8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 1/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 2/62
Soviet Science and
W e ~ p o n s Acquisition
Arthur J. Alexander
Ra n d
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 3/62
Report Documentation PageForm Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing t o comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE
AUG 1982 2. REPORT TYPE
3. DATES COVERED
00-00-1982 to 00-00-1982
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Rand Corporation,1776 Main Street,PO Box 2138,Santa
Monica,CA,90407-2138
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
Same as
Report (SAR)
18. NUMBER
OF PAGES
60
19a. NAME OF
RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT
unclassified
b. ABSTRACT
unclassified
c. THIS PAGE
unclassified
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 4/62
The research described in this report was sponsored by theNational Academyof Sciences under Contract No. 88-82-52.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Alexander, Arthur J .
Soviet science and weapons acquisition.
"R-2942-NAS.""November 1982. 11
"Prepared for the National Academy of Sciences."1. Military research--Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union
Armed Forces--Weapons systems. 3. Soviet Union--ArmedForces--Procurement. I . National Academy of Science
(U.S.) II . Title.U395.S65A43 1982 355.8'2'0947 82-21471ISBN 0-8330-0458-l
The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication doc
umenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research
results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for
general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do no t neces
sarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.
Published by The Rand Corporation
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 5/62
R-2942-NAS
Soviet Science and
Weapons Acquisition
Arthur J. Alexander
August 1982
Prepared for
The National Academy of Sciences
R a n dSANTA MONICA, CA. qo40b
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 6/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 7/62
- i i i -
PREFACE
This report was sponsored by th e National Academy of Sciences to
aid i t s Panel on Scientif ic Communication and National Securi ty. The
in tent of the report is to inform the Panel 's deliberations by an
independent assessment of one facet of a complex policy issue: the
relationship between Soviet weapons development and the sc ien t i f ic
community. Rand does not purport to develop here a complete policy
framework for dealing with the issue of sc ien t i f ic information t ransfer .
Because of the time constraints imposed by the Panel 's schedule,we
have
not ha d the opportunity to perform new research, but rather have
refocused and synthesized past research to f i t the Panel 's in terests .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 8/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 9/62
- v -
SUHMARY
The pr incipal actors in Soviet science and weapons acquisi t ion
include the nine mili tary-product ion minist r ies; the Ministry of
Defense; the mil i tary and civ i l i an science sectors; and two coordinating
agencies--the powerful Hil i tary-Industr ia l Commission (VPK), and the
State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT). The "mili tary
science" sector is defined as comprising the research inst i tutes of the
mil i tary-product ion minis tr ies , and ins t i tu tes direct ly subordinated to
the Defense Ministry and the mil i tary services . The "civi l ian science"
sector consists of the USSR Academy of Sciences, i ts Siberian D ivision,
and the regional academies of sciences; the research component of the
higher educational ins t i tu t ions ; and the research establishments of the
civi l ian production minis tr ies . Soviet science organizations are marked
by the i r separat ion--by administrat ion, s tage of R&D, and sc ien t i f ic
f ield.
Soviet weapons acquisi t ion is shaped by formal procedures, the
planned economy, a powerful and demanding customer, and bureacratic
conservatism. Designers therefore face strong disincent ives to use
advanced technology or to look toward science for solut ions to design
problems. Incentives promote the a rt of design, whereby weapons
developers make as much use as possible of available components and
materials. The VPK and the Party overcome some of the impediments to
R&D ar is ing from the unresponsive economy and other sources through
the i r intervent ion and coordination.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 10/62
- v i -
The general tendency in Soviet weapons i s for relat ively simple
designs; designs that make much use of common subsystems, components,
par t s , and materials; that are evolutionary in the i r improvements; and
tha t are comparatively l imited in performance. Important exceptions to
the tendency exist , however, and weapons are becoming more complex,
cal l ing on more diverse technologies than in the past .
Where once a Soviet production ministry could be close to se l f -
suff icient with i ts own s table of ins t i tu tes and design bureaus, today
an array of ta lents is necessary tha t crosses organizat ional and
sectora l boundaries. This is true for production and test ing, as well
as for component development. Therefore, despite the conservatism of
the process, the changing character of the systems is placing greater
demands on science.
Increasingly, the pol i t ica l leadership ha s emphasized the
importance of science, and ha s promoted the use of contract research in
science establishments. Civil ian science ha s ha d increased incentives
to perform mil i tary research. Individual scient is ts also par t icipate in
mili tary affai rs as consul tants and as members of panels and
commissions. Key individuals (usual ly ins t i tu te directors) act as
science entrepreneurs and promote the ideas of scient is ts before
decisionmakers.
There has been a severalfold increase in civi l ian science support
for the mil i tary since the 1960s. I ts contribut ions mainly precede the
formal weapons acquisi t ion process. I t appears to be directed toward
developing the science and technology base and maturing the technologies
tha t will l a t e r flow into the risk-avoiding weapons R&D process.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 11/62
- v i i -
Civilian science ha s also made major contribut ions to mil i tary "big
science" programs such as high-energy lasers and, most l ike ly , high
energy-beam weapons research.
The l ines are blurring in the Soviet Union between pure and applied
research, mili tary and civi l ian science, Academy and industry. For many
years in the 1960s, and his tor ica l ly , the Academy system was t ruly
"academic," but polic ies intended to promote greater science involvement
in the affairs of the nat ion have had some effect . Scient is ts and
inst i tut ions, especial ly those at the forefront of the i r f ields, are
more l ike ly to be involved in mili tary science--through a varie ty of
mechanisms--than twenty years ago. Consequently, the l ikel ihood that
Soviet science contacts with the West will prove useful to the Soviet
mili tary ha s also increased.
I t may be advisable to impose rest r ict ions on t ransfers of
sc ien t i f ic information to a potent ia l enemy i f the information is
controllable; i f i t generates signif icant positive resource-enhancing
effects or is l ike ly to lead to par t icular ly undesirable capabi l i t ies
(from the U.S. viewpoint); i f these capabi l i t ies have important effects
on U.S. mili tary effor ts ; and i f the gains from avoiding these effects
through controls are not outweighed by th e direct and indirec t costs
tha t the controls impose on domestic science and research.
Four categories of sc ien t i f ic information i l lus t ra te key issues for
analysis: (1 ) sc ien t i f ic theory; (2 ) knowledge of ac t iv i t ies in
specif ic areas; (3 ) know-how; and (4 ) instrumentation and equipment.
The Soviet Union does much bet t e r with theory than with laboratory
hardware. The t ransfer of know-how and equipment is more amenable to
control than theory and knowledge of a f ield.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 12/62
- v i i i -
Most arguments for the control of scient i f ic information t ransfer
break down into three elements: (1) resource-enhancement effects; (2 )
effects on par t icular capabi l i t ies; and (3 ) influence on the recipient 's
world view. The primary task of the analysis of science t ransfer should
be to elucidate the degree to which and the way in which a t ransfer
could aid the military effor t of a potential enemy.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 13/62
- ix -
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The main lines of this report grew out of discussions with Robert
Perry and Thane Gustafson of Rand. An ear l ier draft benefi ted from the
detai led comments of Rand colleagues Emmett Keeler and Nancy Nimitz, and
those of David Holloway of the University of Edinburgh. The sections on
science t ies to the mili tary (Sections V-VII) were derived from Rand
research conducted with Abraham Becker.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 14/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 15/62
- xi -
CONTENTS
PREFACE ......................................................... iii
SUMMARY ........................................................ v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . ix
Section
I . INTRODUCTION ............................................ 1
I I . ORGANIZATIONS IN SOVIET WEAPONS R&D AND SCIENCE • • . . • . • . . 3Defense Industry • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Minis try of Defense • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 5
Civil ian Science • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Coordinating Agencies • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Separation of Science Performers ...................... 9
I I I . SOVIET WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS 11
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPON DESIGN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Constrained Use of T e c h n o l o g y . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . 14Growing Complexity • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
V. SCIENCE TIES TO THE SOVIET MILITARY ;.................... 17
VI. TYPES OF LINKAGES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE MILITARY . . . . . . 20
Contracts . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Science Consultants • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Science Boards, Panels, and Commissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Science Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VII. NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC SU PP O R T . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . 28Rapid Growth . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Main Contributions Occur Before Formal Weapons
Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30"Big Science" and the M i l i t a ry . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . 31
VIII. THE LOGIC OF CONTROLLinG SCIENTIFIC INFORHATION
TRANSFER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 34
The Logic of Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 34Categories of Scientific In fo rma t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 16/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 17/62
- 1 -
I . INTRODUCTION
The re la t ionship between science and the Soviet mili tary has been
intensifying over the past two decades. The forging of t igh ter and more
numerous l inks is the net resul t of opposing se ts of forces: those that
act to preserve the technological and organizat ional status quo; an d
those that encourage the adoption of new technologies and mature the
sc ien t i f ic base. An enduring se t of forces acts to l imi t change and the
use of new technology and science in the Soviet Union, including the
manner in which Soviet weapons acquisi t ion i s organized and managed; the
procedures--both formal regulat ions and customary modes of behavior-
tha t govern the process; and the motivations and constraints that shape
actions. But, act ing in the other direct ion , the evolving nature of
perceived mili tary needs, the movement of science and technology i t se l f ,
and polic ies intended to a l te r connections between science producers and
science users have generated forces fo i change. The resulting
al terat ion in the re la t ionship between science and the mili tary affec ts
the process of science information t ransfer both within the Soviet Union
and between the Soviet Union and other countries.
This report describes Soviet weapons acquisi t ion and i t s t ies to
Soviet science; i t then discusses the logic of restr ic t ing the t ransfer
of sc ien t i f ic information, which is categorized into several classes .
Our knowledge of Soviet weapons acquisi t ion and i t s t ies to the science
community is based on a great deal of past research. Although most of
tha t research has been directed toward purposes other
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 18/62
- 2 -
than the question of scient i f ic communications and national security, I
have attempted to refocus the l i terature to i l luminate th is quest ion.[!]
Before proceeding, however, we must rea l ize that not much is known
about the way in which science is transformed into useful products in
any country, and that even less is known about what affects the
transformation. When we turn to Soviet af fa i r s , especial ly those
dealing with the mili ta ry, our information is even more incomplete.
With these warnings, we ca n proceed.
[1 ] Previous studies by the author form the basis for the present
report : ~ & ~ in Soviet Aviation, The Rand Corporation, R-589-PR, 1970;
Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United Sta tes , The RandCorporation, R-1860-NA, 1976; The Process of Soviet Weapons Design, TheRand Corporation, P-6137, 1978; Modeling Soviet Defense Decisionmaking,
The Rand Corporation, P-6560, 1980; ' ~ e a p o n s Acquisition in the Soviet
Union, United States, and France," in Frank B. Horton I I I , et a l . ·
(eds. ) , Comparative Defense Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore,
1974; Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement, Adelphi Papers
147-148, International Inst i tute for Strategic Studies, London, Winter
1978-79. Other relevant studies are cited in the text .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 19/62
- 3 -
I I . ORGANIZATIONS IN SOVIET WEAPONS R&D AND SCIENCE
The pr incipal actors in Soviet science and weapons acquisi t ion
include: the producers--the nine mili tary-product ion minis tr ies ; the
buyers and users of the products--the Ministry of Defense; the mili tary
and civi l ian science sectors; and two coordinating agencies--the
powerful Mili tary-Industr ia l Commission (VPK: Voenno-promyshlennaia
kommissiia), and the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT:
Gosudarstvennyi komitet nauke i tekhnike). In th i s report, the
"mil i tary science" sector is defined as comprising the research
ins t i tu tes of the mil i tary-product ion minis tr ies , as well as ins t i tu tes
direct ly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and the mili tary
services. "Civil ian science" consists of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
i t s Siberian D ivision, and the regional academies of sciences; the
research component of the higher educational ins t i tu tes ; and the
research establishments of the civi l ian production minis tr ies .
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Each of the nine mili tary-product ion minist r ies is responsible for
the research, design, development, and production of weapons or the i r
components. (See Table 1 .) Some civi l ian production minist r ies also
contr ibute to mil i tary R&D in a minor way; and several of the mili tary
production ministries make substant ia l contr ibutions to non-defense
products, especial ly the Aviation, Shipbuilding, Radio, Electronics, and
Communications Ministr ies.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 20/62
- 4 -
Table 1
MILITARY-PRODUCTION MINISTRIES AND REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS
Ministry of Aviation Industry: Aircraf t , aerodynamic missi les
Ministry of General Machine Building: Ball is t ic missiles, space-launch
vehicles, spacecraf t
Ministry of Defense Industry: Conventional ground forces weapons,
small arms, anti tank guided missi les
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry: Naval vessels , submarines,
merchant vessels
Ministry of Medium Machine Building: Nuclear weapons
~ l i n i s t r y of Radio Industry: Computers, avionics, guidance equipment
Ministry of Electronics Industry: Integrated ci rcui t s ,
electronics components
~ l i n i s t r y of Machine Industry: Ammunition, ordnance
Ministry of Communications Equipment Industry: Radio, telephone,
te levis ion, other communications equipment
The bulk of applied mili ta ry research and development is performed
in the research inst i tutes and design bureaus of the military-production
sector. More than 90 percent of applied R&D in the Soviet Union is
performed in the industr ia l sector, including the military-production
minis t r ies . But the industr ia l sector also performs a s ignif icant share
of basic research, varying over the years roughly from 8 to 23 percent
of the national t o t a l . [ l ] However, because of the far-ranging scope of
sc ien t i f ic and industr ia l act ivi ty engaged in by defense industry, i t is
often necessary for them to go beyond the i r organizational boundaries
for sc ien t i f ic support, par t icular ly in basic research. They require
[1] Louvan E. Nolting, The Financing of Research, Development, and
Innovation in the ~ · ~ · ~ · ~ · • ~ ~ o f Performer, U.S. Department ofCommerce, Foreign Economic Reports FER-No. 9, April 1976, p. 45.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 21/62
- 5 -
some aid in weapons development i t se l f , but general ly the i r own research
ins t i tu tes adequately support the design bureaus tha t develop the
systems and the plants that produce them. The highly directed nature of
the indust r ial minis t r ies ' tasks renders them less able to conduct the
required research on new technologies or on systems based on new or
unfamil iar princip les . I t is in these areas that civi l ian science makes
i t s greates t contribut ion to the mili tary and provides f lex ib i l i ty to
the t ight ly organized system.
An important feature of Soviet industr ia l s tructure is the
organizat ional separat ion of functions and of products. Research i s
performed in research ins t i tu tes to support the i r minis t r ies ' product
l ines ; design and development takes place in design bureaus; and
production in fac tor ies . Ordinari ly, each type of organization is
administrat ively separate from the others and operates under different
procedures and incent ives. The minis tr ies , too, are highly independent
of one another; Russians often say that dealings between minist r ies are
more d i f f i cu l t than negotiat ions between host i le countries. Since the
mili tary production ministr ies operate , to a large extent , under the
same system of incentives and const raints as the centra l ly planned
civi l ian sector , several mechanisms have been adopted to ameliorate i t s
more deleter ious effects on mili tary-re la ted ef for t s . The
~ l i l i t a r y - I n d u s t r i a l Commission (discussed below) performs some of these
buffering functions.
mNISTRY OF DEFENSE
Each of the mili tary services has one or more directorates charged
with managing i t s weapon developments. To support this function, these
armament directora tes maintain research ins t i tu tes to provide technical
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 22/62
- 6 -
expert ise to the buyer and to manage contracts. Central agencies of the
Defense Ministry also have the i r own ins t i tu tes . Staffed with capable
civi l ian and mil i tary personnel, these ins t i tu tes often ac t as the link
between the mil i tary requirement and the weapon developer. They
maintain close contacts with the indust r ial ins t i tu tes and design
bureaus, keeping aware of technical advances and poss ib i l i t i es as they
develop. These mil i tary inst i tutes may perform preliminary design
studies and engage in research on special mili tary needs, such as
re l iab i l i ty or maintainabil i ty problems, but they do not appear to do
deta i l design work or basic research.
CIVILIAN SCIENCE
The premier establishments for fundamental research are the 200
research ins t i tu tes associated with the USSR Academy of Sciences. The
Siberian Division (a mini-academy of 50 inst i tutes that i s largely
independent of the Soviet Academy) is strongly oriented toward
cooperation with industry in the t ransfer of science and technology from
laboratory to applicat ion. The regional academies, especial ly the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (with i t s pi lo t production fac i l i t ies and
jo in t industr ia l laborator ies) , also tend to be bet ter organized for
industr ia l support and to pa y greater at tent ion to the applicat ion of
research than the main division of the USSR Academy.
The univers i t ies and other ins t i tu tes of higher education (VUZy)
comprise the second par t of what is defined here as civi l ian science.
