THE EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING USE ON TURKEY’S
FOREIGN TRADE
Aslı Özgür Aktay
Yıldız Technical University
Istanbul Turkey
August 2014
Preliminary draft
Abstract
More than 20 years, both developed and developing countries have increasingly used
antidumping measures in order to protect their import-competing industries with the help of this
most influential and prevalent trade protection measure. This contingent protection measure has
in fact strong effects on countries’ strategies of foreign trade.
Turkey is mentioned as one of the leading developing countries among the users of antidumping
cases. This paper tries to explain the main effects of antidumping measure on Turkey’s exports
and imports over the past 20 years. A focus of the paper is to find some specific results after the
implications of dumping and antidumping measures related with Turkey.
After a short introduction, Section 1 provides a brief overview of the trends and facts of
antidumping usage of Turkey during the last 20 years. Then Section 2 presents some
characteristics of Turkey’s antidumping data and tries to find empirical evidence on exports and
imports after the cases. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in the last section.
Keywords: Antidumping, international trade, Turkish economy, empirical studies of trade
JEL Codes: F13, F1, O52, F14
1
1.Introduction
While liberalization wind was blowing over most of the world countries during 1980s, Turkey
was as well one of the countries which abandoned most of her trade tariffs and protective
regulations especially from 1984 and on. Foreign trade as well as other financial movements was
liberalized during that period. However this didn’t stop the authorities to adopt the antidumping
(AD) legislation in order to protect import-competitive domestic producers through AD
measures if needed. These measures have already been used by the so-called “traditional users”
(Moore & Zanardi, 2008): EU, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. With the liberalization
period, the AD measures have increasingly been used mostly by the developing countries
including Turkey which is called as one of the frequent users in Moore & Zanardi’s study
(2008). Bown (2006) refers to these “new users” of AD as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela.
The basic definition of dumping takes place in WTO Antidumping Agreement, Article 2 as
follows1:
“… a product is considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of
another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product
exported from one country to another is less tha the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, fort he like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
company”
Dumping takes place when a foreign exporter sells a certain good under its “normal” price in the
importer country’s market. “Normal” in this definition stands for either “price in the exporter’s
country” or –according to some literature, “the good’s production cost in the country where it is
produced”. Either way, when the import-competitive firm suspects a dumping, it has the right to
request an AD investigation for this exporter because “Under competition law, predatory pricing
is understood as a deliberate strategy to drive competitors out of the market by setting very low
prices (e.g.,”cut-throat pricing”), including at below average variable costs.” (Bienen, Ciuriak
and Picarello, 2014) Investigation then is held to find out if the dumping accusation is worth an
enforcement which is mostly an AD duty meant to be paid by the accused exporter. This duty has
1 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm
2
an increasing effect on prices which has a positive influence on the domestic firms’ import
competitiveness.
According to literature, evidence seeking and calculation of dumping margin processes are stated
below:
“Before a government can impose a definitive antidumping import restriction, the Agreement
also requires that its administrating authority solicit and collect substantial economic evidence to
confirm that market conditions and behavior of foreign exporters satisfy technical, WTO-
mandated legal criteria.” Bown (2006) That is, a national government must undertake and
investigation and come up with the appropriate evidence before imposing an AD measure2.
Evidences:
a) The price of the good in exporter’s home market
b) The price of the good in a third market
c) Exporter’s average cost
d) That the domestic industry is materially injured (injury determination)
Turkey handle dumping and injury determination at the same time.
Blonigen and Prusa (2001) state two versions of dumping margin calculation: 1. The difference
between the exporting firm’s home price and its export price. 2. The difference between a firm’s
cost of production and its export price (cost-based).
There are various understandings of AD mechanism such as Derk, Ciuriak and Picarello (2014).
They consider trade remedies as international trade analogue of market competition policies to
domestic competition policy for domestic commerce while Blonigen and Prusa (2001)’s
approach is rather suspicious: “… AD has nothing to do with keeping trade “fair””. They define
AD as “a tool to improve the competitive position of the complainant against other companies”.
Due to wide AD measure usage among the developing countries, there also exits many studies
which searches for correlation between liberalization and AD or the overall import amount of the
2 AD measures: duties, minimum price arrangements, price undertakings; which all result in import restrictions
(Moore and Zanardi, 2008)
3
country and AD or the price change and AD duties (Moore & Zanardi (2008), Bown (2013),
Finger and Nogués (2008), Blonigen and Prusa (2001)). Among them, Moore & Zanardi (2008)
suggest that “past use of antidumping may have led to less rather than more trade liberalization.”
In fact, they find no evidence for a positive correlation between past AD actions and later tariff
reductions in their sample of developing countries, although historically a positive correlation is
expected. For example, Finger and Nogués (2008) points out that Latin American countries
managed AD mechanisms as part of their trade liberalism. However, developing countries do not
seem to provide favorable conditions for such policy changes: “The administrative content of the
rules supported liberalization, the economic content did not.” (Finger and Nogués, 2008).
WTO/GATT doesn’t seem to take into consideration the challenging policy management (both
political and economical) in developing countries. As for Turkey, as a developing country: Bown
(2013) shakes the liberalization phenomenon to the core by indicating this one information that
formation of free trade agreement did not increase Turkey’s export as much as crisis in 2008
decreased it due to downfall in EU demand for imports.
What Moore and Zanardi (2008) have eventually come up with is anyway the evidence “that
higher incomes, lower inflation, weaker economic growth, and better institutions are all
correlated with greater reductions in tariffs” which essentially means that only developed
countries can have a positive correlation and a hope in further tariff liberalization. As a matter of
fact, according to their data, the correlation between AD use and liberalization is found to be
negative among developing countries. They also find that for 60% of the cases developing
countries target other developing countries and that the developing country AD use rises
dramatically around 1993. One can’t help to think that this vicious circle among
developing countries might exacerbate their liberalization process let alone improve it.
Hoping fort he best –in terms of further liberalization, Turkey enacted her first AD case in 1989
and has become a frequent user especially after 2000, where most of the cases were against
China (Avşar, 2014). The aim of this study is to overview the last 20 years of Turkey’s AD
journey in order to determine if there is a significant effect of the measures on the foreign trade,
mostly on imports. The AD data gathered from World Bank, Global Antidumping Database3
3http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22574930~pagePK:642148
25~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
4
starts from 1989 until 2014, and the data gathered from WTO Antidumping data4 is between
1995 and 2013. The data mining reveals that the country which has been mostly subject to the
AD cases run by Turkey is China while the good types from which Turkey has pursued import
protection are woven fanrics of synthetic filament yarn (HS 4-digit code 5407), bicycle ad
motorcycle tires (HS 4-digit code 4011), certain fabrics (HS 4-digit code 5603) and steel billets
(HS 4-digit code 7207). According to import data extracted from UN Comtrade5 the decreases in
imports are significant provided that the investigation is made country by country. From one year
to another with an AD measure implementation, the import fall can be spotted in some cases, but
if the total sector imports are taken into consideration, it is impossible to end up with a decrease
except from steel billets.
The paper is constructed as follows: In the following section, the cases run by Turkey and
against Turkey are being examined after a short background of Turkey’s AD history. In Section
3, the effects of the measures imposed on certain sectors and countries are examined and
discussed. In the final section, last remarks are presented along with a short commentary on the
AD procedures.
4 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm
5 http://comtrade.un.org/
5
2. Turkey’s Antidumping History
2.1. Short background
History of AD begins with 1947 GATT agreement.
World Bank Global Antidumping Data for Turkey’s AD cases start in 1989 for products like
thermometers, polyster fibers, electrodes and paper. Some of the exporting countries were, East
Germany, Taiwan, China and Yugoslavia, respectively.
After adopting rather a liberalized economy in order to fit in the world conjucture at the time,
1980’s were the years when Turkey’s overall economy started to take more active role in world
trade. Trade liberalization, on the other hand, came with a concern: How to protect the domestic
producers now that importing has become much easier. Moreover, as of 1996, when Turkey has
become a member of Customs Union with the European Union (but without being a member in
EU), the domestic economy has raised such concerns along with enjoying mostly duty free and
less regulated trade. After phasing in of a customs union and implementations of Uruguay Round
WTO commitments, Turkey’s ability to alter its import tariffs were restricted and this has lead
Turkey to consider of applications of new TTBs (temporary trade barriers) along with AD
initiations. (Bown, 2010)
According to Bown (2013) Turkey has become one of the frequent users of TTBs, especially
against PTA non-members. It seems like liberalization itself still needed a solid ground where
countries are eager to acknowledge some benefit-seeking boundaries.
Blonigen and Prusa (2001) as well claim that although AD is likely the most costly form of
protection, its actions have flourished since other instruments of trade protection such as tariffs,
quotas etc. have been brought under greater GATT/WTO discipline.
Then, there seems to be a two-way interaction between trade liberalization and AD disputes.
More liberalized trade comes with tariff liberalization. The only so-called protection which is left
for the countries to use rather more freely is AD measures because of the restriction to use other
policies. Bown (2006) on the other hand claims that use of AD can also increase a country’s “…
willingness to take on more extensive liberalization commitments than it would take on without
such an option.”
6
2.2. Turkey as an exporting country
According to WTO AD data, Turkey has been subject to 64 antidumping initiations between the
years 1995-2013 and 33 antidumping measures. That is, Turkey is enforced to antidumping
measures of approximately 45% of the initiations that were held up against her exporting. The
year when Turkey was imposed to investigations most is 2000, with a number of 7 initiations and
4 of them resulted in duties.
Turkey has mostly gone through such investigations by a petition of European Union and the
United States between 1995 and 2013 according to WTO data.
