Download - Sinai, the New Egypt, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

7/31/2019 Sinai, the New Egypt, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

1/8

Vol. 12, No. 19 22 August 2012

Sinai, the New Egypt, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

Alan Baker

The peace relationship established in 1978-9 between Israel and Egypt constituted asignificant and groundbreaking change in the entire mindset of the international

community, in general, and in Middle East relationships, in particular. It was a

revolutionary change in the entire concept of Middle East political, military, economic,

and social relationships that laid the foundation for the ensuing Middle East peace

process between Israel and its other neighbors.

In Article III of the peace treaty, Egypt and Israel undertake: "to ensure that acts orthreats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not

committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any

other forces stationed on its territory."

Thus, both states are obligated to prevent the use of their territory for acts of terroragainst the other. In the context of the present situation in Sinai and the enhanced

terror activity by such organizations as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda, this means

that Egypt has the full sovereign responsibility and obligation to act in order to prevent

any such terror activity which could pose a threat to Israel.

The semi-demilitarization of Sinai, while considered necessary and agreed-upon in 1979,clearly did not visualize the possibility that thirty years hence the area would become a

haven for arms smuggling and terror infrastructure. In order to cope with just such

eventualities, the treaty enables various mechanisms to handle situations that crop up

on an ad-hoc basis and there is no express need for formal amendment to the peace

treaty itself. Conversely, any changes in the level of forces of the Egyptian army in Sinai

without Israels agreement would constitute a violation of the treaty.
http://jcpa.org/JCPA/index.asp


2/8

2

The present challenge and threat to the integrity of the peace treaty posed by theevolving character of Sinai is a challenge that can and should be handled within the

context of the peace treaty. It is perhaps the most serious test of the capability of Egypt

to prove to the world that even in an era of extreme political change, its interest is in

protecting and maintaining the integrity of the peace relationship with Israel.

Introduction

The transfer of leadership in Egypt into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, the consequent

effects on its internal political, social, economic and religious orientation and stability, its status

within the Middle East region, and the standing, strength, and influence of its military all pose

a serious quandary to the international community, in general, and to those countries within

Egypt's own neighborhood, in particular.

The continued integrity of the relationship between Egypt and Israel, based on the Treaty of

Peace between them signed over 33 years ago, which has served the strategic interests of both

states as well as of the international community, is perhaps the major test of how the new

Egypt chooses to see itself and its status in the region.

An integral component of this quandary is the Sinai Peninsula which has served as a buffer

between the two countries, where the presence of Egyptian military personnel, equipment, and

fortifications was limited by mutual agreement in the Treaty of Peace.

However, over the last few years, beginning before the recent changes in Egypt, but

accelerating considerably since these changes, the relative calm and remoteness of the SinaiPeninsula that served as the initial factor in determining its semi-demilitarization and its

character as a buffer area have given way to an extensive and lucrative arms and people-

smuggling industry by the local Bedouin tribes in coordination with Hamas and other terror

organizations, turning the area close to the border with Gaza and Israel into an arena of

lawlessness and a threat to peace.

Taking advantage of the internal turbulence in Egypt and the lack of serious Egyptian military

presence in the area, various terror organizations have developed an independent terror

infrastructure in Sinai, posing a real and immediate threat both to Israel and to Egypt's own

territorial integrity, and placing the integrity of the peace treaty in danger.

This analysis looks at the effects of these recent changes on the peace relationship between

Egypt and Israel, and the dilemma faced by both countries as to how to deal with the unruly

situation in Sinai.


3/8

3

The Unique Nature of the Peace Relationship

For over thirty years, in a Middle East fraught with unceasing change, tension and surprise,

there has nevertheless been one "island" of relative stability the relationship between Egypt

and Israel.

This stability was born out of very sound, solid and logical foundations that evolved as a result

of several factors, both practical and symbolic. These factors included:

An initial period of full-fledged belligerency and hostility between the two countries andtheir populations (1948-9)

1

A period of armistice, accompanied by cross-border acts of terror (by militants known asFedayeen) and reprisals (1949-67),

2and an aggressive Arab boycott of Israel, led by

Egypt3

Renewed hostilities and occupation of Sinai by Israel (1956-7, and 1967) Movement towards reconciliation with the 1975 Interim Agreement terminating the

state of belligerency4

The 1978 Camp David negotiations and Accords,5 and the ensuing negotiation andsigning of the 1979 Peace Treaty,

6heralding a full and open relationship of peace, with

diplomatic, commercial and other relations

A series of "normalization" agreements signed between 1979 and 1983, deepening thecivil relationship between the two countries in such fields as trade, aviation, cultural

relations, agricultural cooperation, customs cooperation, tourism, etc.

An ongoing, stable, yet low-level peace relationship between the countriesThe peace relationship that evolved between Israel and Egypt, founded upon this sequence of

events, with the concomitant psychological effects on the populations of each side, constituted

a significant and groundbreaking change in the entire mindset of the international community,

in general, and in Middle East relationships, in particular.

The peace relationship established in 1978-9 was, in fact, far more than a theoreticaltermination of belligerency. It was a revolutionary change in the entire concept of Middle East

political, military, economic, and social relationships that laid the foundation for the ensuing

Middle East peace process between Israel and its other neighbors, principally the Palestinians.

The significance of the peace relationship between Egypt and Israel, therefore, extends beyond

the specific written commitments in the actual peace treaty itself or in the lengthy list of


4/8

4

normalization agreements signed between the parties after the peace treaty, or even the

day-to-day issues arising between the two countries in the diplomatic and political spheres. Its

relative weight and authority holds a place of its own as the anchor for Middle East peace,

which cannot be underestimated or minimized, whatever might be the practical or volatile

state of the day-to-day relations.

Effect of Recent Developments

In light of recent developments in Egypt and in the Sinai Peninsula, in particular, some concern

is being voiced as to whether the integrity of the peace relationship between Egypt and Israel

can remain intact. This concern stems from a number of considerations:

The nature, composition and ideological basis of the newly formed Egyptianadministration and leadership, composed as it is of the Muslim Brotherhood, some of

whose leaders and spokesmen have called for a review or even revocation of the peacetreaty with Israel and reconsideration of Egypts alliances.7

Within the process of change taking place in Egypt, the lack of security control by theEgyptian military in Sinai has enabled a situation of enhanced terror activity there.

Terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda and the larger global jihad network have penetrated

the area, exploiting the governments neglect of the region and inflaming the local

populations feelings of disenfranchisement.8

Legal Parameters between Egypt and Israel

The basic, legal, and permanent parameters guiding Egypt and Israel in their relationship are set

out in the peace treaty.

Establishment of Peace

The termination of the state of war and installation of a state of peace in Article I of the treaty9

created a new legal and political framework extending beyond the concept of mere contractual

terminology.

Threats of "revoking" the peace treaty would, in effect, be legally questionable as long as the

relationship between the parties does not revert back into a "state of war" through specific

belligerent activity in stark violation of the treaty a highly unlikely possibility given the

realities of the region.


5/8

5

Territorial Inviolability

The mutual recognition of the inviolability of the international boundary between them in

Article II of the peace treaty includes the obligation to "respect the territorial integrity of the

other."10

In Article III they further undertake:

to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate

from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its

control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population,

citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from

organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of

belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere.11

The significance of these obligations is clear in that both states are obligated to prevent the use

of their territory for acts of terror against the other, and are reciprocally obligated not to violate

their mutual boundary.

In the context of the present situation in Sinai and the enhanced terror activity by such

organizations as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda, this means that Egypt has the full

sovereign responsibility and obligation to act in order to prevent any such terror activity which

could pose a threat to Israel.

Assuming that the Egyptian leadership is willing, clearly the question remains as to whether

Egypt has the military capability to fulfill its treaty obligation in light of the prevailing

circumstances and treaty limitations.

Demilitarization of Sinai

The Security Annex to the peace treaty places limitations on the type of forces that Egypt may

maintain in Sinai, beginning with the stationing of one mechanized infantry division and its

military installations and field fortifications in Zone A closest to the Suez Canal.12

In Zone B in

central Sinai "Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weapons and

wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police."13

In Zone C, the area

closest to the border with Israel, the agreed-upon limitations prevent any military presence,

and only "Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal police functions

within this Zone."

14

This semi-demilitarization of Sinai, while considered necessary and agreed-upon in 1979 inter

alia as one of the measures to instill confidence between the parties after the long period of

belligerency between them, clearly did not visualize the possibility that thirty years hence the

area would become a haven for arms smuggling and terror infrastructure.


6/8


7/8

7

context of peace between the two countries, are both central factors that, by all logic, should

rise above momentary political trends and emotions.

The present challenge and threat to the integrity of the peace treaty posed by the evolving

character of Sinai, from the quiet and remote buffer zone of 1979 into a staging post for terror

and violence, is a challenge that can and should be handled within the context of the peacetreaty. It is perhaps the most serious test of the strength of that treaty and of the capability of

Egypt to prove to the world that even in an era of extreme political change, its interest is in

protecting and maintaining the integrity of the peace relationship with Israel.

* * *

Notes

1. See the formal declaration by the Arab League states of their intention to invade Palestine at:

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-

1974/5+Arab+League+declaration+on+the+invasion+of+Pales.htm2. Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement, February 24, 1949,

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Israel-

Egypt+Armistice+Agreement.htm. See Article II(2): No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military

forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or

para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall

advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line.

3. On 1 September 1951 the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon Egypt to terminate restrictions on

the passage of ships through the Suez Canal: Security Council, 6th yr., 558th mtg., para. 5, S/2298/Rev.l.

4. The Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt, September 4, 1975,

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Interim+Agreement+between+Israel+a

nd+Egypt.htm

5. Camp David Accords, September 17, 1978,http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htm

6. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Peace+Treaty.htm

7. Jack Khoury, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Fate of Israel Peace Treaty May Be Decided in Referendum,"

Ha'aretz, January 1, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fate-of-israel-

peace-treaty-may-be-decided-in-referendum-1.404889. See also the February 2011 Pechter Poll in which 38

percent of Egyptians favored ending the peace treaty, while 31 percent disagreed.

http://www.pechterpolls.com/pmep-egypt-poll-february-2011/

8. See Prof. Itamar Rabinovitch, "The Sinai Powder Keg," Project Syndicate, August 13, 2012, http://www.project-

syndicate.org/commentary/the-sinai-powder-keg-by-itamar-rabinovich

9. "The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the

exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty."

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Peace+Treaty.htm

10. Ibid., Article II11. Ibid., Article III(2)

12. Ibid., Annex I, Article II(1)a

13. Ibid., Article II(1)b

14. Ibid., Article II(1)c

15. Ibid., Article IV(1)

16. Dennis Ross, Egypt's New Leaders Must Accept Reality, Washington Post, August 19, 2012,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dennis-ross-egypts-new-leaders-must-accept-

reality/2012/08/19/46e60810-e8ad-11e1-936a-b801f1abab19_story.html; Eli Bardenstein, Netanyahu to Cairo:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/5+Arab+League+declaration+on+the+invasion+of+Pales.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/5+Arab+League+declaration+on+the+invasion+of+Pales.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Israel-Egypt+Armistice+Agreement.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Israel-Egypt+Armistice+Agreement.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Israel-Egypt+Armistice+Agreement.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Interim+Agreement+between+Israel+and+Egypt.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Interim+Agreement+between+Israel+and+Egypt.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Peace+Treaty.htmhttp://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fate-of-israel-peace-treaty-may-be-decided-in-referendum-1.404889http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fate-of-israel-peace-treaty-may-be-decided-in-referendum-1.404889http://www.pechterpolls.com/pmep-egypt-poll-february-2011/http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-sinai-powder-keg-by-itamar-rabinovichhttp://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-sinai-powder-keg-by-itamar-rabinovichhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Peace+Treaty.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Peace+Treaty.htmhttp://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-sinai-powder-keg-by-itamar-rabinovichhttp://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-sinai-powder-keg-by-itamar-rabinovichhttp://www.pechterpolls.com/pmep-egypt-poll-february-2011/http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fate-of-israel-peace-treaty-may-be-decided-in-referendum-1.404889http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fate-of-israel-peace-treaty-may-be-decided-in-referendum-1.404889http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Peace+Treaty.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Interim+Agreement+between+Israel+and+Egypt.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Interim+Agreement+between+Israel+and+Egypt.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Israel-Egypt+Armistice+Agreement.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Israel-Egypt+Armistice+Agreement.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/5+Arab+League+declaration+on+the+invasion+of+Pales.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/5+Arab+League+declaration+on+the+invasion+of+Pales.htm


8/8

8

Remove Egyptian Tanks from Sinai, Maariv, August 21, 2012,

http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/396/980.html?hp=1&cat=404

* * *

Alan Baker, Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for PublicAffairs, served as the Ambassador of the State of Israel to Canada from 2004-2008, and before

that was the legal adviser of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:

http://www.jcpa.org

Dore Gold, Publisher; Amb. Alan Baker, ICA Director; Mark Ami-El, Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

(Registered Amuta), 13 Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-561-9281, Fax. 972-2-561-9112, Email:

jcpa@net visi on.ne t.i l. In U.S.A.: Cent er for Jewi sh Community Studi es, 7 Chur ch Lane, Suite 9, Balt imore, MD 21208;

Tel. 410-653-7779; Fax 410-653-8889. Website: www.jcpa.org. Copyright. The opinions expressed herein do notnecessarily reflect those of the Board of Fellows of the Jeru salem Center for Public Affairs.

The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) is dedicated

to providing a forum for Israeli policy discussion and debate.

To subscribe to the Jerusalem Issue Brief list, please send a blank email message to: [email protected]

To unsubscribe from the Jerusalem Issue Brief list, please send a blank email message to: [email protected]
http://www.jcpa.org/http://www.jcpa.org/http://www.jcpa.org/