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E P I B R I E F I N G PA P E RE c o N o m I c P o l I c y I N s t I t u t E s E P t E m B E R 2 2 , 2 0 1 0 B R I E F I N G P A P E R # 2 7 9
Unemployment has remained at 9.5%1 or above or more than a year, and may remain that high or inch even
higher through the end o 2011. Te predominant, and in our view correct, narrative to describe this situation
has been that the bursting o the housing bubble and the resulting loss o wealth led to sharp cutbacks in
consumer spending. Te loss o consumers, along with nancial market chaos brought on by the bubbles burst, also led
to a collapse in business investment. As consumer spending and business investment dried up, severe job loss ollowed.
Further, even ater economic output stopped contracting (in roughly the middle o 2009), its subsequent growth has not
been nearly rapid enough to create the jobs needed to even keep pace with normal population growth, let alone to put
the backlog o workers who lost their jobs during the collapse back to work.
Our view that this is the correct explanation or the jobs crisis is rooted in datathe observed collapse o overall
output, reductions in consumption, and extensive excess capacity. Te policy conclusion drawn rom this narrative is
that we need aster growth to increase the demand or workers and reduce unemployment.
Yet, there has been increased attention to a competing narrative, the possibility that a large share o current high
unemployment is structural, meaning that the problem is that those who are unemployed are not well-suited to the
jobs becoming available.2 Tis would be, or instance, because their skills are inadequate, have deteriorated, or are not
applicable to the industries that are expanding, or that
the unemployed simply do not live in the places where the
jobs are. Some make claims about structural unemploymentbecause certain aggregate relationships, such as between
job openings and unemployment, do not appear to be
ollowing historical patterns, suggesting a possible skill
mismatch. Others have postulated that employers have
substantially revamped their production processes in this
downturn, thereby eliminating the need or many o the
types o workers who are currently unemployed. Still others
T a b l e o C o n T e n T s
skpticim pprprit ....................................................................3
lkig r vidc .........................................................................5
Ccui ............................................................................................10
www.ep.
Reasons foR skepticismabout stRuctuRal
unemploymentexmiig th Dmd-sid evidc
B y l a W r E n c E m i s H E l , H E i D i s H i E r H o l z , a n D K a t H r y n E D W a r D s
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note that the housing bubble lead to a bloated construc-
tion sector and many o those jobs will never come back,
leaving many workers needing to switch to new jobs or
which they may not be qualied.
O course, it matters whether the claim is that structural
unemployment is a large or small share o unemploy-ment at this stage o the business cycle. Unless our current
unemployment problem is primarily structural, policies
to alleviate cyclical unemployment are still appropriate.
Tus, this paper addresses and questions the claim that
structural unemployment is the predominant reason that
unemployment is high. Tere has been little evidence
oered to support the claim o extensive structural un-
employment, and we nd that the pattern o employer
behavior regarding job openings, layos, and hires does
not support such a claim. his matters quite a bit or
guiding policy. Te policy implications o a nding that
our high unemployment is primarily structural are that:
(1) it would be oolhardy to use urther demand manage-
ment (scal stimulus, either tax cuts or increased spending,
or monetary policy) to lower unemployment; and, (2) the
appropriate policy is to oer education and training to
the unemployed to help them make a transition to new
occupations and sectors.
Lest we be accused o critiquing a straw man, note the
recent statement o the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank
president, Narayana Kocherlakota:
What does this change in the relationship between
job openings and unemployment connote? In a
word, mismatch. Firms have jobs, but cant nd
appropriate workers. Te workers want to work,
but cant nd appropriate jobs. Tere are many
possible sources o mismatchgeography, skills,
demographyand they are probably all at work.
Whatever the source, though, it is hard to see
how the Fed can do much to cure this problem.Monetary stimulus has provided conditions
so that manuacturing plants want to hire new
workers. But the Fed does not have a means to
transorm construction workers into manuac-
turing workers.
