Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing: New Names for an Old Debate
James D. Perry
Overview
• What Is Hegemony?
• Grand Strategies: Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing
• National Goals: Security, Economics, Democracy
• National Willpower: How Badly Do We Want Hegemony?
• