MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME52Docket: Ken-18-130Argued: April12,2018Decided: April17,2018Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.
MAINESENATEv.
SECRETARYOFSTATEetal.PERCURIAM
[¶1] The Superior Court (Kennebec County,Murphy, J.) has reported
sevenquestionstouspursuanttoM.R.App.P.24(a),addressingtheSecretary
ofState’splannedimplementationofranked-choicevotinginMaine’sprimary
elections scheduled for June 12, 2018.1 The first three questions are
substantive,andtheremainingquestionsaddressthejusticiabilityofthosefirst
threequestions.ThisopinionfocusesonlyontheJune2018primaryelection;
itdoesnotaddressanyotherpotentialapplicationofranked-choicevotingin
Maine.
1TheCommitteeforRanked-ChoiceVoting,alongwithprospectivecongressional,legislative,and
gubernatorialcandidatesLucasSt.Clair,MarkEves,DianeRussell,BetsySweet,andBenChipman,intervenedinthematterintheSuperiorCourt.SeeM.R.Civ.P.24.
2
[¶2] Weaccept theReport,answerQuestion3on itsmerits, conclude
thattheotherquestionsraisenonjusticiableissues,andremandthematterto
theSuperiorCourtforentryofafinaljudgment.Insummary:
(1) Weassume,withoutdeciding,thattheMaineSenate,asinglebodyofthebicameralMaineLegislature, has standing to seek adeclarationregarding the legal statusof ranked-choicevoting in the June2018primaryelectionsandtochallengeincourttheoperationalplanningoftheSecretaryofState,whoisaconstitutionalofficer;
(2) WeanswerReportedQuestion 3 and determine that ranked-choicevotingisthecurrentstatutorylawofMainefortheprimaryelectionstobeheldonJune12,2018;
(3) WedeterminethatReportedQuestions1and2,whichasktheCourttoactincontraventiontotheconstitutionalprovisionrespectingtheseparation of powers of the three independent Branches ofgovernment,arenotjusticiable;and
(4) Wedeterminethattheremainingquestionsaremoot.
3
I.BACKGROUND
[¶3]Thehistoryofranked-choicevotinginMainetodatecouldprovide
thesubstanceofanentirecivicscourseonthecreationofstatutorylawinthe
StateofMaine.Weprovidethehighlightshere.
[¶4]In2016,thepeopleofMaineenactedcitizen-initiatedlegislationto
implementranked-choicevotingforgeneralandprimaryelectionsoccurring
on or after January 1, 2018, for the offices of United States Senator and
Representative,StateSenatorandRepresentative,andGovernor.2 L.D.1557,
§§1-6 (referred to the voters, 127th Legis. 2016) (effective Jan. 7, 2017)
(codifiedat21-AM.R.S.§§1(27-C),1(35-A),601(2)(J),722(1),723-A(2017));
seeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18.TheRanked-ChoiceVotingAct3createdbythe
citizens’initiativedidnot,however,amend21-AM.R.S.§723(1)(2017),4which
2TheRanked-ChoiceVotingAct,whichwerefertoastheRCVA,definedan“[o]fficeelectedby
ranked-choice voting” as any office for “United States Senator, United States Representative toCongress,Governor,StateSenatorandStateRepresentative,and. . .anynomination[]byprimaryelection tosuchoffices.” L.D.1557,§1(effective Jan.7.2017)(codifiedat21-AM.R.S.§1(27-C)(2017)).3TheRanked-ChoiceVotingActwasofficiallytitled,“AnActToEstablishRanked-choiceVoting.”
L.D.1557.
4AtthetimetheRCVAwasenactedbycitizenvote,21-AM.R.S.§723(2015)wasineffect.OnJune22,2017,theLegislatureamendedsection723.P.L.2017,ch.248,§§1-9(effectiveNov.1,2017)(codified at 21-A M.R.S. §§ 144, 145, 311(1), 723(1)(A), (2), 753-B(5) (2017)); 30-AM.R.S.§§757(2)(A),2528(4)(C)(2017)).Theseamendments,enactedpriortothemajorrevisionmadeby“AnActToImplementRanked-choiceVotingin2021,”P.L.2017,ch.316,§§1-14(effectiveFeb.5,2018),madeno substantive changes to the votingmethod, butmodified section723and severalotherprovisionsastovoterenrollmentrequirements.P.L.2017,ch.248,§§1-9.Theseinterveningamendmentsdonotaffectthecurrentdispute.Wethereforecitetothe2017versionofsection723.
