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INTRODUCTION
METRO
TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMENT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Grade Crossing Accident at 26th
St.
on
April
25
2 5
At
8:13
p.m. on
Monday,
April
25. 2005, a northbound Light Rail Vehicle LRV)
operated
by
Metro Transit struck a pedestrian at its grade crossing with 26th St. in
Minneapolis
MN.
The pedestrian was pronounced dead at
the scene.
The student
operator of the LRV,
his
instructor. a second non-operating student and passengers
aboard reported
no injuries and
the
LR
V
was
operable from
the scene
with a broken
windshield and some body damage on the leading nose. Service
on
the rail line between
downtown Minneapolis and Mall
of
America was interrupted for approximately 2
hours
while investigation and clean-up operations were underway.
Metro Transit
began
operating the Hiawatha Light Rail line in revenue service on
June
26. 2004, and this accident was the second
fatality
experienced
by
the system,
INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY
The Safoty Department is responsible
to
conduct
an
investigation of rail accidents and
relies heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel. rail
operations and maintenance staff: as well as
its own
experience. This report is
fonnulated
on
observations at the crash scene. interviews
with
appropriate personnel.
review of other agency and internal reports and follow-up analysis. The involved
agencies. personnel and applicable reports are summarized below.
Metro Transit Police Department MTPD) was
on
the
scene and conducted
an
investigation of
he
accident. including interviews with
the
train operator
and
collection
of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally. responding officers
completed reports
and
submitted them with the required vehicle accident report.
Minneapolis Police Department also responded and their traffic department performed
mapping of the intersection and the placement of the body and the LR V in conjunction
with MTPD. This information was included in the reconstruction report developed by
MTPD
Minneapolis Fire
Department
and Hennepin County
Medical
Center
EMS
personnel
responded
to
the initial call.
The Hennepin County Medical Examiner
was
involved
in
the
on
scene death
investigation
and
disposition
of
the deceased.
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Metro
Transit staff
was
present
at
the
accident scene representing transportation, traction
power. signals, executive staff, marketing & customer service.
risk
management. and
safety.
Immediately after
the
accident, and prior
to an)'
further
train
movements,
the
Manager of
Signals performed
signal
component downloads on the Vital Process Interlocking (VP )
components
at both Lake
Street and
Franklin
Ave., as
well
as
the
crossing gate
house at
26th
St. These
are
the
controlling units
that would
activate, control.
and
report
the
activities
of the grade
crossing equipment at
the 26th St.
crossing,
The
results of these
tests and reports
were
shared with the safety department and summarized. indicating that
the
crossing functioned properly and as
designed
prior to the
passage of
the
train.
The
car
was
returned to the O M Facility and secured and
the LRV
event recorder was
downloaded
the
following morning.
This
device records
train speed.
master controller
position
(the position of
the throttle/brake controller,
which
controls train acceleration
and
braking),
br.1king
performance.
and
other related infonnation. This downloaded
infonnation for the period immediately before and subsequent
to the
collision was
analyzed and
reviewed y the Rail
Maintenance Oversight Manager and
the
Manager
Transportation,
and
subsequently provided to the safety department
for
review.
The
responding supervisor
from field operations
prepared a
written
report
of his
activities
and observations at
the
crash site.
The safety
department
took
photographs at the crash
scene, made some applicable calculations and measurements regarding braking of the
train, observed
the
police interview of
the Train
Operator and Instructor post accident and
reviewed
the
required Metro Transit vehicle .accident
report
with
the
Operator, Instructor.
and
their supervisor. Supporting documentation, including photographs
and
available
reports. is
on file
with the Rail Safety Officer.
Safety requested that
the
signals and communication department provide a copy
of
all
train
and R radio
and
phone
transmissions
for the period
beginning
with
the first
report
of the
accident
until
approximately
one
hour after. In processing this request.
that
department discovered that radio and phone conversations have not been recording since
December
14, 2004,
and
thus the
information
was
not available.
Since the
accident was
recent,
the
radio conversations could be reconstructed
from
downloading the individual
RCC
radio consoles, but all
phone
conversations were unavailable. due to the
unmonitored
system
failure.
Metro Transit Police downloaded
the
onboard video recorders
on
the
LRV
and
reviewed
the contents, along
with
the
list
of on•board witnesses with
Risk
Management
Two
debriefings
were
conducted
following the
accident, one for executive staff and
one
for
operating staff. Non-contributory response
and
investigation refinements
were
handled therein.
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DISCUSSION OF EVENTS ND N LYSES
Hiawatha Line
Operating Characteristics
Metro Transit s Hiawatha Light rail
line
currently operates
from
Warehouse station
in
downtown Minneapolis to
the Mall t if
America station, a distance of approximately
12
miles. Operations are governed
by
the Metro Transit
Rules
for Light Rail (Third Edition
February 2005),
the
Metro Transit Hiawatha Light
Rail Line
Revenue Service Timetable
(effective February
28;
2005 at 000 I hours CST), and the current Rail Bulletin 2005-17
(effective
Monday,
April
25, 2005,
at 0001 hours). The
line
section that includes
the 26
1
h
Street grade crossing is operated under BS rules and current of traffic, wherein trains
operate by signal indication, southward
on
main track 2 (MT2) and northward on
MTl).
The
26th
Street grade crossing
is located at
Milepost
MP)
HlA
2. 76,
measured
from the
north end of
the
Hiawatha corridor
at MP
HIA 0.3
at Warehouse station. The northbound
approach trackage comes off a left side curve approximately
0.125
miles south of
the
crossing and is downgrade
to the
crossing itself, entering another very gentle left side
curve immediately north of
he
crossing.
The
26th
St.
grade crossing is protected
by
automatic crossing warning devices consisting
of
crossbucks
with
bells. flashers
and
gate
am1s on the
westbound and eastbound lanes and
has
·Second Train signs that light up
when
multiple trains
are
approaching
the
crossing. The crosswalks each have a yellow
painted stripe across thewalk in
line
with the crossing gate ann (or second train sign
on
the side opposite} and a solid yellow
line
painted across
the
tracks parallel to
the
sidewalk
at the point it meets the ballast. Metro Transit Timetable Special Instructions require all
trains approaching
this
grade crossing to sound
two
blasts ot the
horn as an
additional
warning.
Train speed
in
the
affected area
is MPH on
northbound approach
to the
26th
St.
grade
crossing, increasing
from
35MPH at a
poil)t
approximately 0.1 miles south
of he
crossing near the bottom of the
Lake
Street overpass. These speed limits
and
restrictions
are prescribed
by
Timetable, posted speed limit signs
on the
right of way (ROW).
and rail
bulletin.
Facts
Surrounding
the
ccident
and
Initial Response
On
the evening of Monday, April 25, 2005. the weather was
dark and
a light rain was
falling,
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Immediately preceding the grade crossing collision, the involved train was operating
northbound with
the "A··
end of
LRV 12 l
leading
its
single car consists on
MTI.
The
train
had
departed Lake St. Station with
the
3 crew members and
42
passengers aboard.
As
the operator approached
the
26th
St.
grade crossing, be sounded the required 2
horn
blasts
approaching
the
crossing and noticed a pedestrian standing next to
the
westbound
crossing gate
on the
northeast comer of
the
crossing. The interview revealed that
the
train operator sounded a third horn blast because he noticed the man near the crossing.
As
the
train was occupying
the
crossing, the individual
looked
at the train and then
ran
directly
in
front
of
the train
us it
approached.
