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Syllabus
PUBP 652: STRATEGIES FOR PEACE AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS
Professor: Dr. Michael J. Dziedzic Term: Spring 2018
Work phone: 202 578-8519 Class time: Thursday, 7:20-10:00 p.m.
E-mail: [email protected] Room:
Note: There are no scheduled office hours for this class, but I will be available before and after
class each week for consultation and will answer e-mail queries promptly.
Course Overview and Requirements
This course concentrates on the strategies that have been implemented by actors involved in peace and stability operations, with an emphasis on management of spoilers. Readings, research, and a simulation underpin the class. Attention is also paid to developing students’ graduate-level research and writing skills.
Course content is organized around an inductive examination of the evolution, lessons learned,
and resulting strategies for what the United Nations (UN) calls “peace operations,” the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others call “peace support operations,” the US State
Department calls “conflict and stabilization operations” and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) call
“security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.” These terms encompass activities
that range from peacekeeping and peace building to peace enforcement. They take place
primarily during the international implementation of peace settlements in the wake of intrastate
wars. Success in these endeavors requires effective strategies for conflict transformation and the
ability to recognize and respond appropriately to spoilers. This course is designed to impart
analytical skills that will enable the student to identify critical factors conducive to conflict and
craft comprehensive strategies for confronting them effectively.
The course is conducted as a seminar with about 50-75 pages of reading per week. Students are
assumed to have knowledge of the United Nations system and core peacekeeping concepts.
Attendance and Grading
Students are expected to attend all class sessions, to have completed the assigned readings before
class, and to present their views on the readings in seminar discussions. Three or more
unexcused absences will reduce the final grade by one-half step (e.g., from A- to B+).
There are three writing requirements for this course:
The first requirement, accounting for 40% of the grade, is to prepare ten 2-page point papers
based on the readings assigned for seminars 2-11. The readings address the evolution of peace
and stability operations from Cambodia to Iraq. Each paper should describe the mandate of each
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mission, assess the drivers of conflict (which may not be reflected in the mandate), identify
whether spoilers had an important impact, and assess the efficacy of the strategies employed. In
seeking to determine why some missions have succeeded and others have failed, students should
assess what the root causes of violent conflict were and whether they were adequately addressed
by the peace process. Consideration should be given to unresolved political grievances, the
capacity to use violence to advance political agendas, absence of the rule of law, and economic
incentives. These papers should be in bullet format and will be collected after each seminar (See
the instructions and outline provided as an Annex to the syllabus below). Students will be called
upon to present their assessments during each seminar. No footnotes or quotation marks are
required for the point papers since they will be drawn directly from the course readings. The
lowest score on the point papers will be dropped.
The second requirement, accounting for 20% of the grade, is an in-class simulation that
builds on the theoretical foundation developed in the course. Students will work in strategic
planning teams tasked to provide the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of
the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a strategy for dealing with either Salva Kiir and
his affiliated network of supporters in South Sudan. During the simulation, students will provide
their assessment of whether Kiir is a spoiler, whether he is affiliated with a criminalized power
structure, and what type it is. Teams will propose what the most appropriate ways of dealing with
Kiir and his support base are, recommend any additional resources and authorities that are
required to implement a successful strategy for establishing a sustainable peace, and discuss
whether and how constraints on obtaining them can be overcome. Teams can determine how
these tasks can be equitably divided among the group for the presentation during the simulation,
but all students are required to take part in the presentation to the SRSG.
The third requirement, accounting for 30% of the grade, is a 6-7 page policy paper that takes
into account the feedback provided by the UNMISS SRSG to students during the simulation. The
purpose of the paper is the same as the simulation: To assess whether Salva Kiir is a spoiler in
South Sudan and propose a strategy designed to address him adequately, taking into account the
relevant constraints and limitations. The paper will recommend a strategy for stabilizing the
South Sudan conflict, determine whether additional resources and authorities are required to
implement a successful strategy, and discuss whether constraints on obtaining them can be
overcome. Strategy papers are due May 9.
