Rapid Deploymentas a response to an
Active ShooterIncident
Illinois State PoliceAcademy
2003
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Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The T actic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Inc idents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Findings & Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Recommend ations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Experts’ Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Synopsis o f Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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Introduction
In less than 33 years, the U.S. law enforcement
commu nity has experienced two watershe d events
which shaped our respo nse to incidents involving an
active shooter. The first rude awakening was
perpetrated by Charles Whitman from the clock tower
at the University of Texas at Austin. In a sniper
incident lasting 90 minutes, Whitman killed 15 and
wounded 31 victims. Whitman's training in the U.S.
Marine Corps apparently prepared him well for dealing
with targets as distant as 500 yards from his perch on
the 30th floor obse rvation dec k.
Many regard this incid ent as the impetus of d ramatic
change in police training and response. Some agencies
issued long-range rifles and trained their officers in the
role of counter-sn iper, while other agencies formed
more comprehensive para-military teams with even
greater capabilities. The genesis of what would become
Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT)
undoub tedly began at 1 1:48 a.m . on August 1 , 1966 in
the form of Charles Whitman's murderous spree.
Notably, Whitman was finally stopped that day by two
police office rs and an arm ed citizen wh o teamed up to
attack his sniper perch and kill him.
The evolution of SWAT teams in U.S. police agencies
followed a rather hopscotch pattern around the nation.
Most large cities had very well equipped and trained
teams, while some suburban and rural areas basically
ignored the conce pt or deve loped m utual-aid
agreements with neighboring tea ms. Outside of major
metropo litan areas, few age ncies expe cted incide nts
requiring a SWAT -type response. Another important
consideration is the fact that SWAT teams are
expensive and time consuming.
Most agencies developed policies setting clear
guidelines for the activation of a SWAT team. Patrol
officers in these agencies were gener ally trained to wait
for SWAT when an incident justified deployment of the
special team. Patro l officers were ex pected to
"Contain, Isolate and Negotiate” until SWAT arrived.
During this same time, the primary mission of most
SWAT teams was evolving. Originally, most SWAT
teams were structured for scenarios involving snipers
(or other barricaded gunmen) and hostag e incidents. In
actuality, active shooters, barricaded gunmen and
hostage incidents are infrequent. So, many SWAT
teams trained heavily but rarely deployed.
Administrators looking for w ays to justify their
investment in these units realized that the entry team
component of SWA T units was perfectly suited to
conduct high-risk raids for the service of arrest or
search warrants. Many SWAT teams now spend as
much as 80 per cent of their time conducti ng pre-
planned raids, not eme rgency response missions.
What does this brief history of SWAT have to do with
a study of Rapid Deployment - Immediate Action
tactics for patrol officers? More than 32 years after
Charles Whitma n's rampage , two teenage rs in Colorado
logged a similar death and injury toll at another school
... this time a high scho ol.
Within 13 minutes of the first police call to the April
20, 1999 inc ident at Colu mbine H igh Schoo l, Dylan
Klebold and Eric Harris killed 13 and wounded 24.
Unlike Whitman's sniper incident, the Columbine event
was planned around explosives. Klebo ld and H arris
had set a large impro vised bom b in the schoo l cafeteria
with a timer set to go off when the lunch crow d would
provide nearly 500 victims. The killers planned to
shoot any fleeing students from positions they w ould
take up in the parking lot. Only when their bomb failed
to detonate did Klebold and Harris enter the scho ol to
kill who they co uld with firearm s.
In researching the Whit man shooting in A ustin, little
criticism of the police response could be found.
Anyone who left cover within Whitman's field of fire
was shot down. Indeed, one police officer was among
the dead that day in Austin. No one on that day had
heard of S WAT , a concep t which came later.
At the Columbine incident, however, the police were
loudly criticized. Even other police agencies have
joined in the condemnation of the police response to the
attack perpetrated by Klebold and Harris. At
Columbine, numerous SWAT units deployed as quick ly
as possible an d made e ntry into the school within 45
minutes of the first call. In fact, the shooters committed
suicide at about the same time the first SWAT team was
entering the o ther side of the m assive schoo l.
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The current movement to train patrol officers to
respond using Rapid D eploymen t tactics began in
earnest in the aftermath of the Columbine shooting.
Response strategies like Rapid Deployment have been
around for a while in several forms, but emotions
surrounding the Columbine incident caused many
officers to insist they would “never again wait for
SWAT ” at the scene of an active shooter.
Like so many things in the law enforce ment com munity,
we have come full circle; from Rapid D eploymen t -
through the evolution of SW AT - bac k to Rapid
Deployment in just over 32 years. The resolution of the
Texas Tower incident was a Rapid D eploymen t,
unorganized as it was, by those police officers and the
armed citize n.
Our research into these incidents has uncovered other
instances where an im mediate, unorganized response by
arriving police officers probably saved lives. There is
no question: R apid De ployment tac tics can save live s in
some circumstances. However, the driving force
behind this research project is the understanding that
Rapid Deploym ent tactics carry w ith them a substantial
risk to the responding officers and the possibility that
these tactics could a ctually make some situations worse.
The concern m any express for the use of Ra pid
Deployment falls into the theory...“a little bit of
knowledge is dangerous.” One SWAT team
commander in Illinois put it this way: “In SWAT,
making an entry is always our last option, for w hen all
other methods of resolution have failed ... but, with
Rapid Deployment, we’re telling minimally trained
patrol officer s to use SWA T’s last option as the ir first
option. I wonder if we ’ve really thought this thing
through?”
It is quite easy for two police officers to pencil out a
scenario where Rapid Deployment tactics are the
obvious answer. In looking at 44 active shooter
incidents from the real world, the practicality of R apid
Deploym ent is not so clea r cut.
Our mission in this research was to first identify any
patterns inherent in active shooting incidents, if indeed
any such patterns exist. By better understanding how
these events unfold , we hoped to determine when and
where Ra pid Dep loyment is app ropriate.
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The Tactic
What is Rapid Deployment? Rapid Deployment is a
response strategy utilizing a small team of patrol
officers to assault and neutralize an active criminal
shooter. The theory behind Rapid Deployment is; we
can’t afford to wait for the arrival of a SWAT unit when
a killer is actively shooting victims. The Columbine
school shooting is the example most often pointed to by
Rapid Deployment proponents. Detractors feel the use
of Rapid Deployment tactics at Columbine would have
done no good and possibly made the situation even
worse.
There are several variations of this technique, but most
are quite similar. The names given to this technique
include: Rapid D eploymen t, Immediate Action, H all
Boss training, Active Shooter Response, Violent
Intruder - Police and Educators Response (VIPER) and
Quick Action Deployment (QUAD). We’ve
undoub tedly missed a few acronyms for this technique,
but for the sake of simp licity, we’ll call it Rapid
Deploym ent.
With Rapid Deploym ent, a team of patrol officers,
preferably armed with shotguns or carbines, will enter
the “Kill Zone” and mov e rapidly to make contact with
the shooter. Standard SWAT entry tactics, such as the
systematic clearing of all rooms, a re not used during
Rapid Deploym ent. The contact team’s job is to move
rapidly through an area to find and neutralize the active
shooter...to e ssentially run to the so und of gunfire .
Depending upon the circumstances, the contact team
may bypass downed victims and proceed past obvious
hazards, such as explosive devices. Two types of teams
are generally developed. T he first is the Contact Team
whose mission is to find a nd neutralize the active
shooter. Following the contact team will be one or
more Rescue Teams who will deal with any victims
bypassed by the contact team.
Most agencies training Rapid Deployment develop a
companion policy in their Standard Operating
Procedures outlining the criteria for response and the
type of incidents appropriate for its use. As an
example, most agenc ies specify that Rapid Deployment
is not appro priate for eve nts involving a gunman that
has barricade d in a fixed loc ation or is known to be
holding hostages. Commanders theorize that in such
circumstances, the risk to patrol officers and h ostages is
simply too great. For situations where immediate action
is not deemed appropriate, the Rapid Deployment
team(s) would be used as an inner perimeter to control
the suspect’s movement while a fully trained S W AT
team is assembled.
Most agencies set a minimum size for the Contact Team
at four officers, tho ugh some will send in a team with
only two officers. Most agencies dictate the use of long
guns for the Con tact Team, while others will utilize
only the officers’ sidearms. Some departments issue
ballistic shields and Kevlar© helmets to their patrol
officers for use during a rapid de ployment. A few
agencies require one or more members of their SWAT
team to be on-duty around the clock. These SWAT-
trained officers will assess an active shooter situation
and lead the Rapid Deployment team when they
determine the tactic is appropriate.
Even the training fo r this technique v aries widely.
Many agencies set up elaborate training exercises for
patrol officers using live role-players as suspects and
victims. Combined with a stressful setting and the use
of specialized training weap onry (like Simunitions©),
these sessions can b uild the requisite skills for this high-
risk course of action. However, some locales have
mandated Rapid Deployment training, but deliver it in
a short classro om-only form at.
No matter how agencies train initially, the question of
continuity of training for these perishable skills remains
unresolved. If this tactic is to be maintained long-term,
it must be a part of an agency’s in-service refresher
program.
Clearly, many agencies ad opted R apid Deployment as
an emotional response to the Columbine incident and
have not fully developed their policies for use of the
technique or the circum stances for wh ich it is
appropriate. The mo st importa nt aspect of this policy
development may be the supervisory decision making
process for approving the entry of a Rapid Deployment
team.
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The Incidents
History teaches us not to make a major change in police
practice based on a single incident, no matter how
dramatic the incident. Instead, we should base our
changes on a demonstrated pattern of criminal activity.
We began by o utlining the catastrophic University of
Texas and Colu mbine H igh Schoo l incidents , but we
must remember that they were separated by nearly 33
years.
How frequently do U.S. police agencies face such
overwhelming firefights? Are we justified in spending
precious time and money in preparin g for the unlikely
event that our jurisdiction will ever face such a threat?
On the other hand, we train extensively with firearms
even though we know very few police officers will ever
fire a single shot in the line of duty during their career.
Training for an event w e may never face is clear ly
justified if the potential consequences are seriou s.
By searching various sources, we were able to iden tify
nearly 80 active shooter incidents in the United States
dating back to the 1966 incident in Austin, Texas. As
we tried to debrief these incidents, many proved to not
fit within our parameters of an active shooter and some
were simply too old to allow us to obtain worthwhile
information .
Ultimately, we obtained detailed information about the
police response to 44 incidents. Undoubtedly, a
number of incidents went undiscovered, but the number
of active shooter incidents in an average year from 1966
through 20 01 could easily be cou nted on o ne hand.
Though these incidents are quite rare, they can be very
deadly for those involved. In the 44 incidents we
debriefed, 152 people were killed and 214 were
wounded. These numbers average out to 3.5 killed and
4.8 wounded per incident. Truly, these are serious
events.
For compar ison purpo ses, we also analyzed a 45 th
incident where the Los Angeles (California) Police
Department used Rapid Deployment tactics in an
attempt to rescue a downed officer from a location
controlled by a barricaded gunman. This incident was
included in our discussion for two reasons. First,
LAPD officers use this incident as an example in a
Rapid Deployment training program they have
delivered across the co untry. Secondly, the incident in
question points out ho w Rapid Deployment tactics can
actually make a bad incident worse, when used in the
wrong situation.
After these inciden ts were deb riefed and a nalyzed, a
summit was held to gather input from a number of
experts with extensive expe rience in resp onding to
critical incidents. This report is a compilation of the
discussions and reco mmend ations gener ated during this
meeting held in November of 2001. Each of the experts
helped edit this final docu ment and c ontribute their
personal opinions at the end.