The
train o erator immediate sounded
the
horn
and laced
the
master controller into full brakin .
However,
the
LRV
event recorder confirmed that
the
train was placed
in
emergency brake mode and
was
traveling
at a
speed of IMPH
at the
point
the
brake
was
applied.) The
train
operator
was unable to stop short of striking
the
pedestrian and the train stopped with its
head
end
approximately
504 feet
north
of the
crossing. The body of the victim came
to rest
between main track1 and 2 approximately
125
feet north of
the
crossing.
The
emergency was reported immediately to the RCC, who contacted the Transit Control
Center (TCC) for
MTPD
and EMS response, the Transit Supervisor
on
duty for response,
Signal Department and Tmction Power on-duty for response.
as
well
as
other Metro
Transit staff, as appropriate.
Subsequent
to all
involved parties completing their necessary investigations
at the
site,
the
train was released. the body removed from
the
right-of-way, and
rrain
movement
through
the
area
was
resumed shortly after
IO:OOpm.
nalysis o the facts
The accident occurred
at : l
3pm on Monday,
April
25,
2005.
when a 45 year old male
apparently ignored the warning devices and stepped in front of the approaching train at
the
grade crossing of
the
Hiawatha Light Rail line
and
26th St. By the testimony of all
three crew members,
the
individual was observed standing
next to the
lowered
gate arm
counterweights al the northeast quadrant of the crossing and
ran
in front of the train
as
it
occupied
the
crossing operaling at slightly under
the
posted speed limit of MPH The
student operator
had
sounded the
hom as
prescribed
by
rule
in
approach
to
the
Ct ossing
and was
accelerating
at
the time of the accident. The interview revealed that
the
train
o ·
rator
ound d a thir
horn
b st
because
he
oticed
the man
near
the
crossing. -
As
the
train
was occupying the crossing,
the individual
looke at the
tram and then ran directly in front of
the
train
as
it
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approached, The train operator immediately sounded
the
horn
and placed the master
controller into
full
emergency brake.
The body o the victim was at rest approximately 125 feet north o
the
north edge o the
sidewalk crossing.
The head
end o
the
train
came
to rest
approximately 504 feet north o
that same point. (Exact measurements were
not
taken by Safety Staff due
to
the
Medical
Examiner activities on
the right o way and the
hazards presented
by
the darkness
and
uneven footing; The 504' distance was calculated by counting line side fence posts;
spaced
at
approximately
12'
centers and calculating that distance based
on the nose
o the
LR V being 42 posts north o the crossing.) It appears that the victim may have been
thrown ahead and to
the left o the
northbound train
at
impact; landing
at the left
o the
train
and
rolled
and
dragged
by the
stopping train
to the
point
o
rest. This
is
consistent
with damage noted after the accident
to the
retaining clip on the A'' car truck skirt on the
operators left side
and
blood splattered behind
the l t
access door
on
that same side
o the
LR
V
and testimony o one
o the
witnesses.
According to information from MTPD, post-mortem toxicology reports indicated
the
victim's blood alcohol content o 0.276, almost
3
times the legal limit for
an
operator o a
motor vehicle. This would have indicated severely impaired judgment at the time o
the
accident. Cause
o
death was detennined
to
be multiple blunt force injuries. Post~
accident interviews with the victim's spouse indicated a history o alcoholism, but no
known
suicidal issues.
The instructor on the northbound train immediately radioed the R o the collision,
following appropriate radio procedure, announcing Emergency three times
and
stating
the
location and
the
nature o the accident.
A southbound
LR
V was operating south o
the
24th St pedestrian crossing and passed the
scene
at
approximately the same time
as the
fatal
impact, but did not
see
anything. This
would be consistent with oncoming bright lights from the approaching northbound train
and the fact
that given such lights. the other train operator would
have
focused his
attention ahead
and to his
right in approach of26m SL
That
operator had just entered
the
main~line from the yard and
had not
yet changed
his
radio channel from Yard to
';Operations;' frequency. thus did
not
hear the ·'Emergency call
from
the northbound
train.
Observations at the scene, corroborated by signal department downloads
o the
applicable
grade crossing and VPT appliances and witness testimony indicated that all crossing
appliances were operating properly
and fully
functional
at the
time
of the
accident
The
crossing appliance inspection records indicate regular inspection
and no
reported
anomalies. (The crossing appliance records also indicate that the ·'Second Train
warning
sign
at the
crossing
was
activated at the time
o
impact, triggered
by
the
passage
o both the
affected northbound train
and the
approaching southbound train
to the
26th
St
crossing.)
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The download of the
LRV
on-board event recorder indicates that the train was
accelerating and
had
reached 51
MPH at
the point of impact
at
which time the train
operator applied
the
Emergency Brake with the master controller.
All
vehicle
propulsion
and
brake systems were functioning properly and all three headlights were
working. Vehicle specifications indicate that at 51 MPH. the. driver would react
in
56. I
feet and the stopping distance from that point would be 416.6 feet for a total stopping
distance
of
472.56 feet. These specifications assume an instantaneous
and
flat
deceleration
rate. Our calculation
of 504 feet is supported by these parameters, given a
slight descending grade, wet rail,
brake
pressure buildup,
and
human variables
in
the
reaction time and distance of the operator.
Post accident dru and alcohol tests of the train operator
and
instructor
A preliminary police report
was
received
from
MTPD after the accident, and the final
collision reconstruction report was received
on
May
26, 2005.
ON LUSIONS
The pedest ian failed to heed the operating warning devices at the 26
I St. grade crossing
and for unknown reasons stepped in front
of
the approaching train. The train operator
was operating his train within the parameters of rule and timetable instructions and
reacted promptly and properly, but had no chance
to
avoid impacting
the
pedestrian at
the
crossing, resulting
in
fatal impact.
There is no evidence that any operating practices of Metro Transit light rail contributed to
the unfortunate accident
of
April 25 2005.
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lnvesti ation Follow u nd ction Taken
MTPD and St. Paul EMS were notified and responded; the pedestrian was transported for
treatment.
Rail Operations and Rail Safety responded.
A Bus bridge was initiated,
and
train service
resumed
in approx. 45
minutes.
Vehicle maintenance downloaded the
on
board
LRV
event recorder data and Signals
Communications downloaded
the
VP data to
confirm that the
warning devices functioned
properly. A copy of the LRV download
is
on file with Rail Safety Officer. Manager of Signals
Communication confinns
that
the pedestrian crossing warning devices functioned properly per
VPI
download
and
will
forward
a written summary
to
the Rail
Safety Officer.
The
MTPD
also investigated this incident. A
copy
of the report is on file at MTPD and
with
the
Rail Safety Officer.
Final Report Information
Date Report Prepared:
12/14/05
Report Prepared
by:
John MacQueen, Rail Safety Officer
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INTRODUCTION
METRO
TR NSIT S FETY DEP RTMENT
CCIDENT INVESTIG TION REPORT
Grade Crossing Accident at 46th St on
August 7, 2 6
At 4:56 pm on Monday, August 7,
2006,
a southbound train departing
the
6th St. station
entered the grade crossing at 46
1
St.
and
noted a bicyclist riding southbound parallel to
the train
suddenly enter
the
tracks
toward
the south edge o the crossing.
The
operator
applied brakes, but was unable to avoid fatally hitting the cyclist. There were no reported
h\juries aboard
the train.
Service on the
rail line between Franklin
station
and Mall
o
America was
interrupted for
approximately 2 hours while investigation and clean·up operations were underway.
Metro
Transit began operating
the
Hiawatha
Light
Rail line in
revenue
service on June
26, 2004.
INVESTIG TION
METHODOLOGY
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting an investigation o
rail
accidents
and
relies on the expertise oflaw enforcement and emergency services personnel,
rail
operations and maintenance stafl: as well as its
own
experience. This report is
formulated on observations
at the crash scene,
interviews
with
appropriate personnel,
review
o
other
agency
and internal reports. and follow-up analysis. The involved
agencies, personnel, and
applicable reports are summarized
below.
Metro Transit
Police
Department MTPD)
was
on the scene
and
conducted
an
investigation o the accident, including interviews
with the train
operator
and
collection
o
witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally, responding officers
completed reports and submitted
them with the
re-quired vehicle accident
report.
Minneapolis
Police
Department
also responded and
assisted with traffic control
at the
intersection.
The
Minnesota
State Patrol
(Department o
Public
Safety) Metro
Crash
Reconstruction Team performed mapping
o
the intersection for reconstruction purposes.
This information
was included in the
reconstruction
report provided
to
MTPD.
There was initial response from Minneapolis Fire Department
and
Hennepin County
Medical
Center ambulance personnel.
Inasmuch as the
injuries
were fatal, the Hennepin
County
Medical Examiner responded
to investigate
and take
custody o the deceased.
Metro
Transit staff responded
to the
accident scene representing transportation. signals,
marketing customer service,
and
safety.
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Safety Department Accident Report
Grade
Crossing
Accident at
46lli Street
on
August
7,
2006
Page 2
The train
was returned to
the
O M Facility
and secured until the LRV event recorder
was downloaded. This device records train speed, master controller position (the position
o
the throttle/brake controller,
which
controls train acceleration and braking), braking
perforn1ance, and other related information. This downloaded information
for
the period
immediately before and subsequent
to
the collision was provided to the safety department
for review.
The responding supervisors from field operations prepared written reports
o
their
activities and observations at the crash site.
The
safety department took photographs at
the
crash
scene, interviewed the train operator.
and
reviewed the required Metro Transit
vehicle accident report. Supporting documentation, including photographs and available
reports,
is
on file
with the
Rail Safety Officer.
Metro Transit Police downloaded the onboard video recorders on the
LRV
and reviewed
the
contents, forwarding this
and the
list
o
on~board witnesses
to Risk Management.
DISCUSSION O EVENTS ND N LYSES
iawatha Line Operating Characteristics
Metro
Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line operates from Warehouse station in downtown
Minneapolis
to
the Mall
o
America station, a distance
o
approximately
2 miles.
Operations
are
governed by the
Metro
Transit
Rules
for Light Rail (Fourth Edition- July
I
0,
2006). The line segment that includes
the
46
h St.
grade crossing is governed by
automatic block signals (ABS)
and
trains operate according to an established current o
traffic.
The
46
1
h
Street grade crossing
is
located
at
Milepost (MP)
HIA 5.5
L measured
from
the
north end o he Hiawatha corridor at MP HIA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The trackage is
tangent southbound approaching this
grade
crossing, with a very slight curve toward the
east beginning just north o the grade crossing. Trackage
is
parallel
to
Hiawatha Avenue
(which
is
directly east
o the
tracks). The
46th St.
grade crossing
is
protected
by
automatic grade crossing warning devices consisting o crossbucks
with
bells, flashers
and
gate arms
on the
westbound, eastbound,
and
southbound right tum
lane from
Hiawatha Ave. to westbound
46th St.
All gates are o sufficient
length
to fully extend
across appropriate lanes
o
tratlic at the crossing. Additionally, each grade crossing gate
mm
is equipped
with three4 flashers, plus a pair of I2·•
flashers
that provide
the
grade
crossing warning for a motorist traveling the wrong direction. Bells
on
the crossing
appliances sou11d while the gates
are
in a state o travel downward, but do not sound once
the
gate is
fully deployed.
The traffic signals for the intersection o Hiawatha Avenue and 46th St. are
interconnected with the crossing warning devices for several phases o preemption:
I. A clearing signal phase is activated whereby motorists on the tracks are given
priority to clear from the intersection.
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Safety Department Accident Report
Grade Crossing Accident at 46th Street
on August 7, 2006
Page
3
2.
Grade
crossing warning devices activate to prohibit vehicles from entering
the
grade
crossing via the legally prescribed routes.
3. Motor vehicles approaching
from
all directions are kept in the proper lanes and the
traffic system displays signals prohibiting motor vehicles from proceeding
into
the
area with gates down.
The grade crossing also features a raised curb median in the center o 46
1
h St
on
both
sides of the crossing, separating the eastbound
and
westbound
lanes and
a curbed
median
separating the eastbound lane
o
6th St and the southbound right tum lane off Hiawatha
Ave
on
the
east side of
the
crossing.
The
purpose o
this median
is
to
define traffic lanes
and to discourage drivers from driving around grade crossing protection. There are
curb
cuts to allow mobility device movement
within
the
marked
crosswalks (described
below).
The grade crossing
is
marked with standard pavement markings in accordance with the
Manual
of Unifonn Traffic
Control Devices
MUTCD). These markings delineate a safe
pathway
to
cross 46
1
h and to cross the tracks
to
the ped/bike path, including:
I. A crosswalk parallel to the tracks on the east side
o
the crossing between
Hiawatha
Avenue and the
LRT
tracks
and
outside
the
crossing gates.
2. Crossing
the
tracks at
the
sidewalks
located
on the
north and south
side o 46th St.
Warning devices
in
addition to the standard crossing appliances
include
illuminated
··Walk/Don't Walk'' devices
for
the segment parnllel to the tracks and a yellow diamond
shaped
sign
that
has
Look with a two
headed
arrow} on
both
sides o the tracks.
The
latter also has
an
illuminated Second Train'' feature to
warn
i multiple trains are
approaching the crossing.
The
second train feature would not have functioned in the
accident scenario, as there
was only
the southbound train approaching the crossing at the
time
o
this incident.) Due
to
the wide nature
o
the
north side crosswalk,
an
additional
passive device (Crossbucks
with
a LOOK sign) is in
place, but
would not
have
been
involved in this incident,~ it occurred at the south side o the grade crossing.
A southbound train pre-empts the traffic signals at 6th St. while at the 46
h
St. rail
station
MP
HIA 5.4)
and
the
grade
crossing flashers/gates activate and
fully
deploy
before a southbound train receives a permissive rail signal to depart the station.
Train
speed in the vicinity of46
St. grade crossing is
35MPH
southbound. These speed
limits and restrictions are prescribed
by
Timetable, posted speed limit signs on the right
of way ROW),
and
rail bulletin.
Facts Surrounding the ccident and Initial Response
On the afternoon o
Monday, August
7, 2006, the weather
was
dry and clear.
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Safety Department Accident Report
Grade
Crossing Accident at
46
1
h
Street
on
August
7, 2006
Page4
Immediately preceding the grade crossing collision,
the
involved train
was
operating
southbound with
the
A''
end
o LR V l
03
leading
the train
consist on MT2. The
train
had departed
46
1
h St. Station with the operator and
196
passengers aboard (95 passengers
in
the lead
LR
V
and
O
I
in
the
trailing
LR
V).
As
the train operator approached the
6th
St. grade crossing, he sounded
the
bell, as
required
b)' rule.
Minneapolis
has
a whistle ban
and the
horn
is
sounded
only in
the
case
of
an
emergency, or
when
meeting another train
on
a crossing. As
the
operator
noted the
bicyclist nearing
the
eastbound
hme o
46
1
h St., he
sounded
the high
horn
as an
additional warning and reduced propulsion.
At
the
point where the train
was
approximately at the center
o
the crossing
a roximatelv even with the center medians , the operator noted
At
the
point o impact
with
the lower (operator s) left comer o the lead LRV. the cyclist
was
propelled toward
the
track center. The bicycle
came to
rest
on the
northward track
(MTI)
and
cyclist struck the catenary pole, located between the tracks immediately to the
south o
the
crossing, with the
body coming
to
rest just south
o
that catenary
pole
between Lhe two
main
tracks. The train stopped at a point approximately
243 feet
from
the point o impact with
the
cyclist.
The emergency was reported immediately to the RCC, who contacted the Transit Control
Center (TCC) for
MTPD
and EMS response. the Transit
Supervisor on duty for
response,
Signal Department
and
Traction Power
on
duty for response.
as
well as other Metro
Transit staff, as appropriate.
Subsequent
to all
involved parties completing their necessary investigations at
the
site,
the deceased was
removed
from the right of way by the
Medical Examiner,
the train was
released
and
removed
from the
scene,
and
nonnal train movement through
the
area
was
resumed shortly
after
7:
15
pm.
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Safety Department Accident
Report
Grade Crossing Accident at 46
~
Street
on
August
7, 2006
Page
nalysis
o
the facts
The
accident occurred at 4:56
pm
on Monday, August 7, 2006, when a southbound
bicyclist riding parallel
to the
tracks
on
the sidewalk/bike path through
the
pedestrian
crossing. located between Hiawatha Avenue and the LRT tracks made
an
improper right
tum, proceeding westbound into the eastbound
lane at
46th St. Despite warning devices
and a properly marked crosswalk,
the
bicyclist entered
the path
o and was struck
by
a
southbound train. These facts are substantiated by witness testimony reflected
in the
MTPD investigation reports. There were no other trains in the vicinity o the crossing at
the time o
he
collision.
The Hennepin County Medical Examiner (ME) report, and associated post-accident
toxicology report, indicated that the cyclist's death was the result o multiple
blunt force
injuries resulting
from
a bicycle-light
rail
train crash. with time
o
death listed
as
4:56
pm
on August
7,
2006.
Blood and
urine toxicology rests were negative
t r
prohibited
substances.
The Accident Reconstruction Report received
via MTPD
from
the
Minnesota
State Patrol concluded that
the
bicycle operator
·•was
riding
his
bicycle inattentive
to
surrounding real
and
potential
hazard.
Observations at the scene, corroborated
by
signal department downloads
o
the
applicable
grade crossing
and
VPI appliances and witness testimony, indicated that all crossing
equipment was operating properly and
fully
functional at the
time o
the accident. The
crossing appliance inspection records indicate regular inspection and no reported
anomalies.
All vehicle propulsion and brake systems were functioning properly and all three
headlights were working. The
LRV
event recorder continued that the train
had
accelerated to a speed of29.8
MPH
after departing
the
station;
and then
reduced
propulsion
to
25 MPH, followed with
an
application
o
track brake,
which
shows
deployment
at
21.7
MPH.
The track brake
was
applied
for 4.
I seconds, reducing speed
from
21.7
MPH
to
4.7 MPH, then shows release. Full service brake
continued
to be
applied, stopping the
train completely
J
7 seconds
later.
The entire stopping
time from
application
o
track brake
was
5.8 seconds.
No
clear markings could
be
identified
on the rail
surface
to
pinpoint a location
for
initial
application
o the track
brake. Absent
such
additional physical evidence,
the
investigation is solely dependant on
the
event recorder to provide detail of
the
braking
time and function. Using a series o calculations involving distance traveled per si. Cond
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Safety
Department Accident
Report
Grade Crossing Accident at 46' Street on
August
7, 2006
Page6
and the speeds indicated
on
the tabular event recorder download, the Safety Department
calculates that the train operator actually achieved track brake application at a point 65
•
•
= - - - ~ -== -=~ -~ -~ - . , ,- ~ -
y
p
speed every full second, so these calculations should be considered reliable, yet
not
exact.
hey do, however
lead
to the conclusion that the events transpired rapidly and
given
the
variables
in
human reaction
as well as mechanical
a liances,
train operators have believed they
had
pushed the master
control forward sufficient
to
achieve an emergency brake application, while actually
achieving only a recoverable track brake application or even full service application.
Despite efforts by the training department
to
stress the proper techniques for
use
of the
master controller in achieving emergency brake application, it is still apparent from these
incidents that there
is
an ongoing issue. either in terms of training or with the mechanics
of the master controller, which
needs
to be addressed to ensure that a
train
operator
can
effectively achieve a non-recoverable stopping mode that offers the maximum braking
potential available in
the
event
of an impending
collision.
A preliminary police report was
received from
MTPD
on
August 30, 3006.
and
the
Minnesota State Patrol Department of Public Safety) Crash Reconstruction Report (Case
Number 06980076)
was
received
from MTPD
on
November
'27,
2006.
ON LUSIONS
The cyclist ignored operating warning devices, departed a marked traffic
path
for
pedestrians and cyclists, entered a lane of traffic a ainstthe le al direction of traffic and
was
struck a southbound train.
There is no evidence that
any
operating practices of
Metro
Transit light
rail
contributed to
the unfortunate accident
of
August 7. 2006,
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METRO TR NSIT S FETY DEP RTMKNT
CCIDENT INVESTIG TION REPORT
Pedestrian
Fatality
at
Franklin
Avenue
LRT
Station on
June
8, 2007
INTRODUCTION
At approximately I 29
pm
on Friday.
June
8. 2007, a northbound train had stopped at the
Franklin Avenue station and was departing
the
station when a passenger
on the
platform
moved toward the moving train and
fell
between
the first and second LRV sustaining
fatal injuries.
The incident was not evident to
Metro
Transit personnel until the arrival of the
next southbound train at Franklin station, when passengers
on the
platform
informed
the
operator of that train of
the
body
lying
on the other track. That operator reported the
emergency
to
the Rail Control Center RCC).
Service
on
the rail line between Lake Street and Cedar Riverside stations was interrupted
for approximately 2 hours, 50 minutes while investigation and clean-up operations were
underway. Substitute bus bridge service was instituted between
Downtown
East
Metrodome} station and the Lake Street station during the rail interruption.
Metro
Transit began operating the Hiawatha Light
Rail
line in revenue service on June
26, 2004.
INVESTIG TION
METHODOLOGY
The
Safety Department
is
responsible for conducting
an
investigation of rail accidents
and
relies on the
expertise oflaw enforcement
and
emergency services personnel,
rail
operations
and
maintenance staff,
as
well
as
its own
experience. This report
is
formulated
on
observations at
the crash
scene, interviews with appropriate personnel,
review of
other agency
and
internal reports,
and
follow-up analysis. The involved
agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.
Metro
Transit
Police
Department MTPD)
Was on
the
scene
and conducted
an
investigation of the accident. including interviews with both train operators the incident
train
and
the first arriving train at Franklin Avenue subsequent
to
the accident and
collection of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally,
responding officers completed reports and submitted them.
Minneapolis Police Department also
responded
to investigate the possibility
of
foul play.
Their investigation quickly
concluded
that
the fall
was accidental and
not
a homicide.