Format for the strategy paper:
Assessment Delineate the leading factors that are currently provoking conflict in South Sudan, whether Salva Kiir is a spoiler, and what type of spoiler he is.
Strategy The end your strategy is intended to accomplish is to prevent a genocide and transform any spoilers you identify into supporters of the peace process (or eliminate their ability to obstruct it). Your discussion should identify the most appropriate ways of dealing with spoilers and their support base. You should also recommend any additional means (resources and authorities) that are required to implement a successful strategy and discuss how constraints on obtaining them can be
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overcome.
Classroom participation will account for the final 10% of the grade.
Class Policies
Proper use and formatting of notes and references will be a component of the policy paper grade
(i.e., the third graded requirement). The Modern Language Association reference format works
well.
The policy of the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs (SPGIA) on
plagiarism will be observed in this course. Plagiarism is the use of another’s words or ideas
presented as one’s own. It includes, among other things, the use of specific words, ideas, or
frameworks that are the product of another’s work. Honesty and thoroughness in citing sources
is essential to professional accountability and personal responsibility. Appropriate citation is
necessary so that arguments, evidence, and claims can be critically examined. The faculty of
the SPGIA takes plagiarism seriously and has adopted a zero tolerance policy. Any plagiarized
assignment will receive an automatic grade of “F.”
Although late papers will be accepted, in fairness to those who deliver their work on time, point
papers (i.e., the first graded requirement) that are not turned in by the time the class meets will be
reduced by a full letter grade, since we will discuss what the response should have been in class.
That is, if a paper is e-mailed to me later in the evening of the class day on which it was due, the
best possible grade would be a B. For each subsequent day, a half letter grade will be deducted.
Only two late point papers will be accepted. After that, no credit will be given. Policy papers
(i.e., the third graded requirement) will be docked one-half grade for every 24 hours they are late.
Legitimate excuses include acute personal illness or a death in the family, but if at all possible
notify me before the due date.
Readings
Required readings other than the books available for purchase will be made available either on
library reserve or electronically.
Books Available for Purchase
Dziedzic, Michael (ed.), Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace,
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).
Dziedzic, Michael (ed.), Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit, (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).
Books Available On-line:
Dobbins, James, et al, (2005) The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq. (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation). Available at:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf
Dobbins, James, et al, (2003) America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation). Available at:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/MR1753.pref.pdf
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Books on Reserve: Covey, Jock et al (eds.), The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies
for Conflict Transformation, (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 2005).
Delaire, Romeo & Beardsley, Brent. (2003), Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of
Humanity in Rwanda. (Random House of Canada Ltd.),
Durch, William J., ed. (1996) UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the
1990s. (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
Durch, William J., ed. (2006) Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations. (Washington D.C: USIP
Press).
Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, eds. (2002) Ending Civil
Wars, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).
Elizabeth Cousens, Chetan Kumar and Karin Wermester, eds, (2001) Peacebuilding as Politics:
Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).
Schedule of Classes
Seminar 1 (January 25): Strategic and operational planning
Note: Len Hawley, Director for Multilateral Affairs responsible for developing 40 Political-
Military Plans during the Clinton Administration, including Kosovo and East Timor, will speak
to the class.
STRATEGIC PLANNING
Hawley, Len and Dennis Skocz, “Advance Political-military Planning: Laying the Foundation
for Achieving Viable Peace,” in Covey, et al (eds.), The Quest for Viable Peace, 37-59.
Vera and Fields, “Assessments and Strategic Planning,” in Combating Criminalized Power
Structures: A Toolkit, 9-16.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
Covey, Jock, “The Custodian of the Peace Process” in The Quest for Viable Peace, 77-97.
EVALUATING SUCCESS
Downs and Stedman, “Evaluation Issues,” in Ending Civil Wars, 43-50.
Seminar 2 (February 1): Spoiler management strategies and Cambodia
SPOILER MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2,
Fall 1997, 10-16.