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The Findings and Patterns
We always seem to have a compulsion to define the
“average” of any series of events being measured. The
following average active shooter incident is based on
our analysis o f 44 events.
A single, white male shooter, age d 30, will enter a well
populated location and open fire without warning. This
shooting spree will probably be over in two to three
minutes, usually long befor e even a single police officer
can arrive. The suspect will almost certain ly be familiar
with the locale and will initially target specific people,
but is very likely to fire rando mly before h e stops. Th is
shooter will probably be armed with more than one
firearm and will fire about 25 rounds, killing th ree to
four victims and wounding an additional five people.
After the shooting spree, the suspect is likely to end up
dead, probab ly by comm itting suicide. The incid ent is
almost guaranteed to take place during daylight hours
and will probably occur inside a building.
Surprisingly, many of the incidents we debriefed closely
fit the average we have outlined above. Incidents like
the Texas tower and Columbine are truly exceptional
and far outside the norm.
Victims:
As mentioned before, these incidents resulte d in 152
deaths and 214 people wounded . The largest death to ll,
23, was at the Luby’s Restaurant shooting in Killeen,
Texas in 1991 and the largest number of wounded, 25,
was at the Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon
in 1998.
Suspects:
Only two incidents involved multiple shooters, with a
maximum of two suspe cts in any single incident. Of the
46 shooters, only two were females. The age range of
shooters ran from 11 to 70. Tw enty of the suspec ts died
at the scene; four were killed by police and 16
committed suicide.
Shots Fired:
Suspects in these 44 incidents fired from one to 188
shots. The 188 shot incident was Columbine High
School. Police fired during nine of these incidents,
ranging from two to more than 500 shots. More than
500 shots were fired by seven police officers in an
incident that started at a Cal-Trans maintenance yard
near Orange, California.
Respond er Casualties:
Responders were killed or injured in four of the 44
incidents.
A police officer was wound ed in an exchange of gunfire
at the end of a p ursuit of a suspect who killed four and
wounded six firefighters in a wo rkplace sho oting in
Jackson, Mississippi in 1996.
A New Hampshire Troo per was killed and a second
Trooper was wounded during a traffic stop/ambush at
the onset of a five hour shooting spree near Colebrook,
New Hampshire in 1997. In a subsequent ambush set
by the rifle-armed suspect, four additional officers were
wounded before the suspect was killed.
A police officer was wounded in a 500 round shootout
following the pursuit of an active shooting suspect from
a Cal-Trans maintenance yard near Ora nge, Californ ia
in 1997.
A security guard was killed and two police officers
were wounded by a man who had entered the library of
the Salt Lake City Latter Day Saints church and opened
fire in 1999. This 70 ye ar old man was ultimately killed
by police.
Response Strategy:
A true Rapid Deployment response, by an agency which
had previously trained in this tactic, was only u sed in
three of the 44 active shooter incidents we debriefed.
In two of the Rapid Deployment responses, the use of
these tactics affected the outcome of the incident in a
positive way. In the remaining Rapid Deployment use,
the incident was over before the team was ab le to make
entry into the scho ol.
In the opinion of the writer, Rapid Deployment either
did or might have resulted in a positive effect on the
outcome of the incident in 11 of the 44 incidents (25
percent). In the incidents where Rapid Deployment
would have made no difference in the ultimate outcome,
there was no longer an active shooter to engage by the
time a team could have made entry into the location. In
three of these incidents the shooter had already
barricaded himself, with hostages, in a fixed location.
Environment of Incident:
The majority of the incidents in our study oc curred at a
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school or workplace. Over 95 percent of these
incidents took place during daylight hours. About two-
thirds of the incidents took place within a b uilding. The
other one-third of the incidents involved some shooting
in an outdo or environ ment.
Weap ons:
More than one-half of the incidents involved su spects
armed with one or m ore hand guns. Near ly one-fourth
of the suspects used both handguns and long guns
(rifles and/or shotguns). Four of these incidents (nine
percent) involved the use of impro vised explo sive
devices.
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The Conclusions
There were four general categories o f response
identified in these 44 incidents:
• Immedia te - unorganized response by
personnel on the scene when the incident
began (police, security or citizens).
• Immedia te - unorganized response by
arriving police officers.
• Immedia te - organized response by
ar r iv in g p o l i c e o ff i c e r s ( R a p id
Deployment).
• Arriving police officers contained the
incident and waited for the arrival of
SWA T assets.
Except in the rarest of incidents, like the shootings at
the University of Texas and Colum bine High School,
only the most imme diate respo nse will have a chan ce to
reduce the number of innocent victims likely to be
killed or injured b y an active sho oter. Even a rapid
response by a team of officers using R apid Deployment
tactics will likely find the incident over by the time they
enter the shoo ting area.
Immedia te action taken by personne l who are on -site
when the sho oting starts is the mo st effective way to
stop the killing. In five of the incidents, the suspect was
forcibly detained by citizens at the shooting site (often
at great risk to themselves). In two of these incidents,
the suspect was taken into custody by on-scene police
officers (both at a school).
The need for im mediate ac tion by whomever is there
when the incident begins was born out by the actions of
passengers on Flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and
subsequent flights where dangerous activity has been
encountered. These events happen in seconds and,
unless they are quick ly ended b y someon e already on
scene, the criminals will likely kill until they choose to
stop. The police simply cannot be everywhere violence
may occur and are un likely to arrive before the violence
ends.
A parallel example of on-scene personnel minimizing
death and destruction has been seen recently in Isra el.
Terrorist shooting and bombing attacks have taken a
huge toll in Israel, but some events have surprisingly
low death tallies when you consider the weaponry
brought to the scene by the terrorists. The low body
count is generally attribute d to the terrorist being shot
by military or police p ersonnel. Other reports suggest
many of these terrorists are being sh ot by armed Israeli
citizens who happened to be on the scene or arrived
before military or police units.
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The Recommendations
Based on our analysis of 44 high profile, active
shooting incidents, some general recommendations
were developed by our panel of experts.
• Effective command and control must
begin immediately at the onset of the
incident and must take place independent
of the use of Rapid Deployment tactics.
The on-scene commander must not
become personally involved in the
response. The incid ent comm ander mu st,
instead, conduct a n initial problem
assessment, coordina te the arriving
resources, and ensure commun ication is
established between all responding units.
• The single greatest problem facing the
on-scene commander will be the
threat/risk assessment (intelligence
gathering). Analysis of the incidents
suggests the following problems can be
e x p e c t e d : confusin g informatio n
describing multiple location s and multiple
suspects, a breakdown in nearly all forms
of technological and inter-personal
communication, being inundated by
fleeing inhabitants and rapidly arriving
resources and unfam iliarity with the
incident site.
• All officers should have access to single-
projectile shoulder-f ired weapons,
preferably a carbine chambered for a
cartridge capable of penetrating soft body
armor. Such weapons w ill greatly
increase the effectiveness of contact and
rescue teams, as well as allowing some
incidents to be terminate d quickly by the
first arriving officers.
• The training provided by an age ncy must
include force-on-force sessions in which
officers move as a team, encountering
high-stress complications and liv e
adversaries. The training must include
tactics for team movement in both indoor
and outdoor se ttings.
• The training must be refreshed on a
periodic basis (at least annually) and
should involve all jurisdictions who might
respond to a given location.
• The incident commander must consider a
“response in depth,” an d contem plate
delaying the insertion of a contact team
until a backup team can be asse mbled, in
the most threatening incidents.
• A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
must be develo ped to cover the use of
Rapid Deploym ent and the overall
management of the incident. This SOP
should include the minimum requirements
for manpower, equipment and training for
the use of Rapid Deployment teams. The
SOP should also address complicating
issues, such as: explosive devices;
ambush survival; and p rocedur es to
follow in the event a team takes
casualties.
• Agencies should pre-plan high-risk
locations. These plans should include
floor plans, initial perimeter points and
command post and resource staging
locations.
Based upon this analysis, we recommend police
agencies develop procedures for three levels of
response to active shooter incidents. Ou r experts have
drawn up recom mendatio ns for specific tra ining and
equipment needs for each of these response strategies,
which will be o utlined in deta il.
The first level of response would be an Instant
Response by personnel who are on-scene when the
shooting starts. This would include police officers
regularly assigned to patrol schools, business or public
areas where large numbers of people congregate. In
some instances, this could include a n immedia te
response by the first arriving patrol officer.
The second level of response would be a structured and
coordinated response by team(s) of arriving officers -
Rapid Deployment. To be most effective, these teams
need to be better equipped and more fully trained than
the level at which most agencies currently operate. The
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on-scene commander must have already assumed
command and cond ucted a pre liminary “threat/risk
assessment.” The on-scene comman der must also
begin to establish an inner perimeter prior to giving
authorization for entry of any “contact” team s.
The third level o f response would be a Traditional
SWAT Response of highly-trained and fully-equipped
officers. In some situations, the SWA T eleme nts would
be the second wave to enter a shooting location. Upon
arrival of the SWAT entry team, the Rapid Deployment
team(s) would switch from the ro le of “Pathfind er” to
rescue team, working behind the SWAT elements.
However, some shooting situations may require Rapid
Deployment teams to me rely provide c ontainmen t until
SWAT assets arrive on-scene.
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Instant Response:
This response strategy appears to have the best chance
for successfully stopping an active shooter. However,
this type of respo nse also carr ies with it the highest
degree of risk to the officer. In the case of a school
shooting, this response would be handled by a School
Resource Officer (SRO) or possibly a D.A.R .E.©
Officer who might be on-site when the shooting starts.
In jurisdictions where manpower limitations are severe,
a single patrol officer might be duty bound to seek out
and engage the active shooter without assistance. In the
private sector, properly se lected and trained secu rity
officers can prov ide instant resp onse to an a ctive
shooter.
In the past, we have not necessarily chosen an SRO or
DARE officer based upon their ability as a “warrio r.”
While is it still highly unlikely any particular SRO or
DARE officer will need to confront an active shooter,
we must now factor that possibility into our selection
process.
Clearly, all officers assigned to re gularly patrol a high-
risk location must be armed with at least a duty-grade
sidearm, a flashlight and clearly recognizable police
identification. Though the circumstances may require
these officers to respond to an active shooter with the
equipment they have on their person, we should
consider w ays to make a dditional eq uipment av ailable
to them. Protective gear, like a ballistic helmet and
tactical vest will enhance the ir survivability. A single-
projectile shoulder-fired weapon will allow these
officers to deliver much more precise deadly force and
penetrate ligh t intervening co ver, like soft body armor.
Positioning such equipment in a secure loc ation at a
school or other sensitive facility will require some
imagination. These officers must also have the ab ility
to comm unicate with arriv ing police re sources.
Officers likely to make an “instant response” must take
part in high-stress training scenarios on a regular basis.
These are the officers who will have the be st chance to
“run to the sound of the guns” and thereby save
innocent lives ... but at extrem e risk. In the event these
officers are unable to neutralize the active shooter, they
will serve as a “pathfinder” for arriving resources. The
instant respond er must link up with a Rapid
Deployment or SWAT team and prov ide their intimate
knowledge of the surroundings. The training provided
to these officers must address the following issues:
• individual movement and danger areas
(hallways, corners, rooms, stairs, etc.);
• when to use covert, as o pposed to overt,
movem ent;
• intelligence gathering/reporting and risk
assessment;
• communications with arriving resources;
and,
• f o r c e - o n - fo r c e scenar ios us in g
simunition© type weapons.
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Rapid Deploym ent:
This response strategy is a viable alternative to waiting
for a fully-trained SWAT team, in some circumstances.
In the opinion of ou r panel of ex perts, few Ra pid
Deployment training progra ms are ade quate .
