data Quality Assurance
Sept 2014 Nov
2014
3rd Mission
Feb 2015
Seawater
and
sediment
sample
collection
May 2015
THE IAEA EXPERT MISSIONS TO JAPAN
Reactor and Spent
Fuel Safety
2012
Protection Against
External Events
2012
Transparency &
Communication
2012
Human & Organizational
Factors
2014
Decommissioning
and Remediation
2013
Radiation
protection
2014
Severe accident
management
2015
Research &
Development
2015
Assessment &
Prognosis
2015
Strengthening Nuclear
Regular Effectiveness
2013
Preparedness and
Response
2013
Capacity
Building
2015
IAEA REPORTS - LESSONS LEARNED
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THE WAY FORWARD
MEMBER STATES RESPONSE • Board of Governors + 2015 General Conference
• Wide support for the Action Plan activities the
publication of the IAEA Fukushima Report
“It is essential that the IAEA ensure that the
momentum to improve global nuclear safety is
improved and further increased building on
the Fukushima report”
“Important to follow up to ensure the Action Plan
and IAEA Report contribute to a continuous
improvement in nuclear safety worldwide”
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IAEA General Conference 2015
Resolution GC(59)/RES/9 September 2015
• Welcomes the publication of the IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, consisting of the Director General’s Report and five technical volumes
• Requests the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States, to integrate actions arising from the Observations and Lessons in the Report into the Agency’s regular programme;
• Requests the Secretariat to continue follow-up on the projects/activities arising from the Action Plan and to build upon the findings, lessons learned, and measures implemented from the Fukushima Daiichi accident;
• Requests the Agency to continue to build upon: • the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, • the experience of States in implementing the Action Plan, • the observations and lessons contained in the IAEA Fukushima Report and • the principles of the Vienna Declaration,
and use them for defining its nuclear safety strategy and its programme of work.
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IMPLEMENTATION
• The Agency is developing an implementation plan to facilitate the transition of the relevant activities into its regular work programme
• The aim of the implementation plan is to establish the framework for the work of the relevant Departments and Divisions of the Agency for the coming years
“I believe that this IAEA report will provide a solid
knowledge base for the future and will help to
improve nuclear safety throughout the world. I
hope that governments, regulators and nuclear
power plant operators in all countries will continue
to act on the lessons learned from the Fukushima
Daiichi accident.” Director General Amano
Thank you for your attention
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