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United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit
No. 12- 2280
RONNI E J ONES; RI CHARD BECKERS; WALTER R. WASHI NGTON; WI LLI AM E.BRI DGEFORTH; SHAWN N. HARRI S; EUGENE WADE; GEORGE C. DOWNI NG,
J R. ; CLARARI SE BRI STOW; MASSACHUSETTS ASSOCI ATI ON OF MI NORI TY LAWENFORCEMENT OFFI CERS; RACHELLE COUCH; KERI HOGAN,
Pl ai nt i f f s , Appel l ant s ,
v.
CI TY OF BOSTON, BOSTON POLI CE DEPARTMENT; EDWARD DAVI S,Commi ss i oner of t he Bost on Pol i ce Depar t ment ,
Def endant s, Appel l ees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[ Hon. Geor ge A. O' Tool e, J r . , U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]
Bef or eTor r uel l a, Howar d, and Kayat t a,
Ci r cui t J udges.
J ohn F. Adki ns, wi t h whom Laura Masl ow- Ar mand, Lawyer s'Commi t t ee f or Ci vi l Ri ght s and Economi c J ust i ce, Dor een M. Rachal ,and Bi ngham McCut chen LLP wer e on br i ef , f or appel l ant s.
Hel en G. Li t sas, wi t h whom Ni col e I . Taub, St af f
At t or ney, Of f i ce of t he Legal Advi sor , was on br i ef , f or appel l ees.J oel Z. Ei ger man on br i ef f or J ewi sh Al l i ance f or Law &Soci al Act i on, Bost on Soci et y of Vul cans, Communi t y Change, I nc. ,Massachuset t s Law Ref or m I nst i t ut e, Uni on of Mi nor i t yNei ghbor hoods, J ust i ce at Wor k, I nc. , The Nat i onal Wor kr i ght sI nst i t ut e, Bl acks i n Law Enf orcement of Amer i ca, and NAACP Bost on,ami ci cur i ae i n suppor t of appel l ant s.
St ephen Chur chi l l and Li cht en & Li ss- Ri or dan, P. C. , onbr i ef f or Massachuset t s Empl oyment Lawyer s Associ at i on, Fai r
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Empl oyment Pr oj ect , Amer i can Ci vi l Li ber t i es Uni on ofMassachuset t s, Uni on of Mi nor i t y Nei ghbor hoods, Char l es Hami l t onHoust on I nst i t ut e f or Race and J ust i ce at Har var d Law School , Ci vi lRi ght s Cl i ni c at Howar d Uni ver si t y School of Law, Fai r Housi ngCent er of Gr eat er Bost on, Massachuset t s Law Ref or m I nst i t ut e,J ust i ce at Wor k, I nc. , The Nat i onal Wor kr i ght s I nst i t ute, Bl acks i n
Law Enf orcement of Amer i ca, and NAACP Bost on, ami ci cur i ae i nsuppor t of appel l ant s.
Ri char d Pi anka, ATA Li t i gat i on Cent er , and Prasad Shar maon br i ef f or Amer i can Tr ucki ng Associ at i ons, I nc. , ami cus cur i ae i nsuppor t of appel l ees.
Mar k A. de Ber nar do, J oseph E. Schul er , and J ackson Lewi sLLP on br i ef f or The Counci l f or Empl oyment Law Equi t y, ami cuscur i ae i n suppor t of appel l ees.
Mark A. de Bernardo, Mat t hew F. Ni eman, and J ackson Lewi sLLP on br i ef f or The I nst i t ut e f or a Dr ug- Free Wor kpl ace, ami cuscur i ae i n suppor t of appel l ees.
Pet er A. Bi aget t i and Mi nt z, Levi n, Cohn, Fer r i s, Gl ovskyand Popeo, P. C. , on br i ef f or Psychemedi cs Cor por at i on, ami cuscur i ae i n suppor t of appel l ees.
May 7, 2014
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KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. I n t hi s raci al di scr i mi nat i on
case, t en bl ack pl ai nt i f f s chal l enge t he Bost on Pol i ce Depar t ment ' s
dr ug t est i ng pr ogr am. Seven of t he pl ai nt i f f s ar e f or mer of f i cer s
f i r ed by the depar t ment af t er t est i ng posi t i ve f or cocai ne; t he
ei ght h i s a f or mer cadet i n t he same si t uat i on; t he ni nt h cont i nues
t o wor k as an of f i cer af t er t est i ng posi t i ve and under goi ng
r ehabi l i t at i on as an al t er nat i ve t o t er mi nat i on; and t he t ent h i s
a f ormer appl i cant t o t he depar t ment whose cont i ngent j ob of f er was
r evoked af t er a posi t i ve t est. The pl ai nt i f f s ' pr i nci pal cl ai mi s
t hat t he depar t ment ' s progr am, whi ch used hai r sampl es t o t est f or
i l l egal dr ug use, caused a di spar at e i mpact on t he basi s of r ace i n
vi ol at i on of Ti t l e VI I of t he Ci vi l Ri ght s Act of 1964. Dur i ng t he
ei ght year s f or whi ch t he pl ai nt i f f s pr esent dat a, bl ack of f i cer s
and cadet s t est ed posi t i ve f or cocai ne appr oxi mat el y 1. 3% of t he
t i me, whi l e whi t e of f i cer s and cadet s t est ed posi t i ve j ust under
0. 3% of t he t i me. The pl ai nt i f f s deny t hat t hey used cocai ne,
argui ng t hat t he hai r t est empl oyed by t he depar t ment generated
f al se- posi t i ve r esul t s i n pr ocessi ng t he t ype of hai r common t o
many bl ack i ndi vi dual s. The pl ai nt i f f s al so pr ess cl ai ms under t he
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Uni t ed St at es Const i t ut i on, vi a 42 U. S. C. 1983, and under t he
Amer i cans wi t h Di sabi l i t i es Act ( ADA) . 1
The di st r i ct cour t grant ed summar y j udgment t o t he
depar t ment on al l cl ai ms. We vacate t he grant of summary j udgment
wi t h r espect t o t he pl ai nt i f f s' Ti t l e VI I cl ai m, and we al so
r ever se t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of t hei r mot i on f or par t i al
summary j udgment on t hat cl ai m, f i ndi ng no genui ne i ssue of
mat er i al f act t hat coul d pr ecl ude t hem f r om maki ng a t hr eshol d,
pr i ma f aci e showi ng of di spar at e i mpact . We ot her wi se af f i r m t he
di str i ct court ' s deci s i on.
I. Background
The f act s descr i bed i n t hi s opi ni on ar e not genui nel y
di sput ed, except wher e ot her wi se not ed.
A. The Department's Drug Testing Program
Si nce 1999, of f i cer s and cadet s i n t he Bost on Pol i ce
Depar t ment have been subj ect t o annual dr ug t est s usi ng sampl es of
1 I n t he di str i ct cour t , t he pl ai nt i f f s or i gi nal l y pur sued anumber of other cl ai ms. They have not def ended on appeal t hei rcl ai ms under t he Equal Pr ot ect i on Cl ause of t he U. S. Const i t ut i onor 42 U. S. C. 1981, so t he gr ant of summary j udgment t o thedepar t ment on t hose cl ai ms st ands. See, e. g. , Di al ysi s AccessCt r . , LLC v. RMS Li f el i ne, I nc. , 638 F. 3d 367, 374 n. 7 ( 1st Ci r .
2011) . The pl ai nt i f f s' br i ef on appeal al so does not separ at el ydi scuss t hei r cl ai ms under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 103, and ch.151B, 4, and t he Massachuset t s Decl ar at i on of Ri ght s, except t osay that t hey are governed by t he same anal ysi s as t hei r ADA cl ai m.Because we af f i r m t he gr ant of summary j udgment t o t he depar t menton t hat cl ai m, we al so af f i r m i t on t he st at e l aw cl ai ms.
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t hei r hai r . 2 Under a pr ovi si on of a col l ect i ve bar gai ni ng
agr eement between t he depart ment and t he pol i ce of f i cers' uni on
known as Rul e 111, t he depar t ment sel ect ed a pr i vate company,
Psychmedi cs Cor por at i on, t o anal yze empl oyees' hai r f or t he
pr esence of chemi cal s i ndi cat i ng exposur e to f i ve subst ances:
cocai ne, mar i j uana, opi ates, PCP, and amphetami nes.
When Psychmedi cs r epor t ed t hat an i ndi vi dual ' s t est
r esul t s i ndi cat ed exposur e t o cocai ne, a l i censed physi ci an
sel ected by t he depart ment checked t o see whether t he i ndi vi dual
had been admi ni st er ed "cocai ne hydr ochl or i de . . . dur i ng a
medi cal pr ocedur e. " As an addi t i onal excul pat or y saf eguar d, t he
i ndi vi dual coul d el ect t o have a "saf et y- net " t est of a di f f er ent
hai r sampl e. Dur i ng much of t he per i od i n whi ch t he pl ai nt i f f s
t est ed posi t i ve, t he saf et y- net t est s wer e si gni f i cant l y mor e
sensi t i ve t han t he i ni t i al t est s i n det ect i ng t he pr esence of
cocai ne and i t s chemi cal by- pr oduct s.
I f an empl oyee t est ed posi t i ve, and was not exonerated by
ei t her t he medi cal r evi ew or t he saf et y- net t est , t he depar t ment
t ermi nat ed t he empl oyee unl ess he or she agr eed t o seek
r ehabi l i t at i on f or dr ug abuse and t o accept an unpai d suspensi on of
45 work days whi l e undergoi ng t r eat ment . Bef ore a t ermi nat i on
became f i nal , however , Massachuset t s l aw r equi r ed t he depart ment t o
2 The dr ug t est i ng r egi me underwent changes i n 2007, and t hecl ai ms at i ssue her e rel at e onl y t o the per i od bet ween 1999 and2006, i ncl usi ve.
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pr ovi de a wr i t t en not i ce of r easons, f ol l owed by an evi dent i ar y
hear i ng at whi ch an empl oyee coul d argue that t here was no j ust
cause f or t er mi nat i on. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, 41. A
pol i ce admi ni st r at or cust omar i l y pr esi ded over t he pr e- t er mi nat i on
hear i ngs. I f t he hear i ng of f i cer f ound j ust cause, t he depar t ment
f i r ed t he empl oyee, who coul d t hen mount a post - t ermi nat i on appeal
t o t he Massachuset t s Ci vi l Ser vi ce Commi ssi on. 3 Mass . Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 31, 42.
The depar t ment al so used t he hai r t est t o scr een j ob
appl i cant s. Af t er an appl i cant r ecei ved a condi t i onal of f er of
empl oyment , t he appl i cant was r equi r ed t o pass t he hai r t est bef or e
t he of f er woul d become f i nal .
B. Drug Test Results for Officers and Cadets
A ver y smal l per cent age of of f i cer s and cadet s, ei t her
whi t e or bl ack, t est ed posi t i ve f or cocai ne dur i ng t he per i od
cover ed by t hi s l awsui t . Of t hose who di d t est posi t i ve, however ,
t her e were mor e bl ack empl oyees t han whi t e empl oyees even t hough
over t wo- t hi r ds of t he of f i cer s and cadet s t est ed wer e whi t e. As
an exampl e, i n 2003, an average year dur i ng t he per i od: 6 of 529
bl ack of f i cer s and cadet s t est ed posi t i ve, or 1. 1% of t hat gr oup,
3 I n f act, si x of t he pl ai nt i f f s j oi nt l y pur sued a chal l enget o t hei r t er mi nat i ons at t he Massachuset t s Ci vi l Ser vi ceCommi ssi on. I n Febr uar y 2013, t hat chal l enge r esul t ed i n an or derof r ei nst at ement , wi t h par t i al backpay, f or f i ve of t he pl ai nt i f f s,each of whom cont i nues t o seek f ul l compensat i on and addi t i onaldamages i n t hi s case.