Additiona lly, some situatio ns are beyond the
capabilities of a Rapid Deployment response. While a
policy may outline “safety stops” to help determine
when we should wait for SWAT, we know from vehicle
pursuits there will be some hard charging officers who
may exceed the bounds of prudence.
In a perfect world, every police officer would be trained
in Rapid De ployment tac tics and wou ld be men tally
prepared to succeed . Realistically, some officers are
not physically or m entally equipped for specialty teams,
like SWAT. Likewise, some of our officers may not be
approp riate for assignment to a Rapid Deployment
team. In fact, some officers want no part of this type of
police response. Forcing such officers to train for and
respond with Rapid Deployment tactics is probably not
a good idea. W e can assign re luctant officers to
perimeter points and other less dangerous assignments,
but most agencies are already hard pressed to assemble
sufficient manpower for an effective Rapid Deployment
response. If an agency chooses not to train a ll its
officers for Rapid Deployment, they should devise a
system for quickly ide ntifying those trained. Some
agencies are issuing a special pin or patch to denote a
Rapid Deployment trained officer.
A Rapid Dep loyment response team should have acc ess
to single-proje ctile shoulder -fired weapons equipped
with a practical sling . Weap on-moun ted light sources
are highly recom mended . Protective gear, like ballistic
helmets and bullet-resistant shields will enhance an
officer’s survivability. The team should hav e a well
equipped “traum a” kit and simple breaching to ols.
No officers without a uniform or b old “Police” garment
should ever enter the Kill Zone or man the inner
perimeter. Traffic safety ve sts can easily fulfill this
requirement for plainclothes o fficers.
Initial Rapid Deployment training should consist of not
less than eight hours of instruction, with at least 75
percent of that being practical training under high-stress
conditions. The initial training should include
minimum performance standards, with tests. The
training must follow the established SOP, w hich should
be coordinated with other agencies that might respond
to an inciden t.
The training must addre ss the following issues:
• team command and comm unication;
• intelligence gathering/reporting and risk
assessment;
• team movement indoors (diamond, wedge
or “T” formations, etc.);
• team movement outdoors (bounding
overwatch, etc.);
• improvised explosive devices (find
another way? ... step over and proceed?);
• dealing with downed victims;
• lifting and rescue techniques;
• evacuation and control of innocents; and,
• “failure drills,” in the event a team takes
casualties without neutralizing the active
shooter(s).
Based upon an on-scene problem assessment, the
incident commander may put seve ral “safety stops” in
effect. If one of these “s tops” is enco untered, the R apid
Deployment team must stop hunting the active shooters
and shift to a static mode and maintain a tight inner
perimeter. The team ’s goals in a static m ode are to
limit the movement of the suspect(s), keep innoc ents
from wandering into the kill zone and relay information
to the incident commander and arriving SWAT assets.
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A Rapid D eploymen t team should shift to an inner
perimeter mode if there is probable cause to believe one
or more o f the following co nditions exist:
• multiple active shooters;
• booby t raps or other ambush
preparations;
• active shooter(s) barricaded in a
defensible location;
• hostages being held in a fixed location or
being used as human shields;
• suspect is communicating dem ands;
and/or,
• the incident involves the release of
hazardous materials (H azMat) or the use
or threat of a Weap on of Mass
Destruction (WMD - biological, nuclear,
incendiary, chemical or lar ge-scale
explosive weapon).
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Traditional SWAT Response:
Some agencies ha ve chosen to concen trate on Ra pid
Deployment tactics to the exclusion of traditional
SWA T respo nse tactics. Our pan el of experts c ame to
realize two important aspects of an active shooter
incident which point to the need to maintain SWAT
assets.
First, few incidents in the real world resemble our
image where a team can assemble rapidly, run to the
sound of the guns and quickly neutralize an active
shooter. Most incid ents will be ove r before a R apid
Deployment team has a chance to gather and confusion
at the scene will generally prevent a clear picture of the
events until long after the shooting is over.
Second, Rapid Deployment teams are only trained and
equipped to deal with relatively simple problems. Few
agencies train their Rapid Deployment teams to deal
with taking casu alties. Wha t is the rate of “acceptab le
loss” for Rapid Deploym ent teams? W hat if multiple
shooters have laid an ambush for the first Rapid
Deployment team or have positioned explosive devices
along likely response routes?
Such complica ted criminal e vents are extr emely rare,
but could devastate a Rapid Deployment team. If you
have committed the bulk of your resources to a single
team, the failure of that team could lead to disaster. An
active shooter is a terr ible event. However, sacrificing
a number of officers in a noble, but unsuccessful
response is likely to make the situation worse , not
better. Some situations still dictate the use of patrol
officers for containment while waiting for a S W AT
team to arrive.
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Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment
As we were completing the research phase o f this
project, the United States was struck with the most
horrific terrorist attack yet experienced. When we
consider the very real thre at of continued terrorist
attacks, parallels can be dra wn to the use o f Rapid
Deployment tactics. Both federal agencies and U.S.
military assets are gearing up to deal with terrorist
attacks, but we all know that local police agencies will
be the first to respond to an unexpected strike. And,
we will be facing terrorists willing to die as a part of
their plan.
As a profession, law enforcement has a lot to learn
about responding to critical incidents. Our brothers and
sisters in the fire service have much more experience at
responding as a team and organizing themselves upon
arrival. Still, the highest price paid by first responders
at the World Trade Center was paid by the New York
City Fire Department. Fire administrators across the
nation have made a tough decision in the aftermath of
September 11 th. Fire Departments will now make a
reasoned risk assessment before sendin g their peop le
into the hostile environment of a terrorist attack . We
have trained for several years to expect terrorist groups
to utilize “secondary devices” with an eye toward
killing arriving eme rgency responders. The most
effective secondary device in history was the second
airliner crashing into the second tower in New York
City. We m ust assume the terrorists expected fire and
police responders to rush the site of the first “crash,”
thereby adding to the tally of victims killed by the
second airliner. The te rrorists app arently didn’t
anticipate the collapse of the Twin Towers, but we must
always consider a worst case scenario. While our goal
is always to save as many innocent lives a s possible, to
accomplish this we must stay alive ourselves.
Some in the intelligence community are predicting
terrorist attacks like the Israelis have experienced for
several years. The Israeli attacks are committed by
individuals or small groups who attack with small arms
and/or explosive devices. The label of “suicide
bomber” is accurate, since these terrorists ex pect to die
in the commission of their strike. Like Israel, we must
be prepare d to engag e these attacke rs quickly and
effectively, lest they succeed in spreading terror. W e
must also consider the possibility of a coordinated
effort by multiple terrorists intended to lure in and
eliminate our first responders, clearing the way for the
terrorists to kill without interference.
The recommendations of this report seem to hold up
even when compared to attacks like those faced by
Israel: the best chance for neutralizing the attacker is an
instant response b y someon e who is there when the
shooting starts (or when the bomber is recognized).
Similarly, most of these incidents will be over before
even a sma ll team can be assembled . If the incident is
still ongoing as a team arrives, there is a distinct
possibility they could b e facing multip le terrorists who
have planned and organized their actions. We must not
underestim ate the terrorists; their p lan will proba bly
include preparations for our response. Sending a team
to their death in a well meaning, but futile gesture will
do nothing to eithe r neutralize the active shooters or
save innocent lives. M ost police comm anders wo uld
never consider sending unprotected officers into the
“hot zone” of a chemical atta ck, but expect their
officers to run without h esitation into the “k ill zone” of
an active shooter.
Our worst fear is a terrorist attack using a weapon of
mass destruction (W MD) . We no w know that th e
response to a biolog ical attack will pro bably com e in
the form of an investigation, such as people suffering
from unexplained respiratory problems at a sporting
event. Should an attack involve chemical, radiological
or large-scale explosive weapon s, our response must be
slowed still further. The initial response will require a
risk assessment prior to any deplo yment of resources.
Only a handful of police agencies have the specialized
training and equip ment to resp ond to the sc ene of a
WMD attack, though these capabilities are being
upgraded at emergen cy speed. In Illinois, State
Weapon of Mass Destruction Teams were in training
prior to September 11 th. These teams include members
of several emergency response disciplines, with the core
of each team being T actical Response officers from the
Illinois State Police. Thes e S W AT teams a re fully
trained and equipped to respond to terrorist thre ats
involving a WMD , but their response time is measured
in hours, not m inutes. Local p atrol officers will alw ays
be the first to respond, and the first to die if not
adequately trained and effectively led.
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The Expert’s Opinions
Lieutenant C. W. Black, Littleton (Colorado) Police Department
Lt. C.W. "Bill" Black is with the Littleton, Colorado Police Department and was Commander of their SWAT T eam
during the Columbine High School Inc ident. H e wa s ask ed b y the Inc ident Comm and er fr om J effe rson Co unty She riff's
Department to deploy the arriving SWAT teams and organize the rescue of students during that incident. Lieutenant
Black has been with Littleton Police Department for 23 years and is a Guest Instructor at Thunder Ranch.
Lieutenant B lack’s Comm ents:
“At last we have some empirical data that supports my view, and that of others, that Active Shooter Response is risky
and should only be attempted when no other approach is possible. I still think it is the exception and not the rule.
Unfortuna tely, our profession seems to make the exception the rule when it reacts to a horrendous event in law
enforcem ent.
This study supports the need for BAS IC training in sho oting, movin g and com municating a s an appro ach to any rap id
deployment scenario-no t some mag ic "footba ll play." Law enforc ement's strategy is that w e will respond to any "Active
Shooter" situation, wherever it may occur. Our tactics are what we do once we arrive. These tactics should include
sound, proven, patrol and SWAT tactics as well as stopping the killing where ap propriate . Our tactics should not make
things worse. But, without officers who have the will, the skill and some basic equip ment, chanc es of success a re slim.”
Mr. Richard E. Fairburn, Illinois State Police Academy
Mr. Fairburn has over 20 years of law enforcement experience in both Illinois and Wyoming. Mr. Fairburn’s experience
has included assignments in patrol, investigations, administration and training, including a stint as a municipal police
chief. Mr. Fairb urn has bee n with the Illinois Sta te Police sinc e 1996 , serving in the C riminal Intell igence Bureau,
Critical Incident Re sponse C omman d and T raining Aca demy. Dick developed th e Illinois State P olice Acad emy’s
Critical Incident Response training program and those duties served as the impetus for this research project. Mr. Fairburn
holds a B.S. degree in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University and has authored more than
100 articles on police equipment and training issues and a book on police rifle training.
Mr. Fa irburn’s Co mments:
“As the primary author of this report, my comments are already well represented. My goal when proposing this research
project was to more clearly define the mission and practicality of Rapid Deployment. In many respects, the proliferation
of Rapid Deployment training is little more than an emotional response to the Columbine High School shooting. As
professionals, we must not give in to an emotional response at a horrific incident. The citizens have a right to expect
from us an effective and measured response.
I feel that Rapid Deploym ent training is bo th practical and worthwhile. Sta tistically, however , active shoo ter incidents
are very rare and this research illustrates that almost all of them will be over long before even the quickest teams can hope
to make contact with the shooter. What we can do, is to better train and equip all police officer s for “immed iate
response” in the event they are very close when the shooting starts. In a few of these incidents, including the Columbine
High School incident, had the first arriving officer been armed with a rifle, and well trained it its use, the active shooter(s)
might have b een neutralize d almost imm ediately.
In my opinion , the single most im portant asp ect of the use o f Rapid Deploym ent tactics by pa trol officers is the ro le of
on-scene supervisory personnel. The commander on the scene must take immediate control of the responding assets and
conduct a threat/risk assess ment. The comm ander must set the response priorities, including the essential requirement
to set perimeters to minimize the number of potential victims in the “Kill Zone” and to ensure the shooter cannot escape
to endang er other are as. Before deploying a Rapid Deployment team, the commander has an obligation to ensure the
team has a re asonable chance for success.”
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Mr. Thomas T. Gillespie, Criminal Justice Training & Consulting Services
Mr. Gillespie began his law enforcement career in 1970 in Detroit, Michigan. He has served as a police sergeant,
municipal police chief, city manager, State of New Mexico law enforcement training director and Director of the New
Mexico Attorney G eneral’s Investigations Division. Since 1990, Mr. Gillespie has conducted over 400 Critical Incident
Management programs to more than 6,000 law enforcement supervisors and commanders throughout the United States
and abroad. He has authored a textbook on the police use of force and provides expert witness case review, evaluation
and testimony in crim inal and civil actions involving police training, supervision and use of force. Mr. Gillespie has
authored numerous articles in the field of critical incident management and use of force.
Mr. G illespie’s Comments:
“I have had the distinct honor of training thousands of police supe rvisors and comm anders in critical incident response
and mana gement ov er the past 12 years and the invitation to participate in the Rapid Deploym ent Summ it was greatly
appreciated. The perspective I was able to bring to the table was an awareness of the wide variety and types of
instruction being offered by police agencies in the area of “Rapid Deployment (RD)” training throughout the United
States.
The participants were dedicated police commanders, trainers and tactical leaders attempting to determine the standard
protoco ls to effectively respond to active shooter events. Most were surprised at the various levels of training being
offered to police officers nationwide in the response to and handling of active shooter incidents. As mentioned in the
report, many “Rapid Deployment” training programs mere ly offer classroom instruction. There was unanimous
agreement that RD training must include realistic, hands-on skill building exercises. The failure to conduct practical and
realistic ‘team’ exercises would be similar to atte mpting to train an officer to fire a w eapon fo r accuracy w ith only
‘classroom’ instruction on sight alignment and trigger squeeze.
The RD protocols recommended in this report are simply minimum standards of training for officers facing — potentially
— the most dangerous and high-risk event they may ever deal with in their careers. Tactical officers understand the need
for on-going, rigorous and demanding training for the high -risk incidents they a re expecte d to “handle.” We must not
use shortcuts in preparing patrol officers to deal with the exact same type of incidents for which tactical officers are
training on a regular basis.
Lastly, the need to provide p roper comm and and control at these types of even ts must not be ig nored. First responding
supervisors are the key to effective and successful resolution of the incident. They mus t take charge a nd assume the role
of the COACH, not the PLAY ER. Risk and/or threat assessment, identification of the “kill zone” and establishing a
perimeter must be initiated by the on-scene commander prior to authorizing any type of tactical deployment for
resolution.
It is my hope tha t this effort will attract criticism and comment. It is only through disagreement and discussion of the
issues that clarity and agreement can occur. It is only those supervisors that have nev er experien ced a po lice officer’s
injury or death at the scene of a critical incident that casually comment, “that’s what we get paid to do, it’s a dangerous
job!” We ow e our polic e officers and their families only the best training when confronte d with these type s of life
threatening incidents.”
Mr. Larry Glick, Executive Director, National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA)
Mr. Glick has over 28 years experience in the criminal justice field. Mr. Glick spent seven years as a special response
team member for the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear W eapons Complex. Four of those years were at the DOE
Central Training Academy as a tactics and firearms instructor and Safeguards and Security Training Departm ent Chief.
Larry completed four years as a Regional Director with the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Contractor Support
Program. After the retirem ent of John K olman in 19 93, Mr . Glick became the Executive Director of the NTOA.
Currently he oversees the operations of the NTOA including the NTOA's Information Resources, Regional Seminar and
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Training Program , Tactical U nit and Incident Review Program as well as the publication of The Tactical E dge journ al.
Mr. Glick has lectured nationally to school and police audiences regarding school and police response to active shooters
in schools and public buildings. He testified before the Colorado Governor's Commission on the Columbine High School
tragedy concerning po lice training and response to violent active sho oter situations.
Mr. La rry Glick’s Co mments:
“I want to commend your group on the resea rch and rep ort you pro duced o n Rapid D eploymen t. I have read through
the report twice and the information contained in the report is very informative.
I would add nothing.”
Associate Professor David A. Klinger, Univer sity of M issouri-St. L ouis
David A. Klinger is Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missou ri-St. Louis.
He also has held positions as A ssistant Profess or (199 2-1998 ) and Asso ciate Professor of Sociology (1998-1999) at the
University of Houston. Prior to pursuing his graduate degrees, he worked for three and one-half years as a patrol officer
for the Los Angeles and Redmond (WA) Police Depa rtments. He has held research positions at the Police Foundation
in W ash ingt on, D.C .; the Uni ver sity o f W ash ingt on, Sea ttle; the W ash ingt on S tate 's Atto rney's Office; and the Seattle
Police Department. He has written num erous scholarly articles, book chap ters, and encyclopedia en tries that address
topics such as arrest p ractices, the use of force, and how features of comm unities affect the actions of patrol officers.
He has recently completed a research project on officer-involved shootings and is currently nearing completion of a study
of police special we apons an d tactics (SW AT) tea ms. He rec eived his Ph .D. in Socio logy from the U niversity of
Washington in 1992.
Professor K linger’s Comm ents:
“I take issue with the argument that officers who aren’t keen o n the idea shouldn’t be trained in rap id response tactics.
Since when doe s a line officer get to tell the chief to buzz off and select w hat parts of the d epartmen t mission s/he will
and wil l not do? I f the boss says “My officers will have rapid response training and they will rapidly respond to active
shooting situations” and some officer doesn’t like it, that’s too ba d. S/he can a lways find ano ther job. A s far as I’m
concerned, an officer has n o more a right to recuse h im or herself from rapid respo nse training that s/he d oes from b asic
firearms, tactics, em ergency veh icle opera tion, report w riting, or any othe r aspect of the job.”
Sergeant Patrick Kreis, Winnetka (Illinois) Police Department
Patrick Kreis is a Sergeant with the Winnetka Police Department where he manages a comprehensive Use of Force
training program . He has sixteen years combined law enforcement and military instructional experience and is certified
as a Master Firearms Instructor by the Illinois Po lice Training Institute. Sergea nt Kreis is state b oard cer tified to teach
numerous police subjects including Less Lethal Weapons , Tactical Team Operations, Patrol Tactics, Scenario Based
Training, Use of Force Policy, and Critical Incident Response. He is a primary instructor for the Rapid Deployment
Instructor training offered by Mobile Training Unit #3. Sergeant Kreis is a former SWAT (NIPAS EST) Team Leader
and an active me mber of the Illinois Tactic al Officer’s Association . He is a graduate of Northwestern University School
of Police Staff and Command and holds a Bachelors degree in Criminal Justice Science. Sergeant Kreis served eleven
years in the U.S. Army Reserve with qualifications in Special Forces and Military Intelligence.
Sergeant K reis’ Commen ts:
“We will have to disagree on the issue of perimeter establishment. I feel strongly that deploying the 10-15 initial officers
(5-10 minute response in the urban environment) on scene should be as follows: They are going to be much more
effective at protecting life if they deploy in contact teams to stop the active killing. They are going to be less effective
trying to control a perimeter that in many cases will be a square city block. My town's high school has 27 different
doorway entry points. T he first respon ders are the o fficers that I have the most confidence in. They work together and
train together. They have the same radios and are most familiar with the terrain. The second and third wave of
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responders will be capable of establishing inner and outer perimeters, but less prepared to make entry. What good is a
perimeter outside the b uilding when th e bad guy is inside actively killing multiple victims? This philosophy is even more
essential in the rural communities that can't even count on a 10-15 officer response within a 30 minute response time.
It’s just not practical to tell them to set a perim eter before deciding to make entry. Regardless of when Klebold and
Harris chose to stop killing their victims, the fact of the matter is that those two killers were still seen on video walking
around with guns down without an apparent care in the world. Clearly they were not being pursued or engaged by the
Police, even 37 minutes after the killing started. Just how is a perimeter going to shorten the amount of killing
opportunity time?
Recently, we had an example of victims being their best self-protection in Skokie, Illinois. A student brought a loaded
gun to school and showed it to a friend. The suspect stated that he was going to kill a particular girl then get to the
cafeteria to do mass murder before suicide. Another kid spotted the gun in the would-be shooter’s bag. The second
student calmly told a girl nearby, who used a ruse to leave class and inform the Dean. Then the hero slid the bag away
from the bad-guy when he wasn’t looking. The second student turned the bag over to the Dean and the suspect was
arrested witho ut incident.”
Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II, Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department
Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II is a 12-year veteran of the Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department, a suburb of Chicago
Illinois. He has been a member of the Northern Illinois Police Alarm Systems Emergency Services Team (NIPAS-EST)
for 11 years were he currently serves as the Entry Team Leader. Sergeant Mohn has participated in the successful
resolution of numerous critical incidents, felony fugitive apprehensions and high risk w arrant service operation s. He is
an Illinois State certified instructor in a wide variety of tactical and firearms related disciplines and is the lead instructor
for the NIPAS-EST 96 hour b asic SW AT co urse. Sergea nt Mohn serves on the Board of Directo rs for the Illinois
Tactical Officers Asso ciation (IT OA) and is the lead instructo r for the ITO A's Rapid D eploymen t program . He has
personally trained over a thousand officers in Rapid Deployment technique and tactics. A Grad uate of Na tional-Louis
University, Sergeant Mo hn served six years in the US Army as an infantryman prior to starting his law enforcement
career.
Sergeant E dward F. Mo hn’s Comm ents:
"Train Hard ..............For The Day Will Come. This motto has become the driving force behind the training and
preparation that I have dedicated my team, my fellow officers and myself too. While the panel of experts p resented in
this docume nt do not ag ree on all asp ects of this proj ect, we all strongly agreed and are committed to improving the
training police officers are, or should be receiving in rega rds to the response and mana gement of c ritical incidents. W hile
active shooter type incidents occur infrequently, they present a unique set of challenges and problems that many officers
and agencies are not prepared to face. The traditional response of "Contain, Wait and Negotiate" has served us well and
should still be implemented in 99.9% of the critical incidents that occur. But, when an offender is actively murdering
innocent civilians how can police officers who are sworn to protect and serve our community and it's citizens stand by
and wait? I always ask my students during Rapid Deployment Training "W hat if that was your child, your mother, your
wife or husban d inside that b uilding"? W hat would yo u do? It is, and shall always be d ebated as to how Rapid
Deployment would of made a difference in many of the active shooter situations that have occurred. It is my belief that
the immediate deploym ent of law enforcement resourc es against the active shooter can and does save lives. One mu st
only take a look a t the situation in Israe l and see that live s are saved when polic e officers arriv e quickly and deploy
against armed offenders. Is this a dangero us endeavor?.… ..Yes. Do these techniques and tactics place officers in greater
danger than the tradition al "contain a nd wait" utilized in the past?........Y es. But, if not Rapid Deploym ent, then what?
We continually ask and search for a better solution from those who say Rapid Deployment is not the answer..........but
none have been presented. As long as there are those in the world who will prey upon and murder innocent people, then
there must be those of us who are trained, willing, ab le and ded icated to see king them ou t and stopp ing their dead ly
behavior . To do less is inconceiv able .
Train Hard...........For The Day Will Come".
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Commander Richard A. Ryan, Decatur (Illinois) Police Department
Commander Ryan is a twenty-nine year police veteran. He holds a BA from Eastern Illinois University and served four
years with the USMC, including one tour with an infantry rifle company in Viet Nam. He is a graduate of the FBI
National Academy. Command er Ryan’s police experience includes operational service with both patrol and
investigations functions. He has served as coordinator of the K-9 Unit and as Commander of the Professional Standards
and Investiga tions Division s of the Dec atur Police Departm ent.
Commander Ryan is currently Commander of the Patrol Division of the Dec atur Police Departm ent. He was r esponsib le
for the development of the Decatur Police Department's Emergency Response Team and is Commander of the ERT.
Commander Ryan was the on-scene Commander for all major events related to the five years of turmoil experienced by
the City of Decatur resulting from three maj or labor disputes, a major K lu Klux K lan rally and turmoil during November
1999 involving Jesse Jackson's Rainbow-Push Coalition and white supremacist organizations. The Decatur Police
Departm ent’s Emergency Response Team has served in excess of five h undred h igh-risk search w arrants and has been
involved in the resolution of both hostage and barricaded suspect incidents, including incidents where deadly force was
used.
Commander Ryan is a member of the Nat ional T acti cal O ffice r's A ssociat ion (NT OA ), the Ill ino is T acti cal O ffice r's
Association (ITOA), is a fo rme r me mbe r of t he B oar d of Dir ecto rs o f the ITO A an d is c urre ntly C hair of th e IT OA 's
Legislative Committee. He is the owner of Ryan Crisis Management Consulting, Inc. He has presented at State and
National conferences and has provided training throughout the State for topics related to Tactical Team Operations,
Managing Labor Disputes and Interest Group Events, High Risk Strategy and Tactics for Patrol Operations, Developing
School Crisis Response Plans and Patro l Rapid R esponse T actics for Activ e Shoote r Incidents. He is Coordinator for
Law Enforcement Programming and an adjunct faculty member at Richland Community College in Decatur and an
adjunct faculty member an d Advisory Bo ard member a t the Police Training Institute of the University of Illinois.
Comma nder Rya n’s Comme nts:
“As is often the case in law enforcement, the development of active shooter policies and training were a reaction to an
incident. We have reacted by training operators (first responding officers), hopefully well and to the standards indicated
above. However, we as administrators too often feel that we have done what is expected of us by providing some training
in the area of concern to the oper ators. In a pro fessional law en forcemen t environme nt, it is essential that administration
set clear (and high) standards for the agency in terms of the outcomes expected if the "active shooter" situation develops
in its jurisdiction. Having done so, the administration has the obligation to the officers to provide the policy, training
and equip ment nece ssary to succe ssfully achieve that o utcome.
Second ly, it is important to understand that crisis situations involve much more than the first responder's response. Once
containment and isolation have been accomplished, the real work of the administration begins... mana ging whateve r is
left. That may include managing a hostage or barricade situation (in the traditional fashion), managing a major criminal
investigation and crime scene, victim a ssistance, family reu nification, facility man agement, relief of security teams, etc.
It is critical that our administrators know, understand and be ready to implement a comprehensive Incident Command
Center to ensure that the whole incident is managed professionally--not just the crisis response.
Further, it is critical for the responding officers to understand that there are NO EXCU SES if an active shooter situation
develops. Whether administration has provided the policy, equipment and training or not, those we are sworn to protect
rightfully expect us to be there for them. No matter how many officers we have to respond with, we must be prepared
to get the job done. That means that each individual officer has the moral and professional obligation to have the heart
to respond, to be tactically proficient in terms of both skill development and the wisdom to know when to apply the
approp riate tactics, and must be physically able to perform. It sim ply isn't acceptab le to sit back an d comp lain that the
Departm ent, for whatev er reason, d idn't give me eve rything I need. G ood pe ople, using go od tactics will p revail.”
Master Sergeant John Simonton, Illinois State Police - Critical Incident Response Command
Master Sergeant John Simonton is a 20-year law enforcement veteran, beginning his career with the Boone County
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Sheriffs Department and moving on to the Illinois State Police in 198 4. John has been a member of the Tactical
Response Team program since 1986 and is currently the Team Leader for one of three full-time Tactical Response Teams
with the Illinois State Police. Master Sergeant Simonton is a certified instructor in close quarter battle, Critical Incident
Response and operational planning and management. He holds a bachelors degree in law enforcement administration
and has atten ded num erous supe rvisory training c lasses through out his caree r.
Master Sergea nt John Simonton’s Commen ts:
“While I certainly don’t consider myself an expert in this subject, I d id apprec iate the invitation to discuss the R apid
Deploym ent issues with this diverse and educated panel. W e in law enforc ement nee d to do a better job of critiquing
high-risk incidents and, most importantly, sharing that information with other law enforcement organizations. This
“commu nication gap ” has caused many negativ es in law enforc ement such as:
1. Inconsistent training for high-risk incidents;
2. No basis for decision m aking by new or inexperien ced supervisors facing similar incidents;
3. Repeated improper tactics; and,
4. Improper assessment of high risk factors leading to delayed or disastrous decision-making.
It is incumbent upon us, the trainers, to communicate our thoughts and experiences in handling critical incidents to those
preparing for them. We would not be here today discussing this issue if we had not created our own luck by exhaustive
prepara tions for the ultima te challenge.
A few years ago, a few team members and I started teaching an eight hour room clearing / building entry class for patrol
officers. This training was created for several reaso ns:
1. Requests by patrol officers assisting investigations with other than high risk (SWAT criteria) search and
arrest warrants;
2. a trend was beginning with departments buying equipment for officers, but not budgeting for adequate and
consistent training; and,
3. to prepare as many officers as possible in not only the physical art of room clearing, but the mental aspect
of risk assessm ent when co nfronted with a n active shoo ter incident that m ay require im mediate ac tion.
This type of training has been well received and has been made cost effective through the M obile Te am Tra ining Units
throughout Illinois. The training has been cond ucted now for app roximately three years, with several repeat officers and
agencies attending. Realistic “win” scenarios are utilized and made progressively more difficult, using Simunition© and
incorpo rating decisio n-making am ong peer s in a “stressful” training environme nt.”
-22-
SynopsisActive Shooter Incidents
Case#
Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured
Times RDused?
RD make aDifference?*
Narrative
001 Tampa, FL -RadissonHotel
Workplace
1 maleaged 36
9mm and .38handguns. Many shotsfired (unsure#).
5 15+ 1500 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes
NO NO
Gone on arrival
Suspect shot specific co-workers at hotel,except last victim (a women killed during acarjacking 2 miles from scene). Suspectsurrendered after vehicle pursuit. Suspect hadfled the scene before police arrived.
002 Tampa, FL -Fireman’sFundInsurancebuilding
Workplace
1 malemid-30's
9mm handgun. Many shotsfired (unsure#). Probablereload.
3 2 1100 hours. 4+ officerson the scenewithin 5minutes.
NO NO
Gone on arrival
Suspect entered workplace and targeted specificco-workers. Suspect fled the scene beforeofficers arrived and was later found dead, froma self-inflicted wound, at a nea rby golf course.
003 Anaheim,CA -Hospital
Rampageaftermotherdied inthishospital
1 maleaged 43
2 revolvers. 7shots fired. Probablereload.
2 1 1040 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 6minutes.
NO NO
Already in custody
Suspect entered the hosp ital where his motherhad recently died and shot random targets. Shot3 people, reloaded revolver and was grabbedand detained by hospital staff before policearrived. First arriving officer set-up aCommand Post and implemented ICS. 15-20minutes before police entered the building andtook suspect in to custody.
004 Olivehurst,CA - HighSchool
School 1 maleaged 19
12 gaugeshotgun and.22 rimfirerifle. Estimated 15-20 shots fired,most were 3inch #4 shotloads.
4 10 1405 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes. SWAT entrywithin 10minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponsebySWATtrainedofficers
NO
Suspect hadalready barricadedwith hostages
Former student entered school and killed theteacher that had flunked out this student theprevious year. Remaining gunshot victims weremore random in nature. Suspect then barricadedhimself into the upstairs library with 80+hostages. Two of first arriving officers wereSWAT, who entered as a two man team withlong guns, but no other SWAT gear. This teamwithdrew with a victim. Upon re-entering, theSWAT duo met a student who had been sentfrom the library to announce that hostages werebeing held. The suspect surrendered throughnegotiations after about 8 hours.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-23-
005 Pelham, AL- multiplebusinesslocations
Workplace
1 maleaged 33
.40 handgun. 9-10 roundsfired (6-7 atfirst scene/2killed, 3 atsecond scene/1killed).
3 0 0730 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes.
NO NO
Gone on arrival atboth scenes
Suspect shot specific targets at each of twobusiness locations about 6 miles apart. Suspectallowed some potential targets to leaveunharmed from each location. Suspect had fledboth scenes before police could arrive. Policeknew suspect’s name and description after thefirst shooting incident. Suspect was taken intocustody shortly after the second shooting in afelony traffic stop.
006 Jonesboro,AR -MiddleSchool
School 2 males,aged 11and 13
Each suspecthad 5 guns,including(used): .44Carbine, .30Carbine,scoped .30-06,.357 revolver. 26 shots fired,over 400rounds inpossession.
5 10 1220 hours. 4+ officerson scene inless than 5minutes. 15-20 officerson scenewithin 10minutes.
NO NO
Shooting was overby the time officersarrived
Suspects used the fire alarm to draw victimsfrom the school gymnasi um and fired wi th riflesfrom a woodline 93 yards away. The .357handgun was fired at a construction worker inthe distance. A Deputy Sheriff located thesuspects as they attempted to flee their shootingposition and took them into cust ody.
007 Conyers,GA - HighSchool
School 1 maleaged 15
.22 rimfire rifle(stock cut-down for betterconcealment)and .357revolver. Fired12 shots (11from .22 atvictims and 1at school from.357).
0 6 - allwoundswerebelowthewaist
0759 hours. 4th officerarrived in 7minutes. Incidentover in 12minutes.
NO NO
Shooting was overby the time officersarrived
Suspect got off the school bus (with weapons),walked into the “commons” area and beganshooting with the .22 rifle. Suspect fired the.357 revolver over his shoulder back towardsschool as he fled on foot. Suspect dropped therifle in the school as he fled. Suspect wasconfronted by an assistant principle (student hadthe .357 in his mouth) and surrendered therevolver to the principle when ordered to do so.First officer to arrive was dealing with victims.Second arriving officer placed suspect intocustody.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-24-
008 Sheridan,WY -MiddleSchool
School 1 maleaged 29
9mm handgun. Fired 15-20rounds (unsure)with reload.
0 4 1100 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 3minutes andthird officerarrivedwithin 4minutes.
NO NO
Suspect commi ttedsuicide as theofficers arrived
Suspect walked onto middle school playgroundand opened fire on a group of 20-25 students.All victims had been shot prior to the firstofficer’s arrival. As the arriving officersapproached the playground area, the suspectcommitted suicide with the handgun.
009 Newington,CT - StateLotteryHeadquarters.
Workplace
1 maleaged 35.
9mm handgun,large huntingknife. 20 shotsfired (18 beforepolice arrivedand 2 afterpolice arrived).
4 - (3killedbygunfire and1killedbygunfire andknife.)
0 0844 hours. Four+officersarrived at0846. Incidentresolved at0846.
NO NO
Suspect commi ttedsuicide as theofficers arrived
Suspect killed co-workers at the Lotterybuilding. 2 shots were reported fired afterpolice arrived. Suspect committed suicide uponarrival of the first officers.
010 Wakefield,MA - Officecomplex
Workplace
1 maleaged 43
Shotgun,handgun,AK47 typerifle. At least 7shots fired,most from AK,some fromshotgun.
7 0 Timesunsure:reported thata 3 officerteam enteredthe buildingin from 5-10minutes. 10officers inthe buildingby the timeof arrest.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
NO
Shooting was overby the time officersarrived
Suspect entered a business in a huge multi-business complex and shot employees in hisformer employer’s personnel office. The firstthree officers found a victim and then found thesuspect a few feet away from that victim. Thesuspect had put down his weapons, was almostin a trance, and offered no resistance to arrest.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-25-
011 GreatBarrington,MA -PreparatorySchool
School 1 maleaged 19
AR15. Manyshots fired at 3differentlocationsaround thecampus.
2 4 2230 hours. The firstofficerarrivedwithin 5minutes. 4+officers onscene within20 minutes. Incidentresolved atabout 2300hours.
NO NO
Shooting was overby the time officersarrived
Suspect, a student at this exclusive school, firstshot a security guard at the gate, then shot aprofessor in his car. From there the suspectwalked to the library and a dorm, shootingrandom targets. Suspect barricaded himself inthe cafeteria and called 911. An officer at 911center convinc ed the suspect to surrender. Attime of surrender 7 officers were on the sceneand had just completed setting on-sceneperimeters. SWAT team had been called butwas 1-2 hours out. Shooting was apparentlyover by the time offic ers arrived on scene.
012 Royal Oak,MI - PostOffice
Workplace
1 male in30's.
Rifle andhandgun. Unknownnumber ofshots fired.
5 4 0800 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 2minutes. 3officersentered thebuilding inless than 5minutes. 4-5officers inthe buildingby the timethey foundthe deadsuspect.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
NO
Shooting was overby the time officersmade contact
Suspect, a suspended postal employee andformer Marine, entered the central post officeand targeted former supervisors and co-workers.Suspect was found inside dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-26-
013 LincolnPark , MI -SeniorCitizens’ResidentialHigh Rise
Rampageafterargument.
1 maleaged 55.
.22 rimfirerifle. 20-30shots fired bothinside buildingand out ofwindow atarrivingofficers.
3 1(elderlymanshovedoveragainstwatercoolerassuspectfledshootingscene).
1145 hours. First officerarrived in 2minutes. 6officers onscene within5 minutes. Officersentered thebuilding in 6minutes. Suspect incustody -about 3hours.
NO NO
Suspect hadbarricaded by thetime officersarrived
Resident of high rise went to his apa rtment afteran argument at a meeting and returned with a.22 rifle. Suspect shot managers of theresidential complex and returned to hisapartment on the 14th floor. Arriving officersfound victims, but no active shooter. At thatpoint the suspect opened fire on arriving policeunits from the window of his apartment. Thesuspect called his son and c laimed to be holdinghostages (did not actually have any hostages).The son relayed this info to police. Police heardman snoring on open phone line after he hadtaken medications. SWAT entered and tooksuspect into custody.
014 Dearborn,MI - PostOffice
Workplace
1 malemid 50's.
Handgun. 25-30 roundsfired, withreloads. Someshots werefired after thepolice arrived.
3 0 1000 hours. First officerarrivedwithin oneminute. 4-5officers onscene in 3minutes. Entry madeabout 20-30minutes intoincident.
NO POSITIVE
A RapidDeployment teammight have beenable to makecontact withshooter before hecommitted su icide.
Suspect entered central post office and beganshooting co-workers and supervisors. The firstofficers that arrived heard shots from inside thebuilding after their arrival. Policy in effectrequired containment, so immediate entry wasnot made. Negotiators attempted to makecontact by bullhorn. SWAT made a hasty entry20-30 minutes into the incident and found thesuspect dead from a self-inflicted wound.Though unsure of the time sequence of shots, allvictims were probably shot before an RD teamcould have made contact. However, the remotepossibility remains that one or more lives couldhave been saved by immediate action.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-27-
015 MelrosePark, IL -NaviStarplant
Workplace
1 maleaged 66.
Handgun, SKS(7.62x39) used;12Ga and .30-30 not used. 17 shots fired,most from theSKS.
4 4 0944 hours. First officerarrived inone minute. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes. Officersmadeimmediateentry as theyarrived.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
NO
Shooting was overby the time officersmade contact
Suspect, a former employee, entered factory andfired randomly at workers in the section of theplant where he was most familiar. Arrivingofficers “followed the trail of bodies.” Officersfound the suspect, dead from a self-in flictedwound, within 10-15 minutes of the call.Extremely high noise level of the factoryprevented officers from hearing gunshots, if anyshots were fired after their arrival. Suspect hadprobably already killed him self before theofficers arrived at the plant.
016 Topeka, KS- FederalCourthouse
Courthouse
1 male Handgun(s),pipe bombs,several shotsfired.
2 2 1100 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 1-2minutes and4+ officerswere onscene within4 minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
POSITIVE
Rapid entryprobably forcedsuspect away fromadditional victims
Suspect had previously detonated a car bomb inanother county as a diversionary device prior toentering the federal building for this incident.The suspect was due to be sentenced on drugrelated charges the next day. Upon arrival onthe 4th (court) floor, the suspect shot the securityguard and proceeded to the court clerk’s office,firing at random targets along the way. A pipebomb hanging on the suspect’s clothingdetonated, severely wounding the suspect.Arriving officers pulled the dead security guardoff the floor and quickly returned to search forthe suspect. The severely injured susp ect fireda suicide shot as the officers returned to the 4 th
floor. Topeka PD felt their immediate actionpushed the suspect into a room where wasunable to make contact with additional victims.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-28-
017 Southfield,MI -Psychiatrist’s Officeshooting
Doctor’soffice
1 male inhis 40's
.45 caliberhandgun,emptied 2magazines, 10+shots fired.
2 2 1700 hours. First twoofficersarrivedwithin 2minutes (1officer wasSWATarmed withMP5). RDTeam madeentry intothe buildingwithin 5minutes.
YES POSITIVE
Rapid entryprobably forcedsuspect away fromadditional victims
Suspect entered his psychiatrists’ o ffice andbegan shooting members of his counselinggroup. Suspect had brought a handgun to ameeting on a previous occasion. Arrivingofficers organized a RD response and ent eredthe building within 5 minutes of the call.Shooting was on the 12th floor of a 26 storybuilding. RD team was made aware of activeshooting, a good location description and toldof severely injured (but still alive) victims.FD/Paramedics and building security wereincorporated into the RD response. RD teamarrived on the 12th floor as the suspect fired ashot. The suspect ran back into the doctor’soffice and fired another shot (suicide shot).This PD is convinced that RD saved lives in thisincident.
018 Jackson,MS - FireDepartment
Workplace
1 maleaged 32
.25/9mm and
.357 handgunsand smallpropanecontainers. Many shotsfired (reloadedTEC9 at leasttwice). Suspect fired atsmall propanetanks, but didnot cause themto explode.
4 6 1200 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 2minutes. Suspect hadfled beforeadditionalofficersarrived atFD.
NO NO
Suspect wasleaving as officersarrived
(Counts as Goneon arrival)
Suspect/fir efighter entered a FD staff meetingand shot/killed all 10 personnel in the meeting.Suspect deployed small propane containers, butcould not get them to explode. A firefighter inthe meeting had a safety device which opened amicrophone on FD channel and audio of almostthe entire incident was broadcast and recorded.Suspect fled the scene and was fired at by anarson investigator (not hit). After a pursuit, anofficer from a neighbori ng agency engaged thesuspect and both were hit/wounded. Suspecthad fled the initial shooting scene before anyresponse was possi ble.
019 Jackson,MS - HighSchool
School 1 femalein 30's
Handgun,unsure ofnumber of shots fired (7?).
0 0 Timesunsure.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby SRO
NO
Already in custody
Mother was called to school to meet with sonand school counselor. Son was accused ofselling drugs at the school. Mother arrived andopened fire on the son, landing no hits. Motherran from the school and was tackled by a SchoolResource Officer that was on campus and ran tothe report of gunfire.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-29-
020 Lynnville,TN (GilesCountyS.O.) - HighSchool
Schoolshooting
1 maleaged 17
.22 rimfirerifle, 3-4 shotsfired.
1 2 0800 hours. First officerwas alreadyat school(DAREofficer) , 4+officers onscene with12 minutes.
NO NO
Already in custody
Suspect entered school intending to shootspecific teachers. Student shot/killed oneteacher and then shot another in t he head(survived). As suspect moved through theschool, he fired at anot her teacher, bu t missedand hit a student in the neck (survived). DAREofficer in the grade school wing was unarmed(by policy at that time), ran to his vehicle toretrieve his sidearm and got to the shootinglocation just as 2 teachers and a studentwrestled the suspect to the ground. DAREofficer handcuffed the suspect and radioed toresponding officers that the suspect was incustody. Suspect reported that he had intend edto execute a traffic deputy normally stationed infront of the school and then to later use thepolice car to escape. The traffic deputy was offthat day. Incident was over before RD teamcould have arrived/deployed.
021 Reno, NV randomhighwayshooting.
RandomshootingonInterstate(I-80).
1 maleaged 19
.22 rimfirerifle, 20+ shotsfired. Onevictimwounded byglass shards inface, anotherwounded bysmall bulletfragments inarm.
0 2 0815 hours. First officeron scene0838, 4+officers onscene by0845.
NO NO
Gone on arrival
Suspect fired at random vehicles t ravel ing on I-80 near Reno, NV with a .22 rimfire rifle.Victims first thought their vehicles were beinghit by rocks and did not call police for at least15 minutes. Incoming calls gave multiplelocations and shooting location was verydifficult to pin down. SWAT units and airassets arrived and searched the area (veryrugged and difficult terrain) until 1300 hourswithout locating suspect. The suspect had fledthe scene several minutes before police arrived.Suspect was later apprehended when NHPofficers saw a rifle in the back of his vehicleduring a traffic stop.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-30-
022 Colebrook,NewHampshire,ambushes.
Shootingspree andambushaftershootingtwoTroopersat trafficstop.
1 maleaged 62.
AR15 withAimpoint sight,9mm handgun(not used), 75+shots total. 43shots fired atfirst incident(traffic stop). Some .223rounds wereM855 “greentip” penetratorcartridges. Suspect waswearing levelIII body armorat ambushes.
2 4 1330 hours. First twoofficersinitiated atraffic stopon suspect.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolandSWATtrainedofficers
POSITIVE
However,this situationrequired fire &maneuver tactics,not a diamondformation
Suspect, with long history of violent threats,was stopped by NHSP Trooper. Suspect exitedhis vehicle with an AR15 and shot the firstTrooper (survived). The second arrivingTrooper was shot/k illed through the windshieldof his vehicle, being unable to return fire or exitthe kill zone (43 rounds fired by suspect at thisscene). Suspect then drove one of the policecars to Colebrook where he killed specifictargets (judge that was fleeing her la w officeand a newspaper editor that wrestled the suspectdown). The suspect drove to his home, cha ngedclothes, gathered more ammunition and donnedlevel III soft body armor. The suspect drove thepolice car to a remote location and set it up asambush “bait.” The suspect took up a high-ground position overlooking the stolen policecar. When a Fish & Game officer located thestolen police car, he was shot at several times,including a .223 hit that fragmented on hisbadge. Fish & Game officer was able to driveout of the kill zone. As many other policeagencies arrived, they saw th e “bait” policevehicle, but did not approach it. As officersmoved through the heavily wooded area, a K9alerted and in a subsequent gunfight, 3 officerswere wounded and the suspect was killed.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-31-
023 Aiken, SC,factory.
Workplace
1 male inlate 30's.
Armed with 2handguns(semi-autos),more than 50shots fired.
6 6 1530 hours. 15 officerson scenewithin 4minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
POSITIVE
Teams probablyforced suspectaway fromadditional victims
Suspect was fired employee of engine partsplant. Shot security guard at gate and thenentered building and killed the plant man agerand other specific targets. Arriving officersformed two hasty t eams, lead by on-dut y SWATpersonnel (5-man team in front and 6-man teamin back). The entry teams moved through thebuilding, advancing toward the sound ofgunshots. After several minutes, they heard nomore gunshots and relied on workers in theplant to direct them toward the suspect. Teamsbypassed the dead and wounded and called inadditional officers to deal with the victims.About 15-20 minutes after entry, the teamsrealized the suspect was in a fixed location, sothey set an inner perimeter around the suspectand waited for SWAT to arrive and clear thearea. The suspect tried to commit suicide bydrinking a poisonous liquid. SWAT officersfound him unconscious. Department’s RDpolicy/training was developed around thedetails of this incident, so their response nowwould be the same as they used in this event.
024 Pearl, MS,HighSchool.
School 1 maleaged 16.
Armed withMarlin .30-30lever actionrifle. Fired 6-7rounds - andreloaded. Had30 more roundsin pocket whencaptured.
2 7 0800 hours. 3 officers onscene within4 minutes,11 officerson scenewithin 6minutes. Suspect incustodywithin 3minutes offirst call topolice.
NO NO
Already in custody
Suspect killed his moth er earlier that da y, thenentered school and killed two specific students.He sought a third specific student, but whenunable to locate that t arget, he began firingrandomly. First two students were killed withhead/neck shots. One wounded studentreceived a torso shot, others were minor woundsfrom bullet/concrete fragments from missedshots. A teacher (National Guard Captain) ranto his vehicle and retrieved his Beretta servicepistol. As the suspect attempted to drive fromthe scene, the teacher detained him at gunpoint.The first arriving officer took the suspect intocustody. Suspect was one of 5 studentsconspiring to conduct a large-scale execution-style shooting event, but the other studentsbacked out of the plan. Suspect was detainedby armed teacher before police arrived.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-32-
025 Blackville,SC, HighSchool.
School 1 maleaged 16.
Armed withstolen H&R .32revolver with 4rounds. 4 shotsfired.
1 1 0837 hours. First officerarrived at0839. 4+officers onthe scenewithin 10minutes.
NO NO
Shooting was overby the time officersarrived
Student had been expelled p revious day, andwas part of a 3 student conspiracy to kill theprinciple. The other students backed out of theplan. Student entered the school and shot/killedthe bandleader and a teacher. A third shot hit awall (possibly a missed shot at someone). Thestudent then used his fourth, and last shot tocommit suicide. Suspect had along history ofjuvenile arrests. Incident was over before policearrived on scene.
026 Lewistown,MT, HighSchool
School 1 maleaged 16
Armed with a.41 Magnumrevolver. Suspect fired 5shots.
1 3 Morningevent. Twoofficers inthe school ata ball game,but severalminuteselapsedbefore they werenotified ofthe shooting.
NO NO
Gone on arrival
Student intended to shoot a teacher that wasflunking him. He walked into the classroomand shot the teacher in the back of the headbefore realizing it was a substitute teacher. Thisteacher was killed. Suspect then walkedthrough hallway and shot the vice principal inthe chest. Ast the vice principal was on thefloor, the suspect fired a head shot at closerange, but missed (vice principal survived). Asthe suspect ran from the school, he fired twoadditional rounds at students he thought werepursuing him and they received minor woundsfrom fragments. The student was captured lat erat home. The time line of this event wasestimated to be less than 2 minutes from thefirst shot to the suspect leaving the building.Two Police officers were on-duty in the schoolgymnasium at a basketball tournament, but werenot aware of the shooting for several minutesand were the first to arrive on the shootingscene.
027 Sandy, UT,hotel/restaurantshooting.
Randomshootingspree afteranargument.
1 maleaged 21
Armed with a.38 caliberhandgun, 6shots fired.
2 3 2100 hours. Four+officersarrivedaboutsimultaneously within 4minutes.
NO NO
Gone on arrival
Suspect shot his girlfriend in a hotel after aargument. Suspect then fled to a nearbyrestaurant and shot the man ager and a waiter.He then ran to the parking lot and attempted tocarjack a vehicle, shooting the driver. Suspectthen ran to a gas station and attempted tocarjack another vehicle, eventually fleeing onfoot. The suspect was captured the followingday. The suspect had fled the scene beforepolice officers arrived.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-33-
028 Killeen, TX,Luby’sRestaurant.
Randomshootingspree.
1 male inlate 20's.
Armed withtwo 9mmhandguns(Glock andRuger). Suspect fired atleast 50 shots,with severalreloads.
23 20 1230 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 5minutes and4+officerson the scenewithin 10-15minutes. Event wasover within20 minutesfrom firstcall.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
POSITIVE
Actions of officersforced suspectaway fromadditional victims
Suspect drove his truck through the frontwindows of a Luby’s restaurant and beganrandomly shooting patrons. Responding policeofficers entered through the crash site andimmediately engaged the suspect, hitting himseveral times (non-life threatening wounds).The suspect was driven through the building,and attempted to b arricade himself in thewomen’s restroom, but a patron held the doorclosed. As police officers closed on hisposition, the suspect committed suicide. Mostof his shots were directed at women and wereclose-range execution-style shots. Majority ofthe wounded were from glass fragments andtrampling as the crowd escaped.
029 Salt LakeCity, UT,LDSChurchlibrary.
Randomshootingspree.
1 maleaged 70.
Armed with a.22 rimfiresemi-autohandgun, 25-30rounds fired,includingmultiplereloads of asinglemagazine.
2 3 1031 hours. More than 4officers wereon the scenewithin 3minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
POSITIVE
Actions of officersforced suspectaway fromadditional victims
Suspect was schizophrenic Russian immigrantwho thought he was being pursued by the KGB.Suspect entered the library of the downtownLatter Days Saints (Mormon) church and beganshooting random targets. An unarmed churchsecurity guard was killed. Responding officerswere dragging shooting victims out to safetywhile being fired upon by the suspect. Thesuspect fled to a nearby hallway, where he u sedcover to continue fi ring at police. He reloadedthe single magazine of the pistol multiple times.Police officers eventually were able to get 2shots at the suspect, a .223 rifle shot that missedand a .45 caliber pisto l shot that hi t and killedthe suspect.
030 Salt LakeCity, UT,KSL-TVstation.
Randomshootingspree.
1 femaleaged 25.
Armed with aTaurus 9mmhandgun. 14rounds fired,with a reload.
1 1 1515 hours. More than 4officers onthe scenewithin 4minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
NO
Already in custody
Schizophrenic female had a history of stalkingand threatening media personalities. Suspectentered the KSL-TV station and began firing inthe reception area, but did not hit anyone there.Suspect went up to the 2 nd floor and shotthrough a door she could not open. Suspectthen went up to the 3 rd floor, offices of AT&T,where she killed one person and woundedanother before being wrestled to the ground anddetained by workers in the offic e. Shooting wasover before police arrived.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-34-
031 Williamsport, PA,parochialschool.
School 1 femaleaged 14.
.22 rimfirerevolver. 1 shotfired.
0 1 1203 hours. Four-manRD teammade entryat 1207,suspect incustody at1208.
YES NO
Already in custody
Female student used a .22 revolver to shoot aspecific fellow student in the cafeteria. Thatstudent survived. After firing the shot, the girlpointed the revolver at others and then threw theweapon down. A teacher escorted the student tothe assistant p rincipal’s off ice where she washeld until police arrived. Williamsport PD hadfully trained their personnel in RD tactics and a4-man RD team entered the school in a diamondformation within 3 minutes of receiving the callof this incident. The team moved quicklythrough the building, was directed to theprincipal’s office and took the suspect intocustody at that location. Shooting was overbefore the police a rrived on the scen e.
032 Edmond,OK, PostOffice.
Workplace
1 maleaged 30's.
2 - .45 calib ersemi-autohandguns. 20+shots fired, atleast 1 reload.
15 3 0730 hours. No entryuntil SWATarrived. 4+officers onscene within5 minutes.
NO NO
Shooting was overby the time officersarrived
Suspect had been reprimanded by his supervisorat the Post Office the previous day. Suspectwas a OK National Guard competitive shooter.Suspect entered the post office and shot hissupervisor and then shot random co-workers.Arriving police supervisor made the decisionnot to enter the post office until SWAT arrived.Reports indicate that the last shots were fired atabout the same time that officers arrived on thescene (suicide shot).
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-35-
033 Edmond,OK, randomshooting.
Randomshootingspree.
1 maleaged 40's.
M1, Garand,.30-06. 8 shotsfired. Reloaded andwas preparingto shoot againwhen killed.
1 1 1730 hours. See narrativefor responsedata.
NO POSITIVE
However,this situationrequired fire &maneuver tactics,not a diamondformation
Suspect’s son called police to report that hisfather had shot his computer with a rifle andwas wandering the neighborhood. Severalofficers (5?) Had responded to the area to findthe suspect. About 10 minutes after the initialcall, the suspect fired at a man in his backyard,killing the victim. Nearby, the suspect fired ata man near a backyard pool, wounding thatvictim. An officer in the area heard the shots,saw the suspect running and fired 2 shots at him(.45 handgun - 1 hit @ 73 yards). When hit inthe buttocks, the suspect went down andcrawled under a bush. The suspect reloaded hisrifle and was rising to fire when two otherofficers fired (1 with AR15, 1 shot, 1 hit – 1with 9mm, 2 shots, 0 hits). The suspect waskilled by the AR15 hit.
034 Bethel, AK,HighSchool.
School 1 maleaged 16.
12 gaugeshotgun loadedwith birdshot. 6+ shots fired.
2 2+ 0849 hours. 3 officers onscene andmade entrywithin 4minutes. Suspect incustodywithin 7minutes.
YES POSITIVE
Rapid police actionalmost certainlysaved lives -caused thesurrender
Suspect walked into high school with shotgunhidden under a trench coat. He enteredprincipal’s office and argued for the return ofconfiscated property, then sh ot & killed theprincipal. While walking from the office, thesuspect shot a specific student he wan ted to kill.2 other students had taken part in a pre-eventconspiracy to kill people in the school, but theothers did not participate in the actual shooting.The suspect fired shots at lockers that producedminor wounds to at least 2 other students. Thisschool is built on high supports because ofsurrounding tundra. Several students wereinjured when they jumped from 1s t floorwindows to exit the school (1-2 story drop from“first” floor windows). The suspect walked upthe stairway to the 2n d floor of the school andwas part way up the stairs when the 3-manpolice team made entry in to the lobby/stairwayarea. The suspect fired two shots at the arrivingofficers. One officer returned fire with 2 - 12gauge slugs that narrowly missed the suspect.At that point the suspect threw down hisweapon and was taken into custody.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-36-
035 Fort Worth,TX,Wedgewood BaptistChurch.
Church 1 maleaged 47.
.380 and 9mmhandguns and apipe bomb. 63shots fired, stillhad 96 roundson his person.
7 7 1851 hours. First twoofficersarrivedsimultaneously within 2minutes. More than 4officers onthe scenewithin 3minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
NO
Shooting was overby the time officersmade contact
Suspect walked into a crowded church gatheringand opened fire with handguns. An off-dutyofficer that lived across the street arrived at thesame time as the firs t on-duty officer and theymade immediate entry to find the shooter. Thearriving officers heard a single shot after theyarrived (which was the suspect committingsuicide). A pipe bomb the suspect had hangingon his clothing exploded during the event,severely injuring the suspect, but no one else.The suspect was already dead when the officersmade ent ry into the sanctu ary.
036 Littleton,CO,ColumbineHighSchool.
School 2 malesaged 17and 18.
9mm handgun(TEC9), 9mmcarbine and 2 -sawed off 12gashotguns. 188shots fired(most werefrom 9mmcarbine). 76explosivedevices at thescene, 30devices wereused by thesuspects.
13 24 1119 hours. First officeron scenewithin 2minutes.more than 4officers onthe scenewithin 5minutes.