Dziedzic, “Conclusion,” Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace,
341-2 (Begin at “As defined in Quest for Viable Peace…”)
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Dziedzic, Michael, “Introduction,” Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit,
(Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 1-5.
Dziedzic, “Conclusion,” The Quest for Viable Peace, 268-79.
Note: Skim this reading to identify potential “ways” for your strategy for South Sudan.
CAMBODIA
Dobbins, James, “Cambodia,” The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, 69-71, 78-90.
Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2,
Fall 1997, 26-36.
Doyle, Michael, “Peacebuilding in Cambodia,” in Cousens, et al (eds.), Peacebuilding as
Politics, 89-109.
International Crisis Group, “Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend,” Report #8, August 11,
2000, Executive Summary. Available at:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/cambodia/cambodia-elusive-peace-dividend
Global Witness, “Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of Public Assets
by Cambodia’s Elites,” June 2007, 89. Available at:
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/cambodias-family-trees/
Seminar 3 (February 8): El Salvador and Guatemala
Note: Students can elect to do their point paper on either El Salvador or Guatemala.
EL SALVADOR
Dobbins, James, “El Salvador,” The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, 50-65.
Orr, Robert, “Building Peace in El Salvador: From Exception to Rule,” in Cousens, et al (eds.),
Peacebuilding as Politics, 153-176.
Stanley, William and Loosle, Robert, “The Civilian Police Component of U.N. Peace
Operations,” in Oakley, Robert, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg, eds. (1998) Policing the
New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press),
104, 123-4, 128-32. Available at:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a372330.pdf
GUATEMALA
Note: The Point Paper should address the CICIG mission.
Castresana, Carlos, “Guatemala: Illegal Entities and the Clandestine Security Apparatus,” in
Michael Dziedzic (ed.), Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 53-
76.
Seminar 4 (February 15): Rwanda
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Durch, William, UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, “The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping
and Disaster Relief in Rwanda,” 367-78, 382-9, 396-7,400-402.
Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2,
Fall 1997, 20-26.
Jones, Bruce, (1997) “Military Intervention in Rwanda's ‘Two Wars’: Partisanship and
Indifference,” in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (eds), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and
Intervention, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 116-142.
Delaire, Romeo & Beardsley, Brent. (2003), Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of
Humanity in Rwanda. (Random House of Canada Ltd.), 141-51.
Seminar 5 (February 22): Haiti
Note: Dave Beer, first Police Commissioner for MINUSTAH, will speak to the class about what
it’s like to try to develop a plan at the operational level and get the multiple actors involved to
work together to implement it, the challenges he faced in trying to establish a functional and
integrated strategic planning process when he arrived; the most significant challenges he faced
and how he dealt with them; and at what point local actors were engaged and how he knew who
he could trust. Come prepared with your questions for him.
Beer, Dave, “Haiti: The Gangs of Cité Soleil,” Michael Dziedzic (ed.), Criminalized Power
Structures, 111-43.
Seminar 6 (March 1): Bosnia
Note: Oscar Vera, architect of the strategy that successfully dismantled the Third Entity
Movement, will speak to the class. Come prepared with your questions for him. Dobbins, James, “Bosnia,” America’s Role in Nation-Building, 87-91, 93-4.
Vera and Fields, “Bosnia: Third Entity Movement” in Dziedzic, Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 27-52.
Cousens, Elizabeth and Harland, David, “Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Twenty-First-
Century Peace Operations, 61-5, 88-122.
Seminar 7 (March 8): Kosovo
Dobbins, James, “Kosovo,” America’s Role in Nation-Building, 116-128.
Dziedzic, Mercean, and Skendaj, “ Kosovo: The Kosovo Liberation Army,” in Dziedzic,
Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace,155-196.
March 15: No Class (Spring Break)
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Seminar 8 (March 22): Sierra Leone Rashid, “Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front, “Dziedzic, Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 81-84, 86-106. Dobbins, James, “Sierra Leone,” The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, 136-148.