4
statesthat“[i]naprimaryelection,thepersonwhoreceivesapluralityofthe
votescastfornominationtoanyoffice,aslongasthereisatleastonevotecast
forthatoffice,isnominatedforthatoffice.”Thus,section723(1)continuedto
provide that the winner of a primary election would be determined by a
pluralityofthevotes,evenwhilesection1(27-C)namedprimaryelectionsas
amongthoseelectionstobeconductedusingranked-choicevoting.
[¶5] OnMay23,2017,attherequestoftheMaineSenatepursuantto
Me.Const.art.VI,§3,we,asindividualJusticesoftheMaineSupremeJudicial
Court,issuedaunanimousAdvisoryOpinionstatingthatspecificaspectsofthe
RCVAconflictwiththreeportionsoftheMaineConstitution—Me.Const.art.IV,
pt.1,§5;Me.Const.art.IV,pt.2,§4;andMe.Const.art.V,pt.1,§3.Opinionof
theJustices,2017ME100,¶¶1,7,9,57,64-68,72,162A.3d188.Thosesections
address the electionof theGovernor andmembersof theMaineLegislature,
bothSenatorsandRepresentatives.5 Me.Const.art. IV,pt.1,§5;Me.Const.
art.IV,pt.2,§4;Me.Const.art.V,pt.1,§3.
5 In the Senate’s request for an Advisory Opinion regarding the constitutionality of the
ranked-choicevotingstatute,wewerenotaskedtoaddressprimaryelections,whicharegovernedentirelybystatuteandfindnosourceintheMaineConstitutionitself. SeeOpinionoftheJustices,2017ME100,¶3,162A.3d188;seealso21-AM.R.S.§§331-40(2017);InrePrimaryElectionBallotDisputes2004,2004ME99,¶3,857A.2d494.
AlthoughtheAdvisoryOpiniondidnotgeneratebindingprecedent,weunanimouslyopinedthatthemethodofranked-choicevotingisinconsistentwithelectionbya“plurality”asthatwordisusedintheMaineConstitution.OpinionoftheJustices,2017ME100,¶¶9,64-69,162A.3d188.
5
[¶6] In themonths that followed,anumberof legislativeeffortswere
commenced regarding ranked-choice voting. See L.D. 1256 (128th Legis.
2017); L.D. 1624 (128th Legis. 2017); L.D. 1625 (128th Legis. 2017).
Ultimately, the Legislature enacted “An Act To Implement Ranked-choice
Voting in 2021,” which we refer to as the Implementation Act. P.L. 2017,
ch.316, §§ 1-14 (effective Feb. 5, 2018); see Comm. Amend. B to L.D. 1646,
No.H-568 (128th Legis. 2017). The ImplementationAct, P.L. 2017, ch. 316,
§§1-14,hadtwoessentialcomponents:
• Itdelayedallaspectsoftheimplementationofranked-choicevotinguntilDecember1,2021,and
• Itprovidedforanautomaticrepealofallranked-choicevotingprovisionsonDecember1,2021,if,bythatdate,theMaineConstitutionhadnotbeenamendedtoallowranked-choicevotingfortheofficesofMaineSenator,MaineRepresentative,andGovernor.
[¶7] ThreedaysbeforetheeffectivedateoftheImplementationAct,a
people’s veto of portions of the Implementation Act was initiated by the
submissionofsignatureslatercertifiedbytheSecretaryofState.SeeMe.Const.
art.IV,pt.3,§§17,20;21-AM.R.S.§§901-906(2017).PursuanttoMe.Const.
art.IV,pt.3,§17(3),theSecretaryofStateannouncedthatthestatewidevote
onwhethertovetothechallengedportionsoftheImplementationActwould
6
take place on June 12, 2018, the same day as the primary elections for the
UnitedStatesHouseandSenate,Governor,andStateHouseandSenate.
[¶8] As a result of the initiation of the people’s veto, certified by the
SecretaryofState,theeffectofthosechallengedportionsoftheImplementation
Actwas“suspended”asofFebruary2,2018,pendingthevoteonJune12,2018.
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(2).Criticaltothematterbeforeus,thedelayofthe
implementationofranked-choicevotinguntil2021wassuspended.Asaresult,
the RCVA, along with certain portions of the Implementation Act, became
immediatelyeffective,thuseffectuatingranked-choicevotingfortheJune2018
primaryelections.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(2).
[¶9]WiththechallengedportionsoftheImplementationActsuspended,
theprovisionsoflawthatarepertinenttotheprimaryelectionsare:
• Thepreexistingandunamendedportionsoftheelectionsstatutes,
• The provisions put in place by the citizens’ enactment of theRCVA in2016,and
• ThoseportionsoftheImplementationActthatarenotsuspendedbythepeople’sveto.6
6TheImplementationActrepealedthedefinitionof“[o]fficeselectedbyranked-choicevoting”
and replaced itwith a new version of 21-AM.R.S. § 1(27-C)defining “[e]lectionsdetermined byranked-choicevoting”asfollows:
27-C.Electionsdeterminedbyranked-choicevoting.“Electionsdeterminedbyranked-choicevoting”means:
7
[¶10] OnFebruary16,2018,theCommitteeforRanked-ChoiceVoting
and congressional and gubernatorial candidates Lucas St. Clair, Jim Boyle,7
Mark Dion, Mark Eves, Sean Faircloth, Diane Russell, Betsy Sweet, and Ben
Chipman(collectively,theCommittee)filedacomplaintintheSuperiorCourt
againsttheSecretaryofStateseekingadeclaratoryjudgmentthattheSecretary
ofStateisrequiredtoimplementranked-choicevotingintheprimaryelections.
Comm.forRanked-ChoiceVotingv.Sec’yofState,AUGSC-CV-2018-24,at9n.4
(Me.Super.Ct.,KennebecCty.,Apr.3,2018).WeunderstandthattheSecretary
of State initially announced that his officewould implement ranked-choice
voting for theprimary elections,with the initial result that the suitwas not
aggressivelypursued.
[¶11]OnMarch29,2018,theSecretaryofStateindicatedthattherewas
aconflictbetween21-AM.R.S§1(27-C)—directing theuseof ranked-choice
A. Primary elections for the offices of United States Senator, United StatesRepresentativetoCongress,Governor,StateSenatorandStateRepresentative;[and]
B. General and special elections for the offices of United States Senator andUnitedStatesRepresentativetoCongress.
P.L.2017,ch.316,§1.Becauseitisnotchallengedbythepeople’sveto,theversionofsection1(27-C)currentlyinplaceisthatadoptedbytheImplementationAct.Bothversionsofsection1(27-C)(thatenactedbytheRCVAandthatenactedbytheImplementationAct)provideforranked-choicevotingintheprimaryelections,however.7JimBoyleandSeanFairclothhavesincewithdrawnfromthegubernatorialrace.
8
voting in primary elections—and 21-AM.R.S § 723—providing for plurality
winnersinprimaryelections.ImmediatelyaftertheSecretaryofStateraised
thisissue,theCommitteepresseditssuit,requestingatemporaryrestraining
order “requiring the Secretary of State to continue the implementation of
ranked-choice voting for the June 12, 2018 primary election.”8 Comm. for
Ranked-ChoiceVoting,AUGSC-CV-2018-24,at9. TheSenatedidnotmove to
interveneinthelitigationcommencedbytheCommittee.
[¶12] The court (Murphy, J.), recognizing the urgency of the matter,
conducted a hearing on the afternoon of March 29, 2018, and entered a
thoroughorderdatedApril3,2018,towhichthepartiesagreed,addressingand
resolvingthestatutoryconflictandrequiringtheSecretaryofStateto“continue
implementationof the systemof ranked-choicevoting for the June12,2018
primary election in accordance with 21-AM.R.S. § 1(27-C) and 21-AM.R.S.
§723-A.”9Comm.forRanked-ChoiceVoting,AUGSC-CV-2018-24,at13-14.No
8 Meanwhile, the Secretary of State posted draft rules detailing the procedures for the
administration of elections using ranked-choice voting. Department of the Secretary of State,Proposed Rules Governing the Administration of ElectionsDetermined byRanked-Choice Voting(Mar. 28, 2018), http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/upcoming/pdf/250rcv.pdf; see P.L.2017,ch.316,§10(effectiveFeb.5,2018)(tobecodifiedat21-AM.R.S.§723-A(5-A)).
9Inparticular,thecourtconcludedthattheCommitteehadmetitsburdentoestablishalikelihoodofsuccessonthemeritsofitsclaimthattheintentofthecitizensinenactingtheranked-choicevotingstatute was to apply ranked-choice voting to the primary elections, notwithstanding otherpreexisting statutory language to the contrary. Comm. forRanked-ChoiceVoting v. Sec’y of State,AUGSC-CV-2018-24,at11-13(Me.Super.Ct.,KennebecCty.,Apr.3,2018);seeIngrahamv.Univ.ofMe.atOrono,441A.2d691,693(Me.1982)(settingoutthecriteriaforobtaininginjunctiverelief).
9
appealfromthatorderhasbeentaken,andthepartiestothatproceedinghave
indicatedthatnoappealwillbepursued.
[¶13] On the same day that the Superior Court declared that
ranked-choicevotingwouldbeapplicabletotheprimaryelections,theMaine
Senate filed a five-count complaint against the Secretary of State seeking
declaratoryandinjunctiverelieftohalttheimplementationofranked-choice
votingintheprimaryelections.Thepartiesagreedtoastipulatedrecord,and,
byorderdatedApril11,2018,theSuperiorCourtreportedtous,pursuantto
M.R.App.P.24(a),thefollowingquestions.
1. Has the Senate proven, on the Stipulated Record appendedhereto, that the Secretary of State’s commitment orexpenditure of funds for the purpose of implementingranked-choice voting in the June 12, 2018 primary electionconstitutes a violation of the Legislature’s appropriationauthority or the Separation of Powers clause in the MaineConstitution, Article III, § 2,where the appropriation for theSecretaryofStateinthebiennialbudgetlaw(P.L.2017,c.284)doesnotcontainlanguageexplicitlyreferencingranked-choicevoting and the enactment of P.L. 2017, c. 316 was partiallysuspendedbyaPeople’sVetoPetition?
2. Has the Senate proven, on the Stipulated Record appended
hereto, that the current statutory framework, includingwithout limitation 21-A M.R.S. § 723-A, does not providesufficientauthorityfortheSecretaryofStatetoarrangefortheretrievalandtransportofballotscastbyvotersattheJune12,2018primaryelectionfrommunicipalitiestoacentrallocationin order to determine the winners of the election byranked-choicevoting?
10
3. Has the Senate proven, on the Stipulated Record appended
hereto, that the current statutory framework, includingwithout limitation 21-AM.R.S §§ 1(27-C), 1(35-A), 339, 695,722(1),723(1), someofwhicharesuspendedby the filingofthe People’s Veto Petition pursuant to the Constitution ofMaine,art.IV,pt.3,§17,prohibitsdeterminingthewinnersoftheJune12,2018primaryelectionbyranked-choicevoting?
4.HastheSenateshownthatithasstandingtobringanyandallofthelegalclaimssetforthinitsComplaint?
5.HastheSenateshownthatanyorallofthelegalclaimssetforthin the Senate’s Complaint are justiciable under the politicalquestiondoctrine?
6.HastheSenateshownthatanyorallofthelegalclaimssetforthinitscomplaintareripeforadjudication?
