CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Chapter 5
Critical citizens around the world
The previous chapter compared trends in public opinion in Western Europe and the United
States – all affluent post-industrial societies, long-standing liberal democracies, and stable states.
Instead of a tidal wave of growing political alienation, the evidence during the third wave era
demonstrates fluctuating orientations towards the nation-state, its agencies and its actors. Some
enduring contrasts in cultural attitudes persist for many decades, such as those distinguishing Norway
and Italy, Britain and France, or the Netherlands and Belgium, maintaining diversity among European
nations. Even in the United States – where the loudest alarm bells can be heard about a supposed rising
tide of political cynicism and voter anger – in fact American support for government has both risen and
fallen over time, and contrasting trends in public confidence are evident among the major branches of
the federal government. Subsequent chapters analyze whether the dynamic of systems support can be
best explained by the evolving social-psychology of citizens, shifting normative standards of public life,
problems of government performance, or the structure of winners and losers from political institutions.
Whatever the precise diagnosis and the appropriate cure, post-industrial societies in Western Europe
and the United States are all secure societies and wealthy economies, where the culture of liberal
democracy has deep-seated roots which has evolved over centuries. Lack of trust in government may
tie policy-makers hands.1 Deeply-unpopular governments or leaders may fall. Widespread
dissatisfaction can catalyze support for constitutional reform movements and public outcry for greater
transparency, monitoring, and accountability.2 At worst, contentious politics can fuel sporadic outbreaks
of violent street protest. The existence of multiple indicators of political disenchantment should raise
genuine concern about the workings of democratic governance. But the fundamental resilience and
institutional inertia of long-standing democratic states makes them highly unlikely to collapse due to
political disaffection or a major legitimacy crisis.
The same is not necessarily true elsewhere. This chapter expands the comparative framework to
examine contemporary indicators of systems support in a wide range of countries and conditions around
the world. The chapter first considers the theoretical reasons why support is thought to be particularly
important for democratic consolidation and government legitimacy in fragile states. We then compare
systems support using the indicators, conceptual framework, and regime typology already developed in
chapter 3. We lack cross-national evidence for approval of incumbent office-holders, such as the
popularity of particular party leaders or presidents, but we can compare several dimension, ranging
1
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
from the specific to diffuse levels, including: (i) confidence in a range of public sector institutions; (ii)
evaluations of democratic performance; (iii) support for democratic values; (iv) the rejection of
autocratic forms of government; and also (v) citizens’ orientations towards the nation. Cross-national
comparisons are drawn mainly from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (WVS),
conducted in 2005-7, covering a wide range of societies. The World Values Survey also contains time-
series survey data spanning twenty-five years, since the early-1980s, for a more restricted sub-set of
eleven nations. By examining trends over time, we can see whether there has been any persistent
erosion of system support in these cases. After looking at all these indicators, the next chapter explores
critical citizens in more depth, a syndrome understood as combining cognitive awareness of the
principles of liberal democracy with support for democratic values and yet simultaneously negative
evaluations of the actual performance of democracy.
The role of systems support in democratic consolidation
Theories of congruence suggest that systems support is likely to have consequences for
democratic consolidation, regime stability, and government legitimacy. Any impact is expected to be
particularly important in countries which have only recently experienced the transition from autocracy,
by holding multiparty elections, but which have not yet established the full panoply of institutions
associated with liberal democracy. 3 Many electoral democracies are in regions lacking historical
experience of this form of rule, as well as being found in low income economies, in post-conflict divided
societies, and in fragile states, all providing unfavorable soil for the seeds of democratization to flourish. 4
In particular, congruence theory predicts that regimes will prove most politically stable where they
reflect the mass culture. Hence democratic regimes built upon popular cultures which strongly endorse
democratic ideals are expected to weather shocks arising from any sudden economic crisis, internal
conflict, or elite challenge more successfully than societies where the public remains indifferent, cynical,
hostile, or simply apathetic towards the idea of democracy. Along similar lines, autocratic regimes are
expected to endure where they rest upon popular support, such as deference to traditional monarchs or
religious leaders. Where congruence is lacking, however, regimes are thought more susceptible to
challenge arising from mass uprisings. Democratic states, which rely upon a reservoir of popular
legitimacy and voluntary compliance to govern, remain most vulnerable to this risk. Autocracies, if
undermined from below, can always call the military out of the barracks to reassert their grip on power.
Contemporary developments suggest many reasons for concern both about the state of popular
support for democracy and the underlying stability of many states which experienced transitions from
2
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
autocracy during the third wave era. The heady hopes for the spread of democracy worldwide,
captured by Fukuyama’s idea of the ‘end of history’, coined immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall,
have flagged over time.5 Freedom House report that the number of electoral democracies grew globally
during the third wave era but that further advances stalled around the turn of the 21 st century. 6
Diamond even suggests that the last decade saw the onset of a democratic recession.7 Previous
historical waves of democratization were followed by reversals.8 Elected governments have often
struggled to maintain stability following inconclusive or disputed contests (for instance, in Kenya and
Mexico), partisan strife and recurrent political scandals (Bangladesh and Guatemala), and persistent
outbreaks of violent ethnic conflict (Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq). Setbacks for democracy
have also occurred in recent years following coups against elected leaders (Honduras and Thailand) as
well as creeping restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms (Russia and Venezuela).
One global region where democratic consolidation has made sustained progress has been Latin
America, but even here studies suggest that dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic regimes
to solve problems and to meet social needs has encouraged political disillusionment and cynicism.9
Others have detected evidence of a public backlash in the region against the way that liberal democracy
and economic neo-liberalism works, although not a rejection of democratic ideals per se.10 In sub-
Saharan Africa, younger democracies in some of the world poorest nations, such as Mali, Benin, and
Ghana, have now experienced a series of multiparty competitive elections and major gains in human
rights, but they still lack the capacity to lift millions out of poverty and to deliver the targets for
healthcare, education and welfare in the Millennium Development Goals.11 Among Arab states, some
concrete but limited gains for human rights and freedoms have registered in recent years. 12
Nevertheless Carothers suggests that under the administration of President George W. Bush, the
association of the rhetoric of democracy promotion with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may
have depressed public support for this type of regime in the region, and encouraged a more general
push-back by oil-rich plutocrats.13 Moreover the rhetoric of reform among Arab states runs far ahead of
realities. Many traditional autocracies continue to endure in Eurasia, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 14
Occasional outbreaks of popular dissent seeking to topple autocratic regimes have been brutally
suppressed by the authorities, for example, most recently in Burma/Myanmar and Iran. In the light of all
these factors, initial high hopes and expectations for the further expansion and steady consolidation of
democratic regimes around the world have not come to fruition in recent years.
3
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Does this mean that popular support for democratic governance has also fallen worldwide?
Empirical survey data is now available to compare this issue in many world regions. The third wave era
was accompanied by the rapid growth of new cross-national survey research seeking to understand
public opinion around the globe. The most systematic and comprehensive world-wide evidence of
political attitudes is available using data gathered since the early-to mid-1990s both from successive
waves of the World Values Survey, as well as from the Global-Barometers monitoring public opinion in
post-Communist Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The replication
facilitated by using two independent cross-national surveys allows us to test whether the major
generalizations are robust findings, or whether they may be more technical artifacts, for example if
attributed to the design of particular survey items, questionnaire translation, fieldwork and sampling
practices, or the country coverage.
Propositions, regime classification, and methods
To compare public opinion this chapter utilizes the classification and indices presented in
chapter 3. We can set out a series of propositions about how systems support is expected to vary under
alternative types of regimes, and then use descriptive tables and graphs to examine the relationships
without any prior controls. Subsequent chapters use multivariate analysis to build upon this foundation.
Firstly, cultural attitudes are expected to display the enduring imprint of each society’s historical
political experiences. Persistent differences are predicted to be evident among contemporary liberal
democracies, even those within relatively similar global regions, if they differ in their past political
experiences, such as Spain and France, Hungary and Austria, or Japan and South Korea. Socialization
theory has long suggested that people gradually acquire enduring cultural attitudes during their
formative years and early adulthood, through learning primarily from parents and siblings, as well as
absorbing the prevailing social norms and values transmitted by the mass media, teachers and religious
authorities, and within local communities.15 Longitudinal studies of social learning report that core
political predispositions tend to be highly stable through the life span, with attitudes crystallizing as
people age, infusing core predispositions with increasing psychological strength over time.16 For these
reasons, public opinion should display more positive evaluations of the quality of democratic
governance in long-standing liberal democratic states, which have consolidating and deepened
democratic institutions and inculcated civic awareness among citizens over decades and even centuries,
compared with younger liberal democracies which only developed during the third wave era.
4
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
This leads to the second proposition: systems support is also expected to reflect the type of
contemporary regime in power. If citizens are responding to their current situation, and if there is
congruence, then support for democratic values and satisfaction with the performance of democracy
should be greater among citizens living in contemporary societies which enjoy widespread political
rights and liberties. By contrast, if there is congruence, citizens living today under autocratic regimes
should display greater support for autocratic principles and values. Autocracies commonly exercise
techniques of propaganda and censorship which seek to manipulate public opinion and to suppress
criticism of the regime. Despite these propositions, any relationship between political attitudes and the
type of regime currently in power in any country is expected to prove relatively weak. The reason is that
a state’s level of democracy can fluctuate substantially from year to year (generating noise) due to
specific historical events, such as a sudden military coup staged against elected presidents, or the
breakdown of autocracy following the death of the leader. By contrast, political culture is a relatively
deep-seated and enduring phenomenon. Thus political attitudes and values may not be strongly
associated with short-term fluctuations in Freedom House ratings, although these orientations are
expected to be more important in determining whether democracy persists and consolidates over the
longer term.17
Thirdly, a related proposition suggests that democratic orientations and feelings of government
legitimacy will gradually strengthen over the years among citizens living within younger democracies .
The idea of democratic consolidation suggests that increased experience of living in a democratic state
should inculcate stronger democratic norms and values, such as trust, tolerance and participation, so
that eventually democracy becomes, in Linz and Stephan’s phrase, ‘the only game in town’. 18 Direct
comparison of changes over time within the same countries allows us to test this idea. For direct time-
series analysis, we can compare the eleven countries included in successive waves of the WVS, spanning
a quarter-century.
The regime classification used in this book also facilitates comparison of the most recent 5 th
wave of the World Values Survey, conducted in 2005-7, with earlier studies. In particular, Hans-Dieter
Klingemann compared political support among older democracies, younger democracies, and ‘low’
democracies, based on the 3rd and 4th waves of the WVS conducted during the early-to-mid-1990s.19 His
conclusions highlighted the phenomenon of ‘dissatisfied democrats’, defined as: “people who put a high
rating on the attractiveness of democracy as a form of government but at the same time place a low
rating on the performance of their particular democratic regime.” In Central and Eastern Europe,
5
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
however, when studied by Klingemann, in the early-to-mid-1990s many states had only experienced
their initial founding or transitional multi-party election. This chapter can update Klingemann’s findings
to examine whether this phenomenon continues to be observed in the 5 th wave of the WVS, roughly a
decade later.
As discussed in chapter 3, contemporary regimes (in 2006, to match the 5th wave of the WVS)
are classified into four categories: older liberal democracies, younger liberal democracies, electoral
democracies, and autocracies. Data from Freedom House is used as one of the most common
approaches to classifying contemporary regimes based on the country’s record of civil liberties and
political rights (see Table 3.3). Each country’s historical experience of democratization is measured by
the cumulative record of civil liberties and political rights for each nation during the third wave era, as
estimated annually by Freedom House from 1972-2006, taking account of both downturns and upticks
over the years. The resulting index is standardized to 100-points and it is used to sub-divide older and
younger liberal democracies, to reflect their differing historical experiences. To summarize the core
propositions, does system support vary in predictable ways, generating significant contrasts (i) by length
of historical experience of democratization; (ii) among contemporary regimes by level of democracy;
and (iii) among liberal democracies over time? Are the main hypotheses supported by the survey
evidence?
Table 5.1 summarizes the correlations between six indicators of system support and the
historical and contemporary levels of democracy in comparisons of around 50 nations, without any prior
controls. The technical appendix for the book describes the specific items and measures used to
construct all attitudinal indicators. The correlations show fairly mixed results, rather than a
straightforward story, as discussed in detail below. To understand these general patterns further, we
need to consider the specific measures and scrutinize the cross-national results and time-series trends in
depth.
[Table 5.1 about here]
(i) Confidence in regime institutions
As already observed, at the more specific level, the issue of declining confidence in the core
institutions of liberal democracy, including parliaments, parties, and governments, has attracted
considerable concern in Western Europe and the United States.20 Some of the worry is clearly
exaggerated in popular commentary; the evidence presented earlier shows that most West European
6
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
states have seen trendless volatility in institutional confidence. Admittedly, a few countries have
experienced steadily growing public mistrust of state institutions during the last decade, but others have
experienced the reverse. Confidence in the core institutions of state, however, is arguably far more
critical for democratic stability in countries which have only recently transitioned from autocracy.
Prospects for democratic consolidation in these countries seem poor if the public expresses widespread
cynicism about the working of representative institutions such as parliaments and parties, as some of
the principle agencies connecting citizens and the state, and if the legitimacy and authority of the
government is widely questioned in deeply-divided or post-conflict societies.
To compare the cross-national evidence, an institutional confidence scale was constructed from
the WVS 2005-7 data, measuring attitudes towards seven types of public sector organizations, including
political parties, the national government, the national parliament, the civil service, the courts, the
police, and the armed forces. The factor analysis presented in Table 3.2 shows that in the WVS 2005,
responses to these items were strongly inter-correlated, meaning that people who trusted parties or
parliaments, for example, often usually also trusted governments and the civil service. When the pooled
sample was broken down further by the type of regime, and the factor analysis run separately for each,
the public living in the older liberal democracies distinguished between the institutions closely
associated with liberal democratic governance (parties, parliaments, the government and the civil
service) and those associated with maintaining security (the armed forces, police and the courts). In the
remaining publics, however, no such dimensions emerged from the factor analysis, suggesting that the
scale based on aggregating confidence in all seven types of public sector institutions is the most
appropriate one to compare across all societies.
[Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 about here]
Table 5.2 describes the 100-point standardized institutional confidence scale for each nation in
the fifth wave of the WVS by the major type of regime, without any prior controls. The overall results
show that, with one exception, the majority of citizens living in these societies expressed confidence in
public sector institutions; on average, roughly two-thirds of the public trusted political institutions in the
countries under comparison.21 Did these attitudes vary by the contemporary type of regime, as
predicted? Most strikingly, significantly greater institutional confidence, not less, was expressed in
contemporary autocracies than in liberal democracies (R=-0.356, Sig .012).
To explore this pattern in more detail, Figure 5.1 shows that among all the nations under
comparison, Viet Nam and China were outliers, with the public living in these societies expressing 7
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
exceptionally strong confidence in public sector institutions. The precise reasons for this remain unclear
and these findings are open to several possible interpretations, as discussed in the chapter’s
conclusion.22 Clearly the pattern in these autocracies requires further exploration. If we exclude China
and Viet Nam from the analysis, however, then average confidence in public sector institutions in the
remaining autocracies (Russia and Iran) is similar to levels of support expressed in the other types of
regimes. It is also striking that greater variations in levels of institutional confidence were usually evident
among countries within each category, rather than across different types of contemporary regime.
Amongst the younger liberal democracies, for example marked contrasts can be observed between the
relatively positive attitudes expressed towards state institutions in Mali and India, compared with the
more critical orientations evident in Serbia and in Antigua and Barbuda. Similar variance is displayed
among electoral democracies as well, exemplified by the contrasts between the positive sentiments
recorded in Jordan and Malaysia compared with greater skepticism expressed in Ethiopia and Moldova.
In general, there is little evidence here for the contention that older liberal democracies have a much
stronger and deeper reservoir of institutional confidence than their younger counterparts, casting
reasons to doubt the impact of historical experiences on these indicators of specific support.
[Figures 5.2 and 5.3 about here]
To examine trends over time, Figure 5.2 shows how the institutional confidence index varies
over the last twenty-five years in the eleven countries contained in all five waves of the WVS survey. For
comparison, since much of the concern focuses upon legislatures, Figure 5.3 illustrates the trends in
confidence in parliaments in these nations. Patterns over time show a few cases of decline across both
indicators, notably during the 1980s in Argentina and South Korea. Constitutional rule was restored in
Argentina in 1983; the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín saw the re-establishment of civilian command over
the military and strengthened democratic institutions, although there were persistent economic
problems in controlling hyperinflation. During this era, however, Argentinean institutional confidence
fell sharply before stabilizing at a lower level. The Sixth Republic of South Korea began in 1987 with
democratic elections which marked the transfer of power from the authoritarian President Chun Doo-
hwan; despite this, and growing economic prosperity prior to the Asian economic crisis of 1997,
confidence in public sector institutions gradually slipped among Koreans, and confidence in the National
Assembly fell sharply. In South Africa, however, rising confidence peaked during the first post-apartheid
election and then fell back. There is no support here for the argument that institutional confidence
progressively strengthens over time among younger democracies. In the remaining countries, the
8
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
composite institutional confidence scale generally shows a stable pattern from the start to the end of
the series. The trends in confidence in parliament, however, confirm the fall in the United States
Congress already observed from the GSS data, and a similar loss of confidence in the legislature
occurred in Germany, Argentina and South Korea, while the remaining countries show trendless
fluctuations around the mean. Overall, therefore, any loss of institutional confidence does appear to be
more clearly related to parliaments rather than all public sector institutions, as observed earlier in
America. These patterns also do vary across nations worldwide, as noted in Western Europe in the
previous chapter.
(ii) Evaluations of democratic performance
How do people evaluate the workings of democratic regimes as a whole? This represents a more
diffuse level of support which is arguably more important as an indicator; people can express skeptical
attitudes towards leaders and elected officials in parliament and governments, but in multi-party
democratic states, regular elections provide periodic opportunities to ‘throw the rascals out’, providing a
release valve for pressures. If the public loses faith in the broader workings of democratic regimes,
however, this can have potentially far more significant consequences for political stability. As discussed
earlier, measures gauging democratic satisfaction are common in cross-national surveys including the
EuroBarometer (see Table 4.4), as well as the International Social Survey Program, and the
GlobalBarometers. The standard question asks: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not
very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?” The results have
been widely analyzed in the research literature, especially in cross-national and longitudinal
comparisons using both ordinary least squares and multi-level methods to analyze the impact of
institutional design, good governance, policy performance, and regime histories on satisfaction with
democracy.23 Others have also reversed the relationship, for example to examine whether satisfaction
with democracy is linked to authority structures.24 Nevertheless the precise meaning of the standard
measure of democratic satisfaction remains ambiguous and open to interpretation. Satisfaction with
democracy may reflect assessments of democratic practices and the way that governments work, but
responses to the standard question may also be seen as endorsing normative ideals about the legitimacy
of democratic principles. 25
Using an alternative phrasing, the 5th wave WVS asks the following question: “And how
democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means
that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would
9
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
you choose?” The way that this question emphasizes evaluations of how democratically each country is
being governed makes it suitable to test public evaluations of the perceived democratic performance of
regimes in each country.26 The use of the 10-point scale provides respondents with more choice than the
standard question. Moreover evaluations of democratic performance using this question are strongly
correlated at national-level with another WVS survey item asking respondents to evaluate respect for
human rights in their own country (R=0.78 p>.000 ). This strong association suggests that the question
concerning democratic evaluations taps into how positively people regard the workings of their own
political system more generally.
[Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 and 5.5 about here]
The comparison of 49 nations shows that satisfaction with the performance of democracy was
significantly correlated with the historical index of democratization (see Figure 5.4), reflecting the length
of experience of each country with this form of governance, (R=0.371 p>.009). This pattern suggests
that, unlike institutional confidence, a reservoir of support for the performance of democracy does
gradually accumulate and deepen with greater familiarity with this form of governance. The cumulative
experience of living in a democratic state, and the cultural values gradually acquired through this
process, therefore does seem to generate positive satisfaction among citizens. Attitudes were also
linked with the contemporary level of democracy, although the relationship was weaker and not
statistically significant at the conventional .05 level (R=0.257, P=.075).
To explore these patterns in more detail, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show that the majority of the
public approve of how democratically their country was being governed in nearly all the countries under
comparison, with the exception of four cases (Bulgaria, Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Russia). In older liberal
democracies, on average roughly two thirds of the public approved of the performance of democracy in
their own county, reflecting higher satisfaction than in the other types of regimes. Scandinavian citizens,
in particular, usually proved exceptionally positive about the democratic performance of their states.
But the link between experience of democracy and satisfaction with its performance was not wholly
clear cut, as favorable evaluations are also evident in Ghana, South Africa, Mali, and Jordan, as well as in
Viet Nam and, to a lesser extent, China. Satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the
Communist autocracies deepens the puzzle already observed in terms of institutional confidence. What
do the Chinese and Vietnamese understand when they give high marks to democracy in their own
country? Is this an issue of how the term ‘democracy’ is conceptualized in Confucian cultures, if
understood as representing ‘government for the people’ rather than ‘government by the people’, as Shi
10
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
suggests?27 Is this due to the limits of using opinion polls to gauge political attitudes in autocratic states
which suppress freedom of speech and overt criticism of the governing party? Or is this the product of
effective state propaganda, a process which may encourage citizens to believe (falsely) that they already
live in a democratic state? The next chapter seeks to unravel the meaning of the concept of democracy,
to understand this further.
(iii) Support for democratic governance
Surveys have sought to tap public support for democratic principles in several ways.28 Perhaps
the most common approach has relied upon questions which ask the public to express their direct or
overt preferences for democratic rule as a normative ideal, using the ‘d’ word but without providing a
more specific context, concrete principles, or elaborating its meaning further. For example, surveys have
typically asked people whether they approve of democracy as the ‘best form of government’, whether
democracy is ‘preferable to any other form of government’, whether it is important ‘to live in a country
that is government democratically’, or whether they approve of having a democratic system ‘as a good
or suitable way of governing their own country’. The direct approach allows survey respondents to reply
using their own understanding of these terms, rather than imposing a common meaning. Similar direct
survey question have often been used to gauge opinions towards other complex normative concepts,
such as notions of equality, freedom, or human rights. At the same time, direct questions suffer from
certain important limits which put their face validity into question. It is important to explore the
underlying meaning, as well as the depth, of any overt support for democracy.29
Research based on the Global-barometer and the World Values Surveys suggest that during the
1990s, when asked directly, many citizens around the globe expressed widespread aspirations for
democratic principles as the best system of government. 30 The ‘Asian values’ thesis propounded by Lee
Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, claimed that democracy was a Western cultural
artifact.31 Confucian values, the thesis stressed, emphasize community rather than individualism, duties
rather than rights, and the importance of harmony, consensus, respect for authority, and an orderly
society.32 Nevertheless despite these claims, surveys have reported that in fact orientations towards
authority, as well as support for democracy, are remarkably similar in East Asia and Anglo-American
societies. 33 Indeed almost universal public approval for the abstract idea of democratic governance has
been expressed even in some of the most rigid East Asian autocracies, including Communist China and
Vietnam, where the public lacks any direct experience of living under this type of rule.34 In the Middle
East, as well, the region which lags furthest behind the rest of the world in democratic reforms, it might
11
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
be expected that support for democracy would be low. Yet the 2006 Arab Barometer survey reports that
eight or nine out of ten respondents in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait believe that ‘democracy is
the best form of government’ and that ‘having a democratic system of government would be good for
our country’.35 As Diamond summarized the survey evidence worldwide: “Strikingly, the belief that
democracy is (in principle at least) the best system is overwhelming and universal. While there is a
slightly higher preference for the Western industrialized countries, in every region – even the former
Soviet Union and the Muslim Middle East – an average of at least 80 percent of people polled say that
democracy is best.”36
[Table 5.4 about here]
To further confirm and update these patterns, direct or overt support for democracy can be
compared using the following question in the World Values Survey: “ I'm going to describe various types
of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one,
would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having
a democratic political system.” Most strikingly, overt support for democratic values was insignificantly
related to either the historical experience of democratization or to contemporary levels of democracy.
To understand why, Table 5.4 compares democratic values across the 51 societies included in the 2005
wave of the WVS. It confirms what many previous studies have reported: support for democracy as an
ideal form of governance proves over-whelming and almost universal today; almost nine out of ten
respondents approved of democratic governance as ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ good. Moreover positive attitudes
were expressed among the public living under every type of regime, including in autocracies, and also in
every cultural region, including in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that both the
Chinese and Viet Nam respondents say that they approve of democracy again requires more detailed
analysis and reinforces the need to understand what citizens in these countries understand by the
concept of democracy, an issue explored in the next chapter. Far from being a Western phenomenon, as
earlier research suggested, the WVS survey evidence indicates that approval of democratic governance
is widespread and universal, confirming previous studies based on the Global-barometers. 37 Democratic
states have not produced ‘the end of history’ but it seems as though democratic values have broad
appeal, even in unlikely places.
[Table 5.5 about here]
But has public enthusiasm for democracy possibly faded in recent years, reflecting the
slowdown which has occurred in the process of regime change? Contrary to gloomier predictions, during 12
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
the last decade, in fact direct support for democratic values and principles rose in two-thirds of the
countries under comparison (see Table 5.5). This was particularly notable in some of the post-
Communist societies, including Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, where approval had been well below
average during the mid-1990s. But at the same time trends during this decade are not whole uniform;
approval of democracy fell in South Korea and Romania, despite the fact that the spread of political
rights and civil liberties deepened in these countries during these years.
As an alternative measure, we can also compare the importance of democracy. Democratic
values in this regard are gauged from the World Values Survey 2005 in terms of the statement “How
important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means
it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” This
item is arguably superior to asking simply about approval for democratic values, as it seeks to gauge the
depth or strength of support. Moreover the 10-point scale allows respondents greater flexibility than
the standard 4-point attitudinal measure. Table 5.6 and Figure 5.5 confirm that in most countries, the
general public regards living in a democracy as important, a view especially popular among citizens in
long-established liberal democracies, but also expressed among those living in many autocratic states.
Overall the saliency of democracy also does deepen significantly with historical experience.
[Table 5.6 and Figure 5.5 about here]
(iv) Rejection of autocratic governance
The ubiquity of public approval of democracy around the world raises certain important
questions, however, about the measurement and interpretation of these results. Direct approval or
disapproval of democracy by itself is essentially ‘costless’, and hence it remains difficult to estimate the
weight which should be given to these responses. Thus although general approval of democratic
governance proved remarkably widespread in countries such as Ghana, Mali and Burkina Faso, it is
unclear from this evidence whether democracy is regarded as vital and urgent to people’s lives, or
whether it is seen as generally desirable but as less important than more immediate priorities facing
poorer societies, such as strengthening economic development, living standards, or security. Schedler
and Sarsfield argue that the validity of direct measures of abstract support for democracy can be
questioned due to the potential problems of interviewer effects generating ‘politically correct’
responses, as well as the vague, shifting and controversial meaning associated with ideas of
democracy.38 Instead, they argue, abstract measures need to be compared with attitudes towards more
specific, concrete, and detailed procedures, rights, and institutions associated with this form of 13
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
governance. Hence using a Mexican survey they analyzed approval of freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, political equality and tolerance of minority rights, without mentioning the term ‘democracy’
directly in these questions, to avoid cueing respondents. They report that Mexicans expressing the
strongest support for democracy also manifest illiberal convictions on at least some specific political
rights and civil liberties.
Another way to explore whether attitudes are robust is to compare alternative survey measures
using trade-off items where citizens are asked to express their preference for different types of regimes.
For example, in countries which have experienced a recent water-shed transition, notably in post-
communist Europe, surveys have commonly compared people’s evaluation of the current against the
previous regime.39 This is a useful item in the context of revolutionary upheaval, but it is less
appropriate in countries where democratization has been an evolutionary process of incremental
reforms, or with states such as Russia which have veered back and forth in their human rights record,
rather than experiencing a sharp and distinct break from the past regime. Democratization occurs
gradually in many states, with an extended series of steps transforming each polity. As an alternative, to
see whether people reject autocratic forms of government, the World Values Survey asks about the
desirability of military rule, rule by bureaucratic elites, and strong-man leadership unchecked by
parliament and elections. The standardized autocracy index combines these responses. Table 5.7 shows
the distribution of public opinion, where it is apparent that majorities reject these forms of autocratic
rule in all the countries under comparison. Disapproval is particularly strong among older liberal
democracies, where eight out of ten reject this type of regime, but it can also be observed by two-thirds
of the public living within autocratic states.
[Table 5.7 about here]
For comparability, to see whether the results remain robust and consistent with other
indicators, the Global-Barometer used a trade-off question to monitor regime preferences, as follows:
“Which of the following statements do you agree with most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind
of government. In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic
one. It doesn't matter to people like me whether we have a democratic government or a non-democratic
government.” The results confirm widespread popular support for democratic rule in the abstract, with
majority populations in 43 out of 49 societies preferring democracy over any other kind of government.
Most people also exercised a clear choice, with few responding that it didn’t matter to them either way.
Therefore the trade-off question employed in the Global-barometer surveys, where respondents are
14
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
offered a choice between democracy and autocracy, did produce a less overwhelming consensus that
simply asking about direct approval of democracy. Nevertheless both the Global-barometer and the
World Values surveys confirm the apparent universality of democracy’s appeal and its growing
popularity among a diverse range of contemporary societies, as well as the public’s rejection of
autocratic forms of government.
(v) Strength of nationalism
Lastly we can compare trends in the strength of nationalism, operating at the most abstract or
diffuse level of systems support. Lasting bonds to the nation reflect a sense of community within
common territorial boundaries. Such feelings are important for binding-together every nation-state, but
they are particularly significant for strengthening social cohesion and state legitimacy in multicultural
communities, in deeply-divided societies, and in fragile states emerging from long-lasting conflict.
Nationalism can be expected to weaken under the forces of globalization, especially in Western Europe,
due to the process of European Union integration. The experience of growing economic and political
integration within the EU, with people working, living, studying and traveling across the borders in
different member states, have dissolved traditional physical barriers. European identities can also be
expected to have gradually strengthened most among citizens of the founding states that have lived
under European institutions for a long time, such as Italy, France, and Germany. Despite these
predictions, in fact the empirical evidence that cosmopolitan identities have indeed come to supersede
the older attachments of nationalism, even in the EU, remains limited.40
[Table 5.8 and Figure 5.7 about here]
Nationalism is a complex concept but one way to measure its strength is through feelings of
national pride, as well as by the willingness of citizens to defend their own country in case of war. Table
5.7 shows the distribution of public opinion on the composite nationalism indicator used in this study.
The comparison shows that roughly eight out of ten people expressed strong levels of nationalism.
These feelings proved weakest in the older liberal democracies, especially in West European states and
in the historically-special cases of Germany and Japan. These indicators strengthened in the electoral
democracies and in autocracies, where feelings of national pride and willingness to fight for their
country were exceptionally strong in Turkey, Thailand, Viet Nam and Iran. The overall correlations in
Table 5.1 demonstrate that, at the most diffuse level, feelings of nationalism were negatively related to
both measures of democracy. Although democratic governance is often believed to have many intrinsic
and instrumental benefits, the pattern suggests that it does not lead to stronger feelings of national 15
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
community. One reason is that democratic states are often among the most cosmopolitan societies,
with open borders to information flows. Elsewhere, it has been demonstrated that cosmopolitan
communications weaken traditional attachments to the nation, especially among news users in these
types of societies.41 As some hope, and others fear, denser and faster interconnections across territorial
borders do thereby seem to gradually erode older allegiances and promote a more multicultural ethos.
[Figure 5.8 about here]
What of trends over time? Figure 5.8 shows that these expressive orientations were also
relatively stable during the last quarter century across most of the eleven countries with time-series
data available since the early-1980s. Hence nationalist feelings were persistently low in Germany and
Japan, reflecting the enduring legacy of World War II, in comparison to all the other countries. The major
changes in the series involved South Korea, where nationalism fell over the years, whereas by contrast
the indicator became more positive in South Africa, peaking around the time of the end of apartheid and
the first fully-democratic elections in the early-1990s.
Conclusions
This chapter sought to examine how far system support strengthened with historical
experienced of democratization, as well as how far it varied among contemporary types of regime, and
whether it strengthened over time among liberal democracies. The results suggest that at the most
specific level, confidence in public sector institutions and also approval of the democratic performance
of states usually varied more among countries within, rather than across, each type of contemporary
regime. Approval of democratic principles was remarkably widespread in most countries under
comparison, as many others have reported, and the time-series evidence suggests that support for
democracy usually rose during the last decade. Rejection of autocratic principles was strongest among
the older liberal democracies, but it was evident among the majority of the public in all countries, even
among those living under autocracies. Lastly the strength of nationalism was also high and these feelings
were particularly strong in the less democratic nations.
It remains to be determined why systems support, including overt lip service to democratic
values and approval of the democratic performance of their state, should be exceptionally high in Viet
Nam and China, one-party Communist states. This puzzle requires further investigation in subsequent
chapters and several alternative interpretations remain possible. Propaganda theories suggest that
public opinion polls cannot be relied upon when conducted in states which sharply curtail freedom of
16
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
speech over political issues and which stifle public expressions of dissent. 42 The cumulative result of
years, or even decades, of tight media control in restrictive and isolated societies such as Burma and
North Korea is usually assumed to have a powerful impact on citizens, especially the effect of state
control on political views.43 Autocracies with restrictive media environments aim to suppress critics and
to provide positive messages about the regime, rallying support for the authorities, as well as
manipulating more diffuse feelings of patriotism and spreading ideological values favorable to the
regime. State-run propaganda and official censorship may also mobilize public support for the
government. If state control succeeds in its objectives, then regular exposure to the news media in this
environment would be expected to generate confidence in the government and state institutions and to
reinforce a strong sense of nationalism. In a repressive climate, when responding to social surveys,
people in Viet Nam and China may be unwilling to express negative attitudes towards the current
regime. Yet this view is not given prime fascia support by the high level of approval of democracy
recorded in these nations. Alternatively, instrumental or performance-based interpretations suggest
that public opinion polls capture a genuine snap-shot of public opinion, with positive attitudes towards
government in Viet Nam and China reflecting the rapid growth rates, successful economic expansion,
and marked improvements in living standards experienced by millions of people living in these states in
recent years, as well as the pro-state ideological legacy of communism. 44 To explore these issues
further, the next chapter goes on to operationalize the concept of critical citizens, and then examine the
distinguishing characteristics of this syndrome.
17
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.1: Institutional confidence and historical experience of democracy
Note: V146-147 “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
18
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.2: Institutional confidence over time
Note: Institutional confidence scale (8) 1981-2005. V146-147 “I am going to name a number of
organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal
of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out
and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your
nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional
confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes
the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see
the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
19
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.3: Confidence in parliament over time
Note: Confidence in parliament, 1981-2005
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
20
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.4: Evaluation of democratic performance and historical experience of democracy
Note: V163. “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” For comparison, these items have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey, 2005
21
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.5: Democratic values and historical experience of democracy
Note: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
22
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.6: Anti-autocracy and historical experience of democracy
Note: Rejection of three items: V148-V150 “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.”; “Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country” Having the army rule.” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
23
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.7: Nationalism and historical experience of democracy
Notes: The nationalism index was constructed from the following items.
National pride: V209. “How proud are you to be [French]*? “ Very proud (4); Quite proud (3); Not very proud (2); Not at all proud (1).
Fight: V75. “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?”
For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
24
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Figure 5.8: Trends in nationalism over time
Note: The nationalism scale is constructed from two items: (V75) Willingness to fight for one’s country in a war and (V209) Feelings of national pride. These items are summed and standardized to a 100-point scale.
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
25
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.1: Dimensions of systems support and democratization
Dimension of system support Historical experience of democratization
Contemporary levels of democracy
N.
Nationalism -.280 * -.354 ** 52
Values: Approval of democratic principles
.103 N/s .063 N/s 51
Values: Rejection of autocratic principles
.653 ** .510 ** 51
Values: Importance of democracy .330 * .225 N/s 50
Evaluation of regime performance .371 ** .257 N/s 49
Confidence in public sector institutions -.126 N/s -.355 * 49
Notes: The figures represent the correlation coefficients and their significance. The historical experience of democratization is measured by the cumulative Freedom House index for political rights and civil liberties 1972-2006, standardized to a 100-point scale. Contemporary levels of democracy are measured by the nation’s score on the 2006 Freedom House index for political rights and civil liberties. For details about each of the scales measuring the dimensions of system support, see Tables 5.1 to 5.7. ** = significant at .01 level, * =significant at .05 level.
Source: World Values Survey
26
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.2: Confidence in public sector institutions worldwide
Older liberal democracies
Younger liberal democracies
Electoral democracies Autocracies
Finland 69 India 72 Jordan 78 Viet Nam 91Norway 67 Mali 71 Malaysia 72 China 80Switzerland 66 Indonesia 63 Turkey 69 Iran 62Cyprus 67 South Africa 66 Morocco 64 Russia 57Sweden 65 Korea, Rep 59 Burkina Faso 61Germany 64 Uruguay 58 Zambia 61United States 64 Brazil 57 Thailand 61Canada 64 Bulgaria 56 Colombia 56Australia 63 Chile 56 Ethiopia 54UK 62 Mexico 54 Moldova 50New Zealand 61 Romania 54Spain 61 Trinidad & Tobago 53Japan 60 Ukraine 53Italy 59 Taiwan 53France 57 Poland 53Netherlands 56 Slovenia 52
Serbia 51Antigua & Barbuda 46
Total 63 58 63 73 Note: V146-147 “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Surveys, 2005
27
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.3: Evaluations of the performance of democratic governance worldwide
Older liberal democracies
Younger liberal democracies
Electoral democracies
Autocracies
Norway 81
Ghana 85 Jordan 78 Viet Nam 80
Switzerland 76
Uruguay 77 Malaysia 70 China 67
Sweden 75
South Africa 74 Thailand 70 Iran 52
Spain 74
Mali 70 Zambia 67 Russia 44
Finland 74
Chile 70 Colombia 63
Germany 72
Antigua& Barbuda
70 Turkey 59
Australia 71
Taiwan 69 Burkina Faso 57
Canada 71
Mexico 66 Moldova 51
Japan 69
India 65 Morocco 50
France 66
Indonesia 65 Ethiopia 42
Cyprus 65
Korea, Rep 64
Netherlands 65
Brazil 62
United Kingdom 64
Slovenia 58
United States 63
Romania 58
Trinidad & Tobago 61
Poland 57
Italy 58
Andorra 54
Serbia 52 Bulgaria 43
Ukraine 42Total 6
963 60 63
Note: V163. “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” For comparison, these items have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
28
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.4: Approval of democratic principles worldwide
Older liberal democracies
Younger liberal democracies
Electoral democracies Autocracies
Sweden 98 Andorra 97 Ethiopia 98 China 94Norway 97 Indonesia 97 Morocco 96 Viet Nam 93Switzerland 96 Germany 96 Jordan 96 Iran 92Spain 96 Romania 95 Burkina Faso 95 Iraq 88Cyprus 96 Antigua & Barbuda 95 Turkey 93 Russia 80Germany 95 Taiwan 93 Thailand 93Italy 95 Chile 93 Zambia 92New Zealand 94 India 92 Malaysia 92Canada 91 Uruguay 91 Moldova 88Netherlands 91 South Africa 91 Colombia 88Australia 90 Brazil 90 Guatemala 87Trinidad & Tobago 90 Mali 88Finland 90 Slovenia 87United Kingdom 90 Bulgaria 87France 90 Poland 84Japan 88 Ukraine 80United States 88 Yugoslavia 80
Korea, Rep 79
Total 93 90 85 90
Note: V151: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” For comparison, this item has been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey, 2005
30
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.5: Change in approval of democratic principles, 1995-2005
Nation 1995 2005 Change 1995-2005Russian Federation 6 24 18Ukraine 20 36 16Moldova, 26 41 15Sweden 63 76 13Chile 30 42 12Uruguay 45 55 10Finland 31 39 8Taiwan 25 33 8Australia 52 59 7Germany 58 65 7Slovenia 41 47 5Brazil 27 30 3India 49 52 3Argentina 51 52 2Mexico 28 28 -1United States 55 52 -3Bulgaria 37 33 -5Colombia 35 27 -8Japan 43 35 -8Romania 66 54 -13Serbia 50 35 -15Republic of Korea (South) 45 24 -21Total 40 43 2Note: V151: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” Percentage ‘very good’. The table describes the mean distribution by nation in the 22 societies included in both waves.
Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005
31
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.6: Importance of democracy
Older liberal democracies Younger liberal democracies
Electoral democracies Autocracies
Sweden 95 Ghana 92 Jordan 94 Vietnam 92 Norway 93 Argentina 91 Ethiopia 92 Rwanda 89 Switzerland 93 Taiwan 89 Turkey 91 China 85 Germany 92 Uruguay 89 Morocco 89 Thailand 82 Cyprus 91 Andorra 89 Zambia 88 Iran 79 Australia 91 Poland 87 Burkina Faso 80 Russia 75 Canada 90 Mexico 87 Malaysia 79 Italy 88 South Africa 87 Moldova 79 United States 88 Romania 86 Colombia 79 Netherlands 87 Korea, Rep. 86 Finland 87 Indonesia 85 Spain 87 Brazil 82 Trinidad & Tobago 87 Chile 82 United Kingdom 86 Ukraine 80 Japan 85 Bulgaria 80 France 85 Slovenia 79
Mali 77 Serbia 75 India 71
Total 89 84 86 84
Note: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey, 2005
32
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.7: Rejection of autocratic principles worldwide
Older liberal democracies Younger liberal democracies Electoral democracies Autocracies
New Zealand 83 Andorra 78 Zambia 71 Viet Nam 78Norway 82 Antigua & Barbuda 75 Colombia 69 Iraq 71Germany 82 Slovenia 74 Ethiopia 68 China 67Sweden 81 Uruguay 73 Morocco 66 Russia 66Switzerland 81 Chile 72 Burkina Faso 64 Iran 61Canada 80 Korea, Rep 70 Guatemala 62Italy 80 Serbia 68 Moldova 62Australia 79 South Africa 68 Turkey 61Japan 79 Poland 66 Jordan 59United Kingdom 77 Taiwan 65 Thailand 58Spain 77 Ukraine 64 Malaysia 57Finland 77 Bulgaria 61United States 76 India 60Germany 75 Brazil 59Trinidad & Tobago 75 Indonesia 59Netherlands 74 Romania 59France 74 Mali 57Cyprus 69 Total 78 67 64 67Note: Rejection of three items: V148-V150 “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with
parliament and elections.”; “Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they
think is best for the country” Having the army rule.” For comparison, all indicators have been
standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items
contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey, 2005
33
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM
Table 5.8: Strength of nationalism worldwide
Older liberal democracies
Younger liberal democracies
Electoral democracies Autocracies
Trinidad & Tobago
91 Mali 96 Turkey 95 Viet Nam 96
Finland 87 Mexico 91 Thailand 95 Rwanda 95New Zealand 86 India 90 Burkina Faso 93 Iran 87Norway 86 South Africa 87 Jordan 93 Iraq 83United States 86 Poland 87 Guatemala 90 Russia 83Cyprus 86 Indonesia 86 Malaysia 89 China 77Canada 85 Slovenia 85 Ethiopia 88Australia 85 Uruguay 85 Morocco 85Sweden 83 Antigua Barbuda 83 Zambia 83United Kingdom 81 Chile 82 Moldova 70Spain 79 Serbia 79Switzerland 78 Romania 78Italy 75 Bulgaria 77France 75 Brazil 76Netherlands 71 Korea, Rep 75Germany 64 Andorra 74Japan 60 Ukraine 73
Taiwan 70Total 80 83 87 88
Notes: The nationalism index was constructed from the following items.
National pride: V209. “How proud are you to be [French]*? “ Very proud (4); Quite proud (3); Not very proud (2); Not at all proud (1).
Fight: V75. “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?”
For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.
Source: World Values Survey, 2005
34
1 Marc J. Hetherington. 2005. Why Trust Matters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2 Bruce Cain, Russell J. Dalton and Susan Scarrow. Eds. Democracy Transformed? The Expansion of Political
Access in Advanced Industrialized Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3 Harry Eckstein. 1961. A Theory of Stable Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton
University.
4 Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
5 Francis Fukuyama. 1989. ‘The end of history?’ The National Interest; Francis Fukuyama. 1992. The End of
History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
6 Arch Puddington. 2009. ‘Freedom in the world 2009: setbacks and resilience.’ Freedom in the World,
2009. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
7 Larry Diamond. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World.
New York: Times Books.
8 Samuel P. Huntington. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:
The University of Oklahoma Press.
9 Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press; Marta Lagos. 2003. ‘Support for and satisfaction with democracy.’ International Journal of Public
Opinion Research 15 (4): 471-487; Marta Lagos. 2003. ‘Public Opinion’ In Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael
Shifter. Eds. Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press; Rodolfo Sarsfield and F. Echegaray. 2006. ‘Opening the black box: How satisfaction with
democracy and its perceived efficacy affect regime preference in Latin America.’ International Journal of
Public Opinion Research 18 (2): 153-173.
10 C. Graham and A. Sukhtankar. 2004. ‘Does economic crisis reduce support for markets and democracy in
Latin America? Some evidence from surveys of public opinion and well being.’ Journal of Latin American
Studies 36 (2): 349-377; F. Panizza. 2005. ‘Unarmed utopia revisited: The resurgence of left-of-centre
politics in Latin America.’ Political Studies 53 (4): 716-734.
11 Michael Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van De Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
12 Marina Ottoway and Thomas Caothers. Eds. 2005. Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the
Middle East. Washington DC: Carnegie; Marina Ottoway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso. Eds . 2008. Beyond the
Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World. Washington DC: Carnegie.
13 K. Dalacoura. 2005. ‘US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: a
critique.’ International Affairs 81(5): 963-+; Thomas Carothers. 2006. ‘The Backlash against democracy
promotion.’ Foreign Affairs 85 (2): 55-68.
14 Robert Rotberg. Ed. 2007. Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations. Washington
DC: Brookings Institution Press.
15 M. Kent Jennings, Laura Stoker and Jake Bowers. 2009. ‘Politics across Generations: Family Transmission
Reexamined.’ Journal of Politics 71(3): 782-799.
16 Donald Sears and C.L. Funk. 1999. ‘Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults' political
predispositions.’ Journal of Politics 61: 1 -28.
17 Ronald Inglehart. 2003. ‘How solid is mass support for democracy: and how do we measure it?’ PS:
Political Science and Politics 36 (1):51-57.
18 Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press; Andreas Schedler. 1998. ‘What is democratic consolidation?’ Journal of
Democracy 9 (2): 91-107.
19 Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping political support in the 1990s.’ In Pippa Norris (ed). 1999.
Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20 Russell J. Dalton, 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in
Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press.
21 It remains unclear whether the result in Antigua and Barbuda is an anomaly or whether it reflects public
opinion. The Caribbean island, which gained independence in 1981, is a stable parliamentary democracy
with Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State, represented by the Governor General, and a prosperous tourism-
dependent economy. There have been a succession of scandals, however, and accusations of corruption
against the ruling Bird family.
22 See also, Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the
Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23 Christopher J. Anderson, and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. ‘Political institutions and satisfaction with
Democracy.’ American Political Science Review 91(1):66-81; Christopher J. Anderson, Andre Blais, Shaun
Bowler, Todd Donovan and Ola Listhaug. 2005. Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. New
York: Oxford University Press; Alexander F. Wagner, Friedrich Schneider, and Martin Halla. 2009. ‘The
quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe: A panel analysis.’ European
Journal of Political Economy 25 (1): 30-41; Kees Aarts and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. ‘Satisfaction with
democracy: Do institutions matter?’ Electoral Studies 27(1): 5-18.
24 Neil Nevitte and Mebs Kanji. 2002. ‘Authority orientations and political support: A cross-national analysis
of satisfaction with governments and democracy.’ Comparative Sociology 1(3-4):387-412.
25For a debate concerning the meaning, see D. Canache, J.J. Mondak and Mitch A. Seligson. 2001. ‘Meaning
and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction with democracy.’ Public Opinion Quarterly 65:
506–528; Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman. 2003. ‘Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used
indicator in comparative politics.’ European Journal of Political Research 42(3): 391 – 408.
26 Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman. 2003. ‘Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator
in comparative politics.’ European Journal of Political Research 42(3): 391 – 408.
27 Tian Jian Shi. 2009. ‘Talking past each other? Different understandings of democracy and their
consequences.’ IPSA 21st World Congress, Santiago.
28 William Mishler and Richard Rose. 1995. ‘Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-
Communist Europe.’ Comparative Political Studies 28:553-81; Richard Rose and William Mishler. 1996.
‘Testing the Churchill hypothesis: popular support for democracy and its alternatives.’ Journal of Public
Policy 16:29-58; Richard Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and Its
Alternatives in Post-Communist Europe: Testing the Churchill Hypothesis. Cambridge: Polity Press; Roderic
Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press;
Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes. 2001. ‘Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental.’
British Journal of Political Science 31(3); Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. Public
Opinion, Democracy, and Market Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull
Shin, eds., 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press;
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. 2008. How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press; Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. Eds. 2008. How East Asians
View Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.
29 Andreas Schedler and Rudolpho Sarsfield. 2007. ‘Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect
measures of democratic support.’ European Journal of Political Research 46 (5): 637-659.
30 Ronald Inglehart. 2003. ‘How solid is mass support for democracy: and how do we measure it?’ PS:
Political Science and Politics 36:51-57; Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. How People View
Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
31 Donald Emmerson. 1995. ‘Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate.’ Journal of Democracy 6, 4: 95-105.
32 Z. Wang. 2005. ‘Before the emergence of critical citizens: Economic development and political trust in
China.’ International Review of Sociology 15(1): 155-71.
33 Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds. 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific
Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press; Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin.
Eds. 2008. How East Asians View Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.
34 Larry Diamond. 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner
(eds). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. P.xi.
35 Mark Tessler and E. Gao. 2005. ‘Gauging Arab support for democracy’. Journal of Democracy. 16(3): 83-
97; Mark Tessler. 2002. ‘Do Islamic orientations influence attitudes toward democracy in the Arab world?
Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria’. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 43(3-
5): 229-249; Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler. 2008. ‘The Arab Aspiration for Democracy.’ Table 1. In Larry
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
36 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
37 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. In How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
38 Andreas Schedler and Rudolpho Sarsfield. 2007. ‘Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect
measures of democratic support.’ European Journal of Political Research 46 (5): 637-659.
39 William Mishler and Richard Rose. 1995. ‘Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-
Communist Europe.’ Comparative Political Studies 28:553-81; William Mishler and Richard Rose. 2002.
‘Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes.’ European Journal of
Political Research 41: 5. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998 . Democracy and Its
Alternatives in Post-Communist Europe: Testing the Churchill Hypothesis. Cambridge: Polity Press.
40 Sophie Duchesne and Andrè-Paul Frognier. 1995. ‘Is There a European Identity?’ In Public Opinion and
Internationalized Governance. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University
Press; Angelika Scheuer. 1999. ‘A Political Community?’ In Political Representation and Legitimacy in the
European Union. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press; T. Risse.
2001. ‘A European identity? Europeanization and the evolution of nation-state identities.’ In Transforming
Europe. Eds. M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. See also B. Nelson,
D. Roberts and W.Veit. (eds). The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity . Oxford:
Berg; Lauren M. McLaren. 2005. Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
41 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2009. Cosmopolitan Communications. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
42 Norris and Inglehart..
43 Brett Gary. 1999. The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Top Related