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whi l e 3 of 1260 whi t e of f i cer s and cadet s t est ed posi t i ve, or 0. 2%
of t hat gr oup. 4
The smal l absol ut e number of posi t i ve t est s r el at i ve t o
t he t ot al number of t est s pr esent s oppor t uni t i es f or mar kedl y
di f f er ent char act er i zat i ons of any cor r el at i on bet ween t est r esul t s
and t he r aces of t he i ndi vi dual s t est ed. One coul d say t hat bl ack
of f i cer s and cadet s wer e mor e l i kel y t han t hei r whi t e col l eagues t o
t est posi t i ve by j ust one per cent age poi nt . Or one coul d say t hat
bl ack of f i cer s and cadet s wer e f i ve t i mes mor e l i kel y t o t est
posi t i ve. Per haps t r yi ng t o pr ove cor r ect Mar k Twai n' s qui p about
st at i st i cs, t he par t i es wage bat t l e i n t hei r br i ef s wi t h t hese
unhel pf ul t ypes of compet i ng char act er i zat i ons of t he number s.
St at i st i ci ans, by cont r ast , cust omar i l y appr oach dat a
such as t hi s more pr eci sel y. They ask whether t he out comes of an
empl oyment pr act i ce ar e cor r el at ed wi t h a speci f i ed char act er i st i c,
such as r ace, and, i f so, whet her t he cor r el at i on can r easonabl y be
at t r i but ed t o r andom chance. The cust omary yar dst i ck f or maki ng
t hi s l at t er det er mi nat i on i s cal l ed "st at i st i cal s i gni f i cance. "
St at i st i ci ans empl oy a number of di f f er ent met hods t o
assess st at i st i cal si gni f i cance i n a var i et y of di f f er ent cont ext s.
Feder al J udi ci al Cent er , Ref er ence Manual on Sci ent i f i c Evi dence
251 ( 3d ed. 2011) ( her ei naf t er " FJ C Ref er ence Manual " ) . I n t he
appr oach most r el evant here, st at i st i ci ans may compare out comes f or
4 We descr i be t he genesi s of t hese f i gur es bel ow.
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t wo di f f er ent gr oups ( e. g. , bl ack empl oyees and whi t e empl oyees)
pr esumi ng t hat members of t he t wo gr oups have t he same l i kel i hood
of r ecei vi ng a gi ven out come ( e. g. , a pr omot i on) . See Paul Mei er ,
J er ome Sacks , and Sandy L. Zabel l , What Happened i n Hazel wood:
St at i st i cs, Empl oyment Di scr i mi nat i on, and t he 80% Rul e, 1984 Am.
Bar Found. Res. J . 139, 147 ( 1984) . St at i st i ci ans ar e wel l awar e
t hat t hi s assumpt i on of equal oppor t uni t y, even i f t r ue, does not
mean that t he t wo gr oups wi l l exper i ence exact l y equal out comes:
r andom var i at i on wi l l of t en creat e di f f er ences. To assess t he
l i kel i hood t hat an obser ved di f f er ence i n out comes r esul t ed f r om
mer e chance, st at i st i ci ans cal cul at e t he pr obabi l i t y of obser vi ng
a di f f er ence equal t o or gr eat er t han t hat whi ch act ual l y occur r ed,
assumi ng equal opport uni t y. 5 They cal l t hi s pr obabi l i t y t he
"p- val ue. " FJ C Ref er ence Manual at 250. St at i st i ci ans usual l y
appl y t he l abel "st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant " t o t he obser ved
di f f er ent i al out comes i f t he p- val ue i s l ess t han f i ve per cent , see
Fudge v. Ci t y of Pr ovi dence Fi r e Dep' t , 766 F. 2d 650, 658 n. 8 ( 1st
Ci r . 1985) , al t hough t hey somet i mes use a di f f er ent cut - of f , such
as one percent , FJ C Ref erence Manual at 251- 52.
Essent i al l y, a f i ndi ng of st at i st i cal si gni f i cance means
t hat t he dat a cast s ser i ous doubt on t he assumpt i on t hat t he
5 Because t he part i es have not r ai sed t he i ssue, we do notdi scuss her e t he di st i nct i on bet ween "one- t ai l ed" and " t wo- t ai l ed"t est s f or st at i st i cal si gni f i cance. See Pal mer v. Shul t z, 815 F. 2d84, 92- 96 ( D. C. Ci r . 1987) ( di scussi ng t he i ssue at l engt h) .
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di spar i t y was caused by chance. When st at i st i ci ans f i nd a
di spar i t y bet ween r aci al gr oups t o be st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant ,
t hey ar e wi l l i ng t o r ej ect t he hypot hesi s t hat member s of t he
gr oups t r ul y had an equal chance of r ecei vi ng t he out come at i ssue.
I d.
St at i st i cal si gni f i cance and p- val ue ar e of t en connect ed
wi t h a t hi r d concept , "st andar d devi at i on. " 6 I n di spar at e i mpact
cases, st andar d devi at i on ser ves as anot her way of measur i ng the
amount by whi ch t he observed di spar i t y i n out comes di f f er s f r omt he
aver age expect ed r esul t gi ven equal oppor t uni t y, e. g. , equal r at es
of pr omot i on f or bl ack and whi t e empl oyees. A di f f er ence of 1. 96
st andar d devi at i ons gener al l y cor r esponds t o a p- val ue of f i ve
per cent , whi l e a di f f er ence of t hr ee st andar d devi at i ons gener al l y
cor r esponds to a p- val ue of appr oxi mat el y 0. 5%. FJ C Ref er ence
Manual at 251 n. 101 As t he Supreme Cour t observed i n a case
i nvol vi ng al l egat i ons of di scr i mi nat or y j ur y sel ecti on, "[ a] s a
gener al r ul e . . . , i f t he di f f er ence bet ween t he expect ed val ue
and the obser ved number i s gr eat er t han t wo or t hr ee st andard
devi at i ons, t hen t he hypot hesi s t hat t he j ur y dr awi ng was r andom
6 We, l i ke ot her cour t s, use t he t er m"st andar d devi at i on" t odescr i be a measur e t hat st at i st i ci ans of t en l abel "st andar d er r or . "FJ C Ref erence Manual at 251 n. 101.
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woul d be suspect t o a soci al sci ent i st . " Cast aneda v. Par t i da, 430
U. S. 482, 496 n. 17 ( 1977) . 7
I n t hi s case, t he par t i es wor k wi t h a l ar ge sampl e of
t housands of t est r esul t s f r om whi ch cal cul at i ons of devi at i ons
f r oman expect ed r andomdi st r i but i on can be made wi t h a hi gh degr ee
of st at i st i cal power . The par t i es al so appear t o have no mat er i al
di sput e r egar di ng t he r aw number s under l yi ng t he anal ysi s: t he
pl ai nt i f f s ' br i ef r el i es on a t abl e cr eat ed by t he pl ai nt i f f s
l abel ed "Compar i son of Af r i can- Amer i can and Whi t e Posi t i ve Hai r
Test Resul t s Under Four - Fi f t hs Rul e, " whi ch adopt s count s of f er ed
by t he depart ment ' s expert s, and t he depart ment ' s br i ef makes no
ef f or t t o di savow t hose number s. The pl ai nt i f f s f ur t her ci t e t he
depar t ment ' s cal cul at i ons of t he st andar d devi at i ons associ at ed
wi t h t hose count s, and t he pl ai nt i f f s do not appear t o chal l enge
t hose cal cul at i ons. We t her ef or e deem t hese number s and
cal cul at i ons t o be undi sput ed, except t o t he l i mi t ed ext ent t hat
t he depar t ment r ai ses met hodol ogi cal obj ect i ons t o the anal ysi s of
t he undi sput ed data, whi ch we addr ess bel ow.
The undi sput ed data and cal cul at i ons ar e as f ol l ows:
7 The f or mul at i on of "gr eat er t han t wo or t hr ee" as expr essedi n Cast aneda i s an exampl e of t he uneasy f i t between the l anguage
of l aw and t he l anguage of mathemat i cs. Every number gr eat er t hant wo or t hr ee i s gr eat er t han t wo. What mi ght be sai d morepr eci sel y i s t hat i n many si t uat i ons t wo st andar d devi at i ons wi l lgener at e an i nf er ence of nonr andomness f or a soci al sci ent i st ,whi l e i n ot her si t uat i ons a hi gher t hr eshol d may be empl oyed,dependi ng on the r esearcher ' s assessment of t he conf i dence neededbef or e accept i ng t he r esul t .
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Year # Tested/# Positive Standard
Deviation
Black White
1999 521/ 15 1491/ 10 3. 43
2000 537/ 4 1467/ 3 1. 35
2001 530/ 3 1404/ 3 0. 81
2002 532/ 15 1375/ 4 4. 41
2003 529/ 6 1260/ 3 2. 01
2004 522/ 4 1260/ 4 1. 92
2005 529/ 3 1289/ 1 1. 43
2006 522/ 5 1289/ 2 1. 95
1999 t o 2006 4222/ 55 10, 835/ 30 7. 148
Thi s evi dence does not est abl i sh t hat t he di f f er ences i n
out comes wer e l ar ge. I t shows, i nst ead, t he extent t o whi ch we can
be conf i dent t hat t he di f f er ences i n out comes, whet her l ar ge or
smal l , were not r andom. To t he ext ent t he f act s make i t
appr opr i at e t o consi der t he ei ght - year aggr egat e dat a as a si ngl e
sampl e, we can be al most cer t ai n t hat t he di f f erence i n out comes
associ at ed wi t h r ace over t hat per i od cannot be at t r i but ed t o
chance al one. Nor can r andomness be vi ewed as ot her t han a very
8 The st andar d devi at i on of 7. 14 f or al l year s combi ned i sf ar gr eat er t han t he aver age of t he st andar d devi at i ons i n t hei ndi vi dual year s f or t he same r eason t hat t he odds of a coi nl andi ng on t ai l s i n t hi r t y out of f or t y f l i ps i s f ar l ess than t heodds of get t i ng t hr ee t ai l s i n f our f l i ps. We di scuss bel ow t hedepar t ment ' s per f unct or y obj ect i on t hat t hese dr ug t est out comes,unl i ke f l i ps of a f ai r coi n, ar e not i ndependent event s.
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unl i kel y expl anat i on f or r esul t s i n at l east t hr ee of t he year s
vi ewed i n i sol at i on.
C. Alleged False Positives and Racial Bias of Hair Testing
I n addi t i on t o pr esent i ng a st at i st i cal demonst r at i on
t hat t he r aci al di f f er ent i al i n out comes ver y l i kel y di d not r esul t
f r om chance, t he pl ai nt i f f s al so sought t o pr ove t hat di f f er ences
i n t he chemi cal and physi cal char act er i st i cs of hai r , al so
associ ated wi t h r ace, may have account ed f or t he obser ved
di f f er ent i al i n out comes. The par t i es pr esent ed shar pl y
conf l i ct i ng evi dence on t hi s cl ai m. The pl ai nt i f f s' exper t s ar gue
t hat hai r t est s ar e r el at i vel y unr el i abl e and not e t hat t he f eder al
gover nment has r ef used t o aut hor i ze hai r t est i ng i n dr ug scr eeni ng
of f eder al empl oyees and empl oyees of pr i vat e i ndust r i es f or whi ch
t he gover nment r egul at es dr ug t est i ng. The pl ai nt i f f s' exper t s
al so opi ne t hat bl ack i ndi vi dual s t end t o have hi gher l evel s of
mel ani n i n t hei r hai r , and t hat mel ani n causes cocai ne and
associ at ed chemi cal s cal l ed cocai ne met abol i t es t o bi nd t o hai r at
a hi gher r at e. They asser t t hat cocai ne i n t he f or m of an
"aer osol i zed powder , " whi ch f orms af t er someone has snor t ed or
smoked i t , wi l l "deposi t on any near by sur f ace i ncl udi ng t he hai r
of non- user s. " These deposi t s, t he pl ai nt i f f s say, can become
i ncor por at ed i nt o t he hai r i n such a way t hat cur r ent hai r t est i ng
met hods cannot di st i ngui sh f r om t he ef f ect s of act ual dr ug use.
