5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern ThailandAuthor(s): Astri SuhrkeSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Mar., 1977), pp. 237-250Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643498
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LOYALISTS
AND
SEPARATISTS:
THE
MUSLIMS
IN
SOUTHERN
THAILAND
Astri uhrke
THE
CONTROVERSY
OVER
the
Thai-Malaysian
border
agreement
n
1976
reflected,
mong
other
things,
a
recognition
n
Bangkok
that
the
Thai
government
as
unable
to
govern
he
southern
border
provinces
ffectively.
his
paper
addresses
tself
o this
problem
from he
point
of
view
of the
Muslims
n
southern
Thailand.
What
are
the
main
dimensions
of the
problem,
and
how
are these
regarded
by
the local Muslims?1
The
Muslim
population
in
the
South
is
concentrated
n
the
four
provinces
f
Pattani,
Yala,
Narathiwas
and
Satul.
The
southern
Mus-
limsrepresent
bout
3%
of
the
population
of Thailand,
or
700,000
people
according
to
the
1960
census.
In
the
four
provinces,
however,
they
onstitute
0-80%
of
the
local
population
and are clearly
demar-
cated
as a
distinct
roup.
They
speak
a local
dialect
of Malay
and
only
a small
proportion
20-30%)
also
speak
Thai except
n
Satul,
where
a
substantial
proportion
of
the
Muslim population
speaks
Thai.
They
are Malay Muslims,maintain theirtraditionalMalay dress and cus-
toms,
nd
rarely
marry
hai
Buddhists.
The presence
f
this territorially
oncentrated
roup
of Malays
in
a region
bordering
on
Malaysia,
where
the Malays
have
a
dominant
political
role,
has
meantpersistent
ifficulties
orboth
the
Thai
gov-
ernment
nd
the
minority roup.
Everyone
oncerned
recognizes
hat
the problem
is
an
old one,
going
back
to the
13th
century
when
the
Sukothai
kings
claimed the
southern
Muslim
sultanates
s vassals.
This
relationshipwas decisively ransformed
y
the administrative
eorgani-
1
This is
an
abridged
version
of
a
paper
presented
at the
Association
for
Asian
Studies
meeting,
Toronto,
1976.
It is primarily
based
on information
ollected dur-
ing
fieldwork
n Thailand
in 1970,
1971,
and 1976.
would
like to
note the
assistance
of
Charoenchit
Na Songkhla,
former
director
of the
Co-ordination
Center
in
Yala;
the late
Senator
Leck V.
Angkul,
Dato
Sin
Daraman
in Narathiwas,
Professor
Pattaya
Saihoo
at
Chulalongkorn
University,
and representatives
of the
United
Patani Freedom
Movement.
Connor
Bailey
of
Cornell
University
made
useful
com-
ments on the paper.
237
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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238
ASTRI SUHRKE
zation of
Thailand
starting t the end of
the
19th
century,
t which
time the
presentmanifestations
f the problem
first
egan to emerge.
These can
be divided into three
main areas,
relating
to educational,
administrative,nd economicmatters, ach of which will be briefly
discussed
here.
Education:
The
Thai governmenthas
continuously
emphasized
that the Muslims
must learn
the Thai language and
receive secular
education. Indeed,
there s a
tendency n Bangkok
and among
local
government
fficials
o
regard
ducation as
a panacea forpeaceful
nte-
gration f the Muslims.
But the
response
f the Muslim community
o
secular
education has been mixed.
In lower
primary chool (P.S.
1-4)
student nrollment orrespondso the ethnicproportions f the popu-
lation n
the border
provinces:Muslims clearly
predominatewhile the
Buddhists
re a small
minority. owever, he
Muslim
studentbody
de-
clines
drastically romower primary
o
upper primary chool (P.S.
5-
7), and
this trendcontinues
n high school
(M.S. 1-3,
4-5). The over-
whelmingmajority
of
the student
population
at
these levels is
Bud-
dhist,while the Muslims
constitute
small minority.
This anomaly
s
partly
xplained by
the
attitudes owards
ecular
education mongthe Muslims.Someoppose it out of deference o tra-
ditionalvalues,which
hold
thatreligious ducation
s
more
important
than secular education.
Another
factor s the conviction
mong
some
that the
Thai government
s using
seculareducation
to assimilate
the
Muslims,
o
make
them
eventually
eny
their
religion,
historical
herit-
age, race
and customs-in
short heirreligious
and ethnic
dentity.As
the separatist
nited
Patani Freedom Movement
UPFM)
has claimed:
The
Thai
government
s
trying
o teach
the
younger
generation
he
Thai
language
and make them
ove the
Thai
government
nd
respect
the king o that n the future heywill forget he Malay race and com-
pletely
ccept
Thai
nationality. 2
Militant
Muslimshave attacked
gov-
ernment chools and teachers,
eading
to the establishment
f teacher
vigilantegroups
and a
temporary
eacher boycott
n Narathiwas in
October 1975. These
views,
n
turn,
are
strongly
riticized
by
other
Muslims
who
maintain
that
secular Thai education
is desirable
by
enabling
the Muslims
better
o
protect
heir ights gainst
ocal officials
and
eventually ermitting
pward
socioeconomic
mobility.
There
are some
institutional
ehicles
for
combining
secular
and
religious
education.The Islamic College in Bangkoktakessome stu-
dents
from
the border
provinces,
nd
it
is
interesting
o
note that
among
these
almost
all
cite
the
prospect
for
upward
mobility
s
the
main
reason for seeking higher
education.3
For
the
majority
of
the
southern
Muslims
religious
education s
providedby
the
local
Islamic
2
United
Patani Freedom
Movement,
Declaration
of
Warning,
August
1, 1971.
(Original
in Jawi
and Malay).
3
Author's survey
of student
attitudes
(1971).
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MUSLIMS IN
THAILAND 239
schools (Pondok),
which
until recently
aughtno
standard
Thai cur-
riculum.
n the
traditionalPondok
the
students nteredat
age 8 and
lived with the
teacheron
the
premisesfor several
years
often 7-9),
hence the Pondok constituted n effectiveompetitor o the govern-
ment
schools. The
government
esponded
n the late 1960s
by using
monetary
ncentivesto
gradually
convertthe
Pondoks into
private
schools that would
also
teach Thai
language and
some standard cur-
riculum.
A
majority f the Pondok
headmasters
to-kru
in
Thai) reg-
istered heir
chools n this
program,which
may, f
successful,mediate
the
conflict etween
eligious nd
seculareducation.
Much will
depend
upon
the
manner
of
implementation s
the
Pondok is a
powerful
symbol f
religious
nd ethnic
dentity o
southernMuslims
of all per-
suasions. Separatist pokesmen redictably enounced the program s
an
attempt o
undermine
hePondok
schools, nd
even thoseMuslims
who
favored ecular
ducationcautioned that
the
governmentmustnot
close
down Pondok schools
thatdo
not convert, r
convert
oo slowly.
Administration:here
are no
statistics
vailable on the
number of
Muslims
n thelocal
administration,
ut it
is widely assumed
that
the
Muslims
are in a distinct
minority,
nd a Muslim
District
Officer r
DeputyDistrictOfficers a rarity.This is primarily ue to the low
level of
education among
the
Muslims, although one
frequently
n-
counters
he
suspicion hat ven f a
Muslim would
qualify,
he
govern-
ment
would
post him
anywhere ut the border
provinces
or
fear that
he
may
not be
reliable.
Moreover,
ne
segment
f the
Muslim
com-
munity,
he
separatists, enounces all
forms
f
cooperation
with
the
Thai
government
nd
calls on the
people not
to seek administrative
positions.
The
predominance f
Thai
Buddhist
government
fficialsn
the
South,mostofwhomdo notspeakMalay, s a crucialfactor n creating
an
adversary
elationship
etweenthe ocal
people
and
the administra-
tion.This
ranges
from
omplaints y
the Muslims
of
petty
harrassment
and
corruption
o more
serious accusations of
persecution
and im-
prisonment f
Muslims
based
on tenuous
allegations
of
banditry
or
subversion.
Muslim
leaders have drawn differentonclusions
from his situa-
tion.
Some,
such as the famous
Haji
Sulong,
who was
killed in
1954
(evidently
y
Thai
police),
argue
that
a
majority
of
the
government
officialsn the Muslimprovincesmustbe Muslim,
although
there s
disagreement n
whether his should be
a
gradual
process
correspond-
ing
to
the
growth
f
higher
ducation
among
the
Muslims,
or be im-
plementedregardlessof
existing
educational
requirements
under a
general
autonomy
cheme.4Othersmaintain that the Muslims
should
4
Information ited in Stuara
iswa (Kuala Lumpur), December 1970, claims that
Haji Sulong was killed by
Thai
police agents.
This was confirmed y a less partisan
source,
British former fficer f the Malay police, in an interviewwith this author.
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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240 ASTRI
SUHRKE
rather
rely
upon
present
opportunities
o act
as a
cushion
between
the administration
nd
the people
in the capacity
fvillage
and
hamlet
headmen
kamnan
and
puyaiban),
nd
as electedrepresentatives
o
the
townshipstambon)and in theNational Assemblywhenfunctioning).
This
strategy
as
at
least
two
limitations,
owever.
One
is that
Thai-
land
remains
what
is
aptly
called
a
bureaucratic
polity where
effec-
tive
political
power-to
protect
nd promote
ndividual
or group
in-
terests-resides
n
the
centralized
dministration,
eaving ittle
cope
of
activity
for the
elected
representatives
r local
leaders.
Second,
the
more
successful
his
strategy
s, the
more
it tends
to
polarize
attitudes
within
the
Muslim
community
ince
the
militants
ee it
as
traitorous
cooptation
by
local
leaders.
The
UPFM,
for
nstance,
has accused
the
kamnanand puyaibanof being intelligence fficers or the govern-
ment
and
warned
that
these
are
very
dangerous
people.5
One
may
expect
a similar
reaction
from
militant
Muslims
if the present
Thai
government
roceeds
to
implement
the
Bill
on Local
Government
passed
by
the
National
Assembly
n
November
1975,
designed
to
strengthen
he
power
of
township
ouncils
by
direct
allocation
of
re-
sources
o theseunits
500,000
baht
per
tambon).
Maintenance
of a
modicum
of law
and
order
has
become one
of
themostpressing roblems n theborderprovinces,whichhave been
under
martial
aw since
the
Sarit
Administration.
he government
ev-
eral
times
has
moved
n troops
o
quell
disturbances -whether
aused
by
communists,
andits,
separatists,
r combinations
thereof.
nvari-
ably,
the
presence
f
regular
rmed
forces
eads
to
an escalation
of
vio-
lence and
embitters
xisting
divisions
between
the Buddhists
and
the
Muslims,
s
well
as among
the Muslims.
The
so-called
Pattani
massacre
in December
1975
seems
to
be
a typical
example.
Five Muslim
youths
were allegedly
murdered y
Thai
soldiers, eading
to
large
demonstra-
tions by Muslimswheremorepeople werekilled. But therewas also
evidence
of
disagreement
mong
the
Muslimson
the
propriety
f
the
demandspresented
o
the
government
n that occasion (that
the gov-
ernment
mmediately
withdraw
roops,
pay
compensation
o the
vic-
tims'
families,
nd send
Prime Minister
Kukrit
to the South
for
wide-
ranging
iscussions
with
Muslim
leaders).
Some felt
the
demands
went
too
far,
thers
hat
they
did
not
go
far
enough.
The
government's
e-
sponse
also
received
mixed
reaction,
specially
he decision
to appoint
a Muslimfrom atul, TermsakdiSamantarath, o replace the
incum-
bent
Thai
Buddhist
Governor
f
Pattani.6
To
the militants
t
was
an-
5
United
Patani
Freedom
Movement,
Declaration
of
Warning.
6
Governor
Termsakdi
comes
from
a
distinguished
family
of
public
servants
n
Satul
and
served
previously
n
Narathiwas
and
Satul.
1-is
views
on
conditions
in
the
border
provinces
re
presented
at
length
in
a
thesis
he
wrote
for
the
National
Defense
College,
Kawbanyasarob
satangan
si
changwad
paahtai
(An
Account
of
Conditions
in
the
Four
Southern
Provinces)
(mimeographed),
Bangkok,
1970.
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MUSLIMS
IN THAILAND
241
other cooptation
move;
to others t
demonstrated
overnment
fforts
to meet local
demands
and promised
betterunderstanding nd
com-
munication
betweenthe
local
population
and the
Governor's
ffice.
Economic spects:
Buddhists and
Muslims
agree
thatdisturbances
in
the Muslim
provinces
re
closelyrelated
to economic
problemsthat
have
some
unique, local
dimensions.
The
economic
structure
s domi-
nated by
Thai Buddhist
government
fficialsnd
Thai
Chinesecapital-
ists
(merchants
nd rubber
plantation
owners).
Although
it can
be
demonstrated
haton
a nationwide
cale there
re
Thai Buddhists
who
are
as poor
as the southern
Muslims,the
focus
of the latter
s more
narrow,
usuallyconfined
o the
borderprovinces.
n this universe,
he
Muslim s generally rubbertapper heavilydependenton fluctuating
world
market
rices
fornatural
rubber),
fisherman,r
a vendor,
while
the Thai Chinese
and
the
Thai Buddhists
occupy
the higher
socio-
economic
strata.
Moreover,
the relatively
ow educational
attainment
of
the southern
Muslims
makes
economic
advancement
correspond-
inglydifficult.
thnic divisions
thus
tend to coincide
with economic
cleavages.
Some Muslim
leaders conclude
that
autonomy
or secession s
nec-
essary orthe Muslimsto obtain a just shareofthe incomegenerated
in the area. This claim
is based
on
the
assumption
hat
thefour
border
provinces
re rich
n
rubberand tin
but
this
wealth
s
siphoned
off
by
Thai Buddhists
and
Thai
Chinese.
Others,
however, oint
to the fact
that the
budgets
f the four
provinces
re heavily
ubsidized
by
the
cen-
tral
government,
nd argue
that
pressure
must
be exerted within ex-
isting nstitutions
o increase this share.7
imultaneously,
hey ay,
the
Muslims
themselves
must take
a more
positive
attitudetowards
du-
cation
as
a
means
of
economicadvancement.
One especially ensitive oint is the government's olicyof estab-
lishing
and settlements
nikom
sang
kong eng)
whereby
and is
allo-
cated
to Buddhists
rom ther
provinces.
here
is no evidence hat
such
settlements
re
concentrated
n
the Muslim
provinces
s
compared
to
otherprovinces
n the
country,
ut
this
s a moot
point
to those Mus-
lims
who
fear
that
eventually
he
program
may
seriously
ffect
heir
own
land tenure.8
eparatist
pokesmen
aturally mphasize
the
nikom
program
n theiranti-government
ropaganda.
7
Narathiwas
province,
which
is not
atypical,
collected
local
revenues
totalling
25
million
baht
in
1970,
while
budget expenditures
were slightly over
117
million
baht.
This does
not
include capital
investment
ffected
irectly
under
central
ad-
ministration
offices.
Changwat
Narathiwas,
Hua kawbanyasarob
kong
changwat
narathiwas,
2513.
(Narathiwas
Provincial
Yearbook,
1970).
8
According
to
the
Ministry
f the
Interior,
Self-help
Land
Settlement
n
Thai-
land
(Bangkok,
1971),
therewere
49
nikom
in the
country,
f which
six were in
the
Muslim
provinces.
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242 ASTRI SUHRKE
Loyalists nd Separatists
Within the
southernMuslim community, hen, ne can distinguish
two schools of thoughtwith respectto the nature of the problem
and
the means of solving t. One view, which may be labelled loyalist,
holds that the Muslims must accept Thai rule as legitimate, nd that
theymust work with Thai officials o solve problemsof economic de-
velopment, ducation and administrationn the South. Autonomy
or
separatism re seen as impossible nd for that reason undesirable.The
loyalists rgue that the Thai government ermits great deal of toler-
ance in religiousand educational affairs. n some respects heyblame
the governmentmore for ins of omissionthan commission e.g., failing
to provide adequate social and economic nfrastructure),lthough they
also fear
governmentmisuse of power against
the
Muslims as
indi-
viduals
or
as a
group.
A
completely ontrary iew- the separatist -maintains that the
Muslims will never be able to protect nd maintain themselves
s
a
distinctcommunity nder Thai rule, and that opportunities
or eco-
nomic self-advancementre stifled. hose who are concerned
with the
latter
and not all Muslim leaders are), also argue
that the debate be-
tween orthodox and modern Muslims in the South is perverted
by the presenceof a Thai administration ince to become modern
means
to
become Thai.
Only by obtainingautonomy
or
independence
can those
Muslims
who
wish
to become modern do so while
still re-
maining
a
Malay
Muslim.
Similarly,
hose
whose
primary
oncern s
to
protect eligious nd communalvalues can only do so under
conditions
of
self-rule. his view has in the past been held by advocates
of both
autonomy and secession. However,
the
attractiveness
f
autonomy
as
an
alternative as
declined as
the
Thai
government roved equally op-
posed to this as to separatism. ts leading advocates n the past were
either
killed
(Haji Sulong)
or
went into exile
(Abdul Na
Saiburi and
Tengku
Abdul
Yala).9 Although autonomymay appear
as a
possible
compromise
n the
future f the
situation n
the South
markedly
de-
teriorates,
t
is not likely to findmany supporters t the presenttime.
Moreover,
t
should be
recalled
that the central
government
as tra-
ditionallyresponded
to
challenges o its authority y trying
o
tighten
centralcontrol
rather
han to
decentralize.
While the movements
avoring utonomy ppear
to have declined
9
Some autonomy may be
openly
advocated by
Thai
Buddhists,
however. In
January
1976, for instance, two smaller
opposition parties
in the
National
Assem-
bly, the New
Force
(Palang Mai) and
the
Socialist
Party
of
Thailand, formed
a
united
front
and included
an
item
in
their
program
that
read:
Equal
rights and
some
autonomy
must be
provided
to
minoritygroups. Bangkok Post,
January 6,
1976. Some
Muslims
in
the
Bangkok
area
(who are not
Malay)
have
tried
to
mediate
between the government nd
southern
Muslims who advocate
autonomy, arguing
that the latter
is not
treason. See statement by The
Siam Muslim
Group in
Bangkok
Post, June 27,
1974.
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MUSL[MSX IN THAILAND 243
in recent years, the separatists remain. Their strength nd
constituency,
however, are
extremely hard to assess. They do not seem to draw sup-
port from any one educational or occupational stratum within the
community. So far they have not demonstrated any ability to mobilize
popular support
on a sustained and massive basis. Violent conflict in-
volving separatists
has been limited in scope and distinguished by its
festering nature.
The separatists are divided among themselves, al-
though it is difficult
or outsiders to determine if the various organiza-
tions
are
competing, overlapping, or duplicating entities.'0 None of
them claims to
receive significant xternal support. Still, the separatists
maintain that theirstrength ies with the people, and that the strug-
gle will and must
continue regardless of the poor prospects for success
in the near future.
A closer view of the attitudes and characteristics of
the separatists
can be attained
from the interviews below. They are contrasted with
similar interviews and
descriptions of representatives of loyalist
Muslims.
Mr.
X
is
a young
Muslim born
in
one of the four southern border
provinces.12 He speaks Thai, English, and Arabic, in addition to his
native Malay. He has
a university degree from abroad,
has close con-
tactswith radical student groups in Malaysia, is on intimate termswith
leaders
of the
clandestine
separatist movement,
the United
Patani
Free-
dom Movement,
and earns
his
living by working
for the
Thai govern-
ment in
a professional
capacity.
His
views
on the
separatist
movement,
its
chances
of
success, and
of
the alternative of accepting the
Thai
gov-
ernment's integrationist
policies are ambivalent. He is hedging his
bets
and
keeps
his
options
and contacts
open
to
both
sides.
He
summarizes
his attitude as follows:
I am a Malay Muslim. I must stay with my people. The Thai govern-
ment does not
respect
us. The
villagers
re
treated
with
contempt
nd
the educated
Muslims are
regarded
with
suspicion.
We
have
a
right
to
self-determination,
o
remain Malay
Muslim.
On the
other
hand,
it
is
a
long
and difficult
truggle.Maybe
it is
better to
stay
with Thailand
and take as
much
advantage
of
the educational
and
economic
oppor-
tunities
s
we
can-at
least
until the
Movement
becomes
stronger.
The
United atani Freedom
Movement:13
he meetingwith a represen-
10
Various names
have
appeared
in recent
years, ncluding
The
Patani
Islamic
Revolution,
The
National
Revolutionary
Front,
The
National
Liberation
Front
of
Patani,
and The United
Patani Freedom Movement.
liThe
interviews
ook
place
in
1971.
They were conducted
in Thai
and
Eng-
lish and with
the assistance of
a
Malay interpreter.
12
Further
details have been
omitted
to
prevent dentification
f the informant.
13
For
a
more recent
nterviewwith separatistspokesmen,
ee Norman Peagan,
Boiling Point
in the
Troubled
South,
Far
Eastern Economnic
eview, May
1976,
pp. 10-11.
Mr.
Peagan
does not
identify
which organization these
separatists repre-
sented.
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ASTRI
SUHRKE
tative of
the UPFM military section took place in Pattani
under con-
ditions of considerable preoccupation with security and cautionary
measures by the intermediaries who arranged the meeting.
The military man is quite young. He speaks some Thai, but much
prefershis native Malay. He obtained his military training by staying
with the
Thai Army for two years, and says that some of his
fellow
guerrillas also have been in the Thai Army or police forces
previously.
I
have been in the jungle for eight years now. My whole
family
joined
the
Movement, partly because we were afraid of the
police,
partlybecause we want to help. When we joined, the
Movement
was
a
pretty mall group around Poh Yeh. Now there are about 1,000 of
us, although it is difficult o give exact figures. ome are not quite
loyal,
but are
merelybandits who have escaped the Thai police. They
are not true to the Movement at heart, and we give them
the bad
weapons. We now have one top-secret ermanent amp in the
jungle,
the rest of
us move around. We do not
want
to keep
too
many
men
in
the jungle but, rather, end in people to contact the
villagers
to
educate
them
about the Movement
and
to teach them how
to handle
weapons.
This
way
we
have
an
infrastructure hich
we can call
upon
when
the day comes. Now
we are
building up our strength
nd we
only
attack to get food and
weapons,
and
also to show
the
people
our
strength. ometimes t is necessary o kidnap or kill Muslimsin order
to show the people that they must work with
us.
The poor
people
give
us their
manpower,
but
the
rich
are
less willing to give.
Do we
get
more
support
from
the
uneducated than the educated Muslims?
n
one
sense,
education
helps
us
because
it
is
easier to teach the educated
Muslims
about
our
cause.
They
understand the
principles.
On the
other
hand,
the educated Muslims
are
sometimes
fraid to
cooperate
because they
fear the Thai
government.
The Movement, he says, draws on a variety of sources in its edu-
cational
program.
There are
political
teachers at
the
camp
who discuss
guerrilla
tactics
developed
in
the
Vietnam and
Algerian wars;
there
are seminars
on Castro
and
Che
Guevara.
Educational
material reaches
the Movement in
various
ways.
One
English-language
book
about
Che
Guevara,
for
instance,
was translated
into
Malay by
a
Malaysian
who
had studied
at
Oxford
and
supported
the
Movement because his
grand-
father had
originally escaped
from
Thailand.
Chinese sources
are
translated into
Malay by Malaysian
Chinese
(for appropriate
remuner-
ation), and Vietnamese sources are sometimes translated into Thai by
persons
who have lived
in
the
Eastern
border
regions
where there are
sizable
Vietnamese communities.
As
for
any
further
cooperation
between the
Movement
and other
groups,
he comments:
The
communists
Thai
communists
n
the
mid-South, he Malay-
sian, mainly
Chinese
communistswho
use the
border
provinces
as
a
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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MUSLIMS
IN THAILAND 245
sanctuary]use the same tactics as us, but our
aims
are different.
We
can work togetherfor tactical and diplomatic purposes,
but
not
be-
yond that.
We do want international ecognition,
o that
when we are
ready,we will have foreign upport. For instance, we have discussed if we
should kidnap
British
or Americans who come to the South so that
we can
get internationalpublicity.
With
respect to the currentmilitary ituation (1971) and
the
joint
Thai-Malaysian borderpatrols,he says:
Sometimeswe have
a
mock fightwith
the Thai Border
Patrol
Police,
and the
police
units
surrender heir weapons.
Now
things
are
a bit difficult ecause the Thai Army s brought n, and we are also
worried that the Malaysian security forces
will
go
after
us more
heavily
n
the future.We have told the Malaysian forces
not to
attack
their
Muslim
brothers nd said that we, in return,
will
not attack oint
patrols. f we attack,more Malaysian forcesmay come in.
In the ong run, you can interpret ur tactic s
a
means to weaken
the Thai
economyby making the government pend
more on the
mili-
tary.When the soldierscome down here we withdraw r hide, or only
surfaceto
ambush them. t is
then
difficult or the
government
o
de-
fendtheir expenditures o the National Assembly.Also, if the govern-
ment
has to
spend
more
money on
the
military
here
will be less
to
spend on economic development, nd this will
turn
the people against
the government.
The meetingwithrepresentatives
f
thepolitical
arm
of the
Move-
ment took
place
in a
village
n a
quite
different
tmosphere.
Here we
were clearly
on home
ground. Except
for
the fact
that
the
meeting
took place at night, herewere no security recautions r nervousness.
One oftherepresentativesas a
to-kru,
he otherwas an
imam
leader
of
prayers).
The imam was
an
old
man,
the
to-kru
ather
younger.
None of
them
poke
Thai.
The
aim
of our
organization s
full
independence-not autonomy
or federation
with
Thailand. Neither do
we
want
to be
part
of
Malay-
sia-even
if that were
possible. Only independence
will
serve our
people.
In
order
to obtain
this,
the most
important hing
is
to work
with the
people
and to teach them.
They
must be
taught
slam
first,
and when they re strong n Islam we teach the history f our region
and
the needs for
the
future.
Our
struggle
s
an
old one. In
recent
times,
the
most
promising
periods
for our movement
were
probably during
the war
[World War
II],
and
after
the
war when
Hadji Sulong
was
the
leader.
But
then
came
difficult
ears,
and
things
are also
difficult
ow-partly
because
there
are
parliamentarians.
The
parliamentarians from
the
South]
are not doing
the
right hing.
Their
way
of
doing things
will
not help
our
people,
but
some
people might
still listen
to
them
and
follow
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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246
ASTRI SUHRKE
them.We
are
also in a difficulteriod
now because
the governments
trying o change
the Pondok
schools.
This we
must prevent. f neces-
sary,
we will
stop all the
schools n the
villages
because no teacherswill
dare to come
here and
teach. The people here
are not interested
n
learningThai. But the governments trying o lure thepeople over to
their
side through ducation. Some
to-kru
have
followed
the govern-
ment policy
because they
are afraid,but we can
always win
back the
to-kru.
The policy
of the Thai government
o
appoint some
Muslims
from he region
to administrative
ositions s a
bad policy.
These Mus-
lims cannotreallyhelp their
people
because in
theirhearttheybecome
like the government.
On the question of outside aid, the religious leaders were skeptical
about
the
merits
of establishing a working
relationship
with
Thai and
Chinese communists
in
the area.
It was noted that
they were
not
Mtalay
Muslims; they were
outsiders. Ideological differences
were
also men-
tioned. They were
only slightly
more
optimistic about the
possibility
for
assistance from Muslim
countries
and groups, although
this was
clearly a
more desirable option.
We
hope
for
help
from
other
Muslim
countries,
but
this is
dif-
ficult.We cannot acceptmuch help fromMalaysia either.We appre-
ciate
demonstrations
n
Malaysia
on
behalf of the
rights
of Muslims
in
Thailand,
this
gives
our people
moral support,
but
we
cannot
rely
on getting
muchmore assistance.When
the
day of uprisingcomes,
we
will have
diplomatic
and
international
onnections,
ut first
we must
work with
the
people
and
strengthen
urselves.
The people
are with
us,
and our organization,
which has
existed for
20 years,
s
now
much
better organized
than
before.
We
have
a
centralized
tructurewith
a
small
committee
f
leaders on
the
top,
the
lower
levels do
not know
the personshigher up, and so on. This makes us much more effective
in the
struggle.
It has
been
a
long
struggle.
f we
do
not succeed
in
our
lifetime,
the
next
generation
will
carry
n to
victory.
Abdul Bhuminarong,
at
40
years
old,
has twice
been elected to the
National
Assembly
as
representative
from
Yala.
During
the
1957
elec-
tion,
he
ran on a Saha
Phoumi
ticket;
in the 1969 elections he ran
as
an
independent
but
joined
the
government party
(Saha
Pracha
Thai)
shortly fterbeing elected. He comes from an old and respected Muslim
family;
his
father,
in
particular,
was well
known
in the area. Mr.
Bhuminarong
studied
in
Kelantan-although
he
has no close
family
there
he
says
it was
quite
usual
to
study
in Kelantan at that
time.
Later he
spent
14
years
in
Bangkok,
working
for a
Japanese
firm
and
serving
as
a
parliamentarian
after the
1957
(December)
elections.
He
returned
to
Yala
to
campaign
in the 1969
elections,
and won a
small
margin (37 votes)
over
his two
opponents (a
Thai-Chinese
municipal
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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MUSLIMS
IN THAILAND 247
councillor nd a Thai Buddhistrubberplantationowner). He explains
the slendermarginby referringo his long absence from he province,
and
the factthathe won at all he attributes o his family's restige nd
standing n the area. He lives in a Thai-stylehouse in the provincial
capital,owns a small business, nd is married o a Thai-Chinesewoman
fromYala. His wife was previously radio announcer nd now teaches
high school. She helped her husband in the election campaign (1969)
and
says
that
the villagers id not reactnegatively o the quite unusual
fact
of a Thai-Chinese being marriedto a Muslim, although she took
care torespect he customs f the villagers o as to avoid givingoffense.
Bhuminarongcommented n what he saw as marked changes n
government olicy towardsthe Muslims n the last decade.
He
is par-
ticularly ppreciative f the educational policy.
Primary ducationmustbe expandedon a broad basis so that
the
Muslims
earn to
speak Thai.
If
theyonly complete he
lower
primarychool evelthey oon forget hai. But f they omplete igher
primarychool
s
well they o not forget hai. Now,the
Thai
govern-
mentofficialshink hat the Muslims re stupid. f the Muslims an
speak
Thai
they an protect
heir
ights.
He notesthat ducationdoesprovidethe Muslimwithan increased
range of professional nd economicoptions, nd stresses he encourage-
mentgivenby the government
n
providinghigh school
and
university
education
for
Thai-Muslims.
Several Muslims who
manage
to
go
this
far do not want to return
to
the
South, however,
but
it
is important
that
they
do returnand
set an example
to
others
n
demonstrating
what benefits ducation can
bring,he says.Moreover, f
these educated
Muslims become
government
fficials
hey
will be
able
to
help
their
people because theyknow the local customs nd the language.
On the
other hand, it would not be good if Muslims aspired to high govern-
ment
positions
n
the
South
because the
governmentmight
then
be
afraid of
separatism.
We
have to
find balance.
t is better o have educated
hais as
government
fficialshan
to have uneducatedMuslims
s
officials,
nd
stillbetter o haveboth
Thais
and Muslims
working
n
theadministra-
tion so that
he
government
ould not
worry
bout
separatism.
The
separatist
ovement
s
an
old
story.
t
is
a
hopeless
ause.The
separatistso notknowhow toorganizendfight,nd theyoungMus-
lims are not interested
n the
movement.
he
younger eneration
s
interested
n
getting
n
education
nd
moving
n-within he
Thai
nation.
He
does not see
any incompatibility
etween
being
a
good
Mus-
lim, on
the one
hand,
and
having
a secular education
and
speaking
Thai,
on the other.
Only
the
older
generation
eels
this,
the
conserva-
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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248
ASTRI UHRKE
tive nd stubborn ld people. In
thisconnection,
e recommends
hat
the to-kru
e
presentedwith
progressive
iews
more forcefully
han
is
the
case at present.
The to-kru
onstitute
highly
respected
and
ex-
tremelymportant eadershipsegment n the community nd they
should be educated
n disciplines
ther
han religion
o
that they
ould
teach
n
these areas
as well.
At present,
he government
nly brings
groups
f
to-kru o
Bangkok
for ight-seeing.
here
should
be a much
more comprehensive
rogram.
Even
though
he emphasized
the need
for
secular education,
he
warned
against
the professed
overnment
olicy
of closing
down
all
Pondok
schools
by
the end of
1971
unless they
start
converting
o
private
chools nd
introduce
Thai language
and secular
topics
n the
curriculum. he conversionprocess s difficultnd mustbe gradual.
Religious
education s
better
han
no education
whichmay be
the
al-
ternative
n some
areas
f the Pondok
are closed.
Most
importantly,
he
Pondok
have symbolic
mportance
o
the
Muslims
and there
will
cer-
tainly
be troubles
f
they re closed,
he warns.
Khun Pisan
is a young
Muslim
living
in
Yala where
he
teaches
school.
He
will
shortly e
promoted
o local
school
inspector.
He sug-
gests hathe maynotbe representativefmanyMuslims ince he
is
too
Thai in many respects-including
his practice
of speaking
Thai
at
home
with
his
wife and
children
although
ie
speaks
Malay
with
his
parents)
nd havinga
Thai name.
My father,
who is
a merchant,
was
very
strictwith our
religious
upbringing
when we
were small,
but he
encouraged
me
to
go
to
school.
I
went
first
o
a
Pondok school
in
Pattani,
then to
a
govern-
ment
school,
followed
by pre-university
tudies
at
an
American-sup-
ported
Christian
school in
Bangkok.
Many
of
the
Muslims
who,
like
me, go to Bangkok,do not want to returnto the South because they
feel that
people
here
are
too
orthodox
and
concerned
with
religion
alone.
But things
are
changing
here.
It
is
only
the
old
people
who
are
mainly concerned
about
religion
and the
after-life;
he
young
people
are interested
n
education
and material
welfare,
n
social and
economic
mobility.
hey
are
reversing
he
priorities
f theold
genera-
tion.
The villagers
re
changing. hey
come
into the town
to
sell
their
rubber
and
go
to
the
stores;
they
change
into
town-style
lothes
when
they
are here and change
back
to
traditional
dresswhen they
return to
the
villages.
When
they
are in town
they
even
go
to
the
movie-which s not quite as sinful as it used to be. Some to-kru re
also changing.
The
to-kru
ometimes
ay
that
it is
good
to teach
the
Thai
language
because then the
people
can talk
to the
government
officials
nd
protect
their
rights,
nd,
secondly,
have
a better
material
life.
n
10-20
years
think the Pondok
schools
will
change
to
become
full
private
schools
that teach
only
a few hours of
Islam.
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
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MUSLIMS N THAILAND 249
The old people are rightwhen hey ay t is impossibleo be
both
a traditionalistn religious uestions nd a modernman. When you
go
to the
city
nd
you get
an
education ou cannot
be so traditional
and strict n manyways.But you can still combine he essenceof
Islam withmodem ife.
Concerning he studentdemonstrationsn Malaysia
in
June 1971
protestingThai government olicy in the Muslim provinces,Khun
Pisan feels that the news did not have much impact on the local
people: they only want to be left n peace, theydon't want trouble.
Perhaps
some
bandits in the jungle are interested
n
the news.
He
also
thinks hat the old, traditionalMuslims n the area look askance
at the Muslims in Malaysia for being too modern - there are no
Pondok in Malaysia and the Muslims there ven drinkbeer.
In
discussing the parliamentarians elected from the Muslim
provinces uringthe 1969 elections,Khun Pisan emphasizes hat:
whenpeople elect their epresentatives,hey irstook at his religion,
but secondlyhey ee what ort f manhe is. Rememberhat woBud-
dhist
andidates rom
ala
got manyvotes.But
a
Muslim andidate-
ifhe is a goodman-may ave more fan impact ince hegovernment
will know hathe speaksfor he people.The reason hatmanymem-bersof parliament rom he Southhave been rather uiet n the past
is not that hey re afraid f speaking p or afraid hat hegovernment
will distrust hem
of being separatists,
ut
just
that
they
are bad
M.P.'s. Still, hegovernmentends o misunderstandhesituation ere
by suspecting hat many Muslims re politically ad. In fact,the
separatistsrobably
make
up a very
mall
group.
The
government
lso
misunderstandshe peoplehereby believinghat
ll
Muslims re reli-
gious traditionalists.
n
fact, s
I
have said, things
re
changing.
The Muslimsin southernThailand presenta classic case of the
dilemmas
of a small
minority roup
faced
with
a
majority-directed
integration olicy. The leadership
of
the minority s split between
the
loyalists
who
accept
the
legitimacy
of
majority
rule
and
hope
for
gradual changes
within the
existing ystem, nd,
on the other
hand,
the
separatists
who
proclaim
the
necessity
f
self-rule.
ach
group
at-
tempts
to
mobilize
popular support,
but neither has
been
markedly
successful o date.
One of the most
significant
actors
etermining
he
outcome of
this
competition
n the
future
may
well
be
the
govern-
ment's
education
policy
and the extent o which t succeeds n mediat-
ing
the
conflict
between
traditional and modern
values. If this
dichotomy
s cast in a
communal-religious
old
whereby
moderniza-
tion
is seen
as
equivalent
to
Thai-ification,
he
loyalists and
the
government)
will
undoubtedly
meet considerable ocal
resistance.For
the
separatists
he
question is, rather,
o
what extent the
movement(s)
5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977
15/15
250 ASTRI SUHRKE
can
expand by denying eculareducation and thus alienatingyounger
Muslimswho
receive
such education. Another question
relates to the
role of youngMuslims who have studied abroad in Muslim
countries.
Very ittle s known about thisgroup,even its size, yetit mightcon-
ceivably merge
o
compete
with
ocal
religious
eaders who have
been
instrumentaln shaping eparatistmovement(s)
n the
past.
ASTRI
SUI-IRKE is
an
Assistant Professor n
the
School
of
International
Service,
AmericanUniversity,Washington,D.C.
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