Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program
Sachiko McAlhany, Senior Technical Advisor, NA-23Todd Shrader, Manager, Carlsbad Field Office, DOE-EMSamuel Callahan, Director, Office of Security, AU-50
National Academies of ScienceJune 2018
M3-SR-180-0017, Rev. 0
Reviewed and determined to be UNCLASSIFIED.DC/RO: C. R. Dyer, Sr. QA SpecialistDate: 7/10/2018
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Surplus Plutonium Disposition ProgramMFFF Approach and Dilute and Dispose Approach
MOX Fuel Approach
Plutonium Oxide Feed
Spent Fuel
High Level Waste Repository
(Yucca Mountain)
MOX Fuel
Commercial Nuclear Reactors
MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
Fuel Fabrication
Dissolve and
PurifyWaste
Solidification Building
SRS Waste Management
Waste IsolationPilot Plant
Dilute and Dispose
Waste IsolationPilot Plant
Pantex:Pit Storage
Weapons Dismantled at Pantex LANL:
Pit Disassembly and Convert to Oxide
SRSNon Pit Plutonium
StorageDilute and Dispose
Approach
Liquid Waste
Options
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Proposed Surplus Plutonium DispositionMaster Summary Schedule
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56
Color
Prepare for Disposal
WBS 23.3.2.2
Surplus P tManagementWBS 23.3.2.1
LANLPANTEXMOX Fuel
Dilute & Process
WBS 23.3.2.4
Non-Pit Pu ProcessingWBS 01.78
Surplus Pu Disposition Master Summary Schedule
NNSA
Gov't Fiscal Year
Site
Program Management & Integration
WBS 23.3.1
Key and Critical
M lestones
Geological Repository
DisposalWBS 23.3.2.5
WIPPSRS
MOX FuelWBS 23.3.2.3
Sta t Repos to yD sposal of Non
P t Mate al
Deactivat on Design
7.8 MT Non-Pit Material Geolog cal Repository Disposal Operations
SRS Start 7.8 MT Repository Shipments
Non-Pit Pu Process Operations
Complete LCCE Validation
Complete New NEPA Analysis (34MT ROD)
o ect Schedu e Cont ngency
MOX Project Termination
Complete PD Emplacement Operations
Complete Characterization & Shipping Operations
Complete Dilution
Operations
Complete Surplus P t Shipment Operat ons
Schedule Margin (Management Reserve & Contingency)
Mods Complete
Start Repository Disposal of SPD Material
LANL CD-2/3A Approved
Complete Dilute Operations
Steady-State Characterization, Packaging & Shipping Operat ons
Non-Pit Oxide Production
SPD Pro ect Dilute
Mobilize Dilution Processing Steady-State Dilute and Process Operations
Mobilize Characterization & Pkging
SAVY Feed Spec Ramp up Oxide Production
LANL CD-1 Approved
Steady State Operation of Oxide Production
LANL Deactivation
Ongoing Pit Packaging & Surveillance Operations Surplus Pit Management Steady-State Shipments (on two lines) to Preparation for Disposal'
Process Equipment Installation Project
Logistical Support Center & Support Buildings Project
Develop Characterizat on & Packag ng Capability
26.2 MT Pit Material Geological Repository Disposal Operations
Deactivation
MOX Feed Spec
Sand a WIPP Impact Assessment
SE10019
SRS Complete Implementation Verification Protocol
SPD P oject Ea yF n sh CD 4 App oval)
W2020
L12380
N1460
Independent Verification Req'ts Identified N10089
N10049
L1050L14160
P1160
W PPSM1200 1210
SE10000
SKO2090
SKO1980
SKO5350-SKO8510
SKO8530
L8730
W9999
P1650
Ramp Up
S1100
P1460-P1450P1130-P1440
L8370 - L8350
L6690 - L14190
L2750
SE10419-SE10439
SKE1030-1160
SKE1160SE1800
New NEPA Analysis (34MT)N1040
Initial Dilution Shipments Start
3013 Feed Spec L12390- 3640Complete Prepare for Disposal Operations
L13010L2660 - L2740
SM1000
Establish MD2 Capability
P799
EPA / NMED PCN Approved - 34 MT
N1475
L5050
LANL CD-0 Approved
LANL CD-1 Approved
L1050
LANL CD-2/3A Approved
L14160SRS Start 26.2 MT RepositoryShipments
SE10939
Complete Pu Emplacement at the
Geological RepositoryW999
W2100
Complete Preparation for
Disposal OperationsL13010
Complete Characterizat on & ShippingOperations
SE1000
NS9999
Complete Surplus Pit Shipments To LANL
P1650
LANL CD-4 Approved
L14190
WIPPVP1190
W2020
SE1850
L2750 - L2780
SPD Project CD-4 Approved With Schedule ContingencySKE1180
P o ect Schedu e Cont ngency
SPD ProjectCD-4
Approved w/ Schedule Contingency
SPD ProjectCD-4
Approved
SKE1160 SKE1180
SKO1900
N10129
LANL AoA's Complete
N10189
P t D sassembly & Conve s on 23.3 2 2 2
Commence Deact vat on
SPD P oject CD 3AApp oved
SKE1070
SPD P oject CD-1App oved
SKE1030
SPD P oject CD-2/3App oved
SKE1120
WIPP Ventilation System Line Item Project Complete
W1000
LANL CD-0 Approved
L5050
Complete Removalof 1 MT From SC
N10219
LANL Authorized to Increase Production
L1330
Commence Deact vat on
W PP Complete IndependentVerification Mods
LANL Steady-State
SPD Throughput Increase
SPD Steady-State Throughput
Pantex Start Up Packaging Line 2
P1460
SPD ProjectCD-3A
Approved
SKE1070SPD Project
CD-1Approved
SKE1030
N1040
n t a 7.8 D ut on Sh pments Sta t
SKO2090SKE1160
L2750
Provide 34 MT Inventory Data to
CBFO N10259
CBFO - Submit PCN to EPA
N1495
EPA Approves
PCNN10249 N1475
SPD ProjectCD-2/3
Approved
SKE1120
LANL Inc ease P od. to
400kg/y
L14300
LANL Inc ease P od. to
600kg/y
L14310
LANL Inc ease P od. to
700kg/y
L14320
LANL Inc ease P od. to
1000kg/y
L14330
LANL Inc ease P od. to
1400kg/y
L14340
LANL Inc ease P od. to
1500kg/y
L14350
Pantex Plant
Surplus Pit Management
Los Alamos National Lab
Prepare for Disposal
Savannah River Site
Dilute and Process
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Geological Repository Disposal
NNSA Authorize
Shipments to SC
N1050
L14390
P1140
SKO8740
SE1093
LANL New Equipment Throughput Increase
L14240
SKO8620
P ep fo D sposal at S eady State
SKO8820
W10029
Inc easeP oduct on
to 150kg
Inc easeP oduct on
to 800kg
nc easeP oduct on to 1250kg
nc easeP oduct on to 1500kg
SKO8770 SKO8780 SKO8790 SKO8800
L8630 - L8690
Capac ty nc ease @ Packag ng L ne 2
EPA Review PCN
SKO8820
Cut Off Inputs 2024 CRA
N10279
EPA Recertificat on (CRA) N10289
Repository Upgrades, if needed (Security & Verification Protocol)
Savannah River Site – Dilute and Dispose Process
Can with Pu oxide is placed in a glovebox
Pu oxide is placed in new can along with dry inhibitor to dilute
Pu to less than 10 weight percent
Pipe cutter opens outer and inner can
Puncture device vents can prior to opening to relieve any
pressure
Can is sealed and mechanically
manipulated to further homogenize contents
Can is removed from glovebox, assayed,
packaged into approved NRC-licensed drum for
disposal at WIPP
• Dilute and Dispose involves diluting plutonium oxide with inhibitor materials, packaging it into approved containers, and disposing of the diluted plutonium as TRU waste at WIPP for permanent disposal.
• Requires installation of additional equipment to meet higher capacity requirements
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4
Characterization
Process to determine the physical, chemical and radiological contents of TRU waste containers to ensure that waste is acceptable for disposal at WIPP
Acceptable Knowledge Radiography
Non-destructive assay
Statistical headspace gas analysis
Visual confirmation of each waste to prevent disposition of prohibited items, such as aerosol cans or liquids
Determine radiological contents
Determine volatile organic compound contents
Statistical solids sampling & analysis
Performed on samples of homogeneous waste to analyze for chemical hazards
Establish vetted documentation of waste stream describing origin of waste, content, and waste parameters
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Transportation
Waste containers are loaded into protective shipping containers (such as TRUPACT-II) and shipped via dedicated commercial carrier
Shipping containers are loaded onto specially designed flatbed trailers. State personnel inspect load before departure
Drivers inspect their rigs and load every 3 hours or 150 miles. Some states require additional inspections at their ports of entry
For safety and security reasons, shipments are tracked throughout their journey using a satellite system (TRANSCOM)
WIPP-trained state and local emergency responders (~30,000) along all shipping routes, with frequent exercises
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7
Contact Handled Waste Disposal Operations
Each shipment receives security inspection, radiological survey, and documentation review
Shipping containers are unloaded and transferred to the waste handling building thru airlocks
Health physics technicians perform radiological surveys as shipping containers are unloaded
Waste is lifted from shipping containers using overhead cranes
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Waste Emplacement
Waste containers are placed on waste hoist for 2155’ descent
into underground
In underground, waste is removed from the hoist and
transported to a disposal room
Waste is emplaced in recently mined rooms. Magnesium
oxide is placed on waste stack to control solubility of
radionuclides in event of hypothetical brine intrusion
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Surplus Plutonium Waste Form
• Composition− Ferrous Metals 60 to 85 wt%− Inorganic Compounds 10 to 30 wt%− Non-Ferrous Metals 5 to 15 wt%− Plastic (packaging) 2 to 5 wt%− Cementitious Material 0 to 3 wt%
• Blend can and packaging mass for dilute and dispose− Shielded Container/Closure ~3,500 g− Adulterant ~1,350 g− PuO2 (or other fissile materials) ~170 g (i.e., 150 fissile gram equivalent) − Containers and packaging ~250 g
• Meets WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria
• Sandia prepared report identifying specific adulterant considerations to ensure waste form would not adversely impact WIPP long-term performance
• Sandia also tasked to evaluate the long-term repository performance of emplacing the surplus plutonium at WIPP if added to the waste already emplaced and projected to be emplaced at closure of WIPP
– Inventory: Generate an inventory report containing the surplus plutonium as input for Performance Assessment calculations (LANL)
– Criticality: Perform post closure criticality analysis (ORNL)– Geo-Mechanics: Simulate the deformation and crushing of CCOs as WIPP creeps
closed (SNL)– Features, Event, Processes (FEPs): Update FEPs in advance of conducting performance
assessment calculation, as needed, considering the possible addition of plutonium to the disposed inventory at closure of WIPP (SNL)
– Chemistry: Understand the quantity and chemical composition of the diluent material to be used in the Criticality Control Overpack containers (SNL)
– Performance Assessment: Integrate information listed above into performance assessment calculations to determine whether WIPP would remain compliant with EPA restrictions on cumulative releases over the 10,000-year regulatory period of interest (SNL)