Research performed in this sector appears to be less coordinated and
more fragmented than that performed in the academy system. One reason
is that the great bulk of VUZy research is financed by contracts rather
than by the State budget, leading to a diverse se t of relat ionships and
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 23/62
- 7 -
patterns of sc ien t i f ic involvement with an array of cl i en t s . Many of
the researchers in the higher education sector par t icipate on a par t -
time basis . Much of this research i s concentrated in a few eminent
univers i t ies and polytechnical ins t i tu tes , with the r es t scattered in
small projects across the universe of educational ins t i tu tes . Since the
la te 1950s, the Soviet leadership has taken several s teps to bring the
VUZy closer to both t h ~ A c a d e m y ins t i tu tes and to industr ia l R&D,
par t icular ly through the incentives of contract research.
The research establishments of the civi l ian production ministr ies
comprise the thi rd component of civi l ian science. Organized in similar
fashion to the mili ta ry production sec tor , these inst i tutes par t icipate
in mili ta ry R&D to the extent that the i r ministr ies contr ibute to
military systems.
COORDINATING AGENCIES
The Council of Ministers has created several specia l i s t commissions
concerned with important sectors of the economy. The most powerful of
these i s the VPK, with representat ion from the military-production
minis t r ies , the Ministry of Defense, the State Planning Commission
(Gosplan), and probably the Central Committee Secre tar ia t .
As monitor and coordinator of mili ta ry R&D and production
throughout the economy, the VPK reviews proposals for new weapons with
respect to the i r technical feas ib i l i ty and production requirements.
Draft decrees submitted by lead design organizations specify
par t ic ipants , tasks, f inancing, and t imetables for a projec t . When
approved, the draf t becomes a "VPK decision," which is legally binding
on a l l par t ies concerned.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 24/62
- 8 -
The VPK is instrumental in planning and supervising major
technological programs with mili tary uses, such as the development of
integrated electronic c i rcu i t design and production. I t also appears to
be involved in the planning and coordination of mili tary-re la ted
ac t iv i t ies in the Academy of Sciences.
Despite the overal l involvement of the VPK in most aspects of
weapons acquisi t ion, i t is primari ly an implementing organization ra ther
than on e tha t or iginates policy. I t is the job of the VPK to police
mili tary pr ior i t ies throughout the economy and to see tha t decisions are
actual ly car r ied out . Nevertheless, because the VPK originates
information, sponsors technical analyses, screens recommendations,
approves them, and monitors r esu l t s , i t has a more than marginal
influence on science, technology, and weapons.
The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), another
agency of the Council of Ministers , was establ ished in 1965 (a s a
successor to a ser ies of ear l ie r agencies) to plan, oversee, and
regulate sc ien t i f ic research and development, and to recommend the
introduct ion of technological innovations throughout the economy.
Evidence on the importance of the GKNT in mil i tary affai rs is mixed; i t
has formal authori ty over a l l sc ien t i f ic organizations "regardless of
ju r i sd ic t ion ," but (according to one expert) probably not over the
defense sector . [2]
The Committee ha s no direc t authori ty over the ministr ies or the
Academy of Sciences system; i t attempts to shape events largely through
[2] Louvan E. Nolting, The Structure and Functions of the USSR
State Committee for Science and Technology, Foreign Economic Report, No.16 , U.S. Department of Commerce, 1976, p. 2.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 25/62
- 9 -
moral suasion (working through a network of subcommittees and sc ien t i f ic
councils) or through leverage applied through i t s influence over foreign
contracts , technology, and cooperation. Indeed, the GKNT departments
dealing with foreign ac t iv i t ies , such as those just mentioned, were said
to be larger and more inf luent ial than i t s other departments.[3]
The GKNT may have some effect on mili tary science through i t s
formulation of the "basic sc ien t i f ic and technical problems" of the
country and i t s working out of some 200 programs to deal with these
problems; th i s is the section of the science and technology plan on
which the GKNT concentrates. In par t icular , for the so-called "inter -
branch problems," the GKNT controls an important share of the f inancing
and t r ies to se t t le disputes among part ic ipat ing organizat ions. [4]
Although we have no evidence on this point , i t seems l ike ly that the
mili tary would want to par t icipate in the ident i f icat ion and inclusion
of such problems in the science plan so as to bet ter influence the
course of the nat ion ' s sc ien t i f ic effor t .
SEPARATION OF SCIENCE PERFORHERS
The inst i tut ional and individual performers of science in the
Soviet Union are marked by the i r separat ion--by administrat ive
subordination, stage of R&D, and sc ien t i f ic f ield. As a project
progresses along the successive phases of R&D, i t is relayed from on e
inst i tut ion under one system of authori ty to another inst i tut ion in
another organizat ional s tructure . Thus, a new technology may begin in a
[ 3] ~ t o r r is Bornstein e t a l . , The Planning and Management of
Industr ia l Research and Development in th e ~ - ~ - ~ . g . , Science Policy
Working Group, Joint US-USSR Science and Technology Exchange Program,
SRI International, June 1980, p. 47 .
[4] Paul M. Cocks, Science Policy: USA/USSR: Vol. I I , Science
Policy in the USSR, National Science Foundation, 1980, p. 40 .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 26/62
- 10 -
research ins t i tu te of the Academy of Sciences, t ransfer to a research
ins t i tu te of an industr ia l ministry, enter in to detai led design and
development in a design bureau of the ministry, and f ina l ly be produced
in one or more ministry fac tor ies .
In a complex project , since each of these organizations tends to
special ize according to sc ien t i f ic f ield or class of products, several
ins t i tu tes , minis tr ies , and VUZy could become involved; management and
oversight would be the responsibi l i ty of a research ins t i tu te or other
agency in an armaments directora te of the mil i tary service customer.
The VPK, through i t s project decrees and supra-minister ial s ta tus ,
exercises a necessary coordination over this organization-hopping
act iv i ty .
Despite organizat ional separat ion and f ie ld specia l iza t ion , ~ h e r e is considerable functional overlap among the various R&D performers;
that i s , some Academy ins t i tu tes may develop and produce products,
whereas a number of ministry inst i tutes are leaders in basic research.
Moreover, this overlap is growing as several pol ic ies (discussed below)
act to break down the barr iers or iginat ing in organizat ional separat ion
and make the inst i tut ions on each side of the boundaries more alike.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 27/62
- 11 -
I I I . SOVIET WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS
Soviet weapons acquisi t ion is highly constrained in a number of
ways. One of i t s sa l i en t character is t ics is the control and
minimization of r i sk. An important technique used to control r isk is
the formal process out l in ing the steps to be taken in any development
project . [ 1]
These procedures establ ish standardized project steps from the
statement of requirements to del ivery of the product. (This sequence
wil l be referred to here as the "formal" acquisi t ion process.) Each
project , therefore , progresses according to a s t ipula ted sequence tha t
specifies the tasks to be carr ied out in each phase, the review
procedures by the user , and acceptance rout ines. With each succeeding
s tep , the technical poss ib i l i t i es become less uncertain, less research-
oriented, and more narrow and applied. Science input, therefore, i f i t
is to occur a t a l l in the formal process, is most l ike ly to enter at the
very early stages.
The general in f lex ib i l i ty of the centrally planned economy is an
addit ional const raint on weapons R&D. Because of unrel iabi l i ty of
supply and inabi l i ty to rely on contracts or plans to guarantee
del iver ies , designers are reluctant to ask for new products from
suppliers they have not dealt with in the past . They face strong
incentives to use off - the-shel f components tha t can be counted on to
perform to acceptable (though perhaps not optimal) standards.
[1] These steps have been standardized throughout civi l ian and
military industry and are known as the "Unified System of Design
Documentation" (YeSKD).
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 28/62
- 12 -
Over the past f if ty years, s ince the present economic system was
put into place by Stal in , mil i tary R&D managers have taken many steps to
cope with the system. Design handbooks closely control the choice of
technologies, components, and manufacturing techniques. Standards
organizations at the national level , in the mil i tary-product ion
minis tr ies , and in plants and design bureaus ensure tha t standardized
par ts and techniques a r ~ used to the greatest possible extent . But
perhaps most important in the Soviet environment, the buyer ( i . e . , the
Ministry of Defense) ha s rea l authori ty over the product. The mil i tary
can demand tha t an agreed-upon product be delivered as promised.
Although vigorous negotiat ions may precede a design bureau's acceptance
of a project , the responsible organization i s expected to del iver , once
the project is defined and accepted.
For a l l of these reasons, especial ly the l as t , designers are
re luctant to venture into new realms. They face powerful disincent ives
to use advanced technology or to look toward science for solut ions to
the i r problems. Given these const raints , the a rt of design i s promoted
where the designer works with avai lable materials--often creat ively ,
sometimes with genius.
The number of conservative forces acting on the system, together
with the necessi ty of coordinating complex development projects across
many organizat ional boundaries--mil i tary, c iv i l , minis ter ia l , Academy-
would normally hinder mili tary R&D, as i t hinders the civi l ian sector .
However, the Communist Party and the government have given mili tary R&D
the highest prior i ty over materials, manpower, and production capacity.
These pr ior i t ies are enforced by the VPK, which also coordinates
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 29/62
- 13 -
ac t iv i t i es that cross organizat ional l ines . The VPK and Party can
intervene to ease bott lenecks or loosen bureaucrat ic snags. But they
are s t i l l acting within the Russian system. With the increasing
complexity of modern weapon systems tha t incorporate a broader range of
technologies and inputs than in the past , the military i s l ike ly to
become increasingly dependent on the res t of the economy and could find
i t more di f f i cu l t in the future to avoid the consequences of the
civi l ian sector 's patterns of behavior.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 30/62
- 14 -
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPON DESIGN
CONSTRAINED USE OF TECHNOLOGY
Given the bounds on technical exuberance imposed by the process
described above, i t should not be surprising tha t the general tendency
in Soviet weapons is for relat ively simple designs that make much use of
common subsystems, components, par ts , and materials; that are
evolutionary in their improvements; and that are comparatively l imited
in performance. Of course, exceptions to this pat te rn exist . The
evidence is best viewed as a s t a t i s t i ca l dist r ibut ion, especial ly
revealing when compared with another country 's experience. The bulk of
the evidence suggests that the central tendencies in the dist r ibut ion of
character i s t ics of Soviet and U.S. weapons are dist inct ly separate,
although there is considerable overlap between them.
One concrete example i l lus t ra tes the general tendencies described
above. The Soviet SA-6 surface-to-ai r missi le was analyzed by U.S.
defense industry specia l i s t s , who took note of i ts sol id- fuel , integra l
rocket/ramjet engine. The design, considered "unbelievably simple but
effect ive," permitted such simplif icat ions as the elimination of a fuel
control system, sensors , and pumps to control fuel flow.[l] However,
because the system cannot be modulated for maximum performance as a
function of speed and al t i tude, i t suffers performance degradation off
i t s design point when i t loses oxidative eff iciency. The analysts also
found that the SA-6 employed ident ica l components to those found in
several other Soviet surface-to-ai r and a ir - to -a i r missi les whose
deployment dates spanned more than a 10-year period.
[1 ] "U.S. finds SA-6 to be Simple, Effective," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, December 5, 1973, p. 22 .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 31/62
- 15 -
An exception to this pattern--an outl ier in the dist r ibut ion--
is the T-64 tank. For 35 years, Soviet tank deployment was the epitome
of the standard design pat tern . But in the la te 1960s, the T-64
appeared with almost a l l subsystems of new design, and some with
advanced performance and technology. The tank carried a new engine and
transmission, new suspension, a completely new and modern f i re-contro l
system, advanced armor, and a larger gun scaled up from i t s predecessor,
the T-62; for the f i r s t time, a deployed tank ha d an automatic loader,
which reduced crew s ize from 4 to 3, and permitted the T-64 to be even
smaller than the compact T-62.
GROWING COHPLEXITY
The T-64 example i l lus t ra tes an important point . Although strong
conservative forces act on the design process, there is some movement.
Science and technology advance, as do military requirements. Weapons
performance is constant ly enhanced; missions grow more complex,
dif f icu l t , and numerous. Some T-64 tanks carry a laser range f inder ,
dig i ta l f i re-contro l computer, electro-opt ica l tracking system with
image processors, and armor arrays of several materials.
Not only do weapon systems perform more things, but each thing also
cal ls on more technology and science than in the past. A gun barre l
f ir ing a project i le at 6,000 f t /sec instead of 3000 f t / sec requires more
advanced metallurgical understanding, materials, and production,
measurement, and t e s t techniques than the older guns. Today's tanks
cal l for a greater diversi ty and a broader source of scient i f ic and
technical expert ise in the i r subsystem technologies, materials, and
components. And tanks are among th e more mature and technically stable
systems in modern armories.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 32/62
- 16 -
Where once a Soviet production ministry could be close to se l f -
suff icient with i ts own s table of inst i tutes and design bureaus, today
an array of ta lents is necessary that crosses organizat ional and
sectoral boundaries. This is true for production and tes t ing, as well
as for component development. Therefore, despite the conservatism of
the process, the changing character of the systems is placing greater
demands on science.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 33/62
- 17 -
V. SCIENCE TIES TO THE SOVIET MILITARY
Increasingly complex systems are only one of the forces bringing
science and the Soviet mili tary closer together . The mili tary
leadership now is more experienced in technical and scient i f ic af fa i r s
than in the past , when operational experience rather than technical
expertise was the key to the top posts . The careers of the present
Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff , and several deputy
defense ministers have included s t in t s as weapon developers and
scient i f ic managers of advanced technology programs. Brezhnev himself
spent several years as a Party Secretary with responsibi l i ty for
coordination of mili tary industry and especially ICBM development.
Former Defense Minister Marshal Grechko wrote expl ic i t ly of the need for
a "unified mili tary-technical policy"; one of the object ives of such a
policy, he said, was to direct R&D, including fundamental research, to
problems of mili tary interes t . [ ! ]
The pol i t ical leadership has sta ted a bel ief in the importance of
science to national economic growth and productivity. In recent
Five-Year Plans, Brezhnev has proclaimed a sh i f t in emphasis from the
Stal inis t focus on quanti tat ive goals to quality and efficiency--a sh i f t
that he figures could take a t leas t a generation to accomplish. Though
such proclamations are often only rhetoric , several concrete policies
have been adopted that are intended to bring science closer to
application.
[1] Vooruzhennye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva, 2d ed., 1975, pp .
193-195.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 34/62
- 18 -
One of the more important of these pol ic ies has been the emphasis,
since the late 1960s, on contract research on a cost-accounting
(khozraschet) basis between science performers and cl i en t s . This has
been par t of a broader development in which new t ies are being formed
between civi l ian science and industry; the Academies of Sciences see
themselves now as having an important role to play in innovation.
Because of off icial ly promoted contracting policy, combined with stable
or reduced financing of science enterprises from the State budget,
research ins t i tu tes have actively sought potent ia l customers. The
mili ta ry, with i t s seemingly l imit less budgets, has become a choice
ta rget .
Civil ian science contract work for the defense sector could be a
s ignif icant proportion of a l l (defense and civi l ian) contract research.
In 1975, about 12 percent of the to ta l work of the USSR Academy of
Sciences was financed by contracts; for the Siberian Division and the
Ukrainian Academy, contract research was a considerably larger
proportion of the to ta l a t roughly 20 percent and 38 percent,
respectively. [2 ] Individual academic ins t i tu tes report up to 80 percent
contract financing. From 1962 to 1975, contract funding in the
Ukrainian Academy increased a t a ra te of 18.5 percent per year, whereas
non-contract funding from a l l other sources grew a t less than half tha t
ra te . [3] In higher education ins t i tu tes , contract research accounts for
more than 80 percent of a l l R&D, although these inst i tut ions are
[2] Cocks, op, c i t . , pp . 99-100.
[3] Thane Gustafson, Sell ing the Russians the Rope? Soviet
Technology Policy a n d ~ · ~ · Export Controls, The Rand Corporation,
R-2649-ARPA, 1981, pp. 61, 65 .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 35/62
- 19 -
responsible for only a small share (about 5 to 6 percent) of the
national R&D effort . Although information is scarce on mili tary R&D in
the VUZy, i t should be noted that an increasingly important role is
being played by production ministry laboratories created within the
educational inst i tutes , at the expense of the cl ient ministry.[4]
The Inst i tute of Nuclear Physics a t Moscow State University is an
interest ing example of the growth of contract research. According to a
former staff member, the Inst i tute is formally attached to and managed
by the Physics Department, which supports some 500 faculty from the
State budget. The self-supporting inst i tute , however, employs more than
3000 people, who are engaged in a wide variety of defense, industrial ,
and sc ient i f ic tasks. [5]
[4] Julian Cooper, Innovation for Innovation in Soviet Industry,
Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham,England, 1979, p. 36 .