Nevertheless, Bown (2013) states that:
“The data for Turkey indicate clearly that foreign trade barriers such as antidumping and
other TTBs are not major current causes of concern for Turkey’s exporters and are thus
not a likely major influence on Turkey’s own use of such flexibilities toward its own
imports.”
Either due to small number of cases Turkey was imposed or due to mild AD measures, Turkey
does not seem to have been affected much by AD measures she has been obliged to.
2.3. Turkey as a reporter country
According to WTO AD data, from 1995 to 2013 Turkey has had 168 antidumping initiations. By
2013, the number of measures she has is 154 which leads to the conclusion that approximately
91% of the initiations has resulted in duties, as mostly a kind of import-duty. 2004 is the year
when Turkey pursued protection from import most (25 initiations) and in 2003 Turkey had
measures for 28 cases which implies a possible lag between intitiations and final and affirmative
dumping decision.
According to Global Antidumping Data (GAD) by the World Bank, Turkey has demanded
antidumping investigation mostly on 4 good types which can be easily spotted in Figure 1.
Between 1989 and 2013, these goods have been mostly under investigation:
7
1. HS code 5407: Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn (421 cases)
For this type of good, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand were
investigated. The date of initiation of the investigation was 2000 with date of imposition
of final antidumping measure being 2002.
2. HS code 5603: Nonwovens, whether or not impregnated, coated, covered or laminated
(42 cases)
For nonwovens, China was investigated in 2008 and imposed a measure in 2009 while
investigations were begun for other countries like Iran, Israel, Italy and Saudi Arabia for
certain fabrics in 2008 but they did not end up with a measure; final dumping decision
being terminated prior to ruling by government. That is, the exporter countries act first
and increase their prices before the government even takes an action against dumping, by
reporting to WTO.
3. HS code 4011: New pneumatic tyres, of rubber (35 cases)
Among this code, the exact goods that were mostly imported and taken to investigation
are bicycle tires and motorcycle tires. The countries who were claimed to have done
dumping and were imposed measures were China, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Sri
Lanka, Indonesia and Malaysia. The initiations were taken into consideration in 2002,
2004 and 2008. And the final decisions were made 1 year after the first initiation date.
4. HS code 7207: Semi-finished products of iron and non-alloy steel (18 cases)
For steel billets, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova were investigated in 1994 and imposed a
measure. However, it is removed in 2008 (Bown, 2008).
8
Figure 1
Source: World Bank, Global Antidumping Database
Looking at the sections of these goods considering their 2-digit codes, we come up with three
sections:
Section VII: Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof (40: Rubber and articles
thereof)
Section XI: Textiles and textile articles (54: Man-made filaments; 56: Wadding, felt and
nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof.
Section XV: Base metals and articles of base metal (72: Iron and steel)
Comparing the sections Turkey has pursued antidumping investigations with the sections which
have been mostly subject to such investigations all around the world between 1995 and 2013,
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
3904 4011 4013 4412 4802 5208 5209 5402 5407 5503 5603 6005 7207 7307 7312
Nu
mb
er
of
the
inve
stig
atio
ns
pu
rsu
ed
4-digit HS codes of the goods that has been subject to AD investigation pursued by Turkey more than 10 times between 1989 and 2013
9
WTO data can be examined to figure out whether Turkey has been unique for the sectors that are
important only for her in terms of import competitive domestic firms or not:
With 1287 cases, Section XV, base metals and articles has been the sector which has been
subject to antidumping panels most, in the world. According to this data, Turkey has been
investigated as an exporter country most for the Section XV as well. And 15 measures out of 32
initiations, with almost 50% of the cases, Section XV was also the sector where Turkey has been
enforced measures most. However it is the forth mostly investigated sector by Turkey’s petition
in order to protect its import-competitive producers of similar product. Below, Figure 2 shows
the mostly investigated sector for dumping, all around the world.
Figure 2
Source: WTO Antidumping Database
VI Products of the chemical and allied
industries
VII Resins, plastics and articles; rubber
and articles
X Paper, paperboard and articlesXI Textiles
and articles
XIII Articles of stone, plaster; ceramic
prod.; glass
XV Base metals and articles
XVI Machinery and electrical equipment
The sections that have been subject to antidumping investigations most
10
As for the measures that Turkey gained right to run against exporting countries of the goods that
belong Section VII, Section XI and Section XV, which she ran initiations most, WTO data shows
that almost all the initiations ended up with a measure.
In the whole world, China and South Korea have been the mostly investigated countries for
dumping while India and United States are the countries that have done the reporting most,
according to WTO data. According to Global Antidumping Data (GAD), WTO antidumping data
and data from the website of Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy, the country which
Turkey has petitioned for dumping investigation is China. The other countries that were also
investigated most by Turkey’s request are India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Figure 3 and
Figure 4 show the countries which Turkey targeted for dumping, according to different data sets.
Figure 3
Source: WTO Antidumping Database
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
China India Indonesia Korea, Republic
of
Malaysia Taipei, Chinese
Thailand Viet Nam
Nu
mb
er
of
case
s
The countries that were investigated due to Turkey's petititon according to WTO AD data, between 1995 and 2013
11
Figure 4
Source: World Bank, Global Antidumping Database
Given the general data of AD investigations run against Turkey above, the aim of this paper is to
focus on rather Turkey’s imports and effects of antidumping measures on Turkey’s imports.
Therefore, in the next section, in order to comment on imports, Turkey is taken as a reporter
country only and her being taken as an exporter country can be a future study’s subject.
3. General overview to Turkey’s foreign trade after AD cases
In order to examine the possible effects of antidumping measures to Turkey’s imports of the four
HS 4-digit coded goods, i.e 5407, 4011, 5603 and 7207, from the countries to which Turkey has
pursued AD duties.6
6 The data has been extracted from UN Comtrade. It is informed that data for Taiwan is absent because of political
reasons. Therefore, Taiwan is excluded from the import data
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
China India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand South Korea Vietnam
Nu
mb
er
of
case
s
The countries that were investigated due to Turkey's petition according to GAD, WB, between 1989 and 2013
12
Due to application lags, the data has been examined few years backwards from the first AD
measure imposition and the same number of years forward it.
1. HS code: 5407
The data is sought 5 years before Turkey pursued an AD investigation and 5 years after that,
that is 2000 for all the exporter countries of this good. The reason why the investigation year
is taken into consideration, and not the year that duties start to take place is that during
investigation, the imports are mostly held slow and sometimes they are stopped. When the
imports from all the four countries (China, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) that have
been imposed AD measure in 2002, are aggregrated in two time periods, i.e 1995-1999 and
2000-2004, the total value of imports substantially increase, let alone decrease because of the
measures. However, if we look at the import values country by country, we can spot an
import decrease from 2000 to 2002 in case of China and Thailand.
Table 1: 792 is the code of Turkey and trade flow code 1 refers to imports.
Table 1.a
China
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value
1995 792 1 156 5407 883,307 2,590,498
1996 792 1 156 5407 1,878,296 7,158,728
1997 792 1 156 5407 3,526,470 15,872,207
1998 792 1 156 5407 4,681,032 21,514,404
1999 792 1 156 5407 6,531,895 22,964,700
2000 792 1 156 5407 11,118,406 39,826,294
2001 792 1 156 5407 11,232,351 34,392,090
2002 792 1 156 5407 4,583,016 15,786,383
2003 792 1 156 5407 5,573,903 19,748,226
2004 792 1 156 5407 8,506,302 40,965,454
2005 792 1 156 5407 6,810,182 41,384,815
2006 792 1 156 5407 8,425,809 52,720,399
2007 792 1 156 5407 13,140,191 77,342,206
2008 792 1 156 5407 14,794,244 77,214,225
2009 792 1 156 5407 10,092,283 53,547,989
2010 792 1 156 5407 7,401,168 41,867,281
2011 792 1 156 5407 6,879,780 47,133,419
2012 792 1 156 5407 7,757,668 50,455,674
2013 792 1 156 5407 5,762,005 37,493,773
13
Table 1.b
South Korea
Table 1.c
Malaysia
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value
1995 792 1 410 5407 12,023,099 49,180,608
1996 792 1 410 5407 8,435,902 56,218,632
1997 792 1 410 5407 12,744,139 100,343,440
1998 792 1 410 5407 13,626,257 105,823,856
1999 792 1 410 5407 13,959,985 80,682,432
2000 792 1 410 5407 14,838,070 86,652,285
2001 792 1 410 5407 13,773,254 70,558,032
2002 792 1 410 5407 16,499,244 78,651,915
2003 792 1 410 5407 18,702,162 102,368,929
2004 792 1 410 5407 17,329,371 114,882,822
2005 792 1 410 5407 14,004,769 102,006,569
2006 792 1 410 5407 9,060,151 70,176,256
2007 792 1 410 5407 5,434,879 48,601,524
2008 792 1 410 5407 4,388,039 43,823,700
2009 792 1 410 5407 3,265,201 32,577,986
2010 792 1 410 5407 3,669,932 41,741,143
2011 792 1 410 5407 3,253,375 40,294,773
2012 792 1 410 5407 1,937,165 24,701,547
2013 792 1 410 5407 1,662,779 20,694,372
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
1995 792 1 458 5407 174,432 823,324
1996 792 1 458 5407 1,776,069 8,514,683
1997 792 1 458 5407 1,931,946 8,165,407
1998 792 1 458 5407 4,600,970 16,611,086
1999 792 1 458 5407 4,759,076 12,612,623
2000 792 1 458 5407 4,539,652 12,701,559
2001 792 1 458 5407 2,547,675 6,853,053
2002 792 1 458 5407 6,777,114 17,066,065
2003 792 1 458 5407 11,488,572 28,405,728
2004 792 1 458 5407 13,953,877 46,754,306
2005 792 1 458 5407 18,186,028 60,181,680
2006 792 1 458 5407 20,226,544 59,583,697
2007 792 1 458 5407 22,332,851 69,612,169
2008 792 1 458 5407 19,403,039 59,560,971
2009 792 1 458 5407 9,180,423 37,560,017
2010 792 1 458 5407 9,969,132 52,639,868
2011 792 1 458 5407 9,841,958 52,885,312
2012 792 1 458 5407 11,259,575 38,747,355
2013 792 1 458 5407 9,445,047 29,613,073
14
Table 1.d
Thailand
2. HS code: 5603
Since the other exporters of this good have acted before they were imposed any kind of AD
measure, China is left the only country that Turkey has pursued import protection. However,
looking at the UN comtrade data, one can see that the affirmative dumping decision and AD
measures did not seem to effect China’s exports negatively. Only in 2012, when the measures
are still valid, they are valid for 5 years unless they are removed for any reason like exporter
country’s deliberate price altering, there exists a substantial fall in imports from China. It
might be because of either China’s own economic situation or Turkey’s altering of the TTBs
to more severe measures as Bown (2013) points out to be happening more than seldom. If we
look at the total import figures, they increase in the years following the AD measure.
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
1995 792 1 764 5407 168,263 627,295
1996 792 1 764 5407 414,331 1,466,175
1997 792 1 764 5407 717,094 3,501,329
1998 792 1 764 5407 972,873 3,994,067
1999 792 1 764 5407 2,072,787 8,625,829
2000 792 1 764 5407 1,979,654 7,643,490
2001 792 1 764 5407 1,296,398 4,951,283
2002 792 1 764 5407 342,147 1,868,864
2003 792 1 764 5407 416,361 1,551,444
2004 792 1 764 5407 243,333 1,664,710
2005 792 1 764 5407 137,579 873,215
2006 792 1 764 5407 70,405 493,410
2007 792 1 764 5407 41,282 300,891
2008 792 1 764 5407 89,854 632,872
2009 792 1 764 5407 70,192 474,421
2010 792 1 764 5407 39,117 282,077
2011 792 1 764 5407 20,538 276,038
2012 792 1 764 5407 7,228 107,979
2013 792 1 764 5407 2,060 51,170
15
Table 2 China
3. HS code: 4011
Again, the total import amounts have increased significantly as if there were no measures at
all. For this good, China has been imposed measures both in 2003 and 2005 while other
countries get it once: India and Thailand in 2003; Sri Lanka and Vietnam in 2005; Indonesia
and Malaysia in 2009. Therefore, we compare the imports before and after those years7:
Table 3
Table 3.a
Sri Lanka
7 The data begins from 2000 for convenience.
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value
2002 792 1 156 5603 2,500,895 5,428,772
2003 792 1 156 5603 3,718,575 7,509,510
2004 792 1 156 5603 5,083,870 11,531,758
2005 792 1 156 5603 3,768,196 10,126,733
2006 792 1 156 5603 4,310,732 13,104,392
2007 792 1 156 5603 5,617,841 17,406,757
2008 792 1 156 5603 5,839,272 20,210,367
2009 792 1 156 5603 6,312,624 18,303,349
2010 792 1 156 5603 10,014,354 32,468,182
2011 792 1 156 5603 13,337,275 45,621,523
2012 792 1 156 5603 2,773,750 11,442,262
2013 792 1 156 5603 3,084,007 13,140,250
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
2000 792 1 144 4011 278,647 572,880
2001 792 1 144 4011 332,085 589,428
2002 792 1 144 4011 444,284 915,471
2003 792 1 144 4011 1,098,140 2,038,867
2004 792 1 144 4011 725,096 1,312,767
2005 792 1 144 4011 776,020 1,885,794
2006 792 1 144 4011 829,220 2,245,668
2007 792 1 144 4011 1,168,385 3,179,036
2008 792 1 144 4011 1,263,375 3,891,639
2009 792 1 144 4011 834,320 2,970,751
2010 792 1 144 4011 1,204,934 4,763,780
2011 792 1 144 4011 1,194,766 5,377,287
2012 792 1 144 4011 1,080,286 5,019,884
2013 792 1 144 4011 1,204,032 5,406,296
16
Table 3.b China
Table 3.c
Indonesia
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
2000 792 1 156 4011 12,922,683 17,358,546
2001 792 1 156 4011 4,099,791 5,881,693
2002 792 1 156 4011 12,206,083 15,997,874
2003 792 1 156 4011 29,732,709 43,081,549
2004 792 1 156 4011 26,577,311 44,696,272
2005 792 1 156 4011 6,359,125 12,037,389
2006 792 1 156 4011 1,421,003 3,022,781
2007 792 1 156 4011 1,575,206 3,905,510
2008 792 1 156 4011 3,277,619 10,144,368
2009 792 1 156 4011 1,450,880 4,067,962
2010 792 1 156 4011 2,888,949 7,324,122
2011 792 1 156 4011 9,824,633 35,270,794
2012 792 1 156 4011 10,506,190 40,595,060
2013 792 1 156 4011 13,315,630 49,235,204
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
2000 792 1 360 4011 747,749 1,753,526
2001 792 1 360 4011 158,885 346,375