Berman and Labonte, “Sierra Leone,” in Durch, Twenty-first Century Peace Operations, 141-4,
159-165, 178-183, 194-206 (begin at “The second mechanism…”)
Montague, Dena, “The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone,” The
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring 2002, Vol IX, No. 1, 236.
Seminar 9 (March 29): Democratic Republic of the Congo Note: The DRC case is complex so the focus of the point paper should be only on the strategy that was used to deal with the M23 spoiler threat. The peace settlement that you should analyze is the March 23, 2009 agreement, which is the source of the name of M23. There are two mandates you should look at: UNSCR 1925 and 2098. Jana Nyerges, “Democratic Republic of the Congo: M23,” Dziedzic (ed.), Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 203-27. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Open Letter to the UN Secretary-General on Peacekeeping in DRC,”
International Crisis Group, July 27, 2017. Available at:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/open-letter-un-
secretary-general-peacekeeping-
drc?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=7712cc667
3-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_07_27&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-
7712cc6673-359236985
BACKGROUND ON MONUC
Roessler, Philip and Prendergast, John, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in Durch Twenty-
first Century Peace Operations, 232-43, 248-9, 253-6, 267-70, 275-79, 283-299, 301-6.
Seminar 10 (April 5): Afghanistan
Dobbins, James, “Afghanistan” America’s Role in Nation-Building, 129-30, 133.
Their, Alexander, “Afghanistan,” in Durch, Twenty-first Century Peace Operations, 467-8, 504-
8, 537-543, 550-7.
Carl Forsberg and Tim Sullivan, “Afghanistan: Criminal Patronage Networks,” Dziedzic (ed.), Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 275-301.
Edward Newman and Niklas Keller, “Criminal Legacies of War Economies,” Journal of
Peacebuilding & Development, Vol 3, Issue 3, 2007. 49-50 52-4 57-8.
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Seminar 11 (April 12): Iraq
Note: John Agoglia, lead planner at Central Command for both Afghanistan and Iraq, will speak to the class. Note: For the Iraq lesson, the “peace settlement” to be examined in your point papers is the
Transitional Administrative Law that provided the basis for transitioning to an Iraqi
government. Diamond, Larry (2004) “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs (September/October), 34-
56.
Dobbins, James, “Iraq,” in The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, 181-5, 189-212.
Bisbee, “Iraq: The Rise, Fall, and Persistence of the Maliki Regime,” Dziedzic (ed.), Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 305-17.
Seminar 12 (April 19): Review of Strategies for Conflict Transformation
Dziedzic, “Introduction,” Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace,
10-14.
Dziedzic, “Conclusions,” Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace,
321-73. 52
WAYS AND MEANS Dziedzic, “An Overview of the International Toolkit for Combating Criminalized Power Structures,” Dziedzic (ed.), Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 379-91. Note: Use this reading to identify relevant ways and means you will use in your strategy for South Sudan and conduct further research into those “tools” in Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit). The second half of this lesson will be dedicated to organizing the effort of the team(s) for the simulation.
Seminar 13 (April 26): Preparation for South Sudan simulation
Note: The purpose of this lesson is to begin preparation for the simulation on Lesson 14 and the
policy paper. Review the contents of Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit to
determine which of the tools discussed should be included as means in your strategy for dealing
with the spoilers you identify in your assessment. The sources listed below provide a modest start
for your research, but they are not intended as a comprehensive list that will adequately provide
the background needed to prepare for the simulation and draft the policy paper. They are listed
in chronological order not order of importance.
SOME SUGGESTED SOURCES
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, August 17, 2015. Available at:
https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_compromise_agreement_for_sou
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th_sudan_conflict.pdf
Note: The Hybrid Court for South Sudan is particularly noteworthy.
John Prendergast, “The Paper Tiger in South Sudan: Threats without Consequences for Atrocities
and Kleptocracy,” Enough Project, ” May 2016.
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/The_Paper_Tiger_in_South%20Sudan_May_2016.pdf
Kate Almquist Knopf, “Ending South Sudan’s Civil War,” Council on Foreign Relations,
Council Special Report No. 77 November 2016. Available at:
http://www.cfr.org/south-sudan/ending-south-sudans-civil-war/p38510
“South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard,” International Crisis Group, Report #243 Africa,
December 20, 2016
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/243-south-sudan-rearranging-
chessboard
Webcast of the US Institute of Peace conference, “U.S. Special Envoy Speaks on Sudan and
South Sudan,” Jan 18, 2017. Available
http://www.usip.org/events/us-special-envoy-speaks-sudan-and-south-sudan
The Sentry, “War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay,” September 2016. Available at:
https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/09/Sentry_WCSP_Finalx.pdf.
Brad Brooks-Rubin, “Yes, We Have Leverage: A Playbook for Immediate and Long-Term
Financial Pressures to Address Violent Kleptocracies in East and Central Africa,” Enough Project,
June 2017. Available at:
https://enoughproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/YesWeHaveLeverage_June2017_Enough.p
df
Brian Adeba, Brad Brooks-Rubin John Prendergast, and Jon Temin, “Breaking Out of the
Spiral in South Sudan: Anti-Money Laundering, Network Sanctions, and a New Peacemaking
Architecture, Enough Project, September 2017. Available at:
https://enoughproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/BreakingOutSpiral_Sept2017_Enough_web.pdf
Jill Craig, “South Sudan Government, Rebel Groups Sign Cease-fire Deal,” December 22,
2017. Available at:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2017/12/mil-171222-
voa01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e2187%2eye0ao06xol%2e20i2
Seminar 14 (May 3): South Sudan simulation
Strategic planning teams will present their assessments of whether Salva Kiir heads a
criminalized power structure and thus constitutes a spoiler and provide a suitable strategy for
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dealing with him and his regime to the Special Representative of the Secretary General for the
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).
(Note: Strategy papers are due May 9)
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ANNEX
Instructions for Point Papers
In seminars 2-11 the task is to prepare a 2-page point paper assessing each mission covered in the
readings.
A point paper is not a paper. It should consist of points that you would use in a power point
presentation. This is intended to minimize the time spent writing and maximize the time spent
thinking--about what the point is. Complete sentences are not required.
ILLUSTRATION:
Success of the mission
The mission succeeded in key elements of its mandate (List which)
It failed to institutionalize a peaceful process for determining who would wield power
This failure directly contributed to XXXX instability
XXXX is a qualified success. It is at peace today, with no indications that renewed internal
conflict is likely.
Use this as the outline for each point paper. Each of your point papers should address the items
in bold. Simply plug in the points you think are most important under each point.
I. Root causes of violent conflict What were the main drivers of this conflict?
Identify any of the following factors that contributed to the persistence of conflict.
- Nature of the Peace Settlement
Did it resolve all political issues in dispute or were there continuing political motivations for
conflict?
- Capacity for Political Violence
Were all armed actors brought effectively into the peace process?
- The Rule of Law
Was the legal system a source of repression and impunity for ruling elites?
- The Illicit Political Economy
Did conflict pay and who profited? Did revenue from illicit sources sustain a political power
structure opposed to peace?
II. Purpose or mandate of each mission (Be brief)
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What were the key functions the mission needed to perform and did they receive the means to do
so? Focus on whether the mandate provided the authorities and capabilities needed to address the
root causes and other drivers of conflict that you identified above.
III. Were there any spoilers? What type?
If there were spoilers, describe their characteristics and what type they were?
IV. What was the strategy?
How were spoilers dealt with? Were institutions to address and resolve the sources of violent
conflict you identified above developed?
V. Success of each mission
Was the mission a success or not? Provide your rationale.
VI. Factors associated with success (or failure)
Identify the factors associated with the success of each mission and those that were conducive to
failure. Should anything have been done differently? If yes, how should the strategy have been
changed?
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