O course, the key question is: How much
o the current unemployment rate is really due
to mismatch, as opposed to conditions that the
Fed can readily ameliorate? Te answer seems to
be a lot.Most o the existing unemployment
represents mismatch that is not readily amenableto monetary policy. (Kocherlakota 2010)
Te competing explanation, as mentioned above, is the
one we nd most plausible: the economy is operating
ar below its potential output because o a shortall
in demand caused by an extreme loss o inancial and
housing wealth that caused a cut back in consump-
tion. hus, there are simply not enough jobs to go
around. Evidence or this explanation ocuses on such
indicators as low operating capacity in manuacturing,
which was 71.6% in June 2010, down rom 79.1%
in December 2007.3 Vacancies in commercial oices
(now at 17.4%) (Canalog 2010) are a urther indica-
tion o excess capacity. he bottom line is that total
demand in the second quarter o 2010 is still below its
pre-recession level.4 In act, total output, as measured
by gross domestic product, was still 1.3% below its
pre-recession level.5 O course, one would expect
demand and output to have grown substantially over
the two-and-a-hal years since the recession began.
he Congressional Budget Oice conservatively puts
the output gapthe dierence between potential
and actual outputat 6.4% in the second quarter.6
Te deceleration o ination is another sign o weak
demand, with core ination (excluding uel and ood)
decelerating rom 2.3% to 1.8% to 1.0% over the last
three years.7 Lower ination or deation is a strong in-
dicator that total demand has declined, leaving rms
with excess capacity. Similarly, very low interest rates
accompanying large ederal decits are another sign o
slack in demand, as this would not be the case i rmsand households were borrowing at their usual scale.
In our view, the pervasiveness o: (1) lost employment
and output across sectors; and (2) high unemployment
across types o workers by state, education, age, and
occupation suggests an aggregate or macroeconomic
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explanation rather than one rooted in a ew sectors or
locations or because o the lacking skills o some workers.
s rrTe claim that current unemployment is primarily struc-
tural should require much more evidence than seems tobe oered because common sense would deny such an
explanation. Ater all, a structural unemployment story
presumes that millions o workers are now inadequately
prepared or available jobs even though they were ruit-
ully employed just a ew months or years ago.
Productivity, technology investment: Did the
economy transorm itsel rom the end o 2007 to the
beginning o 2010? What would lead us to believe
that, and what ootprints would such a transormation
leave? One would imagine that such a transormation
would be associated with sizeable productivity gains
and signicant investments. Productivity did grow a
pretty spectacular 6.3% rom early 2009 to early 2010.8
However, thats the ull extent o productivity growth
since the start o the recession, a total o 6.3% growth
over a two-and-a-hal year period. In the last quarter,
the second quarter o 2010 that has received so much
attention or the ailure o unemployment to all, pro-
ductivity was actually negative, a decline o 1.8%. Net
investment in business equipment and sotware in 2009
(the latest data) was actually negative, the rst time this
occurred since World War II. In other words, the alleged
structural transormation o production processes was
notassociated with new equipment or new technological
processes (requiring sotware). It is reasonable to doubt
whether it happened at all.
Location: Is it just a need or greater mobility, or
the unemployed to move to where jobs are more plentiul?
Well, where would they go? Te disparity between states
unemployment rates is indeed striking, ranging rom
14.3% in Nevada to 3.6% in North Dakota.9 In act,there are 11 states where the unemployment rate in June
was less than 7.0%. Still, it is not as simple as a geo-
graphical mismatch, with high perorming and low per-
orming states. Tese 11 states with low unemployment
have a total adult population o about 17 million, or
about 7.0 % o the U.S. total.10 I the unemployed (14.6
million in June) moved to those states they would nearly
double the labor orce there. A similar calculation can be
made or states whose unemployment has risen by 3.0
percentage points or less. Te ailure to relocate can-
not explain high unemployment unless the receiving
states could readily absorb the unemployed. Tat is
simply not the case.Construction: A minor oray into labor market data
suggests that construction does not play the outsized
role imagined by the president o the Minnesota Federal
Reserve Bank and many other commentators. Tough
a construction story is perhaps intuitive given the role
o the housing bubble, it is noteworthy that those who
see a large role or construction have not examined the
associated labor market data. It is true that construc-
tion has lost many jobs in this downturn, losing nearly 2
million jobs rom the start o the recession through the
second quarter o 2010. Tis accounts or about 25%
o all private-sector jobs lost.11 Is this whats ueling the
unemployment problem? Te answer is No, not at all.
