NGOs in Bangladesh:
Activities, Resources, and Governance
Varun Gauri, The World Bank
Examples of low service quality
Bangladesh: Absenteeism rates for doctors in primary health care centers: 74 percentZimbabwe: 13 percent of respondents gave as a reason for not delivering babies in public facilities that “nurses hit mothers during delivery”Guinea: 70 percent of government drugs disappeared
Increasing public spending is not enough
* Percent deviation from rate predicted by GDP per capitaSource: Spending and GDP from World Development Indicators database. School completion from Bruns, Mingat and Rakatomalala 2003
Similar changes in public spending can be associated with vastly different changes in outcomes
Sources: Spending data from World Development Indicators database. School completion from Bruns, Mingat and Rakatomalala 2003
Market Failure and State Failure in Service Delivery: Are NGOs the Answer ?
Altruism to overcome incomplete contracts
Flexibility for allocative and productive efficiency
47% of World Bank projects involved NGOs/CBOs (1997)
37% of USAID budget channeled through NGOs (2001)
Even Jesse Helms likes development NGOs
Theories about what makes NGOs tick?
Altruism
Benefits for founders and managers
Worker control
LITTLE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
‘Massive proliferation’ of NGOs in Bangladesh
27,000 registered with MSA, 1600 with NAB90% of villages have an NGO (2000)One large NGO claimed to have reached 70% of villages and 70 million people (2003)Largest NGOs employ 10 to 70 thousand staff membersAbout 10% of ODA channeled through NGOsBusiness entrepreneurs: cell phones, dairy, publishing, handicrafts
A bit of historyBangladesh began as a nearly ‘failed state’ in 1971 due to civil war and cyclones of 1972Recurrent floods and cyclones (1988 and 1991)Donors poured resources into NGOsNGOs moved from humanitarian relief and reconstruction to ‘development’ tasksNGOs moved from ‘consciousness raising’ to ‘service provision’Donors encouraged self-sufficiency
Conflicts with the state
1991 NGO Affairs Bureau established
1991-2002 slow approval process, transparency issues and for-profit activities
2001-2003 perceived politicization of NGOs
2003 division of apex body
2004 push for new regulations
Objectives of the Survey
Descriptive statisticsNGO characteristics
Community perceptions
What works?
Pilot survey for use in other contexts
Sampling Overview
Thana selection35 chosen; random sampling weighted by NGO activity
Within each thana:Divided into ‘big’ NGOs and ‘other’ NGOs
Sample 100 ‘big’ NGOs
Collect lists of other NGOs during ‘big’ interviews
Choose six other NGOs in each thana randomly from list
Methodology
NGO interviewConducted with branch managersQuantitative and qualitative data collected on a range of aspects of NGO operations
Focus groupConducted with selection of community members / NGO clientsQualitative perceptions of NGO services and activities
Questionnaires
NGO survey topicsActivities
Sources and uses of funds
Relations with community, other NGO’s, government
Governance structures
Focus group topicsVarious measures of NGO ‘performance’
Community characteristics
Field Implementation
Field implementation: March – April 2003Six ‘other’ NGOs refused interviews Only 2 ‘other’ NGOs in two thanas One NGO in operation for less than one year Field staff interviewed only four NGOs in one thana193 ‘other’ NGOs in sample, 310 total
Table 1: Number of NGOs in each selected thana on initial list, updated based on enumeration, and surveyed
Thana Initial Number of NGOs
Updated Number of NGOs
Number of NGOs surveyed
Akhaura 6 7 7 Bagmara 31 33 9 Bandarban 10 28 10 Barisal 55 57 10 Bhola 19 16 9 Bochaganj 7 10 9 Chakaria 9 26 8 Chandina 18 20 9 Chitalmari 14 16 8 Companiganj 2 4 4 Delduar 19 27 9 Dhamrai 22 31 9 Fakirhat 10 14 10 Gabtali 21 14 10 Gaibandha 29 58 8 Gopalpur 15 69 8 Gulshan 44 37 9 Jessore 77 73 10 Manikganj 39 44 10 Mohammadpur (Magura)
13 12 8
Mohammadpur (Dhaka) 192 195 10 Mohonpur 7 14 10 Nasirnagar 15 25 9 Natore 33 33 9 Netrokona 23 23 8 Paikgachha 17 18 8 Pakundia 8 10 8 Raipur 11 12 9 Rajoir 10 14 8 Ramna 60 54 10 Sadullapur 12 25 8 Sakhipur 12 17 9 Sreepur 26 25 11 Tangail 63 75 9 Wazirpur 17 29 10 TOTAL 966 1165 310
Figure 1: NGOs per Thana, Bangladesh 2003
NGOs per Thana, Frequency Count, Bangladesh, 2003
0
50
100
150
200
250
Table 2: Average number of NGOs per capita, by income and wealth quintile
Quintile NGOs per
1000 people (based on
income of thana)
NGOs per 1000 people (based on
wealth of community) 1 0.091 0.097 2 0.082 0.195 3 0.226 0.130 4 0.108 0.114 5 0.184 0.184
Figure 2: Relative percentages of NGO types in
Bangladesh
What do NGOs do?