Such i ncor por at i on mi ght be par t i cul ar l y l i kel y wher e a per son has
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under gone cosmet i c hai r t r eat ment s more common i n the bl ack
communi t y. The pl ai nt i f f s do not cl ai m on appeal , t hough, t hat
each of t hem was exposed t o cocai ne pr i or t o t hei r t est s.
The depar t ment ' s exper t s count er t hat hai r t est i ng has
been val i dat ed by numer ous sci ent i f i c st udi es. They al so di sput e
t hat t her e i s any sci ent i f i c evi dence of r aci al bi as i n hai r
t est i ng. I n par t i cul ar , t hey poi nt t o st udi es showi ng t hat t he
r el at i ve r at es of posi t i ve dr ug t est s f or bl ack and whi t e
i ndi vi dual s r emai n mat er i al l y const ant acr oss di f f er ent met hods of
t est i ng, speci f i cal l y hai r t est i ng, ur i ne t est i ng, and bl ood
t est i ng, and not e t hat t he pl ai nt i f f s' exper t s do not cl ai m t hat
r esul t s f r om ur i ne and bl ood t est i ng ar e r aci al l y skewed. The
depar t ment al so quest i ons any cor r el at i on bet ween posi t i ve t est
r esul t s and mel ani n l evel s. Asser t i ng t hat many Caucasi ans and
most Asi an- Amer i cans have mel ani n l evel s as hi gh or hi gher t han
t hose of t he pl ai nt i f f s, t he depar t ment poi nt s out t hat no Asi an-
Amer i can i n the depar t ment has ever t est ed posi t i ve, nor has any
of f i cer i n t he depar t ment ' s Dr ug Cont r ol Uni t or Evi dence
Management Uni t , where of f i cers woul d be most l i kel y t o be exposed
t o cocai ne on t he j ob.
D. Procedural History
The pl ai nt i f f s i ni t i at ed t hi s sui t i n st at e cour t i n J ul y
2005, and t he depar t ment r emoved i t t o f eder al cour t soon af t er .
Sever al year s of di scovery f ol l owed, cul mi nat i ng i n summar y
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j udgment mot i ons f r om bot h si des. The di st r i ct cour t grant ed
summar y j udgment t o t he depar t ment on al l cl ai ms on September 28,
2012. We have j ur i sdi ct i on over t hi s t i mel y appeal of t he di st r i ct
cour t ' s f i nal or der under 28 U. S. C. 1291.
II. Standard of Review
We revi ew de novo t he di st r i ct cour t ' s gr ant of summar y
j udgment . Tr avers v. Fl i ght Servs. & Sys. , I nc. , 737 F. 3d 144, 146
( 1st Ci r . 2013) . Under Feder al Rul e of Ci vi l Pr ocedur e 56( a) ,
" [ t ] he cour t shal l gr ant summary j udgment i f t he movant shows t hat
t here i s no genui ne di sput e as t o any mater i al f act and t he movant
i s ent i t l ed t o j udgment as a mat t er of l aw. "
III. Analysis
A. Disparate Impact Racial Discrimination
Ti t l e VI I prohi bi t s empl oyers f r omut i l i zi ng "empl oyment
pr act i ces t hat cause[ ] a di spar at e i mpact on t he basi s of r ace"
unl ess t hose pr act i ces ar e j ust i f i ed by busi ness necessi t y. 42
U. S. C. 2000e- 2( k) . Not abl y, a di spar at e i mpact cl ai mcan succeed
even wher e t he empl oyer di d not i nt end t o di scr i mi nat e. See, e. g. ,
Bost on Chapt er , N. A. A. C. P. , I nc. v. Beecher , 504 F. 2d 1017, 1021
( 1st Ci r . 1974) . Thi s di st i ngui shes t he di spar at e i mpact cause of
act i on f r om t he mor e t r adi t i onal di spar at e t r eat ment appr oach t o
pr ovi ng di scr i mi nat i on. To make a pr i ma f aci e showi ng of di spar at e
i mpact, a pl ai nt i f f st ar t s by "i sol at i ng and i dent i f yi ng" t he
empl oyment pr act i ce bei ng chal l enged. Wat son v. For t Wor t h Bank &
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Tr ust , 487 U. S. 977, 994 ( 1988) . A pl ai nt i f f must t hen show t hat
t he i dent i f i ed pr act i ce "causes a di spar at e i mpact on t he basi s of
r ace. " 42 U. S. C. 2000e- 2( k) ( 1) ( A) ( i ) . The Supr eme Cour t has
most r ecent l y descr i bed a pr i ma f aci e showi ng of di spar at e i mpact
as "essent i al l y a t hr eshol d showi ng of a si gni f i cant st at i st i cal
di spar i t y . . . and not hi ng mor e. " Ri cci v. DeSt ef ano, 557 U. S.
557, 587 ( 2009) . See al so Fudge v. Ci t y of Pr ovi dence Fi r e Dep' t ,
766 F. 2d 650, 658 n. 8 ( 1st Ci r . 1985) ( hol di ng t hat a pr i ma f aci e
case of di spar at e i mpact can be est abl i shed wher e "st at i st i cal
t est s suf f i ci ent l y di mi ni sh chance as a l i kel y expl anat i on") .
1. There is no genuine dispute that there is a
statistically significant correlation between
outcomes of the department's drug testing program
and race.
I n t he di st r i ct cour t , and i n t hei r openi ng br i ef on
appeal , t he pl ai nt i f f s made cl ear t hat t he empl oyment pr act i ce t hey
chal l enge i s " t he Hai r Test , " def i ned by t he common el ement s of t he
dr ug t est s used by t he depar t ment between 1999 and 2006, i ncl usi ve.
The depar t ment does not di sput e t hat t hi s pract i ce const i t utes a
"par t i cul ar empl oyment pract i ce" as r equi r ed by t he st at ut e. 42
U. S. C. 2000e- 2( k) ( 1) ( A) ( i ) .
Havi ng i dent i f i ed the chal l enged empl oyment pr act i ce, t he
pl ai nt i f f s pr esent ed evi dence t hat t he r esul t s of t hi s pr act i ce had
a stat i st i cal l y s i gni f i cant cor r el at i on wi t h r ace. As t hei r
t hr eshol d f or st at i st i cal si gni f i cance, t he pl ai nt i f f s chose a p-
val ue of f i ve per cent , or 1. 96 st andar d devi at i ons, t he t hr eshol d
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most commonl y used by soci al sci ent i st s. Most f eder al cour t s have
al so set t l ed on t hi s t hr eshol d i n anal yzi ng st at i st i cal showi ngs of
di spar at e i mpact . 9 Because t he depart ment does not chal l enge t hi s
convent i on, we accept i t her e wi t hout r ul i ng on i t s gener al
appl i cabi l i t y.
Usi ng t he f i ve per cent t hr eshol d, t he pl ai nt i f f s showed
t hat , i n at l east t hr ee of t he ei ght year s dur i ng t he r el evant
per i od, t he di f f er ent i al bet ween posi t i ve r esul t s f or bl ack and
whi t e empl oyees was st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant . Mor eover , when t he
dat a f r om t he ei ght year s i s aggr egat ed, t he di st r i but i on i n t est
r esul t s f or bl ack empl oyees devi ated by more than seven st andard
devi at i ons f r om t he expect ed norm. The depart ment does not
meani ngf ul l y chal l enge the raw mat h behi nd t hese cal cul at i ons of
9 See Tabor v. Hi l t i , I nc. , 703 F. 3d 1206, 1223 ( 10t h Ci r .
2013) ( descri bi ng a st at i st i cal si gni f i cance t hr eshol d of "t wo ort hr ee st andar d devi at i ons") ; Chi n v. Por t Aut h. of N. Y. & N. J . , 685F. 3d 135, 145, 153- 54 ( 2d Ci r . 2012) ( "[ S] t at i st i cal si gni f i canceat t he f i ve- per cent l evel i s gener al l y suf f i ci ent . . . . ") ; St agiv. Nat ' l R. R. Passenger Cor p. , 391 F. App' x 133, 140, 144- 45 ( 3dCi r . 2010) ( hol di ng t hat t he t hr eshol d i s gener al l y "a pr obabi l i t yl evel at or bel ow 0. 05, or at 2 t o 3 st andar d devi at i ons orgr eat er ") ; Pai ge v. Cal i f or ni a, 233 F. App' x 646, 648 ( 9t h Ci r .2007) ( accept i ng 1. 96 st andar d devi at i ons as t he thr eshol d f orst at i st i cal si gni f i cance) ; Adams v. Amer i t ech Ser vs. , I nc. , 231F. 3d 414, 424 ( 7t h Ci r . 2000) ( "Two st andar d devi at i ons i s nor mal l yenough t o show t hat i t i s ext r emel y unl i kel y ( t hat i s, t her e i s
l ess t han a 5% pr obabi l i t y) t hat t he di spar i t y i s due t o chance,gi vi ng r i se to a r easonabl e i nf er ence t hat t he hi r i ng was not r ace-neut r al . . . . " ) ; Ander son v. Zubi et a, 180 F. 3d 329, 340 ( D. C.Ci r . 1999) ( i ndi cat i ng t hat "di spar i t i es . . . exceed[ i ng] 1. 96st andar d devi at i ons under a t wo- t ai l ed t est of st at i st i calsi gni f i cance" ar e suf f i ci ent t o est abl i sh a pr i ma f aci e ofdi spar at e i mpact ) .
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st at i st i cal si gni f i cance. I nst ead, t he depar t ment r ai ses t hr ee
met hodol ogi cal obj ect i ons.
Fi r st , t he depar t ment ' s l awyer s cl ai mt hat t he empl oyees
who opt ed t o avoi d t er mi nat i on i n t he wake of a posi t i ve t est
r esul t by under goi ng dr ug r ehabi l i t at i on or r esi gni ng wer e
"cor r ect l y i dent i f i ed as usi ng i l l i ci t dr ugs" and t her ef or e must be
excl uded f rom t he pl ai nt i f f s ' s tat i s t i cal anal ys i s . The
depart ment ' s own expert s pr ovi de no support f or t hi s argument
penned by counsel , nor do counsel vent ur e t o expl ai n how al t er i ng
t he raw numbers i n t hi s way woul d pr oduce any mater i al di f f erence
i n t he pl ai nt i f f s' ul t i mat e st at i st i cal r esul t s. Thi s ar gument
al so l acks any l ogi cal f oundat i on t hat we can i dent i f y wi t hout t he
benef i t of exper t t est i mony. The pl ai nt i f f s i dent i f y as t he
chal l enged empl oyment pr act i ce, and t her ef or e subj ect t o
st at i st i cal anal ysi s, t he t est used t o i dent i f y whi ch of f i cer s have
used dr ugs, i . e. , t he t est used t o i dent i f y whi ch of f i cer s wi l l
have t o choose bet ween t er mi nat i on and a suspensi on/ r ehabi l i t at i on
r egi men. The pl ai nt i f f s must show, t hen, t hat t hi s sel ect i on
pr ocess pr oduces i dent i f i cat i ons t hat ar e not r andoml y di st r i but ed
by r ace. The accur acy of t hat i dent i f i cat i on pr ocess, as
det er mi ned ex post , i s a di f f er ent mat t er , per haps r el evant t o the
busi ness necessi t y def ense as di scussed bel ow, but not r el evant t o
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t he st at i st i cal showi ng of a di spar at e i mpact i n t he
i dent i f i cat i ons themsel ves. 10
Second, t he depar t ment ar gues t hat pl ai nt i f f Cl ar ar i se
Br i st ow cannot r el y on t he st at i st i cal anal ysi s of t he out comes of
hai r t est i ng f or depar t ment empl oyees because she was not an
empl oyee. Rat her , she r ecei ved a condi t i onal of f er of empl oyment ,
but t hat of f er was ret r act ed when she f ai l ed a dr ug t est . Whi l e
t hi s di f f er ence i s mat er i al t o our anal ysi s of Br i st ow' s due
pr ocess cl ai m, her st at us as a t est ed appl i cant r at her t han a
t est ed of f i cer , as descr i bed by t he depar t ment , i s i mmat er i al t o
her di spar at e i mpact cl ai m. She t ook t he same hai r t est as t hat
gi ven t o t he i ncumbent of f i cer s. The onl y di f f er ence ci t ed by t he
depar t ment - - t hat she was not el i gi bl e f or r ehab when she f ai l ed t he
t est - - i s not a di f f er ence t hat woul d pl ausi bl y af f ect appl i cat i on
of t he hai r t est t o her . Gi ven t hat t he depar t ment cl ai ms no ot her
r espect i n whi ch Br i st ow i s not si mi l ar l y si t uat ed t o t hose ot her
peopl e who wer e t est ed, t her e i s no basi s f or pr ecl udi ng her f r om
r el yi ng on t he pl ai nt i f f s ' stat i st i cal anal ysi s r egar di ng t he
i mpact of t he test she took.
Thi r d, t he depar t ment obj ect s t o t he pl ai nt i f f s'
aggr egat i on of dat a f r omt he f i r st ei ght year s of t he dr ug t est i ng
10 For t he same r eason, we r ej ect t he depar t ment ' s argumentt hat i t s evi dence of t he r el i abi l i t y of hai r t est i ng, i f accept edby t he f act f i nder , woul d pr ecl ude t he pl ai nt i f f s f r om even maki nga pr i ma f aci e showi ng of a st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant di spar i t y.
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pr ogr am. Some f or m of aggr egat i on ( al bei t cer t ai nl y not cover i ng
al l ei ght year s) may be necessary to sust ai n t he cl ai ms of t hose
pl ai nt i f f s who t est ed posi t i ve i n a year i n whi ch t he di spar i t y was
not st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant when l ooki ng at t he dat a f r om t hat
year al one. The depar t ment says t hat any aggr egat i on was i mpr oper
because many of t he same i ndi vi dual s wer e t est ed i n di f f er ent
year s, cut t i ng agai nst any assumpt i on t hat t he t est r esul t s f or t he
di f f er ent year s wer e i ndependent event s. Af t er not r ai si ng t hi s
argument i n i t s memorandum support i ng i t s mot i on f or summary
j udgment i n t he di st r i ct cour t , t he depar t ment now rel i es sol el y on
a vague, one- sent ence f oot not e f r oman exper t r epor t , whi ch of f er s
no anal ysi s of t he act ual magni t ude and ef f ect of t he cl ai med l ack
of i ndependence i n year - t o- year r esul t s. What ever t he mer i t of
t hi s argument , 11 t he depar t ment di d not suf f i ci ent l y devel op i t i n
t he di st r i ct cour t t o r el y on i t now.
Apar t f r om f l oat i ng on appeal t he t hr ee f or egoi ng
argument s t hat we f i nd i nadequatel y support ed and pr eser ved, t he
depar t ment r ai ses no ot her basi s f or quest i oni ng t he exi st ence of
a st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant cor r el at i on bet ween r ace and dr ug t est
r esul t s f or depar t ment empl oyees. Whi l e an ami cus br i ef quest i ons
11 A demonst r at i on t hat t he st at i st i cal anal ysi s was skewedby a l ack of i ndependence i n t he year - t o- year sampl es woul d becompl ex, i mpl i cat i ng such f act or s as l ayof f and hi r i ng pr act i cesand t he pr obabi l i t y t hat a person who t est ed negat i ve i n one yearwi l l t est negat i ve i n a l at er year , as compar ed t o t he pr obabi l i t yof a negat i ve r esul t f or someone f i r st t est ed i n t he l at er year .
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whet her t he st at i st i cal anal ysi s consi der ed and addr essed possi bl e
conf oundi ng var i abl es ( such as, f or exampl e, age) t he depar t ment ' s
exper t s make no at t empt t o expl ai n away t he di f f erent i al s on such
gr ounds, nor does t he depar t ment argue t hat such an expl anat i on
coul d negat e a pr i ma f aci e showi ng of di spar at e i mpact . Rat her ,
t he depar t ment ' s r ebut t al t o t he pl ai nt i f f s' pr i ma f aci e showi ng
r est s on t he ar gument adopt ed by t he di st r i ct cour t : even a showi ng
of a s tat i s t i cal l y s i gni f i cant di spar i t y i s i nsuf f i ci ent i f t he
si ze of t he i mpact i s not suf f i ci ent l y l ar ge, or " pr acti cal l y
si gni f i cant , " as measur ed by t he so- cal l ed f our - f i f t hs r ul e. We
di scuss t hat ar gument i n t he next sect i on of t hi s opi ni on.
2. Title VII does not require plaintiffs to prove that
the observed differential is "practically
significant" in order to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact.
We t urn now t o t he depar t ment ' s argument , adopt ed by t he
di str i ct cour t , t hat even a st at i st i cal l y s i gni f i cant r aci al skew
i n out comes does not const i t ut e a di spar at e i mpact unl ess t he
raci al di f f erent i al i s al so suf f i ci ent l y l arge, or "pract i cal l y
si gni f i cant . " The depar t ment cor r ect l y poi nt s out t hat , wi t h a
l ar ge enough set of dat a, even ver y smal l di f f er ences can be
st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant . See FJ C Ref er ence Manual at 252. For
exampl e, i f you wer e t o f l i p a coi n a mi l l i on t i mes, and t he coi n
wer e t o l and on t ai l s exact l y 50. 1%of t he t i me, t he devi at i on f r om
t he expect ed r esul t of 50% t ai l s and 50% heads woul d be
st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant , even t hough i t amount s t o j ust one f l i p
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per t housand. Recogni zi ng t hi s possi bi l i t y, stat i st i ci ans
acknowl edge t hat not al l st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant r esul t s ar e
pr act i cal l y si gni f i cant , meani ng "pr act i cal l y meani ngf ul or
i mpor t ant . " E. g. , Xi t ao Fan, St at i st i cal Si gni f i cance and Ef f ect
Si ze i n Educat i on Resear ch: Two Si des of a Coi n, 94 J . Educ. Res.
275, 277 ( 2001) . Accor di ng t o t he Feder al J udi ci al Cent er ' s
r ef er ence manual on sci ent i f i c evi dence, " [ w] hen pr act i cal
si gni f i cance i s l acki ng- - when t he si ze of a di spar i t y i s
negl i gi bl e- - t her e i s no r eason t o wor r y about st at i st i cal
si gni f i cance. " FJ C Ref er ence Manual at 252.
The depar t ment t her ef or e ar gues t hat cour t s i n di spar at e
i mpact cases shoul d ask not si mpl y whet her a di spar i t y i s
nonr andom, but al so whet her i t i s suf f i ci ent l y l ar ge. Under t hi s
vi ew, l i abi l i t y may not be j ust i f i ed, f or exampl e, wher e a pr ogr am
gr ant s promot i ons t o 9. 1% of bl ack empl oyees and 9. 9% of whi t e
empl oyees, even i f t he i mbal ance i s st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant . Cf .
Wai some v. Por t Aut h. of N. Y. & N. J . , 948 F. 2d 1370, 1376 ( 2d Ci r .
1991) ( f i ndi ng no di spar at e i mpact wher e, " t hough t he di spar i t y was
f ound t o be stat i st i cal l y s i gni f i cant , i t was of l i mi t ed
magni t ude") .
As a gauge f or measur i ng pr act i cal si gni f i cance, t he
depar t ment pr oposes t he " f our - f i f t hs r ul e, " a r ul e of t humb
devel oped by the Equal Empl oyment Oppor t uni t y Commi ssi on ( EEOC) .
The f our - f i f t hs r ul e provi des t hat wher e an empl oyment pract i ce
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r esul t s i n a "sel ect i on r at e" f or any r aci al gr oup l ess t han f our -
f i f t hs of t he "sel ecti on r at e" f or anot her gr oup, t hese st at i st i cs
"wi l l gener al l y be regar ded by [ f ] eder al enf or cement agenci es as
evi dence of " di spar at e i mpact . 29 C. F. R. 1607. 4( D) . 12 For
exampl e, i f an empl oyer hi r es 14% of bl ack appl i cant s and 20% of
whi t e appl i cant s, t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e woul d i ndi cat e a di spar at e
i mpact , because f our t een i s l ess t han f our - f i f t hs of t went y.
The di st r i ct cour t l ar gel y adopt ed t he depar t ment ' s
posi t i on. The cour t concl uded t hat a st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant
i mbal ance does not aut omat i cal l y const i t ut e di spar at e i mpact wher e
12 The r egul at i on pr ovi des i n r el evant par t :
A sel ect i on r at e f or any r ace, sex, or et hni cgr oup whi ch i s l ess t han f our - f i f t hs ( 4/ 5) ( orei ght y per cent ) of t he r at e f or t he gr oup wi t ht he hi ghest r at e wi l l gener al l y be regar ded byt he Federal enf orcement agenci es as evi dence ofadver se i mpact , whi l e a gr eat er t han f our - f i f t hsr at e wi l l gener al l y not be regar ded by Feder alenf orcement agenci es as evi dence of adver sei mpact . Smal l er di f f er ences i n sel ect i on r at e maynever t hel ess const i t ut e adver se i mpact , wher et hey ar e si gni f i cant i n bot h st at i st i cal andpr act i cal t er ms or wher e a user ' s act i ons havedi scour aged appl i cant s di spr opor t i onat el y ongr ounds of r ace, sex, or et hni c gr oup. Gr eat erdi f f er ences i n sel ect i on r at e may not const i t ut e
adver se i mpact where the di f f erences are based onsmal l number s and ar e not st at i st i cal l ysi gni f i cant , or wher e speci al r ecrui t i ng or ot herpr ogr ams cause t he pool of mi nor i t y or f emal ecandi dat es t o be at ypi cal of t he nor mal pool ofappl i cant s f r om t hat gr oup. . . .
29 C. F. R. 1607. 4( D) .
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pr act i cal s i gni f i cance i s l acki ng, r el yi ng on t he f our - f i f t hs rul e
as a measur e of pr act i cal si gni f i cance.
I n advocat i ng f or t he adopt i on of a pr act i cal
si gni f i cance r equi r ement , t he depar t ment does not pr ess any
ar gument based on t he t ext of Ti t l e VI I . I ndeed, t he st at ut or y
l anguage pr ovi des l i t t l e ai d i n deci di ng whet her a nonr andom
di f f er ence i s enough t o make a pr i ma f aci e showi ng of di spar at e
i mpact , or whet her t he di f f er ence must be l ar ge. For exampl e,
Mer r i am Webst er ' s di ct i onar y def i nes "di spar at e" by usi ng t er ms
such as " f undament al l y di f f er ent " and "mar kedl y di st i nct , " yet i t
al so l i st s as a synonym "di f f er ent . " Webst er ' s New Col l egi at e
Di ct i onar y 329 ( 8t h ed. 1977) ; Mer r i am- Webst er ' s Col l egi at e
Di ct i onar y 360 ( 11t h ed. 2003) ( of f er i ng t he same def i ni t i ons and
synonym) . The spar se and di vi ded case l aw f r omot her ci r cui t s al so
f ai l s t o of f er any cl ear answer s. 13
Sever al f act or s never t hel ess do f avor t he di st r i ct
cour t ' s concl usi on t hat t he si ze of a r ace- based di f f er ent i al i n
out comes mat t ers, i n some manner , i n assessi ng di spar ate i mpact
cl ai ms. Of under st andabl e i mpor t ance t o t he di st r i ct cour t , t he
EEOC' s gui del i nes ar e r easonabl y read as i nt er pr et i ng Ti t l e VI I t o
13 The var i ous appr oaches of t he ot her ci r cui t s i s ref l ect edi n t he cases ci t ed i n f oot not e 9 above, as wel l as Wai some, 948F. 2d at 1376, and Apsl ey v. Boei ng Co. , 691 F. 3d 1184, 1200- 01( 10t h Ci r . 2012) .
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i ncl ude a pr act i cal si gni f i cance r equi r ement . 14 Whi l e t he agency' s
f our - f i f t hs rul e i t sel f has sever al si gni f i cant weaknesses, whi ch
we di scuss bel ow, t he r egul at i on est abl i shi ng t he r ul e shows t hat
t he commi ssi on vi ews pr act i cal si gni f i cance, al ong wi t h st at i st i cal
si gni f i cance, as r el evant i n i dent i f yi ng a di spar at e i mpact . 29
C. F. R. 1607. 4( D) . Si mi l ar l y, t he r egul at i on pr ovi des t hat
di spar i t i es f ai l i ng t o sat i sf y t he f our - f i f t hs rul e may
never t hel ess const i t ut e di spar at e i mpact "wher e they ar e
si gni f i cant i n bot h st at i st i cal and pr acti cal t er ms. " I d.
Second, ver y smal l i mpact s are unl i kel y t o be the pr oduct
of i nt ent i onal di scr i mi nat i on. Whi l e pr oof of a di spar at e i mpact
cl ai m r equi r es no pr oof of i nt ent i onal di scr i mi nat i on, t he
di spar at e i mpact t heor y never t hel ess serves, i n par t , t o r oot out
hi dden i nt ent i onal di scr i mi nat i on. See Ri char d Pr i mus, Equal
Protect i on and Di spar at e I mpact , 117 Har v. L. Rev. 493, 498- 99,
520- 21 ( 2003) . I n a case i n whi ch a r aci al di spar i t y i s so smal l
as t o be near l y i mper cept i bl e wi t hout det ai l ed st at i st i cal
anal ysi s, t he l i kel i hood t hat t he di spar i t y r eveal s a hi dden i nt ent
t o di scr i mi nat e i s cor r espondi ngl y smal l . Mor eover , ef f or t s t o
el i mi nate smal l i mpact s may pr ove count erpr oduct i ve due t o t he
14 Because "Congr ess, i n enact i ng Ti t l e VI I , di d not conf erupon t he EEOC aut hor i t y t o pr omul gat e rul es or r egul at i ons, " t heagency' s gui del i nes r ecei ve wei ght onl y t o t he ext ent of t hei r"power t o per suade. " E. E. O. C. v. Ar abi an Am. Oi l Co. , 499 U. S.244, 257 ( 1991) .
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di f f i cul t y of concl udi ng wi t h conf i dence t hat an al t er nat i ve
pr act i ce wi l l t r ul y l essen t he al r eady smal l ef f ect .
Acknowl edgi ng the f oregoi ng ar gument s f avor i ng a
r equi r ement t hat a di f f er ence i n r esul t s associ at ed wi t h r ace be
pr act i cal l y s i gni f i cant and not onl y stat i st i cal l y s i gni f i cant , we
al so conf r ont powerf ul pr agmat i c ar gument s agai nst adopt i ng such a
r equi r ement . To begi n, t he concept of pr act i cal si gni f i cance i s
i mpossi bl e t o def i ne i n even a r emotel y pr eci se manner . We are
awar e of no test gener al l y accept ed by st at i st i ci ans t hat we mi ght
empl oy t o gauge pr act i cal si gni f i cance ( as we empl oy, f or exampl e,
t he not i on t hat a p- val ue l ess t han f i ve per cent pr ovi des good
r eason t o pr esume t hat a di f f er ence i n out comes i s not t he r esul t
of chance) . Wi t h no obj ect i ve measur e of pr act i cal si gni f i cance,
t he l abel may mean t hat si mpl y t he person appl yi ng i t vi ews a
di spar i t y as subst ant i al enough t hat a pl ai nt i f f ought t o be abl e
t o sue over i t . Cour t s woul d f i nd i t di f f i cul t t o appl y such an
el usi ve, know- i t - when- you- see- i t st andar d, l et al one i nst r uct a
j ury on how t o do so, and par t i es may f i nd i t i mpossi bl e t o predi ct
r esul t s .
Thi s case i l l ust r at es t hese di f f i cul t i es. I n t r yi ng t o
f i nd a measur e of pr act i cal si gni f i cance, t he di st r i ct cour t t ur ned
t o t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e. Al t hough t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e may ser ve
as a hel pf ul benchmark i n cer t ai n ci r cumst ances, both t he Supr eme
Cour t and t he EEOC have emphasi zed t hat cour t s shoul d not t r eat t he
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r ul e as gener al l y deci si ve. See Wat son v. For t Wor t h Bank & Trust ,
487 U. S. 977, 995 ( 1988) ( not i ng t hat t he r ul e "has been cr i t i ci zed
on t echni cal gr ounds . . . and has not pr ovi ded mor e than a rul e of
t humb f or cour t s" ) ; 44 Fed. Reg. 11996- 01 ( expl ai ni ng t hat t he r ul e
was " not i nt ended as a l egal def i ni t i on" and was " not i nt ended t o
be cont r ol l i ng i n al l ci r cumst ances") . We pr evi ousl y r ej ect ed
r el i ance on t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e by a pl ai nt i f f i n a case i n whi ch
t he sampl e si ze was smal l , descr i bi ng t he rul e as " not an accur at e
t est of di scr i mi nat or y i mpact . " Fudge v. Ci t y of Pr ovi dence Fi r e
Dep' t , 766 F. 2d 650, 658 n. 10 ( 1st Ci r . 1985) . And our s i st er
ci r cui t s have bot h mi ni mi zed t he i mpor t ance of f our - f i f t hs r ul e and
cr i t i ci zed i t di r ect l y. See, e. g. , St agi v. Nat ' l R. R. Passenger
Cor p. , 391 F. App' x 133, 138 ( 3d Ci r . 2010) ( unpubl i shed) ( " [ T] he
' f our - f i f t hs rul e' has come under subst ant i al cr i t i ci sm, and has
not been par t i cul ar l y per suasi ve. " ) ; Cl ady v. Los Angel es Cnt y. ,
770 F. 2d 1421, 1428 ( 9t h Ci r . 1985) ( " [ T]he 80 per cent r ul e has
been shar pl y cr i t i ci zed by cour t s and comment at or s. " ) .
The f our - f i f t hs r ul e can l ead t o anomal ous r esul t s. As
an i l l ust r at i on, i magi ne that a pol i ce depar t ment demogr aphi cal l y
si mi l ar t o t he Bost on Pol i ce Depar t ment - - wi t h appr oxi mat el y 500
bl ack of f i cer s and 1200 whi t e of f i cer s- - i mpl ement s a pol i cy l eadi ng
t o t he t er mi nat i on of 90 bl ack of f i cer s and no whi t e of f i cer s. I f
t he "sel ect i on r at e" i s t aken t o be the r at e at whi ch empl oyees
sur vi ved t er mi nat i on, cf . EEOC v. J oi nt Appr ent i ceshi p Comm. of
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J oi nt Bd. of El ec. I ndus. , 164 F. 3d 89, 97 ( 2d Ci r . 1998)
( sel ect i on r at e i s t he r at e at whi ch appl i cant s pass a hi r i ng
r equi r ement ) , t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e det ect s no di spar at e i mpact : 82%
of bl ack empl oyees sur vi ved, whi ch i s mor e t han f our - f i f t hs of
100%, t he r at e at whi ch whi t e empl oyees sur vi ved. Yet t he pol i cy
i n t hi s hypot het i cal i l l ust r at i on undoubt edl y has a ver y
si gni f i cant and di spr opor t i onat e ef f ect on bl ack of f i cer s.
Thi s i l l ust r at i on hi ghl i ght s several f l aws i n t he f our -
f i f t hs r ul e. Fi r st , t o appl y t he r ul e i n cases i nvol vi ng t he
sel ect i on of cur r ent empl oyees f or empl oyment consequences such as
t er mi nat i on, cour t s must r esol ve the rul e' s ambi gui t y regar di ng
whet her t he "sel ect i on r at e" i s t he r at e at whi ch empl oyees wer e
sel ect ed f or t er mi nat i on or t he rat e at whi ch empl oyees sur vi ved
t er mi nat i on. 15 Thi s choi ce can be deci si ve. I n t he above exampl e,
i f a cour t t ook the "sel ect i on r at e" as t he r at e at whi ch empl oyees
wer e f i r ed, t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e woul d i ndi cat e a di spar at e i mpact ,
because the 0% f i r i ng r at e f or whi t e empl oyees i s l ess t han f our -
f i f t hs of t he 18% f i r i ng r at e f or bl ack empl oyees. Const r ui ng t he
f our - f i f t hs r ul e i n t hi s manner , however , woul d l ead t o a di f f er ent
15 The same di l emma can occur i n cases i nvol vi ng hi r i ng.Consi der an empl oyer who consi ders onl y j ob appl i cant s who have
never been convi ct ed of a cr i me: t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e does notspeci f y whet her t he "sel ect i on r at e" shoul d be t he r at e at whi chappl i cant s ar e excl uded f r omconsi der at i on, or t he r at e at t hey ar ei ncl uded. See Gr een v. Mi ssour i Pac. R. R. Co. , 523 F. 2d 1290, 1295( 8t h Ci r . 1975) ( choosi ng t he f or mer appr oach, bef or e t he f our -f i f t hs r ul e was pr omul gat ed) .
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pr obl em: t he rul e woul d det ect a di spar at e i mpact even i f j ust one
empl oyee wer e f i r ed ( a 0/ 1200 f i r i ng r at e f or whi t e empl oyees woul d
be l ess t han f our - f i f t hs of a 1/ 500 f i r i ng r at e f or bl ack
empl oyees) , a r esul t t hat seems cl ear l y i ncor r ect .
Second, and r el at edl y, t he consequences of t he f our -
f i f t hs r ul e var y i n a seemi ngl y ar bi t r ar y way dependi ng on t he
magni t ude of t he sel ect i on r ates at i ssue. I n t he exampl e above,
t he pol i cy l eads t o t he f i r i ng of 90 bl ack of f i cer s, or 18% of t he
popul at i on of bl ack empl oyees, but t hi s di spar i t y i s not act i onabl e
under t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e. Yet , i f t he pol i ce depar t ment pr ovi ded
a r ai se t o j ust 1% of i t s whi t e empl oyees ( 12 of 1200 empl oyees)
and 0. 6% of i t s bl ack empl oyees ( 3 of 500 bl ack empl oyees) , t hi s
woul d qual i f y as act i onabl e di spar at e i mpact under t he f our - f i f t hs
r ul e, even though vast l y f ewer bl ack empl oyees were af f ect ed (and
l ess sever el y) t han i n t he or i gi nal scenar i o.
Conver sel y, t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e makes no di st i nct i on
bet ween an empl oyment pr act i ce t hat l eads t o t he f i r i ng of one of
ni ne bl ack empl oyees and a pr act i ce t hat l eads t o t he f i r i ng of 100
of 900 bl ack empl oyees. I n ei t her case, t he same percent age of
bl ack empl oyees i s af f ect ed. Yet , t he l ar ger sampl e per mi t s a much
st r onger i nf er ence t hat a di spar i t y i s non- r andom and can be
expect ed t o per si st t hr ough f ut ur e uses of t he pr act i ce.
Not wi t hst andi ng t hese l i mi t at i ons, t he f our - f i f t hs rul e
may ser ve i mpor t ant needs i n gui di ng t he exer ci se of agency
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di scr et i on, or i n ser vi ng as a hel pf ul r ul e of t humb f or empl oyer s
not want i ng t o per f or m mor e expansi ve st at i st i cal exami nat i ons. 16
The r ul e i t sel f has some pract i cal ut i l i t y. Ther e i s si mpl y
not hi ng i n t hat ut i l i t y, however , t o j ust i f y af f or di ng deci si ve
wei ght t o t he r ul e t o negat e or est abl i sh pr oof of di spar at e i mpact
i n a Ti t l e VI I case. Havi ng pr evi ousl y r ej ected a pl ai nt i f f ' s
r el i ance on t he f our - f i f t hs r ul e wher e a smal l sampl e si ze
pr ecl uded a showi ng of st at i st i cal si gni f i cance, Fudge, 766 F. 2d at
658 n. 10, we r ej ect her e t he def endant ' s r el i ance on t he f our -
f i f t hs r ul e t o par r y a pr oper st at i st i cal pr oof of a nonr andom
di st r i but i on i n a case wi t h a l ar ge sampl e si ze.
Our r ej ecti on of t he f our - f i f t hs rul e as sui t abl e t o
t r ump a showi ng of st at i st i cal si gni f i cance l eaves us wi t h no
st at ut e, r egul at i on, or case l aw pr oposi ng any ot her mat hemat i cal
measur e of pr act i cal si gni f i cance. Nor as a mat t er of t heor y woul d
we expect t o f i nd any si ngl e measure of t he si ze of t he i mpact t o
det er mi ne i t s pr act i cal si gni f i cance. To f ul l y assess pr act i cal
si gni f i cance, one must consi der t he qual i t at i ve nat ur e and wei ght
of t he i mpact . See, e. g. , St eve Goodman, The Di r t y Dozen: Twel ve
16 The f act t hat t he f our - f i f t hs rul e i s onl y a r ul e of t humbt hat does not al ways work does not mean that i t can never pr ovi de
evi dence of a nonr andom di spar i t y. Thus, i n Ri cci v. DeSt ef ano,557 U. S. 557 ( 2009) , t he Supr eme Cour t coul d ci t e pass r ates of37. 5% f or bl ack and Hi spani c candi dat es and 64% f or whi t ecandi dat es as suppor t i ng what al l par t i es conceded was a di spar at ei mpact . I d.
at 586- 87. Not hi ng i n t hat ci t at i on suppor t ed use oft he test ( agai n descr i bed as a "r ul e of t humb") t o t r ump a mor esci ent i f i c cal cul at i on of t he act ual stat i st i cal devi at i on.
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P- Val ue Mi sconcept i ons, 45 Semi nars i n Hematol ogy 135, 136- 37
( 2008) . For exampl e, j ust a smal l per cent age i ncr ease i n mi l d si de
ef f ect s mi ght not r ender a dr ug unsaf e as compared t o an
al t er nat i ve dr ug, but t he same per cent age i ncr ease i n f at al i t i es
coul d wel l j ust i f y t he el i mi nat i on of t he dr ug. So, t oo, an
empl oyment pr act i ce t hat pr ovi des one par t of a mul t i - par t
pr omot i on t est has l ess pr act i cal i mpact on each empl oyee t han
does, f or exampl e, a pr act i ce t hat cal l s f or t he l abel i ng and
f i r i ng of pol i ce of f i cer s as i l l egal dr ug user s.
Ul t i mat el y, we f i nd any theor et i cal benef i t s of i nqui r i ng
as t o pr act i cal si gni f i cance out wei ghed by t he di f f i cul t y of doi ng
so i n pr act i ce i n any pr i nci pl ed and pr edi ct abl e manner . We
t her ef or e concl ude t hat a pl ai nt i f f ' s f ai l ur e t o demonst r at e
pr acti cal si gni f i cance cannot pr ecl ude t hat pl ai nt i f f f r omr el yi ng
on compet ent evi dence of st at i st i cal si gni f i cance t o est abl i sh a
pr i ma f aci e case of di spar at e i mpact .
Our conf i dence i n r ej ect i ng a pr act i cal si gni f i cance
r equi r ement i s bol st er ed by the f act t hat t wo ot her r equi r ement s t o
be met by a pl ai nt i f f i n a Ti t l e VI I di spar at e i mpact case
i ndi r ect l y secur e most of t he advant ages t hat mi ght be gai ned wer e
i t possi bl e t o f ashi on a pr i nci pl ed and pr edi ctabl e di r ect t est of
pr act i cal si gni f i cance. Fi r st , t he ver y need t o show st at i st i cal
si gni f i cance wi l l el i mi nat e smal l i mpact s as f odder f or l i t i gat i on
i n many i nst ances because pr ovi ng t hat a smal l i mpact i s
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st at i st i cal l y si gni f i cant gener al l y requi r es l ar ge sampl e si zes,
whi ch ar e of t en unavai l abl e. See, e. g. , Fudge, 766 F. 2d at 657- 59.
Second, even i n cases l i ke t hi s one, i n whi ch t he dat a i s
avai l abl e, t he subsequent st eps r equi r ed t o successf ul l y recover on
a di spar at e i mpact t heor y of f er an addi t i onal saf eguar d. An
empl oyer may rebut a pr i ma f aci e case of di spar ate i mpact by
showi ng t hat i t s use of t he chal l enged pr act i ce i s " j ob r el at ed f or
t he posi t i on i n quest i on and consi st ent wi t h busi ness necessi t y, "
42 U. S. C. 2000e- 2( k) ( 1) ( A) ( i ) , and a pl ai nt i f f can pr evai l i n t he
f ace of demonst r at ed busi ness necessi t y onl y by pr ovi ng a f ai l ur e
t o adopt an al t er nat i ve pr act i ce t hat woul d sat i sf y t he
depar t ment ' s l egi t i mat e busi ness needs "wi t hout a si mi l ar l y
undesi r abl e r aci al ef f ect . " Al bemar l e Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 425 ( 1979) . See 42 U. S. C. 2000e- 2( k) ( 1) ( c) ( adopt i ng case
l aw pr i or t o J une 4, 1989, "wi t h r espect t o t he concept of
' al t er nat i ve empl oyment pr act i ce' ") .
Pr ovi ng t hat an al t er nat i ve pr act i ce wi l l not have t he
i mpact i dent i f i ed by a pl ai nt i f f when t hat i mpact i s smal l l eaves
l i t t l e mar gi n f or er r or and wi l l of t en r equi r e ext ensi ve dat a. A
pl ai nt i f f who subj ect s a def endant ' s j ob- r el at ed pr act i ce t o t he
sensi t i vi t y of a l ar ge sampl e anal ysi s can f ai r l y be r equi r ed t o
show t hr ough st at i st i cal evi dence, and wi t h equal conf i dence, t hat
t he pr of f er ed al t er nat i ve pr act i ce wi l l have a smal l er i mpact ,
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except wher e the al t er nat i ve i s sel f - evi dent l y i ncapabl e of causi ng
a di f f er ent i al ( e. g. , a r andom sel ect i on t ool ) .
I n t hi s manner , t he st at ut e as desi gned by Congr ess
ef f ecti vel y assi gns case- speci f i c pr acti cal si gni f i cance t o t he
si ze of t he i mpact : as t he si ze of t he i mpact i ncr eases, so t oo
does t he ease of demonst r at i ng an al t er nat i ve pr act i ce t hat r educes
t he i mpact . And i t i s f i t t i ng t hat t hi s r el at i onshi p exi st s most
r obust l y onl y wher e the chal l enged pr act i ce can be j ust i f i ed by
busi ness necessi t y. Wher e such necessi t y does not exi st , most of
t he r easons f avor i ng some r equi r ement of pr act i cal si gni f i cance
di sappear . I n ot her wor ds, i f a pr act i ce f ai l s t o ser ve a
suf f i ci ent busi ness need, why r et ai n i t mer el y because t he number
of peopl e harmed i s smal l ?
Because we have r ej ected both t he depart ment ' s l i mi t ed
chal l enge t o t he pl ai nt i f f s' showi ng of st at i st i cal si gni f i cance
and t he depar t ment ' s advocacy of a pr act i cal si gni f i cance
r equi r ement , we see no r emai ni ng i ssue of f act t hat coul d per mi t a
r easonabl e j ur y t o r ej ect t he pl ai nt i f f s' pr i ma f aci e pr oof of
di spar at e i mpact . We t her ef or e r ever se t he di st r i ct cour t ' s
deci si on t o deny par t i al summar y j udgment t o t he pl ai nt i f f s on t hat
component of t hei r Ti t l e VI I di spar at e i mpact case.
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3. We decline to decide in the first instance whether
the drug testing program is "job-related . . . and
consistent with business necessity" and whether the
plaintiffs have offered an adequate alternative.
Once a pl ai nt i f f has made a pr i ma f aci e showi ng of a
di spar at e i mpact , t he bur den shi f t s t o the empl oyer t o show t hat
"t he chal l enged pr act i ce i s j ob r el at ed f or t he posi t i on i n
quest i on and consi st ent wi t h busi ness necessi t y. " 42 U. S. C.
2000e- 2( k) ( 1) ( A) ( i ) . I f t he empl oyer makes such a showi ng, a
pl ai nt i f f has one f i nal pat h t o success, by pr ovi ng t he exi st ence
of an "al t er nat i ve empl oyment pr act i ce, " 42 U. S. C. 2000e-2( k) ( 1) ( A) ( i i ) , def i ned i n case l aw as a di f f er ent "t est or
sel ecti on devi ce[ ] , wi t hout a si mi l ar l y undesi r abl e r aci al ef f ect, "
whi ch "al so ser ve[ s] t he empl oyer ' s l egi t i mat e i nt er est . . . . , "
Al bemar l e Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425 ( 1975) . I f a
pl ai nt i f f makes such a showi ng, and the empl oyer " r ef uses t o adopt
such al t er nat i ve empl oyment pr act i ce, " t hen t he pl ai nt i f f pr evai l s.
42 U. S. C. 2000e- 2( k) ( 1) ( A) ( i i ) .
The depar t ment i nvi t es us t o consi der on t hi s appeal
whet her i t has est abl i shed t hat i t s hai r t est i ng pr ogr amsat i sf i es
t he busi ness necessi t y def ense under t he di spar at e i mpact
pr ovi si ons of Ti t l e VI I . Supr eme Cour t deci si ons i l l ust r at e t hat
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t he def ense has t wo mai n component s. 17 Fi r st , t he depar t ment must
show t hat i t s pr ogr am ai ms t o measur e a char act er i st i c t hat
const i t ut es an " i mpor t ant el ement [ ] of wor k behavi or . " Al bemar l e
Paper Co. , 422 U. S. at 431; see al so Dot har d v. Rawl i nson, 433 U. S.