NO NO
Victims were allshot before officerscould have madecontact
Suspects had a detailed plan to use explosivesand guns to kill hundreds of students at theirhigh school. Incident began with a diversionaryexplosion some distance from the school. Whena large explosive device they had secreted in thecafeteria failed to explode, t he suspects walk edfrom the parking lot toward the school, shootingsome students outside the building beforeentering. Most of the victims were shot in theupstairs library area. The first arriving officer(the school resource offi cer - SRO) was pinn eddown by gunfire as he attempted to exit hisvehicle. The SRO returned fire, but did not hitthe suspects (using a handgun @ 60 yards). Thesuspects fired at officers and rescuers at severalpoints during the in cident. SWAT officerspoured a high volume of fire into the librarywindows at one point to cover the rescue ofdowned students below the library. Thesuspects comm itted suicide in the library about47 minutes int o the inciden t; About the sametime that the first SWAT officers were makingentry on the opposite side of the school. All ofthe victims in this incident were shot within thefirst 13 minutes.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-37-
037 ThurstonHighSchool,Springfield,OR.
School 1 maleaged 15.
Ruger 10/22.22 rimfire riflewith a 50 roundmagazine,Glock 9mmpistol andRuger .22rimfire, semi-auto pistol (notfired at school)and knives. Fired 51rounds, 50from rifle and 1from Glock. Had 500+additionalrounds onperson whendetained.
2 25 0754 hours. First officeron the scenewithin 2minutes. Four+officers onscene within5 minutes.
NO NO
Already in custody
Student had been arrested previous day forpossession of handgun at school (expelled).That evening he killed both paren ts at home.The next morning, t he suspect walked ontocampus and started shooting randomly atstudents along a breeze way with a Ruger .22rimfire semi-auto rifle with a 50 roundmagazine. He then entered the busy cafeteriaand began randomly shooting students with therifle. As he attempted to reload the rifle (all 50rounds had been fired), he was rushed by astudent he had already shot in the torso. Thesuspect was able to draw the Glock pistol froma holster and fire one round, wounding a studentin the hand, before being overpowered byseveral students. Suspect was being held downby students when the first officer arrived andrushed directly into the cafeteria, taking thesuspect into custody. It took about 15-20minutes to clarify that the incident involved thesingle shooter tha t was already in cus tody.
038 FrontierMiddleSchool,MosesLake, WA.
School 1 maleaged 13.
.30-30 leveraction rifle, 5shots fired.
3 1 1400 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 6minutes.
NO NO
Suspect hadalready barricadedwith hostagesbefore officersarrived
Suspect (student) called in sick then walked intohis algebra class and opened fire on the first 3students near the doorway. When the teacher inthe class yelled at the student, he turned andshot the teacher. A teacher from a neighboringclass ran into the room and the studen t pointedthe rifle at the second teacher. At that point thesuspect held the remainder of the studentshostage in the classroom , but allowed the singlewounded individual to be dragged out into thehallway. Police entered the building and sawthe wounded student in the hallway. After astand-off of 10-15 minu tes, the second teacherwas able to wrestle the gun from the suspect andcall in police to ta ke the boy i nto cust ody.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-38-
039 USEmbroidery,Sante FeSprings,CA.
Workplace
1 maleaged 37.
.38 revolver, 8shots fired.
1 1 1050 hours. First officeron scenewithin 3minutes. 4+officers onscene within6 minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficersusingballisticshield
NO
Shooting was overby the time officersmade contact
Suspect walked into place of business and shothis business partner and the receptionist. Thesuspect fled to another business in a nearbybuilding. As the people in the second businessran from that building, they heard a shot firedinside and reported that to arriving officers.Arriving police officers made immediate entryinto the second location, using a ballistic shield.As soon as they entered the second building,they saw the suspect , dead from a self-i nflictedwound.
040 OmniPlastics,Sante FeSprings,CA.
Workplace
1 maleaged 38.
9mm Berettahandgun. 25-30 shots fired,with reloads.
2 3 0955 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 2minutes. 4+officers onscene within4 minutes.
NO NO
Gone on arrival
Suspect walked into the plastics plant and beganshooting random co-workers. Suspect fired 25-30 rounds in rapid succession, then fled thescene. The suspect’s weapon was either emptyor had malfunctioned, as he attempted to shootother victims outside the building as he fled.Arriving officers were told the suspect wasalready gone and were p rovided with a d etailedsuspect and vehicle description. About 1 hourlater the suspect committed suicide inneighboring Los Angeles.
041 SantanaHighSchool,Santee, C A.
School 1 maleaged 16.
.22 rimfirerevolver, 15shots fired.
2 13 0921 hours. SRO andoff-duty SanDiego PDofficer wereon campuswhenincidentstarted. 4+officers onscene within4 minutes.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby SRO,off-dutyandpatrolofficers
POSITIVE
Rapid response byofficersundoubtedlycontained thesuspect and causedhim to surrend er
Suspect walked onto campus and began firingfrom a restroom entran ce under a breeze waycanopy. After firing at several random andspecific targets, the suspect retreated into therestroom, popping in and out. The schoolResource Office and an off-duty officerresponded towards the shots and were joi ned bytwo arriving patrol officers by the time theymade contact with the suspect. When thesuspect saw the arriving officers, he present edthe gun by grabbing th e barrel and surr enderedto the police. Suspect made no attempt to pointthe gun or fire the gun at arriving officers.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-39-
042 GraniteHills HighSchool, SanDiego, CA.
School 1 maleaged 19.
20 gaugeshotgun withbirdshot,several roundsfired.
0 5 Morning(timeunsure). 2officersalready onthe scenehandledimmedia tely.
NO -
BUTveryrapidresponseby SROandpatrolofficer
POSITIVE
Rapid actions byon-scene officersneutralized theactive shooter
Suspect arrived in front of the school and beganfiring a shotgun from the street at both specificand random targets. A SRO and another policeofficer (on campus for an unrelated call)responded immediately to the sound of gunshotsand engaged the suspect. One officer fired(unsure how many rounds fired), hitting thesuspect twice (one in the buttocks and one inthe cheek). Suspect was in custody before anyother officers had arrived.
043 Cal-Transmaintenance yard,Orange, CA
Workplace
1 maleaged 35
AK47 typerifle, shotgunand handgun.Handgun notused. Dozensof shots firedwith AK, 3shots fired withshotgun.
4 0 1509 hours. First officeron scenewithin 1minute. 4+officers onscene within3 minutes.
NO NO
Ongoinggunfight/chasefrom the arrival ofthe first officer.
Suspect had been fired from Cal-Transsometime before this incident. Suspect drove tomaintenance yard and shot his first victim witha shotgun while the victim was still in hisvehicle. The suspect then walked into themaintenance yard and fired dozens of roundsfrom an AK-type weapon randomly at peopleand blindly into buildings. The first arrivingofficer saw the shooter firi ng and exchan gedrounds with the suspect, but neither of them washit. Suspect got into his vehicle and fled thescene with arriving officers in pursuit. A shortdistance from the maintenance yard, the suspectgot stuck in an intersection and a large gunfightensued. Seven police officers fired more than500 rounds from handguns, eventually killingthe suspect. One officer was wounded by thesuspect dur ing this exchange.
044 JewishChild CareCenter, LosAngeles,CA
School 1 maleaged 37
unsure 1 5 Morning,time unsure. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes.
NO
BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers
NO
Gone on arrival
Suspect entered a child care center and open edfire with an unspecified firearm, wounding 5.Responding patrol officers made immediateentry into the center to find that the suspect hadalready fled the scene. While driving awayfrom the first shooting site, the susp ect stoppedand shot/killed a postal worker he encountered.It took nearly two hours to determine that thesetwo shooting incidents were related. Thesuspect eventually fled to Las Vegas, NV,where he surrend ered to the FBI.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
-40-
XXX Commercialwarehouse,LosAngeles,CA
AttemptedOfficerRescue
NOT ANACTIVESHOOTER EVENT- BUTRAPIDDEPLOYMENTTACTICSWEREUSED
1 male 9mm handgun 1 2 YES NEGATIVE Two Glendale PD officers entered warehouse toinvestigate the attempted murder of thesuspect’s common-law wife. When themanager escorted them into the warehouse area,the suspect opened fire with a 9mm pistol froman elevated position. The lead detect ive wentdown immediately with a head wound and thesecond detective exited the warehouse andcalled for assistance. Officers rolled a flashlightin the doorway of the warehouse in an attemptto locate the downed officer and the suspectshot the lens of the flashlight. A 7 man rescueteam was formed and entered the warehouseusing suppressive fire directed at the last knownlocation of the suspect. Two LAPD officers onthe rescue team were wounded by the suspect.Additional officers laid down cover fire whilethe 2 wounded offi cers were extr acted. K9“Saber” was sent into the warehouse 2 times,drawing fire both times but not being hit.SWAT officers then en tered the warehouse,deploying several diversionary devices, andextricated the downed detective, taking firefrom the suspect, but suffering no casualties.The SWAT officers returned fire during therescue. Attempts to negotiate with the suspectmet with no success. Chemical agents wereintroduced into the warehou se, but produced noresults. SWAT re-entered the warehouse and,after a lengthy search, found the suspect - deadfrom a self-inflicted wound.
About School Safety Partners
School Safety Partners (www.SchoolSafetyPartners.org) is dedicated to creating long‐term funding partnerships to support school safety best practices. We are a facilitator of joint research projects, reaching out to the general public as well as stakeholders in the public, private, non‐profit, and academic sectors. Since our start in January, 2008, our projects have addressed the legislative, training, compliance, funding, and public awareness sides of school safety. Here are some highlights:
1. We created a reference library documenting all aspects of Colorado Senate Bill 08‐181, a first‐of‐its‐kind measure introduced by Senator Tom Wiens to modernize emergency planning in schools, so students, teachers, and first responders can act fast in an emergency.
2. For the 10th anniversary of the Columbine High School tragedy, we produced the national media event, "Colorado Rising," focusing on the future of school safety in America, and our guests and speakers were covered by NBC‐TV, CNN, NPR, FOX, Oprah Radio, Channel One News, Associated Press, Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, German Public Radio, the Guardian, and dozens of other news sources.
3. We assisted in the 2008 Symposium and the 2009 Symposium on the Prevention of School Violence at Johnson & Wales University, and in the tabletop exercises on interoperable communications conducted for these events by one of our partners, SchoolSAFE Communications (www.SchoolSAFEcom.org).
4. We produced over 4 hours of video footage, with 2 video crews, covering a full‐scale active shooter and multi‐hazard school exercise that involved 18 agencies and over 1,200 persons, and tested interoperable communications in several school‐related settings.
5. We co‐created the School Response Framework Fund in support of the National Incident Managment System (NIMS) and to help Colorado schools become NIMS‐compliant as quickly as possible.
6. We also developed a virtual campus that schools can use as an online training site for their safety teams, and as an action center where schools can build strong relationships with community partners, or local responders.
7. We have developed with ABC‐TV a nationwide community awareness campaign, giving recognition to educators as first responders, and calling for the creation of public‐private partnerships to make school safety sustainable in communities across America.
8. We have also developed with the creators of the feature motion picture, "April Showers," the educational and school safety materials to accompany the film as it is released to the worldwide educational market.
9. Other states have shown an interest in what we have done in Colorado about school crisis response, and for them we have designed webinars and information kits about improving school safety legislation and finding long‐term funding solutions.
We hope that you find our information useful and our contacts productive. We invite you to explore all parts of our website, and also share with us your views, experiences, lessons learned, best practices, and innovations. Please visit us at www.SchoolSafetyPartners.org and register online in order to access all of our sections. Registration is free.
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