Sectors and Activities
Figure 3: Percentage of NGOs that provide each of the specified services
Table 3: Percentage of NGOs that raise awareness concerning selected subjects
Big NGOs Small NGOs
Sanitation 76.90% 79.50% Other health issues 69.31% 76.86% Nutrition 68.28% 72.47% Human rights 62.57% 57.27% Gender issues 54.44% 57.39% Arsenic 49.76% 60.74% Conservation 40.50% 44.16% HIV/AIDS 39.97% 40.73% Other 32.25% 27.43% Road safety 24.34% 24.64%
Methods of raising public awareness
Beyond Service Provision:NGOs and Lobbying
131 NGOs lobby national government97 NGOs had at least one meeting with national government in last year93 at least one meeting with local government58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with national58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with local
Figure 5: Breakdown of NGO partnerships with government agencies
Figure 6: Membership in umbrella organizations
NGO Resources
Finances and staff
Figure 7a: Breakdown of NGO revenues, as a percentage of totals
Figure 7b: Breakdown of NGO expenditures, as a percentage of totals
Figure 8a-b: Service provision by big and small
NGOs, free services vs. paid services
Financing of Activities
Dominant source of fund is fee for service:Full sample: 50% of funds
Big NGOs: 62% of funds
Other NGOs: 43% of funds
Membership fees – common but small amountsOver 90% of organizations collect membership fees
Represent less than 3% of overall revenues
Fraction of organizations with other sources of revenues
Small Big
Grant from Int'l NGO 0.16 0.01Services Rendered To government 0.06 0.02 To other NGO 0.10 0.06Loans from mother 0.16 0.28
Figure 10: Composition of NGO staff, broken down by function and work status. (Big NGOs displayed on the left, small on the right).
Table 5: Average size and salary of NGOs’ specialized staff
Average number of
staff (big NGOs) Average number of staff (small NGOs)
Nurses 0.62 0.37 Medical doctors 0.08 0.41 Teachers 18.32 5.12 Lawyers 0.13 0.11 Social scientists 0.05 0.15 Natural scientists/engineers 0.10 0.05 Holding other university degree 7.72 4.94 Average annual
salary (big NGO) Average annual salary
(small NGO) Nurses 34680.0 (12%) 46868.4 (19%) Medical doctors Teachers 10489.2 (37%) 16574.4 (34%) Lawyers 40706.4 (7%) 48625.2 (6%) Social scientists 51348.0 (3%) 39784.8 (2%) Natural scientists/engineers 73362.0 (3%) Holding other university degree 65101.2 (98%) 54813.6 (95%)
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent estimated percentage of big/small NGOs with at least one of the given type of specialized staff
Specialized Labor: Summary
Teaching is most prevalent type of skilled labor
Majority of NGOs that provide education services have skilled teachers (67%)
Relatively few healthcare organizations employ doctors or nurses (31% and 25%)
Median size and labor intensity of NGOs
Full Sample Other Big
Revenues 1925 1039 3425Employees 14 12 25Households served 2196 1500 3000Rev/Empl 95 76 151Households/Empl 143 113 207
Constraints on improvementFull Sample Small Big
Lack of: Skilled Staff 0.34 0.41 0.23 Equipment 0.33 0.42 0.19 Vehicles 0.49 0.57 0.36 Funds 0.52 0.73 0.18Restrictions from Mother NGO 0.06 0.05 0.09 Nat'l Gov't 0.12 0.09 0.16 Local Gov't 0.09 0.08 0.09
Telephone 0.36 0.34 0.38Utilities 0.11 0.12 0.10Insecurity 0.31 0.26 0.40
Constraints: Summary
Smaller NGOs report greater resource constraints
Government restrictions are not an (self-reported) impediment
Governance
Autonomy, Evaluation, Participation, Accountability, and Management
Table 6: Which decisions are made by the NGO without consulting the supervising branch/headquarters?
