NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STRATEGY, PLANNING, AND OPERATIONS

JEN SPINDEL

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

17 FEBRUARY 2016

AGENDA

■ Strategy: Deterrence theory

■ Strategy in practice

■ War games

■ MAD and options

DETERRENCE: WHAT IS IT?

Three Uses of Force:

1. DefensiveProtect from attack and minimize damage

2. CoercionExploit an opponent’s wants and fears

3. ConquestSeizure of territory or things of value

DETERRENCE: WHAT IS IT?

Three Uses of Force:

1. Defensive

2. Coercion

a. Deterrence

b. Compellence

3. Conquest

DETERRENCE: WHAT IS IT?

Three Uses of Force:

1. Defensive

2. Coercion

a. Deterrence

b. Compellence

3. Conquest

A

B

A

A

A

B

Deterrence

Compellence

DETERRENCE: HOW?

Requirements:

- Credibility: believable threats

- Capability: nukes

- Will: fortitude to use them

How do you make threats credible?

DETERRENCE: SECURE SECOND STRIKE

Nuclear Triad

DETERRENCE: SECURE SECOND STRIKE

Nuclear Triad

Capability Credibility

SECURE SECOND STRIKEMAD

DETERRENCE == MAD?

■ Theory aligned with practice?

■ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara

1967 speech in San Francisco

DETERRENCE: FORMS

■ General v. Specific

1. General: deter adversaries from challenging in first place

2. Specific: deter once challenge has arisen

■ Immediate v. Extended

1. immediate: deter against one’s own territory or core interests

2. Extended: deter against allies’ territory or core interests

Is one type less credible or more difficult than others?

DETERRENCE IN PRACTICE

■ Nuclear triad – force composition

– How do you build your forces?

■ Importance of second strike

– Incentives to strike at new nuclear states?

■ Is MAD inevitable?

■ Non-“strategic” nuclear weapons

– Is there an actual use for nukes short of apocalypse?

NON-MAD NUCLEAR STRATEGY

■ Flexible Response

– Direct Defense

– Deliberate escalation

– General nuclear response

US preferred strategy for NATO defense during Vietnam War-era

Does Flexible Response undermine deterrence?

NON-MAD NUCLEAR STRATEGY: WEAPONS

Blue Peacock nuclear “landmine” (UK)Nuclear rifle “Davy Crockett” (US) Atomic Annie nuclear field cannon (US)

W54 Special Atomic Demolition Munition (US)

Atomic Annie test

NON-MAD NUCLEAR STRATEGY

■ Assured retaliation

■ Asymmetric Escalation

■ No first use

■ No-cities (counterforce) doctrine

WAR GAMES: CHICKEN

■ Jervis’ game-theoretic models

– Cost of attack

– Ease of attack

– Timing of moves

– Order of preferences

■ Chicken vs. Prisoner’s Dilemma

– PD: If player 1 defects, so do you

– Chicken: If player 1 defects, you better not

ROLE OF WAR GAMES

■ Are we locked in a game of chicken or prisoner’s dilemma? Is it iterated? Is there an opportunity for cooperation?

WRAP-UP

■ Can deterrence work without second strike capabilities? In theory? In practice?

– North Korea? Iran nuclear development?

■ Can there be nuclear cooperation?

■ Foreshadowing next week: Is nuclear strategy – either in theory or practice – fundamentally different from strategies based around other types of weapons?