321, 331 ( 1977) ( hol di ng t hat an empl oyer sat i sf i ed t hi s
r equi r ement by showi ng that t he chal l enged pr act i ce measured a
char act er i st i c "essent i al t o ef f ect i ve j ob per f or mance") . Second,
t he depar t ment must show t hat t he out comes of t he dr ug t est i ng
pr ogr am ar e "pr edi ct i ve of or si gni f i cant l y cor r el at ed wi t h" t he
char act er i st i c descr i bed above. Al bemar l e Paper Co. , 422 U. S. at
431. 18
Her e, t he pl ai nt i f f s have not di sput ed t hat abst ent i on
f r om i l l egal dr ug use i s an i mpor t ant el ement of pol i ce of f i cer
behavi or . They have admi t t ed t hat t he depart ment has a " l egi t i mate
pur pose of ensur i ng a dr ug- f r ee workpl ace. " What r emai ns t o be
det er mi ned, t hen, i s whet her t he resul t s of t he depar t ment ' s drug
t est i ng r egi me ar e "pr edi ct i ve of or si gni f i cant l y cor r el at ed wi t h"
17 Accor di ng t o t he "Pur poses" sect i on of t he 1991 st at ut et hat added t he di spar at e i mpact pr ovi si on t o Ti t l e VI I , Congr essai med t o "codi f y the concept s of ' busi ness necessi t y' and ' j obr el at ed' enunci at ed by the Supr eme Cour t i n Gr i ggs . . . and i nother Supr eme Cour t deci si ons pr i or t o Wards Cove Packi ng Co.[ deci ded i n 1989] . " Pub L. No. 102- 166, 3( 2) , 105 St at . 1071,
1071 (1991) .
18 Our ar t i cul at i on of t hi s t wo- par t t est i s subst ant i al l y t hesame as t he t hr ee- par t i nqui r y adopt ed by t he Ni nt h Ci r cui t . SeeAssoci at i on of Mexi can- Am. Educat or s v. Cal i f or ni a, 231 F. 3d 572,585 ( 9t h Ci r . 2000) ( en banc) .
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dr ug use. The pl ai nt i f f s have asser t ed t hat hai r t est i ng i s not
"suf f i ci ent l y r el i abl e t o be j ob- r el at ed and j ust i f i ed by busi ness
necessi t y. " But t hey have pr esent ed l i t t l e i f any evi dence t hat
coul d al l ow a j ur y t o concl ude t hat t he dr ug t est i s so unr el i abl e
t hat i t s r esul t s have no si gni f i cant cor r el at i on wi t h dr ug use.
I ndeed, even t hei r own evi dence, i f bel i eved, woul d of f er cause t o
quest i on t he accur acy of onl y some of t he repor t ed r esul t s, wi t hout
i ndi cat i ng t hat t her e i s a r el at i vel y l ar ge number of f al se
posi t i ves compar ed t o t he si ze of t he pol i ce f or ce. On t he ot her
hand, t he depar t ment , not t he pl ai nt i f f s, car r i es t he bur den t o
pr ove t hat t he pr ogr am' s r esul t s ar e si gni f i cant l y cor r el at ed wi t h
act ual dr ug use.
I n t hei r r epl y br i ef , t he pl ai nt i f f s ar gue t hat , f or t he
pur poses of pr ovi ng the busi ness necessi t y def ense, t he depar t ment
must separ at el y def end mor e than a dozen di f f er ent ver si ons of t he
t est used over ei ght year s. Such an ar gument f l i es i n t he f ace of
t he pl ai nt i f f s' posi t i on t hat mul t i pl e year s of t est r esul t s ar e
pr oper l y aggr egat ed as ar i si ng f r om a si ngl e pr act i ce i n
est abl i shi ng a pr i ma f aci e di spar at e i mpact cl ai m. See Fudge v.
Ci t y of Pr ovi dence Fi r e Dep' t , 766 F. 2d 650, 657 ( 1st Ci r . 1985) .
We rej ect t he pl ai nt i f f s' about - f ace as bot h unpr eser ved and
unf ai r l y i nconsi st ent wi t h t hei r assumpt i on t hat t hey wer e al l
subj ect ed t o a si ngl e chal l enged pr act i ce.
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Gi ven t hat t hi s case has al r eady spanned many year s ( as
di d t he post - t er mi nat i on admi ni st r at i ve pr ocess) , we ar e t empt ed t o
accept t he depar t ment ' s i nvi t at i on to assess whet her genui ne i ssues
of mat er i al f act r emai n concer ni ng i t s busi ness necessi t y def ense.
I n vi ew of t he si ze of t he r ecor d, t hough, and t he f act t hat t he
di st r i ct cour t j udge who has pr esi ded over t hi s case has not yet
par sed t hat r ecor d t o assess busi ness necessi t y or i t s r ej oi nder ,
we decl i ne t o do so i n t he f i r st i nst ance. Feder al appel l at e
cour t s have di scr et i on i n deci di ng whet her t o t ake up quest i ons not
consi der ed bel ow, but t hey gener al l y shoul d not do so. Si ngl et on
v. Wul f f , 428 U. S. 106, 120 ( 1976) . We see no r eason t o depar t
f r om t hat gener al pr act i ce her e. 19
Wi t h t he busi ness necessi t y quest i on l ef t open f or
f ur t her consi der at i on, we have no occasi on t o consi der whet her t he
pl ai nt i f f s' evi dence wi l l pr ove suf f i ci ent t o show t hat "t he
empl oyer r ef uses t o adopt an avai l abl e al t ernat i ve empl oyment
pr act i ce that has l ess di spar at e i mpact and serves t he empl oyer ' s
l egi t i mat e needs. " Ri cci v. DeSt ef ano, 557 U. S. 557, 578 ( 2009)
( ci t i ng 42 U. S. C. 2000e- 2( k) ( 1) ( A) ( i i ) and ( C) ) . We r ei t er at e,
however , our st at ement above concer ni ng the manner i n whi ch t he
19 I n decl i ni ng t o deci de t he i ssues i n t he f i r st i nst ance,we do not suggest t hat t he di st r i ct cour t must r eopen t he r ecor d t oal l ow f ur t her di scover y or exper t r epor t s. The di st r i ct cour tr etai ns i t s cust omary di scr et i on t o manage t he case, and we expectt hat i t wi l l gi ve due wei ght t o t he f act t hat each par t y hasal r eady had ampl e t i me t o put i t s best f oot f or ward.
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pl ai nt i f f s must pr ove t hat any such al t er nat i ve pr act i ce woul d
pr oduce a smal l er r aci al di spar i t y i n out comes t han does t he
depart ment ' s cur r ent syst em.
B. Due Process
The pl ai nt i f f s cont end t hat t he drug t est i ng progr amnot
onl y caused a di spar at e i mpact but al so vi ol at ed t hei r r i ght s under
t he Four t eent h Amendment of t he Uni t ed St ates Const i t ut i on. The
Due Pr ocess Cl ause of t he Four t eent h Amendment pr ohi bi t s st ates
f r om"depr i v[ i ng] any per son of l i f e, l i ber t y, or pr oper t y, wi t hout
due pr ocess of l aw. " The pl ai nt i f f s cont end t hat t hey wer e not
af f or ded suf f i ci ent pr ocess i n connect i on wi t h t hei r t er mi nat i ons
( or other adver se act i on agai nst t hem) , and seek damages under 42
U. S. C. 1983.
1. Nine of the plaintiffs had a constitutionally-protected interest in their employment.
When a publ i c empl oyee can be f i r ed onl y f or cause under
st at e l aw, t hat empl oyee has a pr oper t y i nt er est i n cont i nued
empl oyment . Gi l bert v. Homar, 520 U. S. 924, 928- 29 ( 1997) . Here,
t he depar t ment concedes t hat t he seven f i r ed pol i ce of f i cer s had a
pr oper t y i nt er est i n t hei r empl oyment . The depar t ment al so does
not di sput e t hat t he f i r ed cadet had a pr oper t y i nt er est i n her
empl oyment . And t he depar t ment does not di sput e t hat Rachel l e
Couch, who si gned t he set t l ement agr eement and cont i nues t o work
f or t he depar t ment , was depr i ved of a pr oper t y i nt er est , pr esumabl y
t he appr oxi matel y two mont hs of pay she l ost dur i ng her suspensi on.
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The depar t ment asser t s, however , t hat pl ai nt i f f
Cl ar ar i se Br i st ow had no i nt er est ent i t l i ng her t o due pr ocess. We
agr ee. Br i st ow was an appl i cant f or a posi t i on at t he depar t ment
who i n December 2002 r ecei ved a l et t er condi t i onal l y of f er i ng her
t he j ob. The l et t er r ead: " I f you successf ul l y pass t he medi cal
exami nat i on and hai r dr ug t est i ng component s of t he scr eeni ng
pr ocess, you wi l l be t ender ed a f i nal of f er of empl oyment . "
Thi s ci r cui t has not deci ded whet her a cont i ngent of f er
of empl oyment can cr eat e a pr opert y i nt erest under t he Due Pr ocess
Cl ause. I t i s cl ear , however , t hat t he i nt er est creat ed by a
condi t i onal j ob of f er can be no st r onger t han t hat cr eat ed by an
uncondi t i onal j ob of f er , and t hat t hi s i nt er est i n t ur n r i ses no
hi gher t han that possessed by someone who has r ecent l y begun work
i n t he posi t i on. Her e, t hi s l ogi c l eads t o t he concl usi on t hat
Br i st ow was not ent i t l ed t o due pr ocess.
I n Massachuset t s, publ i c worker s begi n t hei r empl oyment
wi t h a si x- mont h pr obat i onary per i od dur i ng whi ch t hey do not have
t he pr ot ect i on f r om t er mi nat i on wi t hout j ust cause af f or ded t o
t enured empl oyees. 20 See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, 34; Cost a
v. Bd. of Sel ect men, 377 Mass. 853, 859- 60 ( 1979) . Thus, had
20 We do not consi der whether the six-month probationaryperiod could have been or was supplanted under the terms of acollective bargaining agreement. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.150E, 7. The plaintiffs do not assert that Bristow would havebeen covered by a collective bargaining agreement that preemptedthe probationary period, nor have they submitted evidence thatcould support such an argument.
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Br i st ow r ecei ved an uncondi t i onal of f er of empl oyment , and i ndeed
begun wor k as an of f i cer , her j ob woul d have t er mi nabl e wi t h or
wi t hout cause f or si x mont hs. We have pr evi ousl y obser ved t hat
pr obat i onary empl oyees i n Massachuset t s do not have a pr opert y
i nt er est i n t hei r cont i nued empl oyment . See Br ennan v. Hendr i gan,
888 F. 2d 189, 195 ( 1st Ci r . 1989) ; see al so Dasey v Anderson, 304
F. 3d 148, 156- 61 ( 1st Ci r . 2002) . Consequent l y, even had Br i st ow
begun to work, she woul d have had no cogni zabl e pr opert y i nt erest
i n cont i nued empl oyment dur i ng t he ent i r et y of her pr obat i onar y
per i od. A f or t i or i , havi ng not begun wor k, Br i st ow al so had no
cogni zabl e pr oper t y i nt er est based on t he j ob of f er al one. We make
no comment on whet her t he condi t i onal of f er of a j ob not subj ect t o
a pr obat i on per i od mi ght , on ot her f act s, be suf f i ci ent t o gr ant a
due pr ocess ri ght t o i t s r eci pi ent .
2. The department provided sufficient process.
The Supreme Court has hel d t hat " [ t ] he f undamental
r equi r ement of due pr ocess i s t he oppor t uni t y t o be hear d at a
meani ngf ul t i me and i n a meani ngf ul manner . " Mathews v. El dr i dge,
424 U. S. 319, 333 ( 1976) ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) .
Al t hough the pr eci se cont our s of t hi s guar ant ee var y dependi ng on
t he ci r cumst ances, publ i c empl oyees ar e or di nar i l y ent i t l ed t o
not i ce of t he reasons f or a pr oposed t er mi nat i on, an expl anat i on of
t he evi dence suppor t i ng t hose r easons, and an oppor t uni t y t o gi ve
t hei r si de of t he st or y at a pr e- t er mi nat i on hear i ng. See
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Cl evel and Bd. of Educ. v. Louder mi l l , 470 U. S. 532, 546 ( 1985) ;
Cal der n- Gar ni er v. Rodr guez, 578 F. 3d 33, 38 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) .
When a st ate empl oyee i n t he ordi nar y cour se t ermi nates anot her
empl oyee who has a pr oper t y i nt er est i n hi s or her j ob, t he st at e
nor mal l y cannot sat i sf y due pr ocess sol el y t hr ough post - t er mi nat i on
pr ocess. See Louder mi l l , 470 U. S. at 542; Cot noi r v. Uni v. of
Mai ne Sys. , 35 F. 3d 6, 12 (1st Ci r . 1994) ( "Wher e an empl oyee i s
f i r ed i n vi ol at i on of hi s due pr ocess r i ght s, t he avai l abi l i t y of
post - t er mi nat i on gr i evance pr ocedur es wi l l not or di nar i l y cur e t he
vi ol at i on. " ) . As t he Supr eme Cour t has expl ai ned, a pr e-
t er mi nat i on hear i ng shoul d pr ovi de "a meani ngf ul oppor t uni t y t o
i nvoke t he di scr et i on of t he deci si onmaker , " bot h as t o t he f act s
suppor t i ng t he t er mi nat i on and as t o i t s br oader appr opr i at eness.
Louder mi l l , 470 U. S. at 543.
Her e, t her e i s no di sput e that empl oyees subj ect t o
t er mi nat i on f or a posi t i ve dr ug t est wer e of f er ed an oppor t uni t y to
cont est t hei r i mpendi ng f i r i ng at a pr e- t er mi nat i on di sci pl i nar y
hear i ng. Al t hough t he pl ai nt i f f s cl ai mt hat some of t hose who wer e
f i r ed never had such a hear i ng, t hey concede that al l wer e of f er ed
one. And, i ndeed, Massachuset t s st at e l aw mandat es t hat publ i c
empl oyees, bef or e bei ng f i r ed, r ecei ve not i ce of t he reasons f or
t hei r t er mi nat i on and t he oppor t uni t y t o pr ot est t hei r f i r i ng at an
evi dent i ar y hear i ng. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31, 41. Thi s st at ut or y
pr ocess al l owed empl oyees t o pr esent t hei r si de of t he st or y,
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t hr ough bot h t est i mony and evi dence, and even t o cr oss- exami ne
adver se wi t nesses. The pl ai nt i f f s l odge onl y one compl ai nt about
t he pr ocess, cl ai mi ng t hat some of t he f i r ed empl oyees wer e bar r ed
f r om pr esent i ng evi dence of dr ug t est s t aken by the empl oyees
out si de of t he depar t ment ' s progr am. I n one case, t he depar t ment ' s
chi ef hear i ng of f i cer r ef used t o accept r esul t s f r om an out si de
hai r t est i n par t because t her e was not suf f i ci ent i nf or mat i on
r egar di ng t he r el i abi l i t y of t he t est . She al so r ef used i n at
l east t wo cases t o accept r esul t s f r oma ur i ne t est , cal l i ng ur i ne
t est s and hai r t est s " appl es and or anges, " pr esumabl y because ur i ne
t est s have a much shor t er wi ndow of detect i on.
Whi l e we do not necessar i l y agr ee t hat t he evi dence was
unwor t hy of consi der at i on, we f i nd no const i t ut i onal vi ol at i on i n
i t s excl usi on. Even i n cr i mi nal t r i al s, t he st at e has some l eeway
i n cr af t i ng and appl yi ng r easonabl e evi dent i ar y r ul es. See Uni t ed
St at es v. Schef f er , 523 U. S. 303, 308 ( 1998) ; Mont ana v. Egel hof f ,
518 U. S. 37, 43 ( 1996) . The Supr eme Cour t has rul ed, f or exampl e,
t hat a st at e di d not vi ol at e t he Due Pr ocess Cl ause wher e i t bar r ed
a def endant accused of dr ug use f r om pr esent i ng a pol ygr aph t est
i ndi cat i ng t hat he t r ut hf ul l y deni ed t he char ge. See Schef f er , 523
U. S. at 312. The depart ment here was ent i t l ed t o make a si mi l ar
det er mi nat i on as t o evi dence t hat was poss i bl y excul pat or y but
ar guabl y unr el i abl e or i r r el evant .
Even i f excl usi on of t he evi dence r ose t o t he l evel of a
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const i t ut i onal vi ol at i on, t hat er r or woul d have been adequat el y
addr essed t hr ough t he ext ensi ve ci vi l ser vi ce appeal s pr ocess, i n
whi ch t ermi nated empl oyees were permi t t ed t o pr esent evi dence of
out si de dr ug t est s. Thi s pr ocess i nvol ved f ul l hear i ngs bef or e t he
i mpar t i al Massachuset t s Ci vi l Ser vi ce Commi ssi on. Al t hough we have
expl ai ned t hat some pr e- t er mi nat i on pr ocess i s r equi r ed bef or e t he
st at e f i r es an empl oyee, an ext ensi ve post - t er mi nat i on appeal
syst em l essens t he need f or an el abor at e pr e- t er mi nat i on pr ocess.
See Mard v. Town of Amherst , 350 F. 3d 184, 192 ( 1st Ci r . 2003)
( f i ndi ng a "l i mi t ed" pr e- t er mi nat i on hear i ng const i t ut i onal l y
suf f i ci ent gi ven "t he avai l abi l i t y of mor e r i gor ous post -
depr i vat i on pr ocedur es" ) . Toget her , t he pr e- t er mi nat i on
di sci pl i nar y hear i ngs and the post - t er mi nat i on appeal s pr ocess
easi l y sat i sf i ed t he st at e' s obl i gat i on t o pr ovi de due pr ocess. 21
Fi nal l y, t he di st r i ct cour t cor r ect l y gr ant ed summar y
j udgment on t he due process cl ai mof pl ai nt i f f Rachel l e Couch, t he
empl oyee who chose an unpai d suspensi on r ather t han t ermi nat i on.
21 The plaintiffs complain that the civil service appealsprocess took a long time, and indeed it did, as much as ten yearsfor some. Yet, the Civil Service Commission explained in anopinion applying to many of the plaintiffs that "the unusual delayin bringing these appeals to hearing is due, in significant part,to the decisions of the [employees]," for example in asking forcontinuances. We cannot find a constitutional flaw in delay where
the plaintiffs contributed significantly to that delay and do notattempt to demonstrate that any delay would have occurred absenttheir own decisions. The pl ai nt i f f s al so say t hat t wo of t he f i r edempl oyees "wer e not a par t of t he Ci vi l Ser vi ce Commi ssi onpr oceedi ngs, " but because t he pl ai nt i f f s do not pr ovi de any f ur t herexpl anat i on we must assume t hat t hi s l ack of par t i ci pat i on wasvol unt ar y.
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Our di scuss i on above demonst r at es t hat t he depar t ment woul d have
f ul f i l l ed i t s consti t ut i onal obl i gat i on t o Couch i f i t had s i mpl y
f i r ed her , f ol l owi ng i t s nor mal t er mi nat i on pr ocedur es. I nst ead,
t he depar t ment gave Couch a choi ce, al bei t a ver y di f f i cul t one.
The i nj ect i on of addi t i onal choi ces cannot conver t a const i t ut i onal
pr ocess i nt o an unconst i t ut i onal one.
C. Americans with Disabilities Act
The pl ai nt i f f s next cl ai mt hat t he depar t ment f i r ed t hem
( or subj ect ed t hemt o other adver se empl oyment act i on) on account
of an er r oneous per cept i on t hat t hey wer e dr ug addi ct s, t her eby
vi ol at i ng t he Amer i cans wi t h Di sabi l i t i es Act . The ADA pr ot ect s
i ndi vi dual s who have a "di sabi l i t y, " def i ned as a "physi cal or
ment al i mpai r ment t hat subst ant i al l y l i mi t s one or mor e maj or l i f e
act i vi t i es. " 42 U. S. C. 12102( 1) ( A) . The Act al so cover s t hose
who ar e regarded as havi ng a physi cal or ment al i mpai r ment , so l ong
as the per cei ved i mpai r ment i s not " t r ansi t or y and mi nor . " 42
U. S. C. 12102( 1) ( c) , ( 3) .
I ndi vi dual s who ar e r ecover i ng f r oman addi ct i on t o dr ugs
may be di sabl ed i n the meani ng of t he ADA, as t he st atut e ai ms t o
pr ot ect t hemf r omt he st i gma associ at ed wi t h t hei r addi ct i on. See
42 U. S. C. 12114( a) , ( b) ; cf . Bai l ey v. Geor gi a- Pac. Cor p. , 306
F. 3d 1162, 1167 ( 1st Ci r . 2002) ( hol di ng t hat "al cohol i sm i s an
i mpai r ment " under t he ADA) . Si mi l ar l y, t he ADA pr ot ect s t hose who
ar e er r oneousl y per cei ved as dr ug addi ct s. 42 U. S. C.
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12114( b) ( 3) , ( a) . I mpor t ant l y, t hough, t he st at ut e expl i ci t l y
excl udes f r om pr ot ect i on any i ndi vi dual who i s cur r ent l y usi ng
dr ugs, whether addi ct ed or not , when t he empl oyer act s on t he basi s
of such use. 42 U. S. C. 12114( a) . Al l of t hi s means, i n a
nut shel l , t hat i n or der t o sur vi ve summar y j udgment di smi ssi ng
t hei r cl ai m under t he ADA, t he pl ai nt i f f s must pr ovi de a f act ual
basi s upon whi ch t he j ur y coul d f i nd t hat t he depar t ment f i r ed t hem
ei t her because t hey wer e addi ct s or because i t per cei ved they wer e
addi ct s, r at her t han because, as a r esul t of t he dr ug t est s, i t
bel i eved t hem t o be cur r ent l y usi ng i l l egal dr ugs. See Rayt heon
Co. v. Her nandez, 540 U. S. 44, 52- 53 ( 2003) ( hol di ng t hat , i n a
di spar at e t r eat ment cl ai m under t he ADA such as t hi s one,
pl ai nt i f f s must show t hat t hei r per cei ved di sabi l i t y "act ual l y
mot i vat ed t he empl oyer ' s deci si on") . 22
The pl ai nt i f f s made no such showi ng. To t he cont r ar y,
t he evi dence i s t hat t he depar t ment t r ai ned i t s ef f or t s at di r ect l y
i dent i f yi ng user s, whet her addi ct s or not . And i f t he t est r esul t s
may have caused t he depar t ment t o f orm an er r oneous vi ew of any
pl ai nt i f f , t hat vi ew- - t o t he ext ent i t mot i vat ed t er mi nat i on- - was
t hat t he pl ai nt i f f was a dr ug user , not t hat t he pl ai nt i f f was an
addi ct . Nor di d t he depar t ment accept any def ense t hat an of f i cer
22 Al t hough t he di st i nct i on may be subt l e, t he pl ai nt i f f s donot al l ege a di spar at e i mpact cl ai m under t he ADA, even i f onemi ght have been avai l abl e. See Rayt heon, 540 U. S. at 52 ( maki ngcl ear t hat di spar at e i mpact cl ai ms can be pur sued under t he ADA) .
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45/48
used i l l egal dr ugs onl y once, or was other wi se not addi ct ed.
I ndeed, t he ver y exi st ence of t he rehabi l i t at i on pr ogr amshows t hat
t he depart ment was wi l l i ng t
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