Big NGOs Small NGOs Contact local government 84.40% 83.65% Consult community 80.49% 79.40% Staff performance review 77.72% 65.45% Initiate new activity 48.91% 39.59% Partner with another NGO 11.29% 18.29% Set salaries 4.30% 1.95% Hire staff 0.77% 2.86%
Table 8: Percentage of NGOs needing permission from an oversight committee to perform the specified activities
Big NGOs Small NGOs Expand into new activities 37.71% 58.58% Expand into new area 36.15% 58.67% Purchase building 23.58% 35.08% Hire/fire staff 16.94% 39.65%
Table 9: How the NGO manager was chosen
Big NGOs
(branches) Small NGO branches
Small NGO headquarters
Appointed by mother NGO 85% 84% - Elected by oversight committee/board of trustees
7% 11% 60%
Self appointed 3% 1% 24% Elected by members 2% 3% 15% Other 0% 1% 1%
Table 7: Methods used by NGOs to collect information about community needs
Big NGOs Small NGOs
From surveys run by NGO 85.53% 80.94% Observation/experience of staff 65.88% 72.54% Learn from opinion leaders in community 56.20% 53.90% Learn from local government 38.26% 25.29% Participatory workshops with community 23.70% 40.10% Learn from other NGOs 13.02% 16.34% From surveys run by other organizations 1.06% 10.19% Other 0.00% 1.94%
Figure 11: Percentage of NGOs involving community members in provision of services
Figure 12: Methods used by NGOs to collect feedback about how well they are meeting community needs
Employee Review
Full Small Big
Peer 0.15 0.18 0.09Immediate Supervisor 0.70 0.65 0.79Head Office 0.38 0.40 0.36Donors 0.02 0.03 0.01Program Beneficiaries 0.06 0.08 0.03
Additional elements of accountability
Auditing of accounts: 70%Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOsDonor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agencyEver visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36%Ever visited by thana/local government: 55%Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%
Employee Review
Full Small Big
Peer 0.15 0.18 0.09Immediate Supervisor 0.70 0.65 0.79Head Office 0.38 0.40 0.36Donors 0.02 0.03 0.01Program Beneficiaries 0.06 0.08 0.03
Additional elements of accountability
Auditing of accounts: 70%Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOsDonor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agencyEver visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36%Ever visited by thana/local government: 55%Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%
Table 10: Characteristics of NGO managers
Big NGOs Small NGOs
Male 98% 87% Age 36.2 38.2 Bangladeshi nationals 100.00% 99.65% Number of languages spoken 2.3 2.2 Tertiary education 99.6% 96% From “one of richest families in Bangladesh” 0.7% 3% From “middle class family” 88% 84% From a “poor family” 2% 0.8% Had relatives living outside Bangladesh 46% 46% Years in position 8.0 7.2 Worked for another NGO prior to joining 11% 37% Traveled outside Bangladesh 10% 25% Number of national civil servants known 7 10 Number of local civil servants known 10 12 Involved in another NGO 0.3% 5% Had another occupation at time of survey 2% 20% Worked for another branch prior to this one 82% 70% Worked for government 3% 10%
Summary: An Institutional Isomorphism
Branch and headquarters structure
Overwhelming focus on credit services
Service fees / operations main sources of revenue
Salaried and professional staff, not volunteers
No religious affiliation
Partnerships, little sub-contracting w/ government
Middle-class, college-educated male managers
Focus group summary: Qualitative and quantitative measures of NGO
performance:- NGO efficiency at providing services relative to
community- NGO efficiency at providing services relative to
local government- Perceived ‘self-servingness’ of NGO
Performance rating of NGOs
All Small Big
Mean performance rating … relative to community: 51.07 50.12 52.63… relative to government 64.68 64.76 64.55
NGOs are perceived to be approximately as efficient at providing services as communities themselves
NGOs are perceived to be significantly more efficient at providing services than the government
(Performance rating = allocation out of 100)
Correlates of Success & Community Perceptions
Direct evaluation by supervisor
Direct community feedback
Involvement of community members in project execution
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