There was
initial
response
from
Minneapolis Fire Department paramedics. Inasmuch
as
the injuries
were
fatal, the
Hennepin
County Medical Examiner responded to investigate
and
take
custody of the deceased.
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Safety Department Accident Report
Pedestrian
Fatality
at Franklin
Avenue
LRT Station on June 8, 2007
Page
Metro Transit staff responded to the accident scene representing transportation,
marketing & customer service, safety, risk management, and facilities maintenance.
The train was returned to the
O M
Facility
and
secured until
the
LR V event recorder
was downloaded and the exterior could
be
properly cleaned
and
inspected for any
damage. The event recorder records train speed, master controller position (the position
o
the throttle/brake controller, which controls
train
acceleration
and
braking), braking
perfotmance, and other related information. This downloaded information for
the
period
immediately before and subsequent
to
the accident was provided to the safety department
for review.
The
responding supervisors from field operations prepared written reports
o
their
activities and observations at the crash site. The safety department took photographs
at
the crash scene, interviewed the train operator, and reviewed the required Metro Transit
accident reports
and
available video recordings
from
the Franklin
Avenue
station.
Supporting documentation, including photographs,
video,
and available
reports,
is
on
file
with the Rail Safety Officer.
Metro Transit Police downloaded the onboard video recorders on
the
LRV and reviewed
the contents, forwarding this to
Risk
Management. Courtesy cards were not collected
from passengers
aboard
the train as the operator was unaware o what
had
occurred until
some time
after
the actual accident.
Subsequent
to
removal
o
the
deceased, Minneapolis Fire Department and
the
Metro
Transit
facilities
maintenance staff cleaned
the
platform area prior
to
resumption
of
service.
DISCUSSION OF EVENTS
ND
N LYSES
Hiawatha
Line Operating haracteristics
Metro
Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line operates from Warehouse station
in
downtown
Minneapolis to
the
Mall
o
America station, a distance o approximately 2
miles.
Operations are governed by the
Metro
Transit Rules for Light
Rail
(Fourth Edition- July,
2006). The line segment that includes the Franklin Avenue Station is govemed by
automatic block signals (ABS) and trains operate according to an established current o
traffic.
The franklin Avenue station
is
located
at
Milepost (MP)
HIA
2.21, measured
from
the
north end of the Hiawatha corridor at MP HIA
0.3
at Warehouse station. The trackage is
tangent
in
the
station
and
enters a gentle curve toward the west immediately north
o
the
station area. The station platform is located between the northbound track (Main Track
l)
and
the southbound track (Main Track 2), The platform surface is brick with a 24
yellow tactile warning strip at both trackside edges o the platform. There is a pedestrian
crosswalk at
both
the north
and
south end
o
he platform and warning bells at those
crossings sound continuously upon arrival
and
until after departure
o
trains.
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Safety Department Accident
Report
Pedestrian Fatality
at
Franklin Avenue LRT Station on June
8,
2007
Page
Train speed
for
northbound trains departing Franklin Avenue station is 35MPH
northbound. These speed limits
and
restrictions are prescribed
by Rule
Book Subdivision
Special Instructions, posted speed
limit
signs
on
the right
o way
ROW), General Orders,
Operational Notices.
and
Track Warrants.
Facts Surrounding the ccident and Initial Response
On
the
afternoon
o
Friday, June
8, 2007 the
weather
was
dry and clear.
Immediately preceding
the
incident,
the
involved train
was
operating northbound
with the
LRV IO leading. Upon arrival
at
the Franklin Avenµe station northbound on MTl
),
the
operator made his station stop
and
prior to departure, closed
his
doors and checked
his
mirrors. There was
no
one immediately adjacent to
the
side
o the
train. The operator
then focused
his attention
on the
track ahead, including an interlocking signal, pedestrian
crossing,
and the
upcoming Cedar South interlocking. The operator departed
the
station.
As
the train departed,
the
victim
moved toward the
moving train
and
appeared
to
lose
her
balance falling between the first and second LRV. Review o the video and testimony o
witnesses to police officers substantiate this fact nd do not appear to indicate that she
tripped over any obstacle or obstruction.
As the
train continued northbound,
the
victim
w s caught between the second LRV LR V I 17) and
the
station latfonn with resultin
fatal in·
uries.
The emergency
was
reported
to the RCC,
by
the
next arriving train at Franklin Avenue
station approximately 3 minutes
later). Upon
arrival southbound
on MT2,
Operator
9933
was notified by a patron
on the
platform that there
was
a
body on
the opposite track.
Operator 9933 left her operating cab with a portable radio and upon finding the deceased,
notified the
RCC
and
was
provided a blanket by an unidentified passenger from her train,
with which she covered
the
body The RCC contacted the Transit Control Center TCC)
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Safety Department Accident Report
Pedestrian Fatality at Franklin Avenue
LRT
Station on June 8, 2007
Page
for MTP and EMS
response, the Transit Supervisor
on
duty
for
response,
as well as
other appropriate Metro Transit staff.
Subsequent
to
al involved parties completing their necessary investigations at
the
site,
the
deceased was removed from
the
right
o way
by the Medical Examiner,
the
train
was
released and removed
from
the scene,
and
normal train movement through
the
area was
resumed shortly after 4:20
pm.
Metro Transit safety department notified
the
State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota
State Patrol), the National Response Center (NRC-NTSB), and recorded the incident as a
National Transit Database (NTD) Major'' incident.
nalysis o the facts
The accident occurred
at
1
29
pm on
Friday, June
8,
2007,
when
a passenger lost her
balance and fell between the LRVs o a northbound train departing Franklin Avenue
station. These facts are substantiated by witness testimony reflected in the MTPD
investigation reports as well as review
o
station platform video camera footage. There
were
no other trains in
the
vicinity
o
the station
at
the time
o
the accident.
As initial review o he station video indicated other patrons near the deceased. the
possibility of
foul play
needed to be
ruled out.
Minneapolis Police Department homicide
investigators were summoned by MTPO
and,
along
with
MTPD investigators, reviewed
the
video
and
interviewed witnesses. They concluded that there was no foul play
involved
and
that the death
was
the result o
an
accidental fall by the deceased (a
79
year
old female).
According to
MTPD
investigators,
the
Hennepin County
Medical Examiner
(ME)
ruled
the
fatality
to be an
''accidental death'' caused
by
''blunt
force
trauma;' and
the
toxicology
reports showed no abnormal levels. MTPD was unable to obtain a
fit1al
report from the
ME that would give a detailed explanation
o
the victim's prior medical conditions, any
medical diagnosis, or sudden
medical
problem
that
may have caused her to
fall.
While
not directly involved
in
the immediate accident location, Metro Transit signal
department employees downloaded the pedestrian crossing warning devices at the north
end
o the
station platform
as well as the
Vital Process interlocking
{VPI)
controlling
the
Cedar
South
Interlocking. These downloads
show
that
the
northbound train had a
permissive
rail
signal
upon
departure
from
Franklin Avenue station and that
the
pedestrian crossing warning devices (bells and Do Not Walk"
light,;) were
functioning
properly,
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Safety
Department Accident
Report
Pedestrian Fatality at Franklin
Avenue LRT
Station
on June
8 2007
Page
llllllll nt
drug and alcohol test
o he
train operato
A preliminary police report was received from MTPD on June 12 2007. MTPD notified
the Rail Safety
Officer on June
15 2007
that
the
Hennepin County
Medical Examiner
had ruled the death to be accidental and that any criminal investigation was closed. The
Limited Reconstruction
Report
was received
from MTPD
on August 28
2007.
That
report concluded that there did
not
appear to be any factors relating
to
the scene
(obstructed vision,
uneven
surface, placement o warning signs) or vehicle operation
contributing
to the
accident. That report concluded that the incident was not a suicide
and
that because it appears that the
victim loses
her balance and
falls into
the train, a
possible contributing factor may have been
the
victim s physical and/or medical
condition.
ON LUSIONS
There
is
no evidence that
any
operating practices
o Metro
Transit light rail contributed
to
the unfortunate accident
o
June 8 2007.
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METRO TR NSIT S FETY DEP RTMENT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
LRV Collision with Pedestrian at 6th Street on November 21 2007
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 2:42 pm
on
Wednesday, November 21 2007, a northbound train
crossing the 46
1
h Street grade crossing in Minneapolis struck a westbound pedestrian at
the
north side crosswalk.
The
pedestrian was fatally injured and rail service was
interrupted for less
than
two hours. Metro Transit began operating the Hiawatha Light
Rail
line
in
revenue service on June 26, 2004.
INVESTlG TION METHODOLOGY
The Safety Department
is
responsible
for
conducting an investigation
o rail accident'>
and
relies
on
the expertise
o
law
enforcement and emergency services personnel,
rail
operations and maintenance staff, as
well
as
its
own experience. This report
is
formulated on observations at the crash scene, interviews with appropriate personnel,
review o other agency
and
internal reports, and follow-up analysis. The involved
agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.
Metro Transit Police Department MTPD) was on the scene and conducted an
investigation
o
the accident, including interviews with both the train operator and the
witnesses. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally, responding officers
completed reports and submitted them.
There was initial response
from
Minneapolis
Fire
Department paramedics
and
Hennepin
County Medical Center ambulance personnel. The Hennepin County Medical Examiner
was summoned and investigated the scene as well
as
taking custody
o
the deceased.
Metro Transit transportation and safety staff responded
to
the accident scene, along with
the Assistant General Manager- Admin responded to the accident, to carry out
investigative. restoration, and P O tasks
as
appropriate.
The train was returned
to
the O M Facility and secured until the LRY event recorder
w s
downloaded and damage assessed. The event recorder records train speed, master
controller position the position of the throttle/brake controller, which controls train
acceleration and braking), braking performance, and other related information. This
downloaded information for the period immediately before and subsequent to the
accident was provided to
the
safety department for review. The operating cab LRV
I 06B) was equipped with a forward facing camera, but the camera was not functional at
the time
o
the accident
and
thus offered
no
evidence.
Metro Transit Signal and Communication staff downloaded event recorders for
the
adjacent warning devices
to
ensure proper function.
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Safety Department Accident Report
LRV Collision with Pedestrian at 46
1
h St
on November
21,
2007
Page 2
·n,e responding supervisor from field operations prepared written reports o his activities
and
observations at
the
crash site;
The safety department reviewed the required Metro Transit accident reports
and
available
video recordings
from the
CCTV equipment located at 46
1
h
St. station. Supporting
documentation. including
video and
available reports,
is on
file
with the Rail
Safety
Officer.
The
train
operator submitted to the required post accident drug and alcohol tests required
under TA regulations. The Operator also prepared the required Metro Transit
rail
accident incident report and
was
interviewed by Metro Transit Safety and
Rail
Operations
management.
Courtesy cards were collected at the scene.
DISCUSSION OF
EVENTS ND N LYSES
Hiawatha Linc Operating Characteristics
Metro Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line operates
from
Warehouse station in downtown
Minneapolis to
the
Mall o
America station, a distance
o
approximately 2 miles.
Operations are governed by the Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth Edition- July,
2006).
The
46th
Street grade crossing
is
located
at
Milepost
MP)
HlA 5.51, measured
from
the
north end
of
the
Hiawatha corridor at
MP HlA
0.3 at Warehouse
station.
Trackage
is
parallel
to
Hiawatha Avenue which
is
directly east o the tracks) and there
is
clear
visibility
of
the crossing to
a
northbound train. The accident location
was
at
the
pedestrian sidewalk crossing immediately adjacent to
the
north side
o he 46
1
hStreet
grade crossing. The adjacent traffic lanes are protected by active warning devices
including crossbucks, flashers, gate.
and
bell
as
well as a second train sign with
the
word
LOOK visiblellt all times. One
o
he bells rings continuously and
was an
enhancement installed subsequent
to
an earlier collision at
the
same grade crossing in
an
effort
to draw
the attention
o
inattentive pedestrians. Additionally, there
is
a passive
crossbuck in the middle of
the
pedestrian sidewalk crossing, along
with red
''Danger -
Moving Trains signs
on
the fence adjacent
to the
crosswalk.
Train speed for northbound trains at 46
1
h
Street
is 45 MPH
approaching
the
grade
crossing and drops to
35
MPH at the grade crossing. This speed limit is prescribed by
Rule Book
Subdivision Special Instructions and posted
speed
limit signs on
the
right o
way
(ROW). Minneapolis city ordinance prohibits
use
o
train
horn
except
in
case
o
emergency, thus normal operating practice is to sound the bell approaching this grade
crossing,
Facts Surrounding the ccident and Initial Response
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Safety Department Accident Report
LR V Collision
with
Pede~tritm at 46th St on November 21, 2007
Page
3
On
the afternoon
o
Wednesday, November
21,
2007, the weather
was
cloudy,
35
degrees
F, with light snow
and
no accumulation.
from
the LRV I06 B cab at the point
o
he accident,
train
was
unable
to stop
short
o
striking
the
pedestrian, who continued onto
the
track
in
front o the
train
(despite functioning active warning devices)
and
the train horn
sounding,
TI1e
pedestrian
was
killed
y the
impact.
The emergency
was
reported
to the RCC by the
train operator. The RCC contacted
the
Transit Control Center (TCC) for MTPD
and EMS
response, the transit supervisor
on
duty
for
response,
as
well as other appropriate Metro Transit staff.
The pedestrian
was
immediately attended
to
by paramedics and the
body
left
in place
for
the Hennepin County Medical Examiner,
who
removed
it
subsequent
to
its
on
site
investigation. '
Records indicate
64
passengers aboard
the
train at the time
o
the collision and no
immediate reports of
injury.
Metro
Transit safety department notified
the
State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota
State
Patrol) and
recorded
the
incident
as
a National Transit Database (NTD) ·'Major
incident. Additionally,
the
incident was reported
to
the National Response Center NRC-
NTSB .
nalysis o the Facts
The accident occurred
at
2:42
pm
on
Wednesday.
November
21,
2007. when a
northbound train crossing the 46
1
h Street grade crossing
in
Minneapolis struck a
westbound pedestrian
at the
north side crosswalk. The pedestrian
was
fatally injured
and
rail service
was
interrupted
for less than two
hours.
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Safety Department Accident
Report
LRV
Collision with Pedestrian at 46
1
> St on
November 21 2007
Page 4
It is also
possible
to
view the
accident event albeit
t from
some distance)
on the Metro
Transit
CCTV
camera
located
at 46th St Station plarfonn,
The
video showed the
involved pedestrian crossing
Hiawatha Avenue
outside
of the marked
crosswalks
and
against the trnffic I
ght. He
continued
to
step
in
front of the northbound train at
the
pedestrian crosswalk
on
the north side of
46th
Street. being struck
by the front of he
train
and the body propelled towards the chain
link
fence along the east side
of the tracks. The
train comes
to
a stop a short distance
past
the crosswalk. Witnesses interviewed
by
MTPD
corroborated
the victim
crossing Hiawatha A
venue
outside of the marked
crosswalk
and in th . midst
of conflicting traffic.
Metro
Transit
signal
department employees downloaded
the
grade crossing warning
devices at
the 46
1
h St
grade crossing
and found all
devices
were
functioning properly.
Witnesses interviewed by MTPD
also
indicated functional gates, lights, and
bells at the
crossing at
the time of the
incident.
witnesses
interviewed by MTPD indicated hearing the train
horn
immediately prior
to
the impact.
The Hennepin County Medical
Examiner
identified the victim as a 48 year old white
male
and stated immediate cause
of death as
multiple blunt
force
injuries due
to
or
as
a
consequence of, pedestrian-light rail
vehicle
collision.
Date
and time of death
was set
at
November 2I. 2007 at 2:43pm at
the
scene of the
collision. According
to
MTPD reports,
one of the witnesses stated that the victim appeared to be intoxicated and that the witness
could smell
alcohol when near the body. It is
also noted that a partial bottle
of whiskey
was found on the person of the
deceased.
However, the Medical Examiner s
report
indicates that while
Ethanol
alcohol)
was
present
in
the
blood
at
a
rate
of 0.037 gm/di,
this is
at
a
level
where there would be no presumption of impairment under Minnesota
law as it
would relate
to
driving
a
motor vehicle.
Also
that
same
report indicates
evidence of Cocaine Metabolite
in the urine screen, but not
at
a significant level.
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Safety Department Accident Report
LR V
Collision with Pedestrian
at 46 h St on November 21.
2007
Page 5
ON LUSIONS
The westbound pedestrian stepped in front
o
the northbound train despite passive
warning devices, functioning active warning devices. and
the
train horn
soundino The
pedestrian s actions appeared to be the result o inattention and carelessness.
However the train
was
unable
to stop
short
o fatal contact.
There
is no evidence that.any operating
practices o
Metro
Transit
light rail
contributed
to the
accident of November
21.
2007.
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LRT
Accident Investigation Report
For the
5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha
26
1
h
St
Page
I
INTRODUCTION
METRO
TRANSIT
SAFETY
DEPARTMENT
ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
REPORT
Grade Crossing Accident
at
6th St on
May 24, 2008
At 11: 12
p.m. on
Monday, May 24, 2008, a northbound
Light
Rail Vehicle LRY)
operated
by
Metro Transit struck a pedestrian at
its
grade crossing
with 26
1
h
St. in
Minneapolis,
MN.
The pedestrian \Vas transported rom the scene \.Vith serious injuries.
Service
on the
rail
line
between downtown Minneapolis
and Mall
of America
was
interrupted
for
approximately
I
hour white investigation
and
clean-up operations
were
underway.
Metro
Transit
began
operating the Hiawatha
Light
Rail
line
in
revenue service
on
June
26, 2004.
INVESTIGATION
METHODOLOGY
The Safety Department
is
responsible to conduct
an
investigation of rail accidents and
relies heavily
on the
expertise of
law
enforcement and emergency services personnel,
rail
operations
and
maintenance
staff, as well as its own
experience. This report
is
formulated
on
observations at the crash scene, interviews
with
appropriate personnel,
review of other agency and internal reports,
and
follow-up analysis. The involved
agencies, personnel,
and
applicable reports
are
summarized
below.
Metro
Transit Police Department
MTPD) was
on
the
scene
and
conducted
an
investigation of
the
accident, including interviews with
the
train
operator and collection
of
witness data. Evidence collected
was
documented. Additionally, responding officers
completed reports and submitted them with
the
required vehicle accident report. The
MTPD Accident Reconstruction Specialist
issued
a Collision Reconstruction
Report.
Minneapolis Police Department responded, as one
of their
patrol cars was at the
adjacent
intersection
of Hiawatha Ave. and 26
1
h St. at the
time of
the
collision.
Minneapolis
Fire
Department and Hennepin County Medical Center
EMS personnel
responded
to
the
initial call
to aid
the
victim.
Metro
Transit staff was present at
the
accident scene representing transportation, risk
management. media relations. and safety.
Immediately after the accident, signal department personnel downloaded the
26
1
h t
Highway Crossing Appliance
and
the
Franklin
VPl. which are the
controlling
units
that
would
activate, control, and report
the
activities
of the
grade crossing equipment at
the
26
1
h St.
crossing.
The
results
of these tests and reports were shared with the safety
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LIU
Accident Investigation Report
For the 5-24-08 Accident
at
Hiawatha &
6th
St
Page
department and summarized. indicating that the crossing functioned properly and as
designed prior
to
the
passage
of
he
train.
The train was returned to the O&M Facility and secured and the LRV event recorder was
downloaded. This device records train speed. master controller position (the position
of
the throttle/brake controller, which controls train acceleration and braking), braking
perfbnnance, and other related infonnation. This downloaded infonilation
for
the period
immediately before and subsequent
t
the collision was subsequently provided to the
safety department for review.
The
responding supervisor from licld operations prepared a written report of his activities
and observations at
the
crash site. The safety department reviewed
the
required
Metro
Transit vehicle accident report with the Operator. Supporting documentation is on file
with
the Rail
Safety Officer.
Metro Transit Police downloaded the onboard video recorders on
the
LRV and reviewed
the contents; along with the
list of
on-board witnesses with Risk Management.
DISCUSSION OF EVENTS ND N LYSES
Hiawatha Line Operating haracteristics
Metro Transit's Hiawatha Light rail
line
currently operates from Warehouse station in
downtown Minneapolis to the Mall of America station. a distance
of
approximately 12
miles. Operations are governed by
the
Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth
Edition-July 2006).
The
line section that includes the 26
1
Street grade crossing
is
operated under ABS rules and current
of
tramc, wherein trains operate
by
signal
indication, southward
on
main
track 2 (MT2)
and
northward
on
(MT
I).
The
26th
Street grade crossing is located at Milepost (MP)
HlA
2.76, measured from
the
north
end of
the Hiawatha corridor at
MP
HlA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The northbound
approach trackage comes off a lel1 side curve approximately 0.125 miles south
of
he
crossing and
is
downgrade
to
the crossing itself. entering another very gentle le l
side
curve immediately north of
the
crossing. The 26th St. grade crossing is protected by
automatic crossing warning devices consisting of crossbucks with bells. flashers and gate
arms
on the westbound and eastbound
lanes
and has Second Train'' signs that light up
when
multiple trains are approaching the crossing. The crosswalks each have a yellow
painted stripe across the
walk in
line with
the crossing gate am1 (or second train sign
on
the side opposite)
and
a solid yellow
line
painted across the tracks parallel
to
the sidewalk
at the point
it
meets the ballast. There is a conventional octagonal STOP'' sign at each
of
the
sidewalk crossings. Metro Transit rules require all trains approaching
this
grade
crossing to sound two blasts
of
the horn as
an
additional warning.
Train
speed in the affected area
is MPH
on northbound approach to the
26th
St. grade
crossing, increasing from 3SMPH at a point approximately 0.1
miles
south
of
he
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LRT Accident Investigation Report
FQr
the 5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha 26
1
h
St
Page
3
crossing near
the
bottom of the
Lake
Street overpass.
These
speed limits and restrictions
are
prescribed
by
rule and
posted
speed
limit signs
on
the right
o
way
(ROW).
acts
Surrounding
the
ccident and Initial Response
On the evening o Monday, May 24, 2008, the weather
was
dark and it had
rained.
Immediately preceding the grade crossing collision,
the
involved train was operating
northbound with
the
LR V 112 leading
its
consist on MT l.
As the operator approached the 26th
St.
grade crossing, he sounded the required 2 horn
blasts approaching the crossing
and noticed two
bicyclists
and a
pedestrian approaching
the
eastbound crossing gate on the southwest comer o the crossing. The interview
revealed
that
the train operator continued sounding
the
horn blast as
one o
the bicycles
crossed
in
front o the train. but the remaining bicycle and pedestrian appeared
to
be
stopping. As
the
train was occupying the crossing,
the
pedestrian darted toward the train
and
ran
into
the
operator s left (west) side
o he
train.
The
train operator immediately
placed the master controller into
full
service brake to stop the train. The body of
the
victim
came to
rest
between main track
I
and
2
in
the
roadway.
The emergency was reported immediately to the
RCC, who
contacted the Transit Control
Center (TCC)
for
MTPD and
EMS
response,
the
Transit Supervisor on duty
for
response,
Signal Department
for
response, as
well
as other Metro Transit staff , as appropriate,
The victim was
removed
from
the
right-of~way and transported
to
the
hospital.
Subsequent to all involved parties completing their necessary investigations at the site,
the
train was
released and
train
movement through
the
area
was
resumed.
nalysis of
the
facts
The accident occurred
at
11:
12 pm on
Saturday, May 24, 2008, when a 20 year old male
pedestrian apparently
ignQred
the warning devices
and
stepped
into
the
side of
the
approaching train
at
the grade crossing
o
the Hiawatha Light
Rail
line and
6th St.
By
the testimony of
the
operator,
the
individual
was
one of three individuals (two
on
bicycles
in
addition
to
the pedestrian) observed
approaching the crossing on the pedestriim
sidewalk at the southwest quadrant o the crossing.
One
of the bicycles crossed in front
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LRT
Accidenl Investigation
Report
For the 5-24-08
Accident at Hiawatha &
26
1
h St
Page4
)f the train, while
the
remaining
two
individuals appeared
to
stop.
The
operator
continued
to
sound
the horn for
a longer period
than usual
and
as
he
occupied
the
intersection, the pedestrian
ran into the
west
side of the
train at the front comer
and was
struck at a speed of approximately 54.7 MPH. The
train
operator immediately placed the
master controller
into
full service brake.
The pedestrian
was
transported
to
Hennepin County medical Center
for
treatment of
serious injuries. The accompanying bicyclists
both
minors) were interviewed by
responding police officers
and
indicated that they had been drinking
with the victim
prior
to the collision.
According to information from MTPD. toxicology reports indicated the victim is
blood
alcohol content of 0.24 l, over 3 times
the
legal
limit for an oper tor
of a motor vehicle.
This would have indicated severe ,· impaired judgment at the time of
he
accident.
Witnesses at the scene (including a motorist and
two
Minneapolis
Police
Officers located
in vehicles at
the
adjacent intersection) and review of available
on
board and adjacent
video, corroborated by signal department downloads o
he
applicable
grade
crossing and
VPI appliances, indicated
that
all crossing appliances were operating properly
and
fully
functional
at
the time of the accident.
The download of
the
LRV on-board event recorder indicates that the train was
accelerating and had
reached
54.7 MPH at the point
of impact.
at which
time
the train
operator applied
the ··Full
Service Brake"
with the
master controller. All vehicle
propulsion
and
brake systems were functioning properly. The maximum authorized
speed for northbound trains
at
this location
is
MPH.
Post
accident drug
and
alcohol tests of the
train
operator
preliminaty police report
was
received
from MTPD
at\er
the
accident. and
the final
collision reconstruction report was received
on
July 31, 2008.
ON LUSIONS
The pedestrian
failed to
heed the operating warning devices at the 26
1
h St. grade crossing
and for
unknown reasons stepped
into
the side
of the
approaching train.
It is
presumed
that the pedestrian's high level of intoxication contributed to the collision. The train
operator
was
operating his train within
the
parameters of rule and timetable instructions
and reacled
promptly,
but had
no chance to
avoid
impacting the pedestrian at the
crossing, resulting
in
the
impact.
There is no evidence that
any
operating practices of Metro Transit light rail contributed to
the accident ofMay 24. 2008.
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Minnesota
Rail
Oversight Program Accident Incident Checklist
Caller
Name:
J
MacQueen
ail
Safety fficer
Time and Date of notification: 6/25/08 8:00am
MN Rail
Safety
Oversight Program Representative: Lt.
Tim
Rogotzke
Location of Accident/Incident: Direction transit vehicle was traveling:,SB
@38th
St.
station -
north
crosswalk
Transit
Vehicles
Involved (Vehicle Number): l04/122
Date and Time of Accident/Incident: 6/11/0815:27 hours
Number
of
Injuries, (number requiring medical treatment away from the scene):
Other
Vehicles
Involved:
Type of Incident (collision, derailment, bomb threat, assault, Etc. : collision
Number of Fatalities:
Which
Agencies are
investigating?
MTPD: MT Rail
Operations Safety
Estimated Property Damage if available):
Incident Description: Pedestrian walked in front oftrain@north crosswalk from
bus
loading area toward platform and was brushed aside by train no injury)
Any Preliminary Cause: Ignored train horn and audible/visible active warning devices
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RAIL ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT
Basic Information
o
the Collision
Date Time: Sep. 6, 200910:36pm Location: MP IBA 3.6 South
of
3 nd St.)
Accident Description: Southbound train struck trespasser on
main
track 2
LRV: 123
(
116)
Op e r a t o r
ther Vehicle: None
Facts Surroundin the Collision
SB train struck male trespasser south
of
32nd Street grade crossing. Dark at time of
accident
and
trespasser dressed in
dark
clothing. The trespasser was transported
for treatment
of
injuries. There was a service interruption of I l 2
hours,
with bus
bridge instituted immediately.
Prelimina
Review of
front
facing camera indicated person squatting
on
west
rail
a roximatel ·ust over two catenarv oles south
of
3 °d
St.
Train operator stated
Trespasser was transporte for
treatment
of
injuries. There was
evidence of
emergency
brake
application
sand
and rail abrasion) found on both rails.
Final Accident Report
LR V 123 vs. Ped Accident
of
Sept. 6, 2009
lssued September 9. 2009
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Investi ation Follow u and Actions Taken
MTPD and Rail Safety/Rail Operations investigated the accident.
Operator completed required reports,
was
interviewed b MTPD and Rail
Safety/Operations Management
1
MTPD
and Safety Department obtained copies
o
LRV event recorder download
and front facing camera download.
MTPD
requested download o
32°d
St grade crossing appliances, however, Safety
IDepartment
did
not require same, as it
was
a trespasser incident not occurring at or
· involving a grade crossing.
Safety Department notified SSOA
via
and
reported NTD incident.
The
LRV
event recorder indicated a speed o 40 3 MPH (less than the 45 MPH
track speed limit)
at the
time
of
emergency brake application (also confinned
by
the event recorder),
and the
train stopped in
8 3
seconds (which
is
consistent
with
the markings observed on the rail at the site
and
the brak ino table rovided b
Knorr brake.)
camera supports the operator s statement.
As the accident occurred at other than a public grade crossing and significant
evidence to conclude
the
investigation
is
available
to the
Safety
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