As shown in Figure A, in the second quarter o 2010 un-
employed construction workers comprised 12.4% o the
unemployed and 12.5% o the long-term unemployed:
this means that unemployed construction workers are
not more likely to be long-term unemployed than those
displaced rom other sectors. Even beore the reces-
sion, in 2007, unemployed construction workers were
10.6% o all unemployed and 11.0% o the long-term
unemployed.12 Te notion that unemployed construc-
tion workers are ueling unemployment is not true. Just
because there was an extreme loss o jobs in construction
does not imply that those workers are driving up unem-
ployment: many ound jobs in other sectors and some
have let the country.
Beveridge Curve: Te Beveridge Curve describes
the historical relationship between unemployment and
job openings, and allows one to predict how high or low
the unemployment rate should be given a certain numbero job openings. Tere has been much attention to the
mid-July blog post by David Altig (Altig 2010a), senior
vice president and research director at the Atlanta
Federal Reserve Bank who used such an analysis to
suggest that almost a third o the unemployed, 4.6 million
workers, are structurally unemployed. Less noticed is that
Altig backed o this claim just a month later.
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f i g u R e a
shr th tt umpyd d g-trm umpyd wh r ctructi wrkr,
2007q2 - 2010q2
NotE: Data are not seasonally adjusted; data shown are not time series but second quarter of each year only.
souRcE: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
2007q2 2008q2 2009q2 2010q2
Ctructi hr umpyd
Ctructi hr g-trm umpyd
In mid-July Altig wrote in Macroblog, the Atlanta
Federal Banks blog,
Since the second quarter o last year, the un-
employment rate has ar exceeded the level that
would be predicted by the average correlation
between unemployment and job vacancies over
the past decade.
Te dashed line in the chart above, which isestimated rom the data rom 200008, represents
the predicted relationship between the number
o unemployed persons in the United States and
the number o job openings. Tat simple rela-
tionship would suggest that, given the average
number o job openings in April and May, the
unemployed would be expected to number about
10.4 millionnot the nearly 15 million we
actually saw. (Altig 2010a)
Tis claim was based solely on a simple analysis o job
openings and unemployment since 2000, encompassing
the experiences o just two recessions (the Job Openings and
Labor urnover Survey data used in the analysis only
became available in late 2000). Altig conscientiously
backed o (Altig 2010b) in mid-August rom his mid-July claim ater a more in-depth analysis o job openings
and unemployment was presented by Cleveland Federal
Reserve economists Murat asci and John Lindner (asci
and Linder 2010). Using more data to obtain a longer
time rame (going back to 1951) asci and Lindner ound
that unemployment being higher than what the Beveridge
Curve would suggest is not an anomalous relationship
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between job openings and unemployment, but typical o
deep recessions and what happened in the initial recoveries
ollowing the deep recessions in the 1970s and 1980s.
Altig cites asci and Lindners ndings that:
Hence, cyclical changes may not necessarilypresent themselves asa neat movement along
the curve. During and ater recessions in the
postwar period, the Beveridge Curve has gener-
ally ollowed a pattern o shiting to the right
during a recovery. One potential reason or this
could be that even though some unemployed
workers start lling the available job openings,
workers who had let the labor orce might get
encouraged by the recovery and start looking or
a job, thereby keeping the unemployment high.
While the Census may have skewed the data or
this recovery, the path o the curve going orward
looks poised to ollow in the ootsteps o previous
recessionary periods. (asci and Linder 2010)
Altig then backs o o his earlier claim, ending his post by
approvingly listing asci and Lindners conclusion that,
Firm conclusions will only be able to be drawn as more
data are generated (asci and Linder 2010).
l r vOne o the curious aspects o this developing structural
unemployment storyline is how hard it is to nd any
research trying to tie this story to actual detailed trends
in employment, unemployment, or output data. We
explore patterns o employer job openings, layos, and
hiring in this paper to see i they correspond to a structural
unemployment story. his paper, then, presents an
examination o the demand side or the employer side
o the market. We will oer other data ocused on the
characteristics o the unemployed, the supply side, inanother paper. At this point, however, we would point to
a ew trends. We nd:
Claims that todays unemployment is predominantly
structural should be treated skeptically since that
implies that people gainully employed a year or two
ago are now inappropriate or available jobs;
Te notion that work processes have dramatically
changed over the recession, leaving millions o workers
unqualied or work, is hard to square with the low
levels o investment in equipment and sotware and
the meager productivity growth, just 6.3% in two-
and-a-hal years.Tough construction employment has allen substan-
tially, this has not ueled either unemployment or
long-term unemployment as constructions share o
both unemployment and long-term unemployment
remains very near its pre-recession level.
Claims that we are experiencing an anomalous rise in
unemployment relative to job openings are not true:
the same thing happened in the deep recessions o the
1970s and 1980s.
Lack o geographic mobility cant explain unemploy-
ment since the 11 states with less than 7.0% unem-
ployment would have to double their labor orces to
absorb the unemployed.
Tere have been between ve and six unemployed or
every job opening (the job seeker ratio) since mid-2009,
suggesting a shortage o jobs. Te job seeker ratio is
roughly double what it was in the last recession and
reects, in large part, that job openings are one-ourth
lower now than they were in the last recovery.
In the rst 12 months o this recovery there were 32.0
million job openings, 10.0 million ewer than the rst
12 months o the prior recovery, one known or being
a jobless recovery.
Te shortall o job openings in this recovery compared
to the last one is pervasive: it is evident in nearly every
sector including labor intensive service industries such as
hospitality, entertainment, and accommodation. Con-
struction is responsible or just 6% o the overall shortallin openings in this recovery compared to the last one.
Layos during the early stages o this recovery are
comparable to those in the prior recovery, and cannot
explain high unemployment.
Hiring exceeds openings in the private sector more so
now than earlier in this recession and more so than in
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f i g u R e b
Th j kr rtiThe number o unemployed workers per job opening
numbero
uempoyedworkersperjobope
ig
NotE: Shaded areas denote recession.
souRcE: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
the early 2000s recession. Tis evidence runs contrary
to notions that employers are having more difculty
now lling jobs.
Te ollowing analysis examines data rom job openings,
layos, and hires to determine whether the pattern o
evidence its the claim that current unemployment is
predominantly structural.
Job openings
Te job seekers ratio, which is the number o unemploy-ment workers per job opening, provides ample evidence
o a demand-side problem.13 Simply put, the number o
job openings has been ar too ew to accommodate those
looking or work. As Figure B shows, the ratio exceeded
six in the summer o 2009 but has dropped to the low ve
range more recently (once the Census jobs were lled).
Even i the unemployed lled every job opening there
would still remain many unemployed workers, an indica-
tion o too ew job openings: in other words, even i every
single job opening in the United States was lled, 80%
o the unemployed would still be unemployed because
there are no jobs for them. Te ratio o unemployed to job
openings in recent months has been nearly double that
attained at the worst points o the early 2000s recession,
a ratio o 2.8. Tis reects, at least in part, that total job
openings in the last hal o 2009 were 25% below those in
mid-2003, when the job seekers ratio was peaking in the
last recession.We can examine this urther by comparing the cumu-
lative number o job openings in the last recovery to this
one, looking at the rst 12 months o each recovery. We
assume June 2009 is the start o the recent recovery,
meaning the start o the growth o the economy ater it
shrank in the downturn. Te earlier recovery began in
November 2001 (the Job Openings and Labor urnover
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
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01
sep.-
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03
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04
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04
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nv. 2001: 2.5
Dc. 2007: 1.8
nv. 2009: 6.2
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Survey is relatively new, dating back to only December
2000, and thereore does not provide data on earlier
recoveries). Figure C shows that the cumulative job
openings in this recoverys rst year were about 32.0
million, roughly 10.0 million ewer than the cumula-
tive openings in the early 2000s recovery. Keep in mind,
however, that the recovery o the early 2000s is a low
bar: it is known as a jobless recovery, as the economy
shed an additional 600,000 jobs afterthe recession had
ended. Indeed, job growth did not ully establish itseluntil September 2003, 22 months into recovery. Yet the
current recovery has generated ar ewer job openings,
and there are ewer opportunities or job seekers now
than in the jobless recovery o the early 2000s. We would
conclude that we have had a signicant shortall in new
job openings recently, even when measured against the
pitiully weak recovery o the early 2000s.
By sectors: A shortall in job openings is clear, yet a
structural shit would still be evident i this shortall was
concentrated in a ew specic industries. Is that short-
all in new jobs concentrated in a ew industries, like the
much-discussed construction industry whose growth
was ueled by a housing bubble in the earlier recovery?
Figure D shows the ratio in each sector o the cumula-
tive job openings in the current recovery to those in the
early 2000s recovery. Tis measure shows how ar short
this recoverys job openings are to those o the earlierrecovery or each sector. It is clear that the shortall
in job openings is pervasive, occurring in every sector
except mining. Across all sectors, openings averaged 72%
o those in the earlier recovery. Sure, recent construction
job openings were just 58% o those in the earlier recovery.
And, there has been an acute shortall in manuacturing
job openings recently. However, the shortall in job openings
f i g u R e c
Cumutiv privt-ctr j pigFirst 12 months o 2001 and 2009 recoveries
Jopopeigs(miios)
Mth it rcvry
* 2001: Nov. 2001, 2009: June 2009.
souRcE: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
octr 2002: 42.8 mii
My 2010:
32.0 mii
0
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10
15
20
25
30
35
40
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2001 rcvry
2009 rcvry
*
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f i g u R e d
shrt i j pigThe ratio o cumulative jobs openings rom the rst 12 months o the 2009 recovery (June 2009 - May 2010)
to the cumulative job openings rom the 2001 recovery (Nov. 2001 - Oct. 2002), by industry
souRcE: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
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was also very severe in labor intensive service industries
such as hospitality, entertainment, and accommodation.
It is time to stop thinking about unemployment and
the ailure to generate job openings as being driven by
developments in particular sectors since the trends are
pervasive across essentially all sectors.
Table 1 shows the job opening data or each sector
in both the 2001 and 2007 recoveries to urther asses thescale o the recent openings shortall by sector. Construc-
tion is responsible or 5.7% o the recent shortall in
openings but that is comparable to that sectors 5.5% share
o employment, meaning construction has not played any
outsized role in the ailure or openings to rise as ast now
as in the earlier recovery. Te shortall has predominately
been driven by private-sector service industries (proes-
sional and business services, health, education, entertain-
ment, hospitality, and accommodations), which generated
71% o the openings shortall, though had only 46% o
total employment. In act, the worst perorming industry
under this measure was leisure and hospitality, which
accounts or 10% o employment but 18% o the job
openings shortall.
LayofsMaybe the issue is that we have been seeing more structural
changes within industries or shits across industries that
are leading to more layos, thereby impeding a growth in
overall employment. Tat is, maybe the weak net gains in
employment in this recovery are due to a higher rate o
layos or worker displacements. A look at the cumulative
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t a b l e 1
souRcE: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
layos in this recovery compared to the last recovery, as
in Figure E, shows that layos are not a piece that lls
in any puzzle: the cumulative layos in each recovery are
very similar.
Filling job openingsLast, we examine whether it is harder to ll job openings,
an indication that structural challenges such as having
workers with the right skills or in the right locations are
evident. Te data or the private sector, however, show it
is easier to hire people now than in the last recovery, at
least as reected in the ratio o hires per job opening (see
Figure F).14 Te ratio o hires per job opening provides
a sense o how difcult it is to translate openingsa
vacancyinto an actual hire. Presumably i it is difcult
to hire adequately skilled workers, then it should take
longer to ll vacancies and the ratio o hires to openings
should all. In act, the opposite has occurred: the ratio
has been somewhat higher in this recovery (averaging
1.7 hires per job opening) relative to the earlier recovery
(averaging 1.5 hires per job opening). Tis suggests that
it has become a bit easier to ll openings in this recession
than the last recession.
Moreover, this ratio has increased since the reces-
sion started. Not only is it easier to hire now than it was
nine year ago, but it is easier even since the start o the
Cumutiv j pig i mjr ctr, rt 12 mth rcvry,
2001 cmprd t 2009 rcvry
Cumutiv j pig (000)shr
difrc
shr
mpymt,
2007Idutry
2001 recovery
( Nov .2001-Oct. 2002)
2009 recovery
(June 2009-May 2009) Diference
ta nnfar 42,754 32,219 -10,535 100.0% 100.0%
Gvernen 1,163 1,606 443 -4.2 16.1
ta privae 37,546 27,452 -10,094 95.8 83.9
mining and gging 106 131 25 -0.2 0.5
cnrin 1,428 824 -604 5.7 5.5
manfaring 2,941 1,851 -1,090 10.3 10.1
trade, ranprain, and iiie 6,651 4,953 -1,698 16.1 19.4
Reai 4,212 3,164 -1,048 9.9 11.3
Infrain 1,077 849 -228 2.2 2.2
Finania aiviie 2,848 2,148 -700 6.6 6.0
Prfeina and bine ervie 6,964 5,328 -1,636 15.5 13.0
Edain and heah ervie 8,610 6,525 -2,085 19.8 13.3
leire and hpiai 5,064 3,198 -1,866 17.7 9.8
Ar, enerainen, and rereain 679 273 -406 3.9 1.4
Adain and fd ervie 4,388 2,927 -1,461 13.9 8.3
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f i g u R e e
Cumutiv privt-ctr yfFirst 12 months o 2001 and 2009 recoveries
layofs(miios)
Mth it rcvry
souRcE: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
recession. Tere is no indication o a growing structural
problem. Remember, too, how these data are timed.
Job openings is the count o available jobs on the last
day o the month. Hires, on the other hand, is the
sum o all hires completed throughout the month. As
long as the number o hires is larger than the number
o openings, it means that it is taking less than a month
to ll those jobs.
cWe increasingly hear or read claims that we have a serious
structural unemployment problem, even to the extent o
claiming that most o the unemployed beyond a normal
(ull-employment) rate ace structural problems in
nding work. Tis implies that unemployment difculties
reside in the workers who are unemployed: they either
are located in the wrong place or do not have the required
skills or the currently available jobs. I this is so, then
macroeconomic tools such as iscal policy (spending
or tax cuts) or monetary policy can not address our
unemployment or long-term unemployment situation.
Surprisingly, perhaps amazingly, there is no systematic
empirical evidence or such assertions. Te most prominentventure in this arena, Altigs mid-July posting on the
Atlanta Federal Reserves blog, was an application o a
ruler to 10 years o data, a nding that was reversed just
a month later when more rigorous work came orward.
Some, such as the president o the Minneapolis Federal
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2001 rcvry
2009 rcvry
8/8/2019 Reasons For Skepticism About Structural Unemployment
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E P i B r i E f i n g P a P E r # 2 7 9 s E P t E m B E r 2 2 , 2 0 1 0 PagE 11
f i g u R e f
Hir-t-pig rti i privt ctr d th umpymt rt
souRcE: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Ratio
ohirestojobopeigs
Uempoymetrate
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
Hir-t-pig rti
Umpymt rt
Jn.-
01
apr.-01
Jul.-01
oct.-
01
Jn.-
02
apr.-02
Jul.-02
oct.-
02
Jn.-
03
apr.-03
Jul.-03
oct.-
03
Jn.-
04
apr.-04
Jul.-04
oct.-
04
Jn.-
05
apr.-05
Jul.-05
oct.-
05
Jn.-
06
apr.-06
Jul.-06
oct.-
06
Jn.-
07
apr.-07
Jul.-07
oct.-
07
Jn.-
08
apr.-08
Jul.-08
oct.-
08
Jn.-
09
apr.-09
Jul.-09
oct.-
09
Jn.-
10
apr.-10
Reserve simply assume that our problems are centered in
a particular sectorconstruction. A brie oray into un-
employment data shows this not to be the case: construc-
tion does not disproportionately contribute to our unem-
ployment or long-term unemployment problem. Beore
policy makers adopt this rameworkthat much o our
unemployment is structuralthey should require much
more evidence than is currently available. Tis is especially
the case because common sense would suggest that the
problem the unemployed ace is a scarcity of job openings, a
eature o the labor market acing every group o workers
regardless o education, sector, occupation, and location.
8/8/2019 Reasons For Skepticism About Structural Unemployment
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eTe unemployment rate and level used throughout is otal1.Population, age 16 and older, Seasonally Adjusted, rom CurrentPopulation Survey, Bureau o Labor Statistics.
Tis can and should be distinguished rom claims that we will2.eventually see structural unemployment in the uture because
the long-term unemployed will see skill erosion or that a long-term trend toward the need or more skills will eventually bite.We are skeptical o these concerns as well but leave that oranother time.
able 7. Capacity Utilization in Manuacturing. Series G.173.Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization. Federal ReserveStatistics and Historical Data.
Final Sales to Domestic Purchasers. National Income Product4.Accounts. 1.4.6. Relation o Real Gross Domestic Product, RealGross Domestic Purchases, and Real Final Sales to DomesticPurchasers, Chained Dollars. Bureau o Economic Analysis.
Gross Domestic Product. National Income Product Accounts.5.able 1.1.6. Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained Dollars.Bureau o Economic Analysis.
Congressional Budget Ofce. able 2.2 Key Assumptions in6.CBOs Projections o Potential Output. he Budget andEconomic Outlook 2010-2020. August, 2010.
Core Consumer Price Index or All Urban Consumers, Research7.Series (CPI-U-RS). Bureau o Labor Statistics. Rates given showannual ination rates or the years ending the second quarters o2008, 2009, and 2010.
Output per hour o Nonarm Business sector rom Productivity8.and Costs, Bureau o Labor Statistics. Number shown describesgrowth rom rst quarter 2009 to rst quarter 2010, rst quarter2010 to second quarter 2010, and ourth quarter 2007 to secondquarter 2010. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pd/prod2.pd.
Seasonally Adjusted Statewide Unemployment Rates. Local Area9.
Unemployment Statistics, Bureau o Labor Statistics.
Tese 11 states are Oklahoma, Iowa, Minnesota, Wyoming,10.Kansas, Hawaii, Vermont, New Hampshire, Nebraska, NorthDakota, and South Dakota. Population includes the civilian non-institutional population age 16 and older rom the Local AreaUnemployment Statistics, Bureau o Labor Statistics.
All employment and job numbers throughout are Seasonally11. Adjusted, Payroll Employment. Current Establishment Survey,Bureau o Labor Statistics.
Data are not seasonally adjusted, but the average o the three12.monthly rates in each quarter, rom Current Population Surveymicrodata.
All job opening, layos, and hiring data used throughout are13.
Seasonally Adjusted, otal US rom the Job Openings and Laborurnover Survey, Bureau o Labor Statistics.
We use the hires o one month divided by the openings in the14.prior month. Te data are or private-sector openings and hires toavoid any impact o temporary Census hiring.
Rr Altig, David. 2010a. A curious unemployment picture getsmore curious.Macroblog, Te Federal Reserve Bank o Atlanta.
July 16, 2010. Accessed at: http://macroblog.typepad.com/macroblog/2010/07/a-curious-unemployment-picture-gets-more-curious.html
Altig, David. 2010b. Just how curious is that Beveridge Curve?Macroblog, Te Federal Reserve Bank o Atlanta. August 18, 2010.Accessed at: http://macroblog.typepad.com/macroblog/2010/08/just-how-curious-is-that-beveridge-curve.html
Canalog, Victor. 2010. Reis Quarterly Brieng. Reis Reports.Speech given on August 11, 2010. Accessed at: http://www.reis-reports.com/blog/category/reis-quarterly-brieng/
Kocherlakota, Narayana. 2010. Inside the FOMC. Speechgiven at Marquette, Michigan, August 17, 2010. Accessed at:http://www.minneapolised.org/news_events/pres/speech_
display.cm?id=4525
asci, Murat, and John Linder. 2010. Has the Beveridge Curveshited? Economic Trends, Federal Reserve Bank o Cleveland.
August 10, 2010. Accessed at: http://www.clevelanded.org/research/trends/2010/0810/02labmar.cm
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