[5] Lawrence 1. Whetten, Management of Soviet Scient i f ic Research
and Technological Development--Some Military Aspects, School of
International Relat ions, Graduate Program in Germany, University ofSouthern California, 1979, p. 46 .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 36/62
- 20 -
VI. TYPES OF LINKAGES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE MILITARY
CONTRACTS
Scient is ts par t ic ipate in mili tary a f fa i r s through a var ie ty of
mechanisms. Contracting is one of the most important. Not only did the
direct ives encouraging contract research legi t imize the ac t iv i t ies of
those research managers and ins t i tu te directors with a desire to do more
applied work, but i t also provided the incent ives to do so for the
scient i f ic entrepreneur as well as for the ordinary sc ien t i s t who was
simply responding to opportuni t ies.
The chief incent ive ha s been the provision of laboratory
fac i l i t i es , instrumentation, expensive equipment, experimental designs
and models, and capi ta l construct ion tha t flows from contract research
general ly, and from mili tary research in par t icular . With the
pr ior i t ies of mili tary sponsorship, a laboratory ca n obtain scarce
materials and supplies, and develop new areas of research.
Because of these benef i ts , grantsmanship ha s become a rewarded
ta lent ; one technique involves the writ ing of proposals and ins t i tu te
plans to f i t key phrases in Party programs; another, described to the
author, requires frequent vis i t s of researchers to government agencies
in Moscow to keep abreast of plans and new developments. Some of this
research, then, is not very different from what i t would have been under
other funding arrangements, whereas in other cases, responsiveness to
potent ia l contractors ha s helped to redirec t ins t i tu te interes ts to f i t
the needs of c l i ent s . I t is not possible, though, to estimate the
re la t ive proportions in the two different categories.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 37/62
- 21 -
Not a l l of the incentives to do mili tary contract research are
posi t ive . On a personal level, several disadvantages accrue to mil i tary
research, especial ly i f i t is class i f i ed , and most especial ly i f i t
takes place in closed, secret laboratories. Apart from the r igidi ty of
security controls, the most frequent ly mentioned disadvantages are the
const raints on foreign t ravel and on open publication of research
findings. Foreign t ravel , always problematic for Soviet sc ien t i s t s , i s
made almost impossible by close t ies to mili tary research. This policy
was underlined by a designer from the Yakovlev a i rc raf t design bureau
who remarked to the author at the Paris Air Show that only people
working on civi l ian projects could t ravel to Paris; the mili tary side of
the design bureau was t rea ted almost l ike a separate organizat ion, and
no on e from i t was allowed to t ravel .
Control over publication is not quite so s t r i c t as control over
t ravel , but i t is s t i l l dif f icu l t to c lear for publication a paper that
originated in military-sponsored research. Sometimes a sc ien t i s t ca n
disguise the source of the research funding, or perhaps submit his
papers to a journal unfamiliar with the technical publishing rules in
his special ized f ie ld ; but in general , mili tary secrecy imposes a major
bar r i e r to publication, and hence affects the reputat ion and career of a
sc ien t i s t . Some Soviet scient is ts suggest , in fac t , tha t i t is easier
to hide infer ior work and less capable people under a military umbrella
because the research is less l ike ly to come under c r i t i c a l scrutiny.
The bet t e r scient is ts therefore find a lower qual i ty of work among their
colleagues in military research, and are consequently deterred from
par t icipat ing in such work. I f f i r s t - ra te scient is ts are put off by the
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 38/62
- 22 -
quality and environment of mili ta ry research, second-raters perhaps find
this a useful channel for career advancement. Although the lower
quality of mili tary sc ient i s t s has not been universal ly accepted or
described by a l l sources, the evidence contains enough instances to
indicate tha t i t is a serious issue tha t cannot be disregarded.
Another disincentive to working on military research i s tha t cost
and schedule overruns, which are tolera ted on civi l ian projec ts , are
considered serious infract ions in some high-pr ior i ty mil i ta ry contracts.
Although the mili ta ry cl i en t might accept fuzzy excuses for fai lure to
reach objectives in basic research, his insistence on contract
provisions increases as the work moves closer to production.[!]
The posit ive incentives to perform military research act primarily
on the ins t i tu t ion , whereas the negative incentives are fe l t mainly by
the individual; for tha t reason, tension between the two often occurs.
Civil ian laboratories and individual sc ient i s t s may be expected to do
military work occasionally in order to build up the i r equipment and
f ac i l i t i e s , which they ca n then use to advantage in the i r main l ine of
civi l ian research. Refusal to do military research could possibly
hinder one's career poss ib i l i t i es .
In summary, the pol i t ica l leadership 's goal of bringing science
closer to applicat ion, and subsequent pol ic ies emphasizing contract
research, have s ignif icant ly strengthened the civi l ian science sector ' s
t i es to applicat ion in both the mili ta ry and c iv i l spheres. Indeed,
several prominent proponents of the policy are now viewing the resul ts
with alarm, fearing tha t the moves may have gone too far . Concern about
such tendencies has been expressed by many science leaders . The la te
[1 ] Whetten, op. c i t . , p. 53.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 39/62
- 23 -
M. Keldysh, then President of the Academy of Sciences and a famous
leader of applied mili ta ry research in the aviat ion industry, declared
in 1976 that an excessive orienta t ion to production and involvement in
the innovation process could impair the country 's fundamental research
potent ia l . He observed tha t "an obvious tendency has emerged by Academy
ins t i tu tes not to cooperate with industry, but themselves to take the
matter to i t s conclusion. In my view, this tendency is very
dangerous".[2] Even B. Ye. Paton, President of the Ukrainian Academy and
a vigorous proponent of science-industry cooperation, thought tha t an
"inordinate enthusiasm" for short- term problems would act to the
detriment of fundamental research.[3)
Although individual scient is ts often see disadvantages in mil i ta ry-
sponsored research, strong enough posi t ive incentives today make i t
dif f icu l t to escape from performing such work. S t i l l , some tension wil l
continue to exist an d could be a problem in specific cases, although i t
does not seem to be a major hindrance to government policy.
SCIENCE CONSULTANTS
Consulting by civi l ian scient is ts is a frequent, but small-scale,
phenomenon. I t seems to be largely a personal matter involving the
nonins t i tut ional ef for t of a sc ien t i f ic expert . The act ivi ty does not
seem much different from U.S. prac t ices .
Academy personnel are sometimes included on technical committees
convened by a mili ta ry- industry ministry to consider the preliminary
[2] Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR, 1976, No. 9, p. 41 ; J . Cooper, op.
c i t . , p. 37.
[3) Nauka i zhizn, 1977, No. 4, p. 19 ; quoted in Cooper, op . c i t . ,
p. 35 .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 40/62
- 24 -
requirement for a new system. Such committees review the feasibi l i ty of
the requirement and may suggest research prior to fur ther decisions in
order to address technical problems and uncer ta int ies .
I t is not always necessary for a civi l ian sc ien t i s t to have
security clearances to consult on mili ta ry projec ts . The problem can
often be described in a compartmentalized manner without a contextual
framework. In some cases, resul ts are simply delivered to a postbox
number so that even the ins t i tu t ional af f i l ia t ion of the sponsor is
hidden. In fac t , i t i s through such signs tha t sc ient i s t s often
recognize a military connection to sponsored work.
Because of the absence of specif ic projec t , fac i l i ty , or cl i en t
ident i f icat ion in some of this work, i t i s often d i f f i cu l t for both
par t ic ipants and outside analysts to be clear about ult imate uses and
users. I t is perhaps for this reason that many Soviet sc ient i s t s refer
in a vague fashion to mil i ta ry research carr ied on in the civi l ian
sec tor , without being able to del ineate more clearly jus t what the work
is about or who the ult imate cl i en t might be.
SCIENCE BOARDS, PANELS, AND cmmiSSIONS
Commissions, panels , and other formally established boards are
another means for bringing science information to bear on important
questions. The issue of planning and directing science centra l ly has
been approached through the formation of scores of problem councils and
consultat ive bodies. The problems inherent in direc t ing science were
acknowledged by General Secretary Brezhnev in his address to the Academy
of Sciences on i t s 250th birthday. "We have no intention of dic ta t ing
to you the detai l s of research topics- - that is a matter for the
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 41/62
- 25 -
scient is ts themselves. But the basic directions of the development of
science, the main tasks that l i f e poses, wil l be determined joint ly."[4]
Some of the tasks of the various consultat ive groups include the
se lec t ion of basic science direc t ions . Such councils exist in the
academy system, in the indust r ial minist r ies , an d in joint groups tha t
bring together individuals from different organizations. Assessing the
importance of these groups, though, is dif f icu l t . The sc ien t i f ic
problem councils of the Academy are consultat ive and have no formal
administrative authority, yet they are said to "exert considerable
influence over the course of research."[5] They suggest topics for
inclusion among the "basic directions" and recommend assignments among
ins t i tu tes . Furthermore, inclusion of a subject on the l i s t s of basic
problems or basic directions provides a se t of highly visible pri_orities
tha t can influence the choice among al te rna t ives when research managers
must make decisions between programs. Other views, however, give the
Academy of Sciences councils less weight. Their powers are undefined
and the i r administrat ive support is often inadequate. Horeover, some of
the par t ic ipants in the council ac t iv i t ies dismiss them as of no
observable value. Even the chief academic secretary of the USSR Academy
complained of the bureaucrat ic nature of the councils and of their
inabi l i ty to influence the choice of research projects . [6]
[4 ] Pravda, October 8, 1975.[5 ] Cocks, op . c i t . , p. 131.
[6 ] V. H. Sisakyan, quoted by Helgard Weinert, "The Organization
and Planning of Research in the Academy System," in E. Zaleski e t a l . ,
Science Policy in the USSR, OECD, Paris , 1969, p. 230.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 42/62
- 26 -
Coordinating groups in industry seem to fare l i t t l e bet ter . When,
for example, a leading Soviet computer sc ien t i s t was questioned by the
author about the resul ts to be expected from a newly appointed top
level , high-status committee, formed to iron out problems in the
computer industry, he dismissed the committee with a shrug and a laugh,
indicat ing tha t i t met once a year , ha d no formal authori ty, and was too
large and unwieldy to came up with a coherent se t of recommendations.
On the basis of this evidence, i t i s not possible to ignore such
committees, commissions, and counci ls , nor i s i t appropriate to regard
them in the same l ight as they may be described in the i r char ters . At
the leas t , these bodies serve as indicators of the direct ion of
government policy, of the research trends that are favored, and of the
ins t i tut ions tha t have been given the leading roles. They also draw
scient is ts into contact with decisionmakers as well as allow them to
communicate among themselves; [7] Moreover, members of the Academy from
mili tary inst i tutes may find that the i r involvement in Academy
proceedings provides them with a good view of what is going on in the
broader sc ien t i f ic world. Beyond th i s , especial ly in mil i tary af fa i r s ,
the various committees and commissions may at times actually recommend,
coordinate, and direc t the course of sc ien t i f ic research in an effect ive
way.
SCIENCE ENTREPRENEURS
Key actors in the l inks between science and the mil i tary (and in
the larger science t ransfer process) are the science-promoters. This
handful of individuals par t ic ipates in numerous committees and are
[7] These points are made by Weinert, op . c i t . , p. 231.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 43/62
- 27 -
always in demand as consultants. They help break the bonds of r igidi ty ,
allowing the system to act more effectively. They usually head the i r
own ins t i tutes , possess solid reputations as producers or managers of
science, and s i t on academic and government boards. Their inst i tutes
work on both mili tary and civi l ian research; they chair problem councils
and coordinating committees. Although the i r committees may not achieve
a l l that is expected of them, these entrepreneurs of science have the
opportunit ies to promote the i r own ideas and those of their colleagues
before decisionmaking bodies and pol i t ica l leaders. Therefore, even i f
no formal t ies exis t , leading scient is ts may be connected to the
mili tary in a variety of ways.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 44/62
- 28 -
VII. NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT
RAPID GROWTH
Many Russian emigre sc ient i s t s have described periods of rapid
growth of civi l ian sc ien t i f ic support of the mili tary , especial ly since
the la te 1960s. Some estimates have suggested tha t the aggregate effor t
ha s grown by many times in the past 20 years. According to counts based
on the f irst-hand evidence of former Soviet sc ien t i s t s , almost half of
the research inst i tutes in the Academy seem to have part ic ipated in
mili tary research.
The resurgence of Academy support of the mili tary in the past 20
years is not a to ta l ly new phenomenon in Soviet mili tary-science
rela t ionships. Before war broke out in 1941, Academy inst i tutes were
working on about 200 research topics ordered by the Defense and Navy
commisariats (the predecessors to today's minis t r ies) . Some leading
ins t i tu tes - - for example, the Ioffe Physico-Technical Inst i tute in
Leningrad--were heavily engaged in mil i tary research.[l] This work may
have been prompted by new statutes introduced in 1935 that st ressed the
promotion of timely and ef f i c i en t applicat ion of sc ien t i f ic
achievements; for several years before th i s , the Party ha d pushed the
admission of engineers into the administrat ion of the Academy.
Within days of the German attack on the USSR, inst i tutes of the
Academy of Sciences were ordered to review the i r research programs and
to redirec t the i r ef for ts to defense-related work. Coordinated by a
[1] G. D. Komkov, B. V. Levshin, and L. K. Semenov, Akademiia nauk
SSSR: kratki i i s tor icheski i ocherk (The USSR Academy of Sciences: Short
Histor ical Essay), Vol. I I , 1917-1976, 2d ed. , Moscow, 1977, p. 166.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 45/62
- 29 -
science plenipotentiary of the State Defense Committee, sc ient i s t s
performed a great deal of valuable applied research during the war.
Following the war, civi l ian science made important contribut ions to
nuclear weapons developments, ba l l i s t i c missi les , radar , and j e t
propulsion. Many of the fields stimulated by wartime science
contribut ions matured and stabi l ized suff icient ly to form industr ia l
minist r ies around the new technologies and products; elect ronics ,
missi les , and nuclear weapons gained minis ter ia l s ta tus in the 1960s.
Several administrat ive reforms in the early 1960s removed from the
Academy applied research inst i tutes and those that were more oriented
toward engineering. The remaining organizations were directed to
concentrate on basic research. The more recent t rend appears to be an
attempt to find a balance between basic and applied research in the
leading ins t i tu tes of Soviet science.
Despite this vigorous growth, R&D contribut ions by the mil i tary
production ministr ies and the Defense Ministry dominate civi l ian ef for ts
by an order of magnitude. Civil ian science is not a central actor in
the formal weapons acquisi t ion process. Such effor ts as occur seem to
be ad hoc, short-term, and associated with specif ic problems ar is ing
during development. The further a weapon proceeds in the development
process, the more l ike ly that civi l ian science support will be l imited
to solving unexpected and narrowly del ineated problems tha t ar ise in
design, t e s t , production, or use. At the Inst i tute of Nuclear Physics
associated with Moscow State Universi ty, with 3000 employees, the ad hoc
nature of much of the type of work is demonstrated by the fact tha t few
mil i tary contracts are for more than 12 months, and most are for around
6 months. [2] In such cases, the problems are usual ly given to the
[2] Whetten, op . c i t . , p. 46.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 46/62
- 30 -
civi l ian inst i tutes in abstract form and not presented as connected to a
specif ic weapon development. Often, i t is only through indirect means
that a researcher might fathom the ul t imate purpose of his effor ts .
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OCCUR BEFORE FORMAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION
The military seems to sponsor research in the civi l ian science
community for several reasons: to ascertain the feasibi l i ty of a
requirement; to investigate potent ia l ly useful concepts and
technologies; or to reduce the r i sks inherent in new things by research
and experimentation. This kind of research appears to precede the
actual incorporation of a new concept, technology, or device in a weapon
design, althougr some of this work could be associated with a
development program, par t icular ly a t an early stage.
In general , i t appears tha t the military science sector has been
unable to meet a l l of i t s R&D requirements to support the pre-weapons
acquisi t ion phases, part icular ly in highly advanced technologies. Much
of the civi l ian science effor t appears to be directed toward developing
and maturing the science base and the technologies tha t wil l l a te r flow
into the risk-avoiding weapons R&D process. The broader range of
weapons technologies must be brought to maturity before their
incorporation in weapons designs. The technology requirements of new
systems are l ikely to go beyond the capabi l i t ies of the mili tary-science
sector , especial ly in the short ru n when they have not yet adapted to
the new demands. A lagged response of the military sc ien t i f ic base,
therefore, requires more extensive support from civi l ian science.
Civil ian science's main contr ibution to the military is to what can
be described as an enlarged "front end" of the standard acquisi t ion
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 47/62
- 31 -
process. Despite this greater attention to science and technology in
the early phases, we have no evidence tha t the style of design has
changed. Designers and mili tary customers alike s t i l l seem to shun
r isky solutions, untr ied technologies, and immature components. I t is
the new task of the science community to reduce the r isk through
research and experiment, to prove the technologies, and to demonstrate
the technical feasibi l i ty of new kinds of components--before they enter
into weapons development.
"BIG SCIENCE" AND THE MILITARY
In recent years, many Soviet science leaders have advocated program
planning for large science projects . The program approach emphasizes
the achievement of specif ic goals and the drawing up of a comprehensive
se t of measures for that purpose. In the postwar period, this approach
ha s been customary for prior i ty projects in the economic, socia l , and
mili tary spheres. In the development or both nuclear weapons and
bal l i s t ic missi les , special systems of management were headed by
councils subordinated to the highest levels of government and Party to
assure the adequacy of prior i ty and resources, backed by pol i t ica l
authori ty. Nuclear weapons and ba l l i s t i c missi les were l a te r
inst i tut ional ized within the standard minis ter ia l s t ructure , but the
management pattern of those successful programs ha s now become the norm.
"For the most important problems, a lead ministry or lead organization
wil l be designated and granted cer ta in r ights in re la t ion to other
part ic ipants and the allocation of resources," with a government
decision fully specifying schedules, resources, and executors.[3] I t is
[3] Cooper, op. c i t . , p. 42 .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 48/62
- 32 -
not accidental that this descript ion applies to weapon system
development generally, and to the management of large, mili tary-re la ted ,
"big science" programs specif ica l ly . (4] I t has been the chief means by
which the Soviet leadership has attempted to achieve major advances in
science and technology. In some instances, as in the development of
nuclear weaponry, i t has been highly successful. In other areas--the
supersonic t ransport Tu-144 being a conspicuous example--special
management techniques, abundant resources, pr ior i ty , and pol i t ica l
backing have not overcome recalci t rant technologies and an economy tha t
is generally inhospitable to innovation.
Current examples of the project-planning technique may include the
work on high-energy devices, including so-cal led "par t icle beam weapons"
and high-energy lasers . Of the 20 to 30 research organizations
par t ic ipat ing in these effor ts in a major way, approximately half are
members of the Academy of Sciences (national an d regional) , one-quarter
are higher education ins t i tu t ions , and the remaining quar ter are
af f i l i a ted with the mili tary-production minis t r ies . (5]
The enlargement of those military research act iv i t i es we have
called "big science" i s a new "front end" to systems tha t have never
been bui l t before. The differences between these act ivi t ies and the
science contributions during the pre-weapons-acquisition phase l ie in
the scale of the undertakings and in the breadth of the technological
[4] By "big science," is meant coordinated research act ivi ty
involving many par t ic ipants , large volumes of resources, and expensive
fac i l i t ies invest igat ing and applying science a t the f ront ie rs of
knowledge.
[5] Examples of ins t i tu te par t ic ipa t ion are presented in SimonKassel and Charles D. Hendricks, High Current Par t icle Beams, I: TheWestern USSR Research Groups, The Rand Corporation, R-1552-ARPA, 1975.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 49/62
- 33 -
development tha t a system--new in al l i t s par ts - -wi l l require i f i t is
to prove feasible. I t i s one thing to work, for example, on holographic
signal processing for a conventional radar system. I t is substant ia l ly
more complex to devise a high-energy laser defense for bal l i s t i c
missi les . All of the subsystems and components in the l a t t e r case must
be researched, demonstrated, and integrated into a system. No exist ing
organizat ion ha s the capabi l i t ies to carry out the whole task for such
systems. Special ly designated lead inst i tutes and loose, informal
coordination seem to define the chosen approach. Once again, though,
these ac t iv i t ies appear not to have affected the standard approach to
weapons acquisi t ion. The big-science effor ts are clearly dis t inc t from
weapons development, although many of the same defense industry
organizations may par t ic ipa te in big-science projects as in conventional
developments.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 50/62
- 34 -
VIII. THE LOGIC OF CONTROLLING SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION TRANSFER
THE LOGIC OF CONTROL
Consideration of the control of sc ien t i f ic information requires
set t ing out a simple logic or framework in order to es tabl ish a context
for specif ic points. The f i r s t prerequis i te in this logic is
f eas ib i l i ty . Control is more feasible when there are few sources of the
information and when they are in the control ler ' s own country. Magnetic
fusion research, for example, from i t s beginnings in wartime, was highly
classi f ied in the United States and was confined to research sponsored
by the Atomic Energy Commission. This control lasted unt i l 1958, when
sc ient i s t s from India, Great Bri ta in, and the USSR revealed the i r own
research competence and resul ts in the f ie ld . At that point , the
feasibi l i ty of control dwindled and the benefi ts of collaborat ion grew
apace, whereupon the U.S. declassif ied i t s fusion research.
To just i fy control , the information should be valuable to potent ia l
enemies. Scient i f ic information can be valuable i f i t enhances overal l
eff iciency, or i f i t permits and encourages undesirable enemy mili ta ry
capabi l i t ies . (These points wil l be discussed in greater deta i l below.)
I t is thus necessary to estimate the s ize of the resource-enhancement
effects , the probable military uses of the science, and the potent ia l
damage to the U.S. of permitting a t ransfer . That damage should then be
weighed against the costs generated by control processes or by the
forgone prof i t s or other benefi ts from sale and exchange. A case can be
made for control , therefore, i f the information is contro l lable , i f i t
generates s ignif icant posi t ive resource effec ts or is l ike ly to lead to
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 51/62
- 35 -
par t icular ly undesirable capabi l i t ies , i f these capabi l i t ies have
important effects on U.S. mili tary ef for t s , and i f the benefi ts of
avoiding these effects through controls are not outweighed by the direc t
and indirec t costs tha t the controls impose on domestic science and
research.
Ultimately, most arguments for controll ing (or encouraging)
t ransfers to a potential.enemy can be decomposed into three elements:
(1 ) general resource-enhancement effects , (2 ) effec ts on par t icu lar
capabi l i t ies , and (3 ) inf luence on the other s ide ' s world view.[l ] Any
t ransact ion will general ly have a ll three effects . Most important for
the analysis of science t ransfer is the second effec t : the way and
degree tha t a par t icular science t ransfer could aid the mil i tary effor t
of a potent ia l enemy.
Resource-enhancement effec ts act to increase the resource base or
national income of a country by direct ly adding to resource
avai labi l i ty: by direc t credi t and resource t ransfers; by supplying a
product more cheaply than i t can be produced domestically; or by
increasing eff iciency and product ivi ty . This, in effect , i s equivalent
to an overall sh i f t in the income or budget of the recipient ; the
increase can be allocated in a general way throughout the economy. But,
in addi t ion, the accompanying effects of a t ransaction wil l usual ly make
some par t icu lar se t of goals relat ively cheaper to obtain than other
goals , and thus encourage expenditures in specific direct ions. [2]
[1 ] The f i r s t two effects are what economists cal l the income and
pr ice effects .
[2] In standard economic analysis , these income and price effectsare not independent. They joint ly depend on supply and demand
e la s t i c i t i e s , and prices .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 52/62
- 36 -
The changing-world-view argument is based on the notion tha t a
potent ia l enemy wil l become more (or less) benign as t ransfers to i t are
encouraged (or denied). A control pol icy could be undone, therefore, i f
the potent ia l enemy's react ion were to view the world as more dangerous,
and therefore increase i ts mil i tary expenditures. The other argument is
also heard: Reducing science- t ransfer controls will ease tensions and
lead to a less dangerous world. The val idi ty of the arguments, however,
has not been demonstrated in ei ther the benign or malevolent guises. [3]
By decomposing the effects of a t ransaction into i t s general and
par t icu lar components, the considerations for control can be made more
expl ici t . Income enhancement effects from the t ransfer of gra in,
electronics technology, or bombs can be analyzed by the same metric.
However, the par t icu lar effects of such very different transfers are
l ikely to lead to quite different behavior. The primary task for
analysts of science t ransfer should be to elucidate the par t icu lar
effec ts : tha t i s , how and to what degree a par t icu lar t ransfer could aid
the mili tary effor t .
CATEGORIES OF SCIENTIFIC INFORNATION
The t ransfer of scient i f ic information can occur in many ways.
Four information categories i l lus t ra te ke y issues for the analysis of
the effec ts of t ransfer on Soviet weapons development: (1) sc ien t i f ic
theory; (2 ) knowledge of act ivi t ies and progress in speci f ic areas; (3 )
experimentation and procedural know-how; and (4 ) instrumentation and
equipment.
[3] For a skept ical view on the posi t ive effects of t rade on Soviet
sens ib i l i t i es , see Nathan Leites, The New Economic Togetherness:
American and Soviet Reactions, The Rand Corporation, R-1369-ARPA, 1973.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 53/62
- 37 -
Soviet science is strong in theory, but weakens as one moves down
through the categories to hardware, where i t suffers in comparison with
the West. Soviet theory often equals tha t of the West, especial ly when
i t does not depend on empirical foundations that require a great deal of
modern equipment.[4] The USSR ha s ha d notable di f f i cu l ty in producing
laboratory equipment. Inst i tutes are often forced to spend considerable
time and resources building the i r own one-of-a-kind devices. I t is
noteworthy tha t Russian emigre scient is ts mention tha t a laboratory
out f i t t ed with Western equipment i s a mark of high-pr ior i ty , mil i tary
research. Indeed, obtaining access to such equipment is one of the
incentives for engaging in mili tary work.
Knowledge of what is going on in a f ield, of who is doing what, of
the main directions and the false steps, is of grea t benefi t in planning
one 's own research ef for t s . I t is especial ly useful to followers ra ther
than leaders. I t is a category of science-information t ransfer whose
value r ises when the user is in second place or cannot afford r isky
ventures.
Know-how is often the most important, and most often the missing
element in the t ransfer process. I ts absence ca n prohibi t or delay
transforming an idea or device into something useful . Examples abound
of Soviet attempts to duplicate American devices and processes--from
Tupolev's copy of the B-29 bomber to recent effor ts to reverse-engineer
integrated ci rcui t s . In many cases, inst i tutes or design bureaus are
presented with a device and ordered to imitate and produce i t - -by a
[4] Thane Gustafson, "Why Doesn't Soviet Science Do Better Than I t
Does?" in Linda Lubrano and Susan G. Solomon (eds . ) , The Social Context
of Soviet Science, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 32.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 54/62
- 38 -
minister or pol i t ica l leader. In most instances, this takes years , i t
is very dif f icu l t , an d according to those involved, se ts back indigenous
Soviet science by almost as many years as i t takes to master the foreign
example.[5] The asser t ion of being retarded is widespread over time and
technologies; i t was made by Tupolev, who was forced by Sta l in to
produce the Tu-4, and more recently by those involved in similar
ac t iv i t ies in electronics. The important point here is tha t know-how is
what does not get into the journals. I t requires personal contact and,
frequently, dedicated effor t by both par t ies . This applies to the
t ransfer not only of know-how concerning a device or process, but also
to purely theore t ica l information. Soviet analysts of science often
point with envy to the " invis ible colleges" of the i r colleagues in the
West, where sc ient i s t s working in the same f ield ca n make easy contact
by telephone, le t te r s , or v is i t s . The Soviet penchant for secrecy and
compartmentalization, together with the high ins t i tu t ional barr ie rs
between organizations and sectors , strongly impedes the interna l flow of
information as well as interna t ional flows.
One influence of interna t ional sc ien t i f ic information t ransfer tha t
is associated with knowledge of the f ield l ies more in the psychological
and cul tura l realm than in the world of imitat ion and reverse
engineering. In reviewing statements by Soviet sc ient i s t s about the
conduct of research, on e is struck by the number of times tha t American
or other Western experience i s cited to jus t i fy , ra t ional ize , or
legi t imize the i r own in i t ia t ives . An example of th i s , as related to the
author by an American physic is t , concerned the Soviet physic is t Leonid
[5) I t should be mentioned tha t this claim could be a self-servingcomplaint by people who see themselves invidiously compared with the i r
American counterparts .
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 55/62
- 39 -
I . Rudakov of the Kurchatov Inst i tute . He ha d been mentioned by name in
the f i r s t major ar t ic le in the U.S. on beam weapons.[6] This came to the
at tent ion of high Soviet government of f ic ia ls , an event which, Rudakov
claimed, assured him ful l funding for his beam fusion program, despite a
good deal of ear l ie r doubt and hesi ta t ion by the author i t ies . He noted
tha t , "I no longer have to make neutrons to survive." This looking to
the West is not new. I t goes back to Peter the Great and the founding
of the St . Petersburg Academy of Science in 1724, when Western science
was the norm as well as the goal. Apparently, i t s t i l l is .
Considerations of the control of science information t ransfer must
account for the dif ferent character is t ics of the various categories
mentioned above. Theory is t ransmitted through journals, ar t ic les ,
papers, prepr in ts , presentat ions a t meetings, seminars, and other
processes. Control is dif f icu l t unless the research is performed
predominantly under closed, secret conditions. Even when the bulk of
the research in a f ield is performed in secure f ac i l i t i e s , para l l e l
ac t iv i t ies in open inst i tut ions can lead to some loss of control , as
recent ac t iv i t ies in cryptology demonstrate. Furthermore, i t is not
suff icient to control only the formal publication process.
Communications take place prior to publication through the " invis ib le
col leges" mentioned above.
Knowledge of what is going on in a f ield is just as dif f icu l t to
control as theoret ical information. Published resul ts of research are
important, of course; but so is information on the kind of work that is
being pursued, which is usually available from a wider variety of
sources than are the actual research resul ts .
[6] Clarence A. Robinson, J r . , "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 2, 1977, p. 16.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 56/62
- 40 -
Because t ransfer of know-how often involves the energet ic
par t ic ipat ion of the possessor of the information, i t s t ransference i s
more readily ident i f iab le and controllable than theory or general
knowledge. I t general ly goes beyond the mere description of research
resul ts or of product at t r ibutes; i t involves the myriad detai l s of
technique. Attempts to acquire know-how are more obvious than the
acquisi t ion of more general knowledge, precisely because of the
extensive effor ts tha t may be required. Because know-how i s often
associated with applications, the us e to be made of the information may
also be discerned, thus informing the applicat ion of controls.
When one considers laboratory instrumentation, equipment, and
supplies, however, the si tuat ion is different . When used direct ly ( that
i s , when i ts acquisi t ion is not for imitat ion but for actual use), the
scient i f ic information is embodied in the hardware. Since such
equipment is designed to be used and documentation i s usual ly available
to fac i l i ta te i t s use, control of t ransfer requires controll ing the
physical shipment of the equipment. In some cases, the equipment is so
highly special ized tha t i t s end use i s fai r ly obvious. This i s not
always the case, though; much of the Soviet deficiency in this area is
in general purpose laboratory hardware as well as in special purpose,
low-production-quantity devices. However, since mili tary uses have
highest pr ior i t ies on foreign purchases, acquisi t ion (legal and i l legal)
of foreign equipment is more l ikely to be for mili tary-re la ted research
than for other uses.
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 57/62
- 41 -
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The l ines are blurr ing in the Soviet Union between pure and applied
research, mili tary and civi l ian science, Academy and industry. For many
years in the 1960s, and his tor i ca l ly , the Academy system was t ruly
"academic," but polic ies intended to promote greater science involvement
in the affai rs of the nation have had some effec t . Scient is ts and
ins t i tu t ions , especial ly those at the forefront of the i r f ields, are
more l ike ly to be involved in mili tary science-- through a var ie ty of
mechanisms--than twenty years ago. Consequently, the l ikel ihood tha t
Soviet science contacts with the West wil l prove useful to the Soviet
mili tary ha s also increased.
I t has not been the aim of this report to delve deeply into the
logic of control , but rather to describe the t ies of Soviet weapons
acquisi t ion to science and the t ransfer implications ar is ing from those
t i e s . Three main points flow from that analysis: (1 ) The Soviet
weapons design process faces many incent ives tha t or ient i t away from
the use of advanced science and technology. (2 ) However, the increased
complexity of modern weapons makes greater demands on science and
technology. (3 ) As a net resul t of these two forces, co ntribut ions of
Soviet civi l ian science to the mili tary have been on the increase since
the la te 1960s; these effor ts tend to precede the rout ine
weapons-acquisition process; and civi l ian science contribut ions are
v i ta l to nonroutine "big science" mil i tary effor ts .
Of course, many general questions on the t ransfer of sc ien t i f ic
information remain, answers to which would bet ter inform future pol icy:
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 58/62
- 42 -
(1 ) How should the value of the flow of scient i f ic information and
technology be measured?[!] (2 ) How-can "defense-relevant" scient i f ic
information and technology be identif ied? (3 ) How can the contribut ion
of science to the mili tary be quantified? (4 ) What are the direct and
indirect costs of control to the controller? Progress in answering
these questions would permit a more ra t ional and appropriate application
of the logic of control than i s possible today.
[1] For example, should information be valued at the orig inal costto the sender, the savings to the receiver , the to ta l value to the
receiver (consumer's surplus) , or at a market price established by
actual or proxy t ransact ions?
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 59/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 60/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 61/62
8/7/2019 Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/soviet-science-and-weapons-acquisition 62/62
RAND/R-2942-NAS
Top Related