2002 792 1 360 4011 794,835 1,487,390
2003 792 1 360 4011 1,376,675 2,647,540
2004 792 1 360 4011 2,276,617 4,434,481
2005 792 1 360 4011 2,140,956 4,232,305
2006 792 1 360 4011 1,712,020 4,233,329
2007 792 1 360 4011 2,468,423 6,901,160
2008 792 1 360 4011 2,714,394 8,355,479
2009 792 1 360 4011 2,728,879 8,853,936
2010 792 1 360 4011 4,090,090 14,269,482
2011 792 1 360 4011 3,127,821 13,297,033
2012 792 1 360 4011 2,409,264 12,116,952
2013 792 1 360 4011 3,882,358 17,241,934
17
Table 3.d Malaysia
Table 3.e India
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
2000 792 1 458 4011 139,064 384,688
2001 792 1 458 4011 34,161 78,548
2003 792 1 458 4011 42,182 124,650
2004 792 1 458 4011 303,874 660,705
2005 792 1 458 4011 1,008,156 2,439,135
2006 792 1 458 4011 926,944 2,272,161
2007 792 1 458 4011 833,293 2,081,305
2008 792 1 458 4011 758,697 2,090,849
2009 792 1 458 4011 151,740 558,983
2010 792 1 458 4011 388,361 1,753,587
2011 792 1 458 4011 241,833 1,323,540
2012 792 1 458 4011 397,170 2,117,963
2013 792 1 458 4011 142,204 823,907
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
2000 792 1 699 4011 269,771 343,825
2001 792 1 699 4011 667,091 853,363
2002 792 1 699 4011 636,215 853,346
2003 792 1 699 4011 428,499 764,923
2004 792 1 699 4011 1,050,107 2,147,225
2005 792 1 699 4011 2,463,976 5,965,979
2006 792 1 699 4011 3,018,836 7,503,130
2007 792 1 699 4011 4,080,425 10,490,999
2008 792 1 699 4011 2,092,742 6,702,729
2009 792 1 699 4011 1,295,245 4,089,350
2010 792 1 699 4011 1,559,519 5,436,072
2011 792 1 699 4011 3,085,729 14,098,954
2012 792 1 699 4011 3,797,750 17,198,564
2013 792 1 699 4011 4,902,144 20,820,943
18
Table 3.f Vietnam
Table 3.g Thailand
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
2000 792 1 704 4011 226,293 409,158
2001 792 1 704 4011 126,115 209,675
2002 792 1 704 4011 185,470 274,598
2003 792 1 704 4011 1,379,115 2,043,167
2004 792 1 704 4011 1,040,461 1,570,362
2005 792 1 704 4011 786,446 1,152,394
2006 792 1 704 4011 123,836 234,497
2007 792 1 704 4011 91,648 205,804
2008 792 1 704 4011 400,289 1,443,515
2009 792 1 704 4011 635,243 2,049,777
2010 792 1 704 4011 1,012,377 3,551,328
2011 792 1 704 4011 1,094,089 4,656,973
2012 792 1 704 4011 928,825 4,049,588
2013 792 1 704 4011 872,519 3,390,955
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
2000 792 1 764 4011 619,673 1,133,103
2001 792 1 764 4011 428,618 509,374
2002 792 1 764 4011 379,443 401,968
2003 792 1 764 4011 354,416 807,105
2004 792 1 764 4011 706,281 2,351,535
2005 792 1 764 4011 2,868,836 7,649,619
2006 792 1 764 4011 3,531,046 10,059,430
2007 792 1 764 4011 5,655,477 17,353,889
2008 792 1 764 4011 4,788,068 15,834,586
2009 792 1 764 4011 3,083,169 10,568,509
2010 792 1 764 4011 5,600,251 19,531,066
2011 792 1 764 4011 3,457,914 15,899,961
2012 792 1 764 4011 3,810,830 18,109,934
2013 792 1 764 4011 7,734,106 33,434,108
19
4. HS code: 7207
This sector is the only sector that shows a decrease in imports of the good in total import
figures as well as country based imports. The dramatic fall in imports as soon as measures
have been forced in 1995 is obvious. In 2008, the measures have been removed.
Table 4:
Table 4.a
Moldova
Table 4.b
Russia
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code
Netweight (kg) Value
1992 792 1 498 7207 8,525,570 1,647,095
1993 792 1 498 7207 128,877,500 25,539,293
1994 792 1 498 7207 68,884,312 13,673,639
1995 792 1 498 7207 3,972,875 816,678
1996 792 1 498 7207 11,891,511 2,613,677
1997 792 1 498 7207 2,027,062 446,403
1998 792 1 498 7207 4,214,367 844,763
1999 792 1 498 7207 2,000,000 306,099
2004 792 1 498 7207 14,881,200 5,889,500
2008 792 1 498 7207 6,052,050 5,976,023
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value
1992 792 1 643 7207 391,824,885 72,437,633
1993 792 1 643 7207 763,467,781 155,262,170
1994 792 1 643 7207 434,920,839 80,822,098
1995 792 1 643 7207 261,306,608 54,015,112
1996 792 1 643 7207 302,328,352 64,454,436
1997 792 1 643 7207 558,599,744 124,618,968
1998 792 1 643 7207 604,405,824 133,138,952
1999 792 1 643 7207 814,448,042 121,325,709
2000 792 1 643 7207 1,040,709,584 200,963,735
2001 792 1 643 7207 435,166,149 71,847,200
2002 792 1 643 7207 347,798,161 66,257,985
2003 792 1 643 7207 772,545,002 183,696,757
2004 792 1 643 7207 980,426,022 407,966,257
2005 792 1 643 7207 964,805,228 389,473,487
2006 792 1 643 7207 1,647,939,271 741,275,720
2007 792 1 643 7207 1,594,759,998 841,761,640
2008 792 1 643 7207 2,047,144,381 1,707,095,905
20
Table 4.c
Ukraine
Some of the data above do not have a hint of a decrease in imports even after the AD measures
have been imposed. Some of them decrease, while some of them implies a lag between the first
time AD measure is applied and the import has decreased. Also, these ordinary decreases could
have been caused by various economic conditions. For example, in case of conjunctional shocks,
imports tend to fall. Bown (2013) finds that Turkey’s TTB (temporary trade barriers) import
restrictions coincide with economic shocks; the increasing numbers of measures in 1994 and
2000 also are a proof of that. According to Blonigen and Prusa (2001) other possible
explanations for such a down movement of imports can be stated as:
- Effects of exchange rates on dumping measures and injury determination.
- AD activity being greater in periods of low foreign demand due to global downturn.
- Characteristics of AD duties -they are not static over time.
Year Reporter Code
Trade Flow Code
Partner Code
Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value
1992 792 1 804 7207 37,720,230 7,257,605
1993 792 1 804 7207 817,211,714 170,468,526
1994 792 1 804 7207 616,451,186 116,216,170
1995 792 1 804 7207 328,286,272 72,603,408
1996 792 1 804 7207 253,115,584 53,470,080
1997 792 1 804 7207 443,147,840 96,588,904
1998 792 1 804 7207 493,509,728 90,048,736
1999 792 1 804 7207 543,310,226 83,995,339
2000 792 1 804 7207 547,620,836 90,731,697
2001 792 1 804 7207 245,757,253 39,263,719
2002 792 1 804 7207 360,885,031 60,751,737
2003 792 1 804 7207 503,345,160 114,331,855
2004 792 1 804 7207 376,931,930 138,072,867
2005 792 1 804 7207 826,688,796 314,007,993
2006 792 1 804 7207 1,103,882,874 424,154,155
2007 792 1 804 7207 1,566,546,215 778,801,909
2008 792 1 804 7207 1,250,456,466 955,411,434
21
4. Concluding remarks
In this study, the effects of AD use on Turkey’s foreign trade is examined, focusing mostly on
Turkey’s imports of the good that she has pursued protection most. Turkey is one of the most
frequent users of AD since she has adopted AD legislation at the end of 1980s which makes one
wonder why this frequency. With wider use of AD measures, it is now of great importance to
acknowledge the determinants of industrial use of AD measures in developing countries. For
example Avşar (2014) comes up with one of the determinants to be labour force; he runs an
econometric model and finds a positive relation between the number of antidumping
investigations pursued in a sector and the employment in that certain sector. More labour implies
more possibility of existence of a labour union. And according to him the reason why in the
sectors like base metals and its articles, there are more AD investigations than other sectors also
lies in high employment and number of unions. Many economists, on the other hand, are
convinced that the larger the sector takes place in a country’s domestic economy, the more AD
measures are sought and received: “… the larger volume of imports and the larger the profit
(output) loss, the greater chance of an affirmative decision” states Blonigen and Prusa (2001)
while Bown (2006) claims that larger and more concentrated industries which also have greater
capital expenditure and face rapidly falling import prices receive greater AD protection from
imports.
Many economists also allege that stimulus for AD use lies under liberalization itself: After all the
global limitations against protectionism in order to make international trade more fair, AD
measures and some other TTBs as such are the only tools left for having somewhat an incentive
over a country’s trade which has strong connection to public welfare. That is why some
economists are concerned that not all AD attemps are meant to be: Avşar (2014) is not convinced
that the genuine reason for an antidumping initiation is always the dumping which put the
domestic industries in disadvantage. He spots cases where the recession and the poor economy of
the country lead domestic industries search for a way out. Also, Blonigen and Prusa (2001) point
out AD’s “combination of political and economic manipulability, incentives and intrigues”. That
is, they consider it very important that the agencies conducting the investigations keep
themselves transparent and independent of domestic industry or political pressure. The authors,
furthermore, find the expansion of AD protection law unnecessary. They also suspect the overall
22
gain claiming that domestic producers gain at the expense of consumers’ welfare because “an
immediate effect of an AD duty is to raise the price paid by consumers in the protected market”
while Bown (2013) suspects about the producers’ gain as well pointing out the fact that applying
TTBs to both end-consumer products and key industrial products may exacerbate domestic
companies which use these imported goods as inputs thus face an increase in production costs.
Adding that, in WTO system, use of measures causing significant trade policy uncertainty for
exporter countries is something to think about, Bown (2010) indicates.
As explicitly for Turkey, suspicious minds still work because of the “sluggishness” about
removal of the AD measure when they expired (Bown, 2013); that is 5 years after the measures
come into effect, according to WTO Antidumping Agreement, Article 11. One can imagine,
being late for removing an import protection, does not serve the existence of AD investigations
in the first place. When it comes to vulnerability of this mechanism to political pressure, Turkey
again fails to seem as a trustful user of AD. With a widening current account deficit because of
Turkey’s export not having kept up with increasing imports, particularly severe trade imbalances
sometimes result in policymakers taking drastic action to cut imports through exercise of trade
policy flexibilities, suspects Bown (2013).
However, looking at the data that has been taken into consideration in this study implies there is
nothing to worry about. It seems there is almost no significant fall in imports of the goods that
have been subject to AD measure by Turkey’s requests from import-competing firms for
protection. The total import figures continue to increase even after the measures are imposed for
woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn, bicycle and motorcycle tires and certain fabrics. Only
the total imports of steel billets have decreased apparently due to the AD measures, according to
data. If one examines the imports country by country, he can spot some decreases in imports
from one year to another with imposed duty. Those countries are China and Thailand for woven
fabrics of synthetic filament yarn, Sri Lanka, China, Malaysia, India and Vietnam for bicycle and
motorcycle tires and finally Moldova, Russia and Ukraine for steel billets which by the way
present the most noteworthy import fall. These data coincides with Bown (2013)’s study where
he finds that increases in applied tariffs in the textiles and steel industry affect Turkey’s
manufacturing only up to 9%.
23
Considering the insignificant fall in most of the sectors’ import, its dependence on the current
political and economic structure of the country and the lack of inspection on the period that the
measures are supposed to be held, one can’t help to wonder if antidumping mechanism seems to
remain having some loop holes. What it comes to is that managing AD procedures is a matter of
how much and how long. One can’t help to agree with Prusa (2005) who considers AD as more
of a problem for international trade than economically meaningful dumping, like in medication
being more dangerous than the disease, due to misuse or overuse of it. Rational use of medicine
then is at least as important as possession of the medicine, for stable condition…by all means.
24
References
Avşar,Veysel (2014) “Türkiye’nin Antidamping Soruşturmalarını Etkileyen Faktörler: Sanayi
Verileri ile Ekonometrik bir Analiz” Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi, İİBF Dergisi, Nisan
2014, 9(1), pp. 41- 54
Bienen, Derk; Ciuriak, Dan & Picarello, Timothée (2014) “Does Antidumping Address “Unfair”
Trade?”, The International Trade Journal, 28:3, pp. 195-228, DOI:
10.1080/08853908.2013.878233
Blonigen, Bruce A. & Prusa, Thomas J. (2001) “Antidumping” Working paper 8398,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8398, National Bureau of Economic Research
Bown, Chad P. (2006) “The World Trade Organisation ans Antidumping in Developing
Countries” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4014 The World Bank,
Development Research Group, Trade and Integration Team, Policy Research Working Papers.
Bown, Chad P. (2010) “Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties,
1990-2009” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-5436 The World Bank,
Development Research Group, Trade and Integration Team, Policy Research Working Papers.
Bown, Chad P. (2013) “Trade Policy Flexibilities and Turkey, Tariffs, Antidumping, Safeguards,
and WTO Dispute Settlement” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6322
The World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade and Integration Team, Policy Research
Working Papers.
Finger, J. Michael & Nogués, Julio J. (2008) “Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American
Trade Liberalization” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 The
World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade Team, Policy Research Working Papers.
Moore, Michael O. & Zanardi, Maurizio (2008) “Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade
Liberalization in Developing Countries?” IIEP-WP#1 Institute for International Economic Policy
Working Papers Series, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
Prusa, Thomas J. (2005) “Anti-Dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade”
http://manoa.hawaii.edu/ctahr/aheed/ALex/Prusa%20AnitDumping.pdf
25
comtrade.un.org
WTO Antidumping Agreement: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm
WTO Antidumping Database: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm
Data from Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy:
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=71F44472-9290-D77E-3BAB6F7C07B1E205
World Bank, Global Antidumping Database:
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:2
2574930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html)
- Working paper describing data and sources: Bown, Chad P. (2007) “Global Antidumping
Database Version 3.0”
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-
1272916036631/bown-global-ad-v3.0.pdf
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