7. HastheSenateidentifiedacauseofactionforanyofthelegalclaimssetforthinitsComplaint?
II.DISCUSSION
A. ReportedQuestions
[¶14]Webeginbyaddressingthevehiclebywhichthismatterreaches
us—aReportpursuanttoM.R.App.P.24(a).10Becausetherehasbeennotrial
10MaineRuleofAppellateProcedure24(a)provides,
(a)ReportbyAgreementof ImportantorDoubtfulQuestions. When thetrial court is of the opinion that a question of law presented to it is of sufficientimportanceordoubttojustifyareporttotheLawCourtfordetermination,itmaysoreportwhen:(1)allpartiesappearingagreetothereport;
11
court adjudication of facts or other matters ordinarily resolved by the trial
court,wedonotautomaticallyacceptsuchareport.ConservatorshipofEmma,
2017ME 1, ¶7, 153 A.3d 102. “When the trial court reports questions for
review, we independently determine whether acceptance of the report is
consistentwithourbasicfunctionasanappellatecourtorwouldimproperly
placeusintheroleofanadvisoryboard”duetothelackofafinaltrialcourt
judgmenttoreview. Id. (quotationmarksomitted). Althoughweemphasize
thattheacceptanceofareportedquestionistheexception,nottherule,seeid.,
in these unusual circumstances, we do accept the Report pursuant to
Rule24(a).
B. Question3
[¶15] We address Question 3 first. The Senate asks whether the
contradictionbetweentheapplicationofranked-choicevotingtotheprimary
elections delineated in 21-AM.R.S. § 1(27-C) and the plurality provision for
(2)thereisagreementastoallfactsmaterialtotheappeal;and
(3)thedecisionthereonwould,inatleastonealternative,finallydisposeoftheaction.
12
primaryelectionsdescribedin21-AM.R.S.§723(1)preventstheSecretaryof
Statefromimplementingranked-choicevotingintheJune12,2018,primary.
[¶16] The Senate’s argument onQuestion 3 addresses the very issue
decided by the Superior Court in Committee for Ranked-Choice Voting v.
Secretaryof State,AUGSC-CV-2018-24 (Me. Super.Ct.,KennebecCty.,Apr. 3,
2018).Hadthepartiesinthiscasebeenabletofullyaddresstheissueofthe
Senate’s decision not to seek intervention in Committee for Ranked-Choice
Voting, it is possible that we would have determined that the Senate was
precludedfromadvancingthesameargumentnow.See,e.g.,Taylorv.Sturgell,
553 U.S. 880, 893-95 (2008) (identifying six circumstances in which the
assertion of collateral estoppel is permitted against a nonparty under the
federal common law). We have never addressed the issue of nonparty
preclusioninthesecircumstances,however,andwedonottakethisoccasion
toopineonitnow.Accordingly,weaddressthemeritsofQuestion3.
[¶17] Fordecades,Maine’selection lawshaveexplicitlyprovided that
thewinnerofaprimaryelectionisdeterminedbyapluralityofthevotes.See
21-A M.R.S. §723(1); P.L. 1985, ch. 161, § 6 (effective Sept. 19, 1985).11
11 Public Law1985, ch. 161, repealed the prior title 21M.R.S.A, generally governing election
practices,andreplacedtitle21withtitle21-A,whichhassincegovernedelectionlaws.P.L.1985,ch.161,§§5-6(effectiveSept.19,1985).
13
Section723(1)provides,inpertinentpart,“[i]naprimaryelection,theperson
whoreceivesapluralityofthevotescastfornomination. . .isnominatedfor
thatoffice.”21-AM.R.S.§723(1).WhentheRCVAwasenactedbythecitizens’
initiativein2016, itaddressedtheapplicationofranked-choicevotingtothe
primary elections through the enactment of 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C), which
declared that an office elected by ranked-choice voting “includes any
nominationsbyprimaryelectiontosuchoffices.” L.D.1557,§1. TheRCVA,
however, contained no reference to or amendment of section 723(1), thus
creatingadirectconflictintheapplicablestatutoryprovisions.
[¶18] When theRCVAwas addressed by the Legislature in 2017, the
referenceinsection723(1)topluralityvotingforprimaryelectionswasleftin
placeuntilDecember1,2021. P.L.2017,ch.316,§6. Atthesametime,the
formatof21-AM.R.S.§1(27-C)wasamendedsothat,uponalatereffectivedate,
primaryelectionswouldproceedasfollows:
27-C. Elections determined by ranked-choice voting.“Electionsdeterminedbyranked-choicevoting”means:
A.PrimaryelectionsfortheofficesofUnitedStatesSenator,United States Representative to Congress, Governor, StateSenatorandStateRepresentative.
P.L.2017,ch.316,§1.
14
[¶19]Asaresultofthepeople’sveto,thechangestosection723(1)that
deferred rank-choice voting in primary elections for several years were
suspended,thusremovinganytemporal impedimenttotheoriginalplurality
languageofsection723(1).SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(2).Separately,the
requirementof ranked-choicevoting in theprimaryelections establishedby
21-AM.R.S. §1(27-C) became immediately effective andwould apply to the
June2018primaryelections. Becausedeterminingthewinnerofanelection
throughpluralityvotingisinconsistentwithdeterminingthewinnerthrougha
ranked-choice voting process, see Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100,
¶¶64-69,162A.3d188,12thetwostatutesareinconflict.
[¶20] The legal issue presented by the conflict presents an age-old
question—which of two conflicting provisions applies? See, e.g. Knight v.
Aroostook River R.R. Co., 67 Me. 291, 293 (1877).13 When a more recent
12WeacknowledgethatanOpinionoftheJusticesisadvisoryonly,anditdoesnotprovidebinding
precedent.Me.Const.art.VI,§3;OpinionoftheJustices,2017ME100,¶9,162A.3d188.Throughthis opinion, we adopt the referenced reasoning in full without reciting the analysis verbatim.Opinionof the Justices, 2017ME100,¶¶64-69, 162A.3d188 (advising that “theRanked-ChoiceVotingActisindirectcontradictiontothepluralityrequirementsoftheMaineConstitution”).13 QuotingaMassachusettscase,Commonwealthv.Kelliher,94Mass.(12Allen)480,481(1866),
withapproval,wesaidinKnightv.AroostookRiverRailroadCo.,67Me.291,293(1877),
[W]heneverastatuteispassedwhichembracesalltheprovisionsofpreviousstatuteson the same subject, the new statute operates as a repeal of all antecedentenactments. Thiswell settled rule of interpretation is founded on the reasonableinferencethatthelegislaturecannotbesupposedtohaveintendedthatthereshouldbetwodistinctenactmentsembracingthesamesubjectmatterinforceatthesame
15
amendment to aMaine statutedirectly conflictswith anolderprovision,we
must, as always, determine the intent of the Legislature, and the question
becomeswhethertheolderprovisionhasbeenrepealed“byimplication.”Blair
v.StateTaxAssessor,485A.2d957,959(Me.1984).Weapplythismethodof
statutoryconstruction
whenalaterenactmentencompassestheentiresubjectmatterofan earlier act, or when a later statute is inconsistent with orrepugnanttoanearlierstatute.Whenalaterstatutedoesnotcovertheearlieractinitsentirety,butisinconsistentwithonlysomeofitsprovisions,a repealby implicationoccurs to theextentoftheconflict.
Id.(citationsomitted).
[¶21] In the matter before us, there is both a direct conflict in the
statutorilyprovidedmethodofvotinginMaineprimaryelectionsandaclarity
ofpurposeregarding themostrecentenactment.14 SeeLewistonFirefighters
Assoc.v.CityofLewiston,354A.2d154,159-160(Me.1976);seealsoOpinionof
theJustices,311A.2d103,108(Me.1973).
time,andthatthenewstatute,beingthemostrecentexpressionofthelegislativewill,mustbedeemedasubstituteforpreviousenactments,andtheonlyonewhichistoberegardedashavingtheforceoflaw.
14 Although we would not apply concepts of implicit repeal in doubtful cases, see LewistonFirefightersAssoc.v.CityofLewiston,354A.2d154,159(Me.1976),thereisnodoubtaboutthedirectconflictinthiscase.
16
[¶22]Theconsistentandexplicitpurposeofthecitizens’initiativeand
the people’s veto has been to transition Maine elections to a system of
ranked-choicevoting. Thewisdomof ranked-choicevoting isnotbeforeus.
Our role is todetermineandeffectuate the intentof the legislationunless it
conflictswiththeMaineConstitutionortheUnitedStatesConstitution.Neither
Constitutionis implicatedbythequestionspresentedhere,butthestatutory
conflictisclear.Despitetheexistingreferencetopluralityvotingintheprimary
electionsinsection723(1),boththeRCVAasfirstenactedbythepeoplein2016
and the amendments to ranked-choice primary voting enacted by the
Legislature in the Implementation Act in 2017 and immediately effectuated
through the people’s veto expressly provide for primary elections to be
governedbyranked-choicevoting.L.D.1557,§1;P.L.2017,ch.316,§1.
[¶23]Itisevidentthattheranked-choiceprimaryprovisionoftheRCVA,
21-AM.R.S.§1(27-C),enactedbythepeoplethroughtheinitiativeprocessand
amended only in format by the Legislature in the Implementation Act, is
“repugnant” in substance to the plurality provision in 21-AM.R.S. § 723(1).
LewistonFirefightersAssoc.,354A.2dat160.Thus,aswehaveheld,“thenew
statute,beingthemostrecentexpressionofthelegislativewill,mustbedeemed
17
a substitute for previous enactments.” Knight, 67 Me. at 293 (quoted with
approvalinLewistonFirefightersAssoc.,354A.2dat160).
[¶24] Accordingly, we conclude that the “plurality” provision of
21-AM.R.S.§723(1)hasbeenimplicitlyrepealedbythemostrecentprovision
oflawaddressingtheranked-choicevotingmethodtobeemployedintheJune
primaryelections,21-AM.R.S.§1(27-C).15Pursuantto21-AM.R.S§1(27-C),
ranked-choice voting must be applied to the primary elections on June 12,
2018.
C. Question1
[¶25] Through Question 1, the Senate seeks a declaration that the
SecretaryofStatelacksconstitutionalauthoritytocommitandexpendpublic
monies for the implementationof ranked-choicevoting in the absenceof an
explicitly targeted appropriation by the Legislature. Assuming without
decidingthattheSenatehasstandingtoassertsuchaclaim,weconcludethat
Question1isnotjusticiable.
[¶26] We have long recognized a host of considerations according to
whichwewilldeclinetoexercisejurisdiction;werefertothisasthe“universal
rule”ofjusticiability.OpinionoftheJustices,2017ME100,¶15,162A.3d188
15 This determination is consistentwith the decision of the Superior Court inCommittee for
Ranked-ChoiceVoting,AUGSC-CV-2018-24,at11-13.
18
(quotationmarksomitted).Justiciabilityregards“thefitnessoftheissuesfor
judicialdecision.” NewEnglandTel.&Tel.Co.v.Pub.Utils.Comm’n,448A.2d
272,302(Me.1982)(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶27]Inthecontextofthematteratbar,therequirementofjusticiability
demands thatour authority todecideamatter is limitedby thatmostbasic
tenet of our governmental structure—the constitutionally-mandated
separationofpowers.SeeMe.Const.art.III,§2;Bouchardv.Dep’tofPub.Safety,
2015ME50, ¶10,115A.3d92. TheMaineConstitution requiresboth that
“[t]hepowersofthisgovernmentshallbedividedinto3distinct[Branches],the
legislative,executiveandjudicial”andthat“[n]opersonorpersons,belonging
tooneofthese[Branches],shallexerciseanyofthepowersproperlybelonging
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted.”Me.Const.art.III,§§1-2;seeOpinionoftheJustices,2017ME100,
¶13,162A.3d188.
[¶28] Like the federal courts, “our constitutional structure does not
requirethattheJudicialBranchshrinkfromaconfrontationwiththeothertwo
coequal branches.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (alterations omitted) (quotationmarks omitted). Nevertheless,
therearesomemattersinwhichwewillexercisejudicialrestraintbyrefusing
19
toadjudicatematterswheretheadjudication“wouldinvolveanencroachment
upon theexecutiveor legislativepowers.” Wrightv.Dep’tofDef.&Veterans
Servs.,623A.2d1283,1285(Me.1993)(quotationmarksomitted);seeTurner
v.Safley,482U.S.78,85(1987)(“[S]eparationofpowersconcernscounsela
policy of judicial restraint.”), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom
RestorationAct,Pub.L.No.103-141,107Stat.1488.
[¶29]RegardingQuestion1,theSenatearguesthatthegeneralallocation
offundingtotheSecretaryofStatecannotbeutilizedbytheSecretaryofState
absentanexplicitly-descriptiveallocationofappropriatedfundstoparticular
actions related to voting and elections. The Senate has provided neither a
constitutionalbasisforthisargumentnorastatutoryfoundationforitsclaim
torestricttheauthorityoftheSecretaryofState.
[¶30] Without pointing to a live, current constitutional violation, the
SenateaskstheCourttoinvolveitselfintheSecretaryofState’sexpenditureof
already-appropriatedfunds.Theseparationofpowersdoctrineprecludesus
fromentertainingthisrequestbytheSenatefortheCourttoassumeanyrolein
supervising the legislatively delegated tasks of the Secretary of State. See
generally,21-AM.R.S.§§21,601–609(2017). AstheUnitedStatesSupreme
Courthas announced, courtswill not involve themselves in the “amorphous
20
generalsupervisionoftheoperationsofgovernment.”Raines,521U.S.at829.
Question1isnotjusticiable.
D. Question2
[¶31] Regarding Question 2, the Senate challenges the Secretary of
State’s authority, in the absence of additional explicit legislative action, to
arrangeforthesecurity,possession,andtransportationofballotsinaranked-
choice voting election. As with Question 1, we are not persuaded by the
suggestion that the logistics of implementing ranked-choice voting create a
constitutional crisis sufficient for us to ignore the separation of powers
problemsinherentinthesecircumstances.Question2regardstheepitomeof
governmentalactioninwhichthecourtslackauthoritytomeddlepursuantto
theseparationofpowersdoctrine.Question2isnotjusticiable.
E. Questions4through7
[¶32] Theremainingquestionshavebeenresolvedbyouranswers to
Questions1,2,and3andarethereforemoot.
III.CONCLUSION
[¶33]WehaveacceptedtheReportofQuestionsfromtheSuperiorCourt
pursuant to M.R. App. P. 24(a). As to Question 3, we conclude that
21
ranked-choicevotingisthelawofMainewithregardtotheprimaryelections
onJune12,2018,notwithstandinganycontradictionby21-AM.R.S.§723(1).
[¶34] We have also determined that the courts of Maine will not
adjudicate either of the remaining substantive questions presented by the
Report—Questions1 and 2. Thesequestions ask us to address the internal
fundingandadministrativedecisionsoftheOfficeoftheSecretaryofStateand
seektheCourt’sinterventionintotheprospectivelogisticalarrangementsfor
securing,possessing,andtransportingtheballotsduringtheprimaryelections
tobeheldonJune12,2018.Weconcludethatthesequestions,whichreflect
Counts1through4oftheSenate’scomplaint,cannotbeadjudicatedbecause
theyarequintessentiallynonjusticiable.
[¶35]Finally,theneedtoanswerQuestions4,5,6,and7,whichaddress
justiciability,isobviatedbyouranswerstoQuestions1,2,and3. Theissues
raised in those four questions are moot. Thus, the matters raised by the
Senate’s complaint, distilled to the sevenquestionspresentedhere, are fully
resolvedbyouranswers.
22
Theentryis:
Report accepted. Remanded to the SuperiorCourt for entry of judgment on Count 5(Question3)declaringthatranked-choicevotingshallbeemployedintheJune12,2018,primaryelection,anddismissingasnonjusticiableCounts1,2,3,and4(Questions1and2).Mandatetoissueforthwith.
TimothyC.Woodcock,Esq.(orally),RyanP.Dumais,Esq.,andKadyS.Huff,Esq.,EatonPeabody,Bangor,fortheMaineStateSenatePhyllisGardiner,Esq.(orally),andThomasA.Knowlton,Esq.,OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,fortheSecretaryofStateJamesG.Monteleone,Esq.(orally),andMichaelR.Bosse,Esq.,BernsteinShur,Portland,fortheCommitteeforRanked-ChoiceVoting,LucasSt.Clair,MarkEves,DianeRussell,BetsySweet,andBenChipmanTimothyR.Shannon,Esq.,RachelM.Wertheimer,Esq.,JonathanDunitz,Esq.,MarieM.Mueller,Esq.,andSamuelBaldwin,Esq.,VerrillDana,LLP,Portland,foramicusTheLeagueofWomenVotersofMaineKennebecCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2018-51FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY