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LeadershipDynamicsinTerroristOrganizationsinSoutheastAsiaCarlyle A. Thayer*
[Paper to the conference on The Dynamics and Structure of Terrorist Threats in South East Asia,sponsored by The Institute for Defense Analysis in cooperation with the South East Asia RegionalCenter for Counter-Terrorism and the U.S. Pacific Command Joint Interagency CoordinationGroup for Counterterrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 18-20, 2005]
Introduction:MethodologicalProblemsOne key methodological problem associated with the study of terrorist
organizations and their leaders is the lack of an agreed definition of what
constitutesterrorism.1Theinternationalcommunity,firstthroughtheLeagueof
NationsandthenthroughtheUnitedNations(U.N.)hasfailedinitsattemptsto
adopt a convention defining precisely what is meant by terrorism. Other
internationalorganizations
have
fared
no
better.
The
Organization
of
Islamic
Conference (OIC) also hasbeen unable to reach agreement on a definition of
terrorism.AttheOICextraordinarysessionheldinKualaLumpurinApril2002,
Malaysias Prime Minister Mahathir proposed that any deliberate attack on
civilians(includingthosebyPalestiniansuicidebombers)shouldbeclassifiedas
acts of terror.Delegates disagreed. In the finalOICDeclaration on Terrorism
theystatedinteralia:
WerejectanyattempttolinkIslamandMuslimstoterrorismasterrorismhasno
associationwithanyreligion,civilizationornationality;
Weunequivocally
condemn
acts
of
international
terrorism
in
all
its
forms
and
manifestations, including state terrorism, irrespective ofmotives, perpetrators
andvictimsasterrorismposesaseriousthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity
andisagraveviolationofhumanrights;
Wereiterate theprincipledpositionunder international lawand theCharterof
theUnitedNationsofthelegitimacyofresistancetoforeignaggressionandthe
struggleofpeoplesunder colonialoraliendominationand foreignoccupation
for national liberation and selfdetermination. In this context,we underline the
*C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of AdvancedInternational Studies, Johns Hopkins University, currently on leave as Professor Politics andDirector of the UNSW Defence Studies Forum, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.
1See the discussion in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press1998, 13-44.
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urgencyforan internationallyagreeddefinitionof terrorism,whichdifferentiates such
legitimatestrugglesfromactsofterrorism[emphasisadded].2
TheOIC threw thishotpotatoback into the lapof theUnitedNations.This
year, theSecretaryGeneral,KofiAnan,proposed that theU.N. adopt an anti
terrorism
convention
that
would
define
terrorism
as
any
act
that
is
intended
to
causedeathorseriousbodilyharmtociviliansornoncombatantstointimidatea
community,governmentorinternationalorganization. 3
Surprisingly, the United States government, the leader in the globalwar on
terrorism, has not adopted a single comprehensive definition of terrorism.
Terrorism is defined in theU.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 4but the State
Department,5DefenseDepartment 6andFederalBureauofInvestigation7allhave
their own separate definitions. President GeorgeW. Bush added yet another
definitionwhenhe issuedExecutiveOrder 13224 (September 23, 2001) in the
wake of 911.8One scholar has determined that various agencies of theU.S.
Governmentemploynineteenseparatedefinitionsofterrorism.9
UnderthetermsofExecutiveOrder13224,theSecretaryofState,inconsultation
withtheSecretaryoftheTreasuryandtheAttorneyGeneral,hasbeengiventhe
2Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, adopted at the Extraordinary Sessionof the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on Terrorism, April 1-3, 2002. http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_extraordinary/ declaration.htm.
3Colum Lynch, Annan Drafts Changes for U.N., The Washington Post, March 20, 2005, A20.
4US Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as: the unlawful use of force and violenceagainst persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or anysegment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).
5US Department of State defines terrorism as: premeditated, politically motivated violenceperpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usuallyintended to influence an audience.
6US Department of Defense defines terrorism as: The calculated use of violence or the threat ofviolence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in thepursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
7The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses the definition of terrorism contained in the U.S. Code
of Federal Regulations cited in note four above.8According to the Executive Order on Financing Terrorism (September 24, 2001), terrorism (i)involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and (ii)appears to be intended (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence thepolicy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a governmentby mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.
9Nicholas Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of TooMany Grails,Journal of Legislation [Notre Dame School of Law], 30, Spring 2004, 249-274.
http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_8/14/2019 Thayer Terrorist Leadership in Southeast Asia
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authoritytodesignateforeignindividualsorentitiesthatthreatenthesecurity
of theUnitedStatesasForeignTerroristOrganizations (FTO).TheUSAPatriot
Actof2001authorizedtheSecretaryofStatetodesignateterroristorganizations
forimmigrationpurposes.ThisauthorityisknownastheTerroristExclusionList
(TEL).
IntheaftermathofSeptember11th,theU.N.adoptedResolution1267thatmade
provision for theUnitedNationsMonitoringGroup tomaintainaconsolidated
listofentitiesand individuals thatwerepartoforassociatedwith theTaliban
and al Qaeda.10 The United Nations has designated only three terrorist
organizations currently operating in Southeast Asia: al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf
Group(ASG)andJemaahIslamiyah(JI).AllmembersoftheU.N.areobligated
tocomplywith this resolutionbut implementationhasbeen spotty. Indonesia,
for example, has not outlawed JI. In 2004, Indonesias new president, Sisilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, indicated his willingness to submit legislation to
ParliamentbanningJIbutonlyifproofisprovidedthattheorganizationexists.
The U.N. list is not a comprehensive database of terrorists or terrorist
organizationsfoundacrosstheglobe.11
Therearedifferencesbetween theU.N.and theU.S. listspertaining to terrorist
groups active in Southeast Asia. The United States includes al Qaeda, Abu
SayyafGroupandJemaahIslamiyahonitslistofForeignTerroristOrganizations
(December 30, 2004) aswell as theCommunist Party of the Philippines/New
PeoplesArmy.TheU.S.TerroristExclusionList (December30,2004)adds the
AlexBoncayaoBrigade,NewPeoplesArmy,andThePentagonGang.
The scholarly community is equally divided on this question.Onewriter has
identified 109 different definitions used in the academic literature.12 Scholars
specializingonSoutheastAsiahavebeenfreetopickandchoosewhichIslamic
militant groups to include in their analysis.13 In most cases little or no
10The U.N. resolution is binding on all members. The current list contains the names of 272persons associated with al Qaeda and the Taliban. Second Report of the Monitoring Group, pursuantto resolution 1363 (2001) and as extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003) on Sanctions
against al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates and associated entities, 2003.11In 2003, a U.N. monitoring committee found that 108 states failed in their responsibility toreport the names of suspected terrorists to the U.N. Betsy Pisik, 108 Nations Decline to PursueTerrorists, The Washington Times, December 2, 2003.
12Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts,Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005.
1313Defining what constitutes a militant Islamic group is problematic as well. The securityliterature that discusses terrorism and Islam in Southeast Asia employs a number of descriptors
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justification is given for their inclusion of a particular group as a terrorist
organization.ItoftenappearsthatifamilitantIslamicgroupengagesinpolitical
violence and has linkages to alQaeda it isuncritically classified as part of al
Qaedas international network. For purposes of analysis this paper defines a
terrorist organization and its leadership as those individuals and groups that
have been proscribed by the international community through the United
NationsandarecurrentlyactiveinSoutheastAsia.
Two of the three groups proscribed by the U.N. al Qaeda and JI also
constitutecorecomponentsofwhatMarcSageman14hastermedtheglobalSalafi
jihad.15 This term specifically excludes nonMuslim terrorists and Muslim
terroristsinvolvedindomesticinsurgencyandurbanwarfareagainsttheirown
governments. 16AccordingtoSageman:
The global Salafijihad is aworldwide religious revivalistmovementwith the goal of
reestablishingpastMuslimgloryinagreatIslamiststatestretchingfromMoroccotothe
Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries. It preaches salafiyyah the
restorationofauthenticIslam,andadvocatesastrategyofviolentjihad,resulting inan
explosion of terror towipe outwhat it regards as local political heresy. The global
versionof thismovementadvocates thedefeatof theWesternpowers thatprevent the
establishmentofatrueIslamiststate.
AlQaedaisthevanguardofthismovement,whichincludesmanyotherterroristgroups
that collaborate in their operations and share a large supportbase Salafi ideology
determines itsmission, sets itsgoals, and guide its tactics.What sets the globalSalafi
jihad apart from other terrorist campaigns is its violence against foreign nonMuslim
governmentsandtheirpopulationsinfurtheranceofSalafiobjectives.17
Finally,according
to
Sageman,
the
global
Salafi
jihad
is
anew
development
in
thehistoryofterrorismbecauseitcombinesfanaticism(excessiveenthusiasmin
religiousbelief)with terrorism against the far enemy (foreign governments
such as fundamentalist, deviationist, radical, militant, Islamist and extremist. Often these termsare undefined and used interchangeably. Militancy is often equated with terrorism. Quite oftentoo, analysts fail to distinguish between Islamic fundamentalism, extremist religious views andpolitical terrorism. For a discussion see: Carlyle A. Thayer, Radical Islam and Political Terrorismin Southeast Asia, in Derek da Cunha, ed., Globalisation and its Counter Forces, Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, forthcoming 2005.
14Sageman is a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer who served in Islamabad from 1987 to 1989where he worked closely with the Afghan mujahiden. He is also a forensic psychiatrist.
15Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta andBrussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2003, 1.
16Sageman excludes the ASG on the grounds that it has lapsed into criminality and has lost thesupport of al Qaeda; Understanding Terror Networks, 64.
17Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 1.
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andtheirpopulations)inpursuitoftheSalafiobjectiveofestablishinganIslamist
state.18SagemansuseofthetermSalafimaybeviewedasanunfortunatecaseof
inappropriate branding. The International Crisis Group, in a report on this
subject, concluded that most Indonesian salafis find the terrorist bombing
activitiesofJIasanathema.Further,salafismasabeliefsystemmaybemoreof
abarriertotheexpansionofjihadistactivitiesthanafacilitator.19Finally,salafi
jihadism represents a radical fringe and is not representative of the Salafi
movementmorebroadly.Accordingtoarecentstudy:
In Indonesia, most strict salafists appear to regard the terrorist movement Jemaah
Islamiyah(JI)withsuspicionandcontempt.Theyobjecttoitsclandestinenatureandits
practiceofmembersswearingoathstotheJIamir.Forpuristsalafists,allegianceshould
onlybegiventotheamirulMuslimeen(amiralMuslimeen),orcommanderofthefaithful
(i.e., leaderof theglobal Islamiccommunity),not to theheadofa smallcovertgroup.
TheyalsorejectJIsinterpretationofjihad,whichsanctionsterroristattacksandtheuseof
martyrsuicidebombers.Mostsalafileadersregardterroristsasmuharibeen(thosewho
causeharm
on
earth)
and
believe
that
the
perpetrators
of
such
acts
should
be
punished
bydeath.They furtherbelieve thatdeathby suicide ina terrorismattack isa sin that
precludesmartyrdom.Finally,salafistgroupscondemnJIsdeterminationtobringdown
theMuslimgovernmentsofIndonesiaandotherSoutheastAsiancountries,believing
thatMuslimsareforbidden torebelagainsttheirrulers,even if theyare tyrannicaland
impious. 20
WhatIsAlQaeda?Ever since the events of 911, international terrorism experts and regional
securityanalystshaveanalyzedtheactivitiesofmilitantIslamicorganizationsin
Southeast
Asia
through
what
might
be
termed
an
al
Qaeda
centric
paradigm.21
TherearethreekeymethodologicalproblemsindiscussingtheroleofalQaeda
18Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 17.
19See: Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Dont Mix, Asia Report No. 83,Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 13, 2004.
20Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia,Lowy Institute Paper 05. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005, 78.
21
For a critical evaluation of three main approaches to the study of terrorism in Southeast Asia international, regional and country studies see: Carlyle A. Thayer, Political Terrorism andMilitant Islam in Southeast Asia, in Mohd. Shafie Apdal and Carlyle A. Thayer, Security, PoliticalTerrorism and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, Trends in Southeast Asia Series 7, Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. 11-30; Carlyle A. Thayer, Political Terrorism inSoutheast Asia, Pointer: Quarterly Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, October-December 2003,29(4), 53-62; and Carlyle A. Thayer, Al Qaeda and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia, in PaulSmith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and RegionalStability. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. 79-97.
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inSoutheastAsiainthismanner.22ThefirstishowtobestcharacterizealQaeda
asanorganization.Thesecondproblemishowtoaccountforchangeovertime.
The third problem is how to assess the question of agency in al Qaedas
relationshipwithJIandothermilitantIslamicgroupsinSoutheastAsia.
Internationalterrorism
experts
and
regional
security
analysts
differ
in
their
characterization of alQaeda as an organization.ZacharyAbuzawrites that al
Qaeda is composed of a central leadership of around thirty individuals, an
internationalnetworkoftwentyfourconstituentgroups,eightyfrontcompanies
operating in fifty countries, and a membership ofbetween 5,000 and 12,000
organizedintocellsinsixtydifferentcountries.23Finally,AbuzaarguesthatAl
Qaeda was brilliant in its cooptation of other groups, those with a narrow
domesticagenda,andinbringingthemintoAlQaedasstructure.24
JaneCorbin and Peter Bergin,25 argue that alQaedawas run like abusiness
conglomerateor
multinational
corporation
under
the
directorship
of
Osama
bin
Laden. Bergin writes that al Qaeda was an analogue of the Saudi Binladen
Group,thelargeconstructioncompanyfoundedbyOsamabinLadensfather:
[Osama] Bin Laden organized alQaeda in abusinesslikemannerhe formulates the
general policies of alQaeda in consultationwith his shura council. The shuramakes
executive decisions for the group. Subordinate to that council are other committees
responsibleformilitaryaffairsandthebusinessinterestsofthegroup,aswellasafatwa
committee,whichissuesrulingsonIslamiclaw,andamediagroup.26
RohanGunaratnascharacterizationofalQaedasorganizationislesspreciseand
moreequivocal.Ontheonehand,heportraysalQaedainmuchthesameterms
asCorbin
and
Bergin.
He
notes
that
in1998alQaedawasreorganizedintofourdistinctbutinterrelatedentities.Thefirstwas
apyramidalstructuretofacilitatestrategicandtacticaldirection;thesecondwasaglobal
22This section is drawn from Carlyle A. Thayer, New Terrorism in Southeast Asia, in DamienKingsbury, ed., Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, forthcoming2005.
23Zachary Abuza, Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaedas Southeast Asian Network, ContemporarySoutheast Asia, December 2002, 24(3), 429-430. This is repeated in Zachary Abuza, Al-QaedaComes to Southeast Asia, in Paul J. Smith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia:Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2005, 40.
24Abuza, Tentacles of Terror, 431; and Abuza, Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia, 40.
25Jane Corbin, The Base: Al-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror, New York: Pocket Books,2002, 33 and Peter Bergin, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, New York:Touchstone Book, 2001, 31. They both rely on the testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese defector.
26Bergin, Holy War, Inc., 31.
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terroristnetwork;thethirdwasabaseforceforguerrillawarfareinsideAfghanistan;and
thefourthwasaloosecoalitionoftransnationalterroristandguerrillagroups.27
The first entity, the hierarchical leadership structure, consisted of an Emir
General, a consultative council (shura majlis), four operational committees
(military,
finance
and
business,
fatwa
and
Islamic
study;
and
media
and
publicity), and dispersed regional nodes. Gunaratna further notes thatbin
Ladendirectedthecoreinnergroupandthattheoperationalcommitteesensured
the smooth daytoday running of the organization. An emir and a deputy
headedeach committee.Themilitary committee, for example,was responsible
for recruiting, training, procuring, transporting and launching terrorist
operations.28AlQaedaalsoranitsowninternalsecurityserviceandanextensive
financialandbusinessempire.29
Ontheotherhand,GunaratnaassertsthatalQaedaisneitherasinglegroupnor
acoalitionofgroups: itcomprisedacorebaseorbases inAfghanistan,satellite
terroristcellsworldwide,aconglomerateofIslamistpoliticalparties,andother
largely independent terroristgroups that itdrawson foroffensiveactionsand
other responsibilities.30 This amorphous portrayal of al Qaeda permits
GunaratnatoincludevirtuallyallIslamicterroristgroupsandmilitantMuslims
intohisdefinitionofwhatconstitutesalQaeda.Thisisthemainmethodological
weaknessofthealQaedacentricparadigm.
Jason Burke presents a powerful critique of the al Qaedacentric paradigm
adopted by Bergin, Colvin, Gunaratna and other international terrorism
experts.31Burkedismisses thenotion thatalQaedawasacoherentand tight
knit organization, with tentacles everywhere, with a defined ideology and
personnel, thathademergedasearlyas the late1980s.32Burkeargues that to
accept such aview is tomisunderstand not only its truenaturebut also the
natureof Islamic radicalism thenandnow.The contingent,dynamicand local
27Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2002, 57.
28Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 58
29Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 60-69.
30Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 54.
31Jason Burke,Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, London: I. B. Tarus, 2003.
32Burke,Al-Qaeda, 12.
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elementsofwhatisabroadandilldefinedmovementrootedinhistoricaltrends
ofgreatcomplexityarelost.33
According toBurke,alQaeda,as it ispopularlyconceived,consistedof three
elements.Thistripartitedivisionisessentialtounderstandingthenatureofboth
theal
Qaeda
phenomenon
and
of
modern
Islamic
militancy.34
The
first
of
these
elements composed the alQaedahardcore,numberingaroundonehundred
activepreeminentmilitants, includingadozenclose longtermassociatesof
OsamabinLaden,manyofwhomhadswornanoathofloyaltytohim.Theinner
corewascomprisedofveteransoftheAfghanwarorveteransoftheconflictsin
BosniaorChechnya.Theyactedas trainers andadministrators inAfghanistan
andonoccasionweresentoverseastorecruit,actasemissariesor,morerarely,to
conductspecific terroristoperations.But,Burkecautions,it isamistake tosee
eventhishardcoreasmonolithicinanyway.35The9/11Reportconcluded:
The
inner
core
of
al
Qaeda
continued
to
be
a
hierarchical
top
down
group
with
defined
positions, tasks,andsalaries.Mostbutnotall in thiscoreswore fealty (orbayat) toBin
Ladin.Otheroperativeswere committed toBinLadenor tohisgoalsandwould take
assignmentsforhim,buttheydidnotswearbayatandmaintained,ortriedtomaintain,
someautonomy.AloosercircleofadherentsmightgivemoneytoalQaedaortrainitits
campsbutremainedessentiallyindependent.36
The second element comprises the scores of other militant Islamic groups
operatingaroundtheworld.But,injectinganothernoteofcaution,Burkeargues
a careful examination of the situation shows that the idea that there is an
international network of active groups answering tobinLaden iswrong.To
labelgroups
included
in
this
second
element
as
al
Qaeda
is
to
denigrate
the
particular local factors that led to theiremergence.37Burke explainswhy this
secondelementshouldnotbeincludedasconstitutingpartofalQaeda:
33Burke,Al-Qaeda, 12.
34Burke,Al-Qaeda, 13. The quotations in this paragraph are taken from pages 13-16.
35Burke,Al-Qaeda, 13.
36The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the UnitedStates, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, 67.
37Burke,Al-Qaeda, 14. In October 2004 Abu Musab Zarqawi pledged his networks allegiance tobin Landen and al Qaeda. U.S. Intelligence analysts who have studied the flow ofcommunications between bin Laden and Zarqawi have concluded both are still independentoperators rather than activists who have fully combined their efforts. See: Walter Pincus,Analysts See Bin Laden, Zarqaqi as Independent Operators, The Washington Post, March 5,2005, p. A15.
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But, though theymay seebin Laden as a heroic figure, symbolic of their collective
struggle, individuals andgroupshave their own leaders and their own agenda, often
onesthataredeeplyparochialandwhichtheywillnotsubordinatetothoseofbinLaden
orhiscloseassociates.UntilveryrecentlymanyweredeeplyantipathetictobinLaden.
AsmanyremainrivalsofbinLadenashavebecomeallies.38
Thecases
of
Indonesias
Laskar
Jihad
and
Free
Aceh
Movement
are
instructive.
Both received and held discussions with al Qaeda representatives and both
rejectedoffersofsupportinordertoretaintheiroperationalautonomy.Yetsome
regionalsecurityanalystsinvariablycharacterizeLaskarJihadasalQaedalinked
if not an alQaedaaffiliate.The FreeAcehMovement isheld suspectbecause
severalofitsmembersreportedlyhavereceivedtrainingatalQaedaaffiliated
camps in the southern Philippines runby theMoro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF).39
Burkes third elements comprising alQaeda consists of those individualswho
subscribeto
the
idea,
worldview,
ideology
of
al
Qaeda
in
other
words,
the
vast, amorphous movement of modern radical Islam, with its myriad cells,
domesticgroups, groupusculesand splinters40 Burke rejects thealQaeda
centricparadigmthatcharacterizesalQaedaasanorganizationincorporatingall
threeelements into itsorganizational structure. Inhisview, it is thehard core
alonethatcomprisesalQaeda.41AndasReevenotes,formanyyearsalQaeda
waslittlemorethananumbrellaorganizationforvariousbinLadenprojects.42
Thesecondmethodologicalproblem indiscussingalQaedas role inSoutheast
Asiaishowtoaccountforchangeovertime.Internationalandregionalterrorism
expertsadopt
an
approach
that
can
be
characterized
as
back
to
the
future.
In
otherwords,theiranalysisofalQaedasoperationsinSoutheastAsiainthelate
1980s and 1990s begins with the events of September 11, 2001 and works
backwards in an ahistorical manner. Al Qaeda is portrayed as a purposive
organization,endowedwithvirtuallyunlimitedresources,fromtheverystart.It
isasifOsamabinLadensannouncementoftheformationoftheWorldIslamic
FrontdeclaringjihadagainstJewsandCrusaderswhereever theyarefound,
38Burke,Al-Qaeda, 14.39Dana R. Dillon, Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism, Heritage Lectures, No. 860.Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, December 20, 2004, 3-4.
40Burke,Al-Qaeda, 16 and 207.
41Burke,Al-Qaeda, 207.
42Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism, Boston:Northeastern University Press, 1999, 170.
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wasmadein1988not1998.JasonBurkearguesthatalQaedaasanorganization
waslimitedintimeandspace:
Something that canbe labeled alQaedadid existbetween 1996 and 2001. Itwas
composed of a small number of experienced militants who were able to access
resourcesofascaleandwithaneasethatwashithertounknowninIslamicmilitancy,
largelyby
virtue
of
their
position
in
Afghanistan
and
the
sympathy
of
so
many
wealthy,andnotsowealthy,MuslimsacrosstheIslamicworld,thoughparticularly
intheGulf.43
Burkesviewisechoedbythe9/11Commission,whichconcluded:
In now analyzing the terrorist programs carried outbymembers of this network, it
wouldbemisleading to apply the label alQaedaoperations toooften in these early
years [199296]. Yet it would be misleading to ignore the significance of these
connections.Andinthisnetwork,BinLadensagendastoodout.44
Inotherwords,itwasonlyafterbinLadenreturnedtoAfghanistaninMay1996
thatal
Qaeda
emerged
as
an
international
jihadist
terrorist
organization
in
its
ownright.InAugust1996,alQaedashifteditsfocusfromthenearenemyand
defensivejihadtoWarAgainsttheAmericansOccupyingtheLandoftheTwo
HolyPlaces (Expel the Infidels from theArabPeninsula).According toBurke,
onceensconcedinAfghanistan,[t]heyevenhadacountrytheycouldvirtually
call theirown.Therewere thusable tooffereverythingastatecouldoffer toa
militant groupbyway of support.45 In Gunaratnas assessment, Al Qaeda
becamethefirstterroristgrouptocontrolastate.46AlQaedaplayedtheroleof
the stateby projecting its power and influence globallyby using the huge
financial resourcesandhuman capitalavailable. In sum,alQaeda facilitateda
global terrorist network through funding, services and facilities but did not
controlordirectlocalagents.47
It is important to note that militants from Southeast Asia firstjourneyed to
Pakistanin1980oratleasteightyearsbeforealQaedawasfoundedandeighteen
43Burke,Al-Qaeda, 208.
44The Foundation of the New Terrorism, The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the NationalCommission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 59.
45Burke,Al-Qaeda, 16.
46Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 62.
47Burke suggests that three models characterize al Qaedas organizational structure: a wealthyresearch university, a venture capitalist firm and a publishing house. In each of these three casesindividuals, small companies and free lancers approach the institution to seek support andfacilities for their ideas and proposals. Some are accepted and funded, others are not. Burke,Al-Qaeda, 208-209.
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yearsbeforebinLadenlaunchedhisglobaljihad.Itwasduringthisearlyperiod
that Southeast Asians forged personal links with leading figures in the
mujihaden. One particularly influential figure was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a
Pushtunwarlordandleaderofoneofthefourmajormujihadenfactions.48Itwas
underSayyafspatronagethatkeyfutureleadersoftheASGandJIweretrained
at his camp inAfghanistan. Sayyaf provided training facilities to thebulk of
SoutheastAsiasMuslimmilitantswhilebinLaden,alongwith thebulkofhis
supporters,wasinexileintheSudan(199196).
Duringhis stay in theSudanbinLadenmaintainedguesthousesand training
campsinPakistanandAfghanistan.Thesewerepartofalargernetworkusedby
diverse organizations for recruiting and training fighters. Bin Laden also
attempted to create a base for worldwide business operations and for
preparations forjihad.Alarge and complex setof intertwinedbusiness and
terrorist enterprises emerged. Increasingly, however, bin Laden began to
encounter seriousmoney problems as several of his companies ran out of
funds.BinLadenwasforcedtocutbackhisspendingandtocontrolhisoutlays
more closely. Bin Laden also wore out his welcome with the Sudanese
government,whichcanceledtheregistrationofthemainbusinessenterpriseshe
hadsetupandseizedeverything[he]hadpossessedthere.Accordingtoan
assessmentby the 9/11Commission, Bin Ladenwas in hisweakest position
since his early days in thewar against the Soviet Union.When he left for
AfghanistaninMay1996,heandhisorganizationweresignificantlyweakened,
despite his ambitions and organizational skills.49 The decision to relocate to
Afghanistanresulted
in
the
disengagement
by
many
of
his
supporters
some
of
whomwent off in their own directions. It shouldbe noted thatbin Ladens
decisiontoleavetheSudanforAfghanistanandshifthismainobjectivefromthe
nearenemytothefarenemyprovokedgravedissensionwithintheranksof
hissupporters.AccordingtoMarcSageman,binLadenreturnedtoAfghanistan
withabout150 followersand[m]anypeoplestayedbehindand left thejihad,
which they believed was taking an uncomfortable turn. The return to
Afghanistanwas theoccasion foranother largepurgingofalQaedaof its less
militantelements,whohesitated to takeon theUnitedStates,withwhom they
had
not
quarrel
and
no
legitimate
fatwa.50
48Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan.
49The quotations in this paragraph are taken from: The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 62-65.
50Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 45. The 9/11 Commission Report observed: some alQaeda members viewed Bin Ladens return to Afghanistan as occasion to go off in their own
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WhenbinLadenarrivedinAfghanistanthecountrywasembroiledinacivilwar
astheTalibaninitiateditsdrivetopower.SimonReevenotesthatbinLadenwas
apowerful figure fundingmany Islamicmilitants,buthis levelofdaytoday
control over al Qaeda must be questioned.51 Given the uncertainty of this
period, Southeast Asias militants decided in 1995 to relocate their training
campstothesouthernPhilippines.
The alQaedaSoutheastAsia relationshipmaybe viewed as having passed
through at least three distinct phases following the Afghan war against the
SovietUnion.The firstphase (199196)primarily involved theestablishmentof
networksandprovisionof trainingfacilities inAfghanistanunderAbdulRasul
Sayyaf. During this periodbin Laden was in exile in the Sudan, individual
contacts were initiated between Southeast Asian leaders and personalities
affiliatedwithalQaeda.Equipmentand trainingassistancewasprovided to
theASG,JIandtheMILF.Duringthesecondphase(19962001),theleadersofthe
MILF,ASGandtheJIrelocatedtoSoutheastAsia.Therewasanintensificationof
linksbetweenthemandthealQaedaleadership.Butitshouldbenotedthattwo
key leaders, Abdullah Sungar (the founder of JI) and Abdulrajak Janjalani
(founderoftheASG)bothdiedinthelate1990s.
Theperiodafter2001marksathirdanddistinctivephase.TheU.S.ledattackon
theTaliban regime and alQaeda camps inAfghanistan in the finalquarterof
2001, resulted in the death or capture of key al Qaeda leaders, and greatly
degraded and disrupted al Qaedas international command and control
structures.AlQaedamemberswere forced to seek refuge in remote areas of
eastern Afghanistan and in Pakistans North West Frontier. Other al Qaedamembersdispersedoverseas, includingYemen,Chechnya, Iran52andSoutheast
Asia.Since late2001 the initiative forpolitical terrorism inSoutheastAsiahas
mainlyrestedinthehandsofindigenousorganizationswithsomecollaboration
withalQaedaremnantsleftstrandedintheregion.
Thethirdmethodologicalproblemishowtoassessthequestionofagencyinal
Qaedas relationship Jemaah Islamiyah and other military Muslim groups.53
direction. Some maintained relationships with al Qaeda, but many disengaged entirely, FinalReport of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 65.
51 Reeve, The New Jackals, 192.
52Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, 82(4), 27-40.
53Gunaratnas analysis is one dimensional. JI is uncritically described as an organization that hasbeen penetrated by al Qaeda or as an al Qaeda associate group. Laskar Jundullah and theMILF are listed [a]mong the parties and groups it [al Qaeda] has established, infiltrated, and
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International terrorism experts and regional security analysts are often
ambiguouswhen theyuse the term alQaeda.Whoorwhat represented al
Qaeda in itsdealingswithSoutheastAsianmilitantgroups in these formative
years?What roledid international terrorist freelancersplay?54Andperhaps
mostimportantly,whowere theSoutheastAsian leaderswhojoined theglobal
Salafijihadtobecome terrorists?Andwhatfactorsaccountfor theirdecision to
doso?
LeadershipDynamicsMarc Sageman provides perhaps themost insightful account into leadership
dynamicsamong international terrorists inhis studyof thebiographiesof172
individualsbelonging to theglobalSalafijihad.Sagemanconsiders threemain
explanatoryapproachestothestudyofwhyindividualsjointerroristgroups:(1)
social background, (2) common psychological make up, and (3) particular
situationalfactors
at
the
time
of
recruitment.
Sageman
evaluates
the
strengths
andweaknessesofeachapproach.Hethenconstructsatheoryofsocialnetworks
to explain the dependent variable of why individuals become terrorists.
Sagemans study makes clear that the global jihad movement is historically
unique when compared with other terrorist groups and that JI differs in
significantwaysfromitsterroristcounterpartselsewhereintheworld.
Socialbackground. In termsofgeographicalorigin,of172persons inSagemans
sample, twothirds came from SaudiArabia (N = 31),Egypt (24), France (18),
Algeria(15),Morocco(14)andIndonesia(12).Ifthepatternofinteractionamong
individualterrorists
is
used
to
discriminate
among
the
sample,
four
large
clusters
emerge:
CentralStaff(alQaedaleadership),32members; CoreArabStates(SaudiArabia,Egypt,Yemen,Kuwait),66members;
influenced... The question of agency is overlooked. An authoritative study concluded: LaskarMujahidin refers not to a specific organization but to a coalition of ideologically like-mindedforces that probably included a few JI and DI [Darul Islam], Mujahidin KOMPAK, and some localgroups... See: Rohan Gunaratna, Understanding al-Qaeda and Its Network in Southeast Asia,in Smith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia, 70 and Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad inCentral Sulawesi, Asia Report No. 74, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 3,2004, 6.
54There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid SheikhMohammed, who though not necessarily formal members of someone elses organization were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to BinLaden, the blind Sheikh, or their associates, The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the NationalCommission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 59.
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MaghrebAfrica(Algeria,MoroccoandTunisiaandwellasmigrantsfromthesecountrieslivinginFrance),53members;and
SoutheastAsia(JImembersfromIndonesiaandMalaysia),21members.IndonesiansformthemajorityofthemembersoftheSoutheastAsiacluster(12of
21);other
members
include:
Malaysia
(3),
Singapore
and
the
Philippines
(2
each),
and Australia and Kuwait (1 each).Most of themembers ofJIwere former
studentsand/orstaffattwoboardingschools,PondokNgrukiinIndonesiaand
PesentrenLuqmanulHakiem inMalaysia, foundedby thegroups leaders.The
SoutheastAsiaclusterisalsothesecondoldest(formedin1993),anddeveloped
inthe1990swhentheleadersofJIwereexiledinMalaysia.JIdidnotembarkon
terrorismuntilafteritsleadersreturnedtoIndonesiain1999.
Sageman included five variables in his analysis of socialbackground factors:
socioeconomicstatus,education,faithasyouth,occupation,andfamilystatus.
Intermsofsocioeconomicstatus,theSoutheastAsiaclustermaybeclassifiedas
solidlymiddle class. TheCentral andCoreArab clusters are similar and are
skewed toward the middle and upper classes; while the Maghreb cluster is
evenlydividedbetweenlowerandmiddleclasses.
The 172 individuals comprising the global Salafijihad leadership came from
relatively welltodo families and were much better educated than the
populationatlargeinthedevelopingworld.Oversixtypercenthadatleastsome
college education. They were a bettereducated group than their parents. A
sizeable proportion had experience living abroad in theMiddle East and the
West.Theywereable tospeakseveral languages.TheCentralStaffclusterwas
the best educated. Eightyeight percent had completed a college or tertiary
educationandtwentypercenthelddoctorates.
The majority of Sagemans sample attended secular schools; only seventeen
percent had Islamic primary and secondary educational backgrounds. It is
significant to note that the Southeast Asia cluster was drawn mainly from
religious studies, while terrorists in the other clusters undertook science,
engineeringorcomputersciencecourses.OfthosewhohadanIslamiceducation,
halfwerefromIndonesia.The Indonesiannetworkstandsoutamong theother
clusters with such a high percentage of its members the product of Islamic
education.
In terms of faith as youth, thirteen of sixteen Central Staff were considered
religious as children. The Southeast Asia cluster exhibited a similarly high
patterndue to theboarding school experienceof itsmembers.TheCoreArab
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cluster also showed early religious commitment.TheMaghreb clusterwas an
exception;itsmemberswerebroughtupinasecularschoolenvironment.
Averyhighproportion(75%)ofterroristleaderscanbeclassifiedasprofessional
(medical doctors, architects, teachers or preachers) or had semiskilled
occupations(police,
military,
mechanics,
civil
service,
small
business,
students).
The remaining onequarter of the samplewas classified as unskilledworkers;
heretheMaghrebArabspredominated.
In terms of family ormarital status, seventythree percent of the samplewas
married.AlloftheCentralStaffandSoutheastAsianleadersweremarried(data
availableon37).Theseindividualswereencouragedbytheirsocialnetworksto
marry theircolleaguessistersanddaughters.These ingroupmarriages forged
closereligiousandpoliticalrelationshipsandthuscontributedtothesecurityof
thegroup.55Thismaritalprofile isunique to theglobalSalafijihad;mostother
terroristswere
unmarried.
Psychological explanations. Sageman considered and rejected a variety of
psychological explanations as factors explaining why individuals became
terrorists.56Hissamplewasrelativelysmall;sufficientinformationwasavailable
ontencasesoutof172.
Circumstancesofjoiningthejihad.Sagemanconsidersfivevariablesaspartofthis
explanatoryapproach:age,placeofrecruitment,faith,employment,andrelative
deprivation.The average agewhen aperson joined thejihad57 tobecome a
terroristwas25.69years.TheSoutheastAsianclusterhadthehighestmeanage
onjoining,
29.35
years,
followed
by
the
Central
Staff
whose
average
on
joining
was27.9years.
Seventypercentof the terrorist leadershipsamplejoined thejihad inacountry
other thanwhere theyhadgrownup.Theywereexpatriatesaway fromhome
and familyworkers,refugees,studentsand fightersagainst theSovietUnion.
The Central Staff members converted to global jihad while in the Sudan.
IndonesianmembersofJIjoinedwhilelivinginMalaysia.Withtheexceptionof
55See the discussion in Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, AsiaReport No. 63, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2003, 27-29.
56These factors included: mental illness, terrorist personality, pathological narcissism, paranoiaand authoritarian personality.
57Sageman defines join the jihad as an individuals decision (as part of a group) to gosomewhere for training Afghanistan, the Philippines, Malaysia or Indonesia.
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theSoutheastAsiansandtheSaudis,mostotherterroristleadersjoinedthejihad
intheWestFrance,GermanyortheUnitedKingdom.
Inasignificantfinding,Sagemandiscoveredthattherewasadecidedshiftinthe
degree of devotion to Islam in adulthood (greater than religious devotion as
youths)by
individuals
prior
to
their
becoming
mujahedin.
Ninety
seven
percent
of his terrorist sample adopted Salafi Islambeforejoining thejihad through
exposureatmosqueswherereligiousleadersespousedthediscourseofjihad.
Finally, Sageman considered the variable relative deprivation. Thebiographic
data indicated thatjustbeforejoining thejihad, future terrorists suffered from
social isolation, spiritual emptiness and underemployment (lack of a fulltime
job).Thesebecame a source ofgrievance and frustration. Sageman concluded
that his data supported relative deprivation as a necessarybut not sufficient
explanationofwhytheindividualsinhissampleturnedtoterrorism.
Itis
beyond
the
scope
of
this
paper
to
provide
afull
elaboration
of
Sagemans
theory of social networks as the key variable in explainingwhy individuals
decided tojoin theglobaljihad. Insummary,Sagemanargues thatjoining the
jihadwasathreeprongedprocessofsocialaffiliation(socialbonding)involving
membership in smallworld groups based on friendship, kinship58 and
discipleship. Over time members of these cliques experienced a progressive
intensificationoftheirbeliefsandfaithleadingthemtoembracetheglobalSalafi
jihadideology.Thenextstageinvolvedanencounterbythesmallgroupwitha
link to the jihad. The final stage involved intense training and voluntary
recruitmentusually
marked
by
aformal
ceremony
(swearing
an
oath
of
loyalty).
Sagemans findings reject the arguments that individuals become terrorists
becauseof topdown recruitment andbrainwashing. Inhisview, socialbonds
predatingformalrecruitmentintothejihadarethecrucialelementoftheprocess.
Groupsof friends thatspontaneouslyassemble inmosquesconstitute themain
venueforjoiningthejihad.
JemaahIslamiyahIn termsof socialnetwork theory,a terroristorganizationmaybeviewedasa
network composed of individuals in small groups (relatively isolated nodes)
linkedby hubs (well connected nodes), a very important component of this
network. According to Sageman, a few highly connected hubs dominate the
architectureoftheglobalSalafijihad.ButinthecaseofSoutheastAsiaonehub
58For example, Ali Ghufron, his three younger brothers and the nextdoor neighbor were allinvolved in the 2002 Bali bombings.
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dominatestheclustertheleadershipgrouparoundAbdullahSungkar(untilhis
deathinlate1999)andthenAbuBakarBaasyir.
Sagemansanalysisofthehistoricalformationoffourterroristclustersrepeatedly
highlights how different the Southeast Asia cluster is from the other global
clustersalong
two
dimensions.
First,
the
bonding
of
students
to
their
religious
mentors,AbdullahSungkarandAbuBakarBaasyir, isparticularlynoticeable.
Sageman findings thus underscores the importance of discipleship in JIs
organization. Second, the Southeast Asia cluster is more hierarchical in
leadership structure than the other clusters. JIs founder, Abdullah Sungkar,
intentionallycreatedJIfromabove.
AccordingtotheGeneralGuidelinesfortheJemaahIslamiyahStruggle,JIisledbyan
amir (initially Abdullah Sungkar) who appoints and controls four councils:
governingcouncil,religiouscouncil,fatwacouncil,anddisciplinarycouncil.The
governingcouncil
is
headed
by
acentral
command
that
oversees
the
leaders
of
four territorialdivisions ormantiqis.Themantiqi is subdivided intowakalah,
sariyah, katibah, kirdas, fiah and thoifah. But in practice this structure was
simplifiedtojustthreelevels:wakalah,kirdasandfiah.Thetermmantiqimaybe
literallytranslatedasregion.ButtheInternationalCrisisGrouparguesthatitis
more appropriate to viewJI as a military structure with brigades (mantiqi),
battalions(wakalah),companies(khatibah),platoons(qirdas)andsquads(fiah).59
Initsidealform,JIcomprisedfourmajordivisionsasfollows:
Mantiqi1Singapore,peninsulaMalaysiaandsouthernThailand Mantiqi2Indonesia(exceptSulawesiandKalimantan) Mantiqi3southernPhilippines,Sulawesi,Kalimantan,easternMalaysia
andBrunei
Mantiqi4AustraliaandPapuaWhenJI was first set up it was organized into two mantiqi.Mantiqi 1 had
responsibility forMalaysiaandSingaporeandwasassigned fund raisingas its
majorobjective,whileMantiqi2coveredIndonesiaandwasgiventhepromotion
ofjihadatitsprimemission.Mantiqi3wascreatedin1997duetologisticaland
59Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 11 and Indonesia Backgrounder:Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 2, note 4. For variations see: Republic of Singapore, Ministry of HomeAffairs, White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism . January 7, 2003;Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks,140; Abuza, Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia, 44-45; and Rohan Gunaratna, Understanding al-Qaeda and Its Network in Southeast Asia, inSmith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia, 70.
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communication problems with existing arrangements. Mantiqi 4 was never
establishedasaproperadministrativeorterritorialunit.TheInternationalCrisis
Group(ICG)assertsamantiqibasedinAustraliawasneveragoingconcern.60
According toSageman,itwasthecentralleadershipthatinitiated,plannedand
executed operations. In this organizational sense, JI was a fairly traditional
organizationincontrasttotherestoftheglobalSalafijihad.
TheICGand itsteamofIndonesiabasedresearchershaveproducedanumber
ofindepthdetailedreportsonJI,itsorigins,itsrelationshiptootherIndonesian
militantMuslimgroupsandJIsregionalconnections. 61Thesereportschallenge
the alQaedacentric paradigm adoptedbymany international and regional
terrorism specialists that homogenizes Southeast Asias very diverse and
complexpoliticallandscape.62
AnISGreportissuedinAugust2003concluded:
60Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia, 2.
61The most important of these reports are: Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, IndonesiaBriefing, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 10, 2001;Al-Qaeda in Southeast
Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia, Indonesia Briefing, Jakarta and Brussels:International Crisis Group, August 8, 2002; Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah IslamiyahTerrorist Network Operates, Asia Report No. 54, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group,December 11, 2002;Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, Asia ReportNo. 63, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2003; Indonesia Backgrounder:
Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report No. 74, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group,
February 3, 2004; Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, Asia ReportNo. 80, Singapore and Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 13, 2004; and Recycling Militantsin Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report No. 92, Singapore andBrussels: International Crisis Group, February 22, 2005. See also: Australian Government,Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia. Canberra: National Capital Printing, 2004. For acritique of this report see: Carlyle A. Thayer, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia,Whats Next? [Perth: Future Directions International], October 2004, 12.62Abuza, for example, states categorically that Laskar Mujahideen and Laskar Jundullah areparamilitary arms of JI and the Majelis Muhahideen Indonesia (MMI) is a JI front. LaskarMujahideen is not an organization per se but a term used to describe a collection of militantMuslim groups. It may have had a few JI members (see note 53 above). Laskar Jundullah is thesecurity force of the Committee to Prepare for the Upholding of Islamic Law. Its founder, Agus
Dwikarna, was a member of Wadah Islamiyah who left this group in a dispute over whether ornot to wage jihad in Ambon. The MMI was a broad based political coalition designed to rallysupport for oppressed Muslim communities abroad. Radicals within JI opposed its formation.See: Zachary Abuza, Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia, in Smith, ed., Terrorism and Violence inSoutheast Asia, 45-46; and Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist NetworkOperates, 3-4. For a nuanced discussion of this issue see: Robert W. Hefner, Political Islam inSoutheast Asia: Assessing the Trends, in Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report,Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2003.
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JIhaselements incommonwithalQaeda,particularly itsjihadist ideologyanda long
periodof shared experiences inAfghanistan. Its leaders reverebinLaden and seek to
emulatehim,and theyhavealmostcertainly receiveddirect financial support fromal
Qaeda.
ButJI isnotoperating simplyasanalQaeda subordinate.Virtuallyallof itsdecision
makingand
much
of
its
fund
raising
has
been
conducted
locally
and
its
focus,
for
all
the
claims about itswanting to establishaSouthEastAsian caliphate, continues tobeon
establishinganIslamicstate inIndonesiatheemphasisonjihad inIndonesiaremains
strong.63
Elsewherethesamereportofferedthisassessment:
Despitetheseclearties,JIsrelationshipwithbinLadensorganizationmaybelessoneof
subservience, as is sometimes portrayed, than of mutual advantage and reciprocal
assistance,combinedwiththerespectsuccessfulstudentshavefortheirformerteachers.
OnesourcefamiliarwithJIdescribeditsrelationshiptoalQaedaassimilartothatofan
NGOwithafundingagency.TheNGOexistsasacompletelyindependentorganization,
butsubmits
proposals
to
the
donor
and
gets
agrant
when
the
proposal
is
accepted.
The
donoronlyfundsprojectsthatare in linewith itsownprograms.Inthiscase,alQaeda
mayhelpfundspecificJIprogramsbutitneitherdirectsnorcontrolsit.64
In sum, the ICG reports and assessmentsbyWestern andAsian government
analystsestablishquiteclearly thatJI isastandaloneregionaloperation,with
itsowncamps,recruiting,financingandagendaautonomousfromalQaeda.65
Asecondmajor themedevelopedby theICG is thatseriousfissuresdeveloped
withintheJIleadershipoverdifferencesabouttheorganizationslongtermgoals
and strategy.Broadly speaking, agroup ofJImilitant radicals formed around
AbdullahSungkar.
These
comprised
his
former
students
including
Hambali,
ImamSamudraandAliGhufron.FromthetimeSuhartosNewOrdercollapsed
this group advocated violentjihad.They citedbinLadensfatwas of 1996 and
1998asauthorityforthenecessitytowagejihad inIndonesia inordertocreate
anIslamicstate.
WhenAbdullahSungkar returned to Indonesia in1999hediscovered that the
leaders of Mantiqi 2 had an entirely different agenda. They wanted more
resourcesandtimetobuildupamasssupportbasethroughreligiouseducation
and training. Leaders ofMantiqi 2 argued that therewas no clear enemy in
Indonesiaand
that
it
would
be
amistake
to
expend
limited
resources
on
63Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 1.
64Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 30.
65Raymond Bonner, Officials Fear New Attacks by Militants in Southeast Asia, The New YorkTimes, November 22, 2003.
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prematurelylaunchingajihad.ThemajorityfactionwithinJIviewedthefatwas
implementationasinappropriateforIndonesiaanddamagingtothelongerterm
strategyofbuildingamassbasethroughreligiousoutreach.66Theyarguedfora
strategy ofbuilding up a core of cadres and set a target date of 2025 for the
establishmentofanIslamicstateinIndonesia.67
SungkarsdisciplesweredissatisfiedwhenAbuBakarBaasyirbecameJIsleader
following Sungkars death in November 1999. According to an ICG report,
[t]heysawBaasyirastooweak,tooaccommodating,andtooeasilyinfluenced
byothers.68In1999,Hambaliissuedinstructionstoactivateoperationalcellsin
Malaysia.Thesecellswereordered tocommenceplanning foraseriesofhigh
profile attacks against selectedwesterndiplomaticmissions inSingapore,U.S.
militarypersonnelintransitonshortleave,U.S.warshipintheStraitofMalacca,
Changi airport and Singaporean defense facilities. JI emissaries went to
AfghanistantopresenttheirterroristprospectivetoalQaeda,butalQaedatook
noaction.HambaliwasalsoinvolvedintheChristmaschurchbombingsinlate
2000(seebelow).HambalisambitiousterroristplanscameforSingaporecameto
anabruptendwhenMalaysianandSingaporeansecurityauthoritiesconducteda
seriesofarrestsofJIsuspectsin2001and2002.
Theantagonismbetweenthemajorityandextremistminorityfurtherintensified
whenBaasyirfoundedtheMajelisMujahidinIndonesia(MMI)inAugust2000.
BaasyirbecamesoinvolvedwithMMIthatheturnedoverdaytodayrunning
ofJI to an assistant (Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan).69 JIs extremist faction
argued that the JI should continue to pursue its aims as an underground
organization. Even more importantly, JIs radicals objected to working withMuslim political parties that advocated Islamic law through elections and
parliament because they viewed this as accommodation with a nonIslamic
(Indonesian) state that would contaminate the faithful and was therefore
forbidden.70
TheeruptionofsectarianviolenceinPosoinCentralSulawesiinlate1998andin
Ambon (Maluku) in1999alsoexposed the fissures thathaddeveloped inJI. It
tooktheJIleadershipafullsixmonthstodecidetosendforcestoMaluku.The
66Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 1.
67Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 3.
68Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, Executive Summary.
69Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 3.
70Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, 4.
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conflict inAmbon revealeddifferencesbetweenMantiqi2andMantiqi3.Ata
June1999meetingofJIleaders,forexample,theheadofMantiqi2washeavily
criticizedforbeingtooslowandbureaucratic.71BythetimeZulkarnaen,head
ofmilitary operations forJI,was dispatched thereweremany othermilitant
groupsactiveon the scene.72SomemembersofJIevenjoinedoneof the local
militiagroupsbeforeJIhaddecidedonitspolicy.JIsrolewasmainlyconfined
totraining.Therewerealsoleadershipdifferenceswithineachmantiqi.
TheBalibombingsof2002createdadeepriftwithintheJIleadership.Justprior
to thebombings,Baaysiraddressed severalmeetingsofMMIJImembersand
arguedstrenuouslythatbombingsand thearmedstruggleforanIslamicstate
shouldbe put on hold for the timebeingbecause theywould have negative
repercussions for themovement.73 In otherwords,Baasyirs objectionswere
tactical. Baaysirs advice was not accepted by JIs radical extremist faction.
AlthoughtheycontinuedtoshowrespectandacknowledgehimasheadoftheJI,
theradicalsbegansearchingfornewleadersclosertotheirwayofthinking.74
JIs extremistminoritywas responsible for the suicidebombing of theJ.W.
MarriottHotelinJakartainAugust2003.
Thebreakdownofthe2001MalinoAccordandtheeruptionofviolencebetween
Christians andMuslims in Poso inOctober 2003 once again raised the issue
withinJIoverhow,where,andwhen towagejihad.75But,as the ICGscase
study of jihad in Central Sulawesi makes crystal clear, JI is not a unified
monolithic organization. The majority of members were mainly focused of
building up military capacity and creating a mass base through religious
indoctrinationtosupportwhatwouldeffectivelybeanIslamicrevolutioninthecountrywhenthetimeisripe76Theminorityfactionwasdeterminedtoattack
Western targets (thefarenemy)andwere influencedby thefatwas issuedby
binLaden.ThissplitinJIpittedtheleadersofMantiqiIagainstthoseofMantiqi
71Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 4.
72Zulkarnen heads JIs Special Operations Force, Laskar Khos, which emerged during the conflictin Poso in 2000. Members of Lasker Khos are drawn from individual cells sometimes foroperations without the knowledge of their direct superiors in the chain of command.
73Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, 4.
74Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, 4.
75Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 1.
76Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 24.
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2.77Theextremistminoritycontinuedtopursuetheirownagendawithasuicide
bombingoutsidetheAustralianEmbassyinJakartain2004.
A thirdmajor theme to emerge from ICG reports on terrorism and political
violenceisthatterrorismanalysisinIndonesiahasfocusedtoomuchonJItothe
exclusionof
smaller
groups
with
local
grievances 78
With
respect
to
the
reemergence of sectarian violence in Poso in 2003, for example, the main
instigatorswere localmembersofamilitiagroup calledMujahidinKOMPAK.
Thismilitiawasspawnedbybut independentofJI.79 Therewerealsomany
otherlocalactorsinvolvedaswell.Thisleadstotheconclusionthatjustaswith
thecaseof thealQaedacentricparadigm, it isalsoamistake toviewpolitical
violence by militant Muslim groups in Indonesia through an exclusively JI
centricframework.
JI turned to political violence in 1999 when itbecame involved in sectarian
conflictin
Poso
(Central
Sulawesi)
and
Ambon
(Maluku)
that
had
already
erupted.Theseactionsmayberegardedasdefensivejihad.JIturnedtoviolent
terrorism in 2000when it attacked the home of the Philippine ambassador in
Jakarta (August) and orchestrated a coordinated campaign involving thirty
church bombings in eleven cities in six different Indonesian provinces
(December).JI crossed over to globaljihad in 2001when it plotted to attack
westernembassiesandmilitarypersonnelinSingapore.WhenthisplotfailedJI
extremists turned tosofter targetsabarandnightclub inBali (2002), theJ.W.
MarriottHotel(2003)andtheAustralianEmbassyinJakarta(2004).
JI:ACurrentAssessmentJIs organizational development, and regional outreach to likemindedmilitant
groupsinSoutheastAsia,hasbeenseverelydisruptedinMalaysiaandSingapore
duetotheactionbysecurityauthoritiesin200102andsubsequently.Earlier,in
July2000,JIsufferedasetbackwhenitpremiertrainingcampinMindanaowas
capturedby theAFP. In Indonesia, eachof the threemajor terroristbombings
(Bali, Marriott and Australian Embassy) has resulted in a round up of key
suspects. Eachwave of arrests has generated actionable intelligence that has
resultedinfurtherarrests.
Thecumulative
impact
of
these
losses
has
impacted
on
all
levels
of
JIs
organization and leadership resulting in a severe dislocation of JIs internal
77Mantiqi 1 was initially led by Hambali . He was replaced by Mukhlas after his capture in 2003.
78Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,1.
79Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,1.
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structure.JIsmidlevelorganizationhasbeenseriouslydegraded.JIhashadto
paredownthetableoforganizationsetoutinitsguidelines.Theregionalshura
reportedly no longer functions and the mantiqi level of organization also
reportedlynolongeroperates.Bymid2003,theJIhadbeensodecimatedbythe
arrestof itsmembers that somewakalahs collapsedentirely.JI in Indonesia is
now divided into fourmain groups:Lamongan,EastJava; Semarang,Central
Java; Banten, West Java and Poso, South Sulawesi.80 The wakalah structure
continuestofunctioninPalu/Poso.
JI has never had a strong financial base. It relied heavily on public donations tosupport its operations in conflict areas such as Maluku and Sulawesi. Thedampening down of sectarian conflict has closed off this avenue for mobilizingdomestic funding. JI was also the beneficiary of external funds, including alQaeda,81 channeled from Pakistan. Al Qaedas demise after 2001, coupled withthe separate arrests of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Hambali, has resulted in
drying up of this source of funds. JIs precarious financial position is nowproving an impediment to its operations. JI, for example, is presently unable tosupport the families of all its arrested members. Some members of JI have hiredout their services to other militant groups. Other JI members have taken torobbery to raise cash. But overall there is little evidence that JI has becomeinvolved into criminal activities (narcotics trade, credit card fraud or peoplesmuggling) in an organized and sustained basis.
InAugust2003,AustralianintelligencenotedaclearsplitbetweensomeJIcells
stronglypushing fora return topoliticalagitationandpropagandaandothers
that advocate nothing less than increased militancy.82 These differences
surfacedagain
in
the
wake
of
the
suicide
bombing
outside
the
Australian
Embassy when militants inside JI criticized the planners for conducting an
operationthatresultedinmostlyIndonesiandeaths.
According to a seniormember ofAustralias counterterrorism effort, JI has
becomeabitfracturedfromwithinwithadisparatecollectionofcellsworking
at cross purposesdue to deep divisions over strategy and no clear leader. In
August2003,forexample,theheadofJIsmilitaryoperationscellinJakartawas
planning tobomb theBankCentralAsiaoffice,unaware thatanother cellwas
planning the suicide bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel. To take another
80But JI cells reportedly remain active in Maluku, East Kalimantan and the Riau islands.
81Al Qaeda funding has been marginal to JIs operations. JI reportedly received $140,000 overthree years. The Bali bombers, for example, had to rob a bank to finance their operation.
82Quoted in Martin Chulov and Patrick Walters, JI deeply divided on use of violence, TheAustralian, August 14, 2003.
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example,althoughJIisabletorecruitnewmembers;someofJIsrecruitmentis
being conducted by individuals who are deeply opposed to Hambali and
targetingofwesterners. In sum,new recruitmentdoesnotnecessarilyproduce
more foot soldiers for the radical extremistswithinJI.JI training activities are
now being conducted on a reduced scale (in Sulawesi and Mindanao); the
standardofthistrainingdoesnotmatchthatwhichwasofferedinAfghanistan
oratCampAbuBakarbeforeitwasoverrun.83
Most recent reports indicate that JIs central command and top leaders are
debatingwhetherornot toreturn tosectarianviolencebyrenewingattackson
Christiancommunities.Elements of JIs extremist faction were reportedly behindthe recent upsurge in attacks in Maluku and Poso in the belief that more violencewould attract more recruits and funding to the global jihadist cause. JI extremistshave advocated extending sectarian violence to Malaysia and Thailand. In this
respect, the speculation that Dr. AzaharibinHussinmayhavebrokenwithJIto
formhis
own
group
may
be
significant. 84
The
Azahari
clique
drew
in
recruits
from outsideJI to execute the southJakartabombing outside the Australian
Embassy.ThesuicidebomberwasamemberofDarulIslam.
In summary, JI has now become badly fractured organization in disarray.
According to formerJI regional leader,NasirAbbas,now in custody, JI is in
ruins now.Anybodywhowas aJImember is no longer claiming tobe aJI
membernow.AzahariandNoordinarethemostdangerous,buteventheydont
say they are part of JI now. There is no management, no administration
anymore.85
Finally,anetassessmentofJIwouldhavetoconcludethatJIhasbeencontained
butnoteliminated.JIhasbeen reconfigured intoa looselydefinednetworkof
independent cells,which initiate their own actions, with intermittent contact
withmembersof the central command.The streamliningofJIsorganizational
structure may have made the organization more difficult to identify and
penetrate.
JIenjoysarangeofcontacts inIndonesiasuchasLaskarJundullah inSulawesi
andMijahidinKOMPAKinJava.JIslinkswiththeMILFandASGhavenotbeen
severed; individualmembers ofJI conductjoint operations with elements of
83After JIs Camp Hudaibiyah, located within the Camp Abu Bakar complex, was overrun, the JIrelocated its training facilities to Camp Jabal Quba in the mountains.
84Shefali Rekhi, Terror in South-east Asia, The Straits Times, October 25, 2004.
85Rekhi, Terror in South-east Asia.
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thesegroups in thePhilippines.AndJI cellshave recentlybeendiscovered in
PakistanandBangladesh.
JIhasbeen able to replace its toplevel leaders fromwithin its own ranks. Its
central command structure is still intact;86 this includes the key technical
specialistsand
bomb
makers.
JIs
infrastructure
remains
in
place87
and
increasinglyJImembersrecruitedandtrainedoutsideAfghanistanareactivein
terroristoperations.
JIsexternalanddomesticoperationalenvironmentshavealteredradicallyover
thelasthalf decade.WhilethePalestineissueisfarfromsettled,forthemoment
television images aredominatedby the peaceprocess and Syrianwithdrawal
fromLebanonnotIsraelimilitaryoperationsandsuicidebombers.Theimagesof
war in Afghanistan have given way to the electoral process and national
reconstruction. Television coverage of Iraq is now dominated by carnage
committedby
terrorists
against
fellow
Muslims.
Domestically,
Indonesia
has
moved from the disintegration of theNewOrder and sectarian violence that
accompanieditsdemise,toacalmerperiodwhereregionalceasefiresareholding
byandlarge.Indonesiahaspeacefullycompletedademocraticelectoralprocess
thatrevealedlittlepopularsupportforMuslimmilitants.Thequickresponseby
theUnitedStates to the tsunami in late 2004has resulted in a rise inpopular
perceptionsfromalowoffifteenpercentattimeoftheAfghanistanwartonearly
fiftypercent today.Nonetheless, thereare traditionalhot spots in Indonesia,
especially where the Darul Islam movement was active or where sectarian
conflict has been particularly rife, that will continue to nurture the social
networksthatprovidearecruitmentbaseforterroristsforalongtimetocome.
86Including Abu Dujanah (secretary), Zulkarnaen, Azahari, Noordin Mohammad Top, and DulMatin.
87Laskar Khos remains a potent threat.
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