• Schedule: Work suspended: Completion date TBD
• To date, no issues identified
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Repository Performance
• Prepare National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)– NEPA establishes process for decision makers to use in
considering potential environmental impacts of major actions • Utilizes existing technologies within existing operational facilities
– May require minor, routine permit modifications at the sites for Line Item construction projects during construction
• Have not identified any permit modifications required at WIPP specifically for the proposed 34 MT surplus plutonium mission
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Environmental Regulatory Requirements
• DOE O 474.4 “Safeguards and Security Program” – Defines roles and responsibilities
• DOE O 474.2 “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability”- Establishes requirements for developing, implementing, and maintaining a nuclear material and accountability program
• Termination of Safeguards– Must determine that the nuclear material has no programmatic value in
consultation with the Program Office and Office of Nuclear Material Integration
– Must meet criteria for attractiveness level E or if D or higher, approval received from departmental element after consultation with Office of Environment, Health , Safety and Security (AU) and for NNSA facilities, from Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security after consultation with AU
– For disposal of Category II or greater quantity of Special Nuclear Material, security analysis for theft or diversion of the material performed jointly by shipping and receiving site/facility
– Ensure that the level of security specified by DOE line management as a condition of termination of safeguards is implemented effectively
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Safeguards and Security - Termination of Safeguards
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Safeguards and Security – Attractiveness Levels
Excerpt from DOE O 474.4
• Documents the security strategies for protection of material, facilities involved, transportation, and equivalencies that may be required throughout the duration of the combined EM and NNSA 40 MT surplus plutonium disposition campaign
– Describes each facility and the security strategies in place today– Identifies roles and responsibilities– Aligns and adjusts with installation of new capabilities and increased
production– Security continues throughout program, including at WIPP, consistent with
operations today– Evaluates threats periodically throughout the program– Identifies processes for contingency planning – incorporates risk mitigation
strategies
• Approval by the Deputy Secretary
• Schedule for approval:– June 2018 Draft prepared however work suspended– Expect approval TBD
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Campaign Plan
• Documents the results of the Risks and Opportunities Assessment for the dilute and dispose approach
• Identifies risks and opportunities and handling strategies
– Risks primarily assessed in the following categories: Projects, Operations, Staging, Regulatory, Personnel, Transportation
• Monte Carlo simulation performed on risk impacts to determine Technical and Programmatic Risks Assessment (TPRA) risk and Schedule margin risk at 70% confidence level
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LCCE Risks and Opportunities Analysis Report
• 48 active events identified for the dilute and dispose approach (40 risks and 8 opportunities of which 1 risk was avoided)
• Categorized as either Program Risk (16 events) or Execution Risk (29 events)
• Primary Risks: – Anomalous Events - Anomalous events occurring at one or more of the
sites could interrupt operations, causing an impact to schedule and cost– Equipment Failure - higher-than-expected failure rate of infrastructure,
processing equipment, or shipping containers could interrupt operations, causing an impact to schedule and cost
– Impactful Delays: Longer-than-planned durations of activities could extend the schedule and increase cost
• Examples include: installation of equipment at LANL; execution of the line item project at SRS; ability to hire, qualify, and retain critical staffing; and extended WIPP outages
• Avoided Risk: Insufficient in-line storage at LANL– Added sufficient storage safes
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LCCE Results and Primary Risks
• Assesses technologies used in the proposed dilute and dispose approach and identifies activities to further mature technologies if necessary
• Identified 59 technologies required for program implementation
• Identified 5 critical technological elements that are necessary for successful completion of the program including pit cutter, two involving shipping packages, oxidation of Pu/HEU, dilute processing
– None involve new technologies– Limited modifications to existing technologies or expanded demonstration
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LCCE Technology Readiness Assessment and Maturation Plans
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