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Page 1: Jay McClelland

Dynamical Models of Decision MakingOptimality, human performance, and

principles of neural information processing

Jay McClelland

Department of Psychology and Center for Mind Brain and Computation

Stanford University

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How do we make a decision given a marginal stimulus?

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An Abstract Statistical Theory(Random Walk or

Sequential Probability Ratio Test)• How do you decide if an urn contains more

black balls or white balls? – We assume you can only draw balls one at a time and want

to stop as soon as you have enough evidence to achieve a desired level of accuracy.

• Optimal policy:– Reach in and grab a ball– Keep track of difference between the # of black balls and

# of white balls.– Respond when the difference reaches a criterion value C.– Produces fastest decisions for specified level of accuracy

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The Drift Diffusion Model• Continuous version of the

SPRT• At each time step a small

random step is taken.• Mean direction of steps is

+m for one direction, –m for the other.

• When criterion is reached, respond.

• Alternatively, in ‘time controlled’ tasks, respond when signal is given.

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Two Problems with the DDM• Accuracy should gradually

improve toward ceiling levels, even for very hard discriminations, but this is not what is observed in human data.

• The model predicts correct and incorrect RT’s will have the same distribution, but incorrect RT’s are generally slower than correct RT’s.

Hard -> Easy

RT

Errors

CorrectResponses

Prob

. Cor

rect

Hard

Easy

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Two Solutions• Ratcliff (1978):

– Add between-trial variance in direction of drift.

• Usher & McClelland (2001): – Consider effects of leakage

and competition between evidence ‘accumulators’.

– The idea is based on properties of populations of neurons.

• Populations tend to compete

• Activity tends to decay away Activation of neurons responsive to

Selected vs. non-selectedtarget from Chelazzi et al (1993)

Selected

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Usher and McClelland (2001)Leaky Competing Accumulator

Model• Addresses the process of deciding

between two alternatives basedon external input (1 + 2 = 1) with leakage, self-excitation, mutual inhibition, and noisedx1/dt = 1-(x1)+f(x1)–f(x2)+1

dx2/dt = 2-(x2)+f(x2)–f(x1)+2

• Captures u-shaped activity profile for loosing alternative seen in experiments.

• Matches accuracy data and RT distribution shape as a function of ease of discrimination.

• Easily extends to n alternatives, models effects of n or RT.

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Discussion of assumptions• Units represent populations of neurons, not single neurons –

rate corresponds to instantaneous population firing rate.• Activation function is chosen to be non-linear but simple (f = []

+). Other choices allow additional properties (Wong and Wang, next lecture).

• Decay represents tendency of neurons to return to their resting level.

• Self-excitation ~ recurrent excitatory interactions among members of the population.

• In general, neurons tend to decay quite quickly; the effective decay is equal to decay - self-excitation

• (In reality competition is mediated by interneurons.)• Injected noise is independent but propagates non-linearly.

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Testing between the models

• Quantitative test:– Differences in shapes of ‘time-accuracy curves’– Use of analytic approximation– Many subsequent comparisons by Ratcliff

• Qualitative test:– Understanding the dynamics of the model leads to novel

predictions

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Roles of (k = – ) and

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Change of Coordinates (Bogacz et al, 2006)

x1

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Time-accuracy curves for different |k-|

|k-= 0|k-= .2|k- = .4

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Assessing Integration Dynamics• Participant sees stream of S’s and H’s• Must decide which is predominant• 50% of trials last ~500 msec, allow accuracy assessment• 50% are ~250 msec, allow assessment of dynamics

– Equal # of S’s and H’sBut there are clusters bunched together at the end (0, 2 or 4).

Leak-dominant Inhibition-dom.

Favored earlyFavored late

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S3

Subjects show both kindsof biases; the less the bias,the higher the accuracy,as predicted.

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Extension to N alternatives

• Extension to n alternatives is very natural (just add units to pool).

• Model accounts quite well for Hick’s law (RT increases with log n alternatives), assuming that threshold is raised with n to maintain equal accuracy in all conditions.

• Use of non-linear activation function increases efficiency in cases where there are only a few alternatives ‘in contention’ given the stimulus.

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Neural Basis of Decision Making in Monkeys (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002)

RT task paradigm of R&T.Motion coherence anddirection is varied fromtrial to trial.

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Neural Basis of Decision Making in Monkeys: Results

Data are averaged over many different neurons that areassociated with intended eye movements to the locationof target.

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Neural Activity and Low-Dimensional Models

• Human behavior is often characterized by simple regularities at an overt level, yet this simplicity arises from a highly complex underlying neural mechanism.

• Can we understand how these simple regularities could arise?

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Wong & Wang (2006)

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7200- and 2-variable Models both account for the behavioral data

… and the physiological data as well!

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Some Extensions• Usher & McClelland, 2004

– Leaky competing accumulator model with• Vacillation of attention between attributes• Loss aversion

– Accounts for several violations of rationality in choosing among multiple alternatives differing on multiple dimensions.

– Makes predictions for effects of parametric manipulations, some of which have been supported in further experiments.

• Future work– Effects of involuntary attention– Combined effects of outcome value and stimulus uncertainty on

choice