EditorialHistorical RadarThis special issue contains, in the main, papers on the earlydevelopment of British Radar that were written near theend of the Second World War by people close to theevents they describe. Most of these papers lay buriedamong the records of the Ministry of Defence until recent-ly, but they have now been declassified. Some are availablein the Public Records Office but the compilers of thisspecial issue feel that they are all of sufficient interest tomerit the wider circulation which, it is hoped, they willnow receive.

In selecting and preparing these papers for publication,several problems had to be resolved. First, the amount ofworthwhile material greatly exceeded the space available.To include as wide a selection as possible, the Editorsdecided, reluctantly, that they must shorten slightly someof the papers. Complete copies have been deposited in theIEE Archives. The papers selected deal mainly with the useof radar. They complement the technical descriptions givenin the Proceedings of the IEE Conference on Radiolo-cation in 1946*. A second problem was that most of thepapers either were not illustrated or the original illustra-tions had been lost. Pictures from the RSRE photographiccollection and elsewhere have therefore been included toaccompany the papers.

Readers of these papers are advised to treat them with ahistorian's due reserve. They say what the authors believedto be correct and, as such, are as close to a contemporaryaccount of radar development as we are likely to get. Butthey were written in haste by people closely involved in theevents they describe. Writers today might put a differentstress on some aspects of the story. Where this occurs it isworth pausing to ask why. Apart from minor corrections,the Editors have avoided any attempt to alter the originalemphasis. They have cross-checked the papers againstother records and have assured themselves that theycontain no major errors of fact.

The first paper, by Sir John Cockroft, describes hisexperiences of radar from the time he stopped nuclearresearch at the Cavendish until he became Director ofChalk River in Canada. Cockroft's contributions to radarincluded his part in the Tizard Mission to the USA andthe direction of the Air Defence Research and Develop-ment Establishment (ADRDE) (later the Radio Researchand Development Establishment (RRDE)) for most of theWar.

This is followed by an account of the Telecommunica-tions Research Establishment's (TRE's) contribution to theD-Day operations written by the late Prof. J.W.S. Pringle.Pringle, a distinguished zoologist and a skilled glider pilot,was concerned with helping the airborne troops and withRAF-Army co-operation in general. His description of theradar contributions to D-Day contains much hithertounpublished material.

A major battle that has never been widely understoodwas the struggle at sea, in the Atlantic and other oceans, tomaintain our supply lines. This provided the first task forairborne radar. We are therefore indebted to the late Prof.R.A. Smith and his colleagues for a very detailed mono-graph on the development and use of ASV (aircraft tosurface vessel).

* Proceedings of IEE Radiolocation Convention. J. IEE, 1946, 93, Pt MA

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 6, OCTOBER 1985

More has been heard of the development of AI(airborne interception) enabling night fighters to pursuetheir prey. This requirement provided the main impetus forthe development of the first centimetric radar. This isdescribed in Dr. W.E. Burcham's article reprinted from theoriginally secret TRE Journal of 1945.

A subject still of major controversy is the RAF bombingoffensive against Germany. It is as well to remember thatthis offensive could not have been carried out without theradar navigational aids developed by TRE. The next twoarticles, also reprinted from the 1945 TRE Journaldescribe two of these: the Oboe precision bomb aimingsystem and the H2S navigational and blind bombing aid.A distinguished American historian has said that thecavity magnetron had a greater impact on the War thanthe atom bomb. Its contribution to the destruction ofGermany through these radar aids is but one example.

The spectacular advances in airborne radar tended toovershadow the continuing progress of radar on theground. Ground radar did not stop with the Battle ofBritain. A new and more extensive system (GCI: groundcontrolled interception) had to be built up to support thenight fighters, and when Fighter Command, in 1941, beganoffensive operations over Europe, the GCI system had tobe further developed to support these. In doing so, thefoundations of today's air traffic control systems were laid.Finally, when the Allied Armies moved into Europe,mobile radar control systems went with them. This isdescribed in the paper by Neville Orgel.

Although the papers so far have shown the power ofradar as a weapon of war, there was in another sense aradar war. As soon as both sides realised the importanceof radar techniques, they began attacking each other usingall methods from brute force jamming and physical assaultto deception techniques to feed in false information. SirRobert Cockburn's paper, written in 1945, describes theBritish effort, which he led. A major problem with militaryradar, still not completely solved, is that of telling friendfrom foe (Identification friend or foe: IFF). Considerablesuccess was achieved by the development, starting before1939, of simple airborne transponders which enabled ouraircraft to identify themselves. Lord Bowden, who played amajor part in this development, has recently prepared anaccount of it which can very appropriately be includedhere.

We are also very pleased to be able to include a shortaccount of the Moonshine deception scheme used beforeD-Day, written, just before his recent death, by Prof..Martin Ryle, better known as a pioneer of radioastronomy.

The final paper is an account of early Naval radar rep-rinted from the Naval Electrical Review. The contributionsto British radar made by the Naval Signals School and theAdmiralty Signals Establishment have never received fullrecognition. Their importance in the purely Naval contextis obvious, but what is not so widely realised is that, before1939, the Naval laboratories were the only ones with theexpertise on valve design required to organise the develop-ment and production of the vast numbers of new andimproved valves, from centimetric magnetrons to highpower rectifiers and cathode ray tubes, needed before theradar designers could start work. The final paper is a

325

token acknowledgment of this debt, which really deservesanother volume in its own right.

It is appropriate to acknowledge the work done by theco-Editor of this issue, Mr. H.R. Johnson. As a formerScientific Officer in the Navigational Aids Division at theTRE in Malvern, he had first-hand experience of the devel-opment of some of the equipments described in this issue.His work on the initial editing of the papers was invalu-able in giving the issue a coherent structure from an earlystage. Both Guest Editors are grateful for the help of refer-ees and members of IEE Professional Group S7. Theirsuggestions on the presentation of the papers are muchappreciated.

Photographs were provided by Mr. I. Graham, ChiefLibrarian at RSRE Malvern, and Mr. H.R. Johnson. TheGuest Editors would also like to thank Mr. I. Graham forhis help in finding copies of many of the manuscripts.

E.H. PUTLEY

A.P. Rowe C.B.E.The development of British radar was a co-operative effort involving many people from awide range of disciplines. One individual whocan represent them all is A.P. Rowe, whose earlystudies on air defence led to the setting up of theoriginal Tizard committee (of which he wassecretary) and who, from 1938 to 1945, was headof the Telecommunications Research Estab-lishment.

Crown Copyright Reserved

326 IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 6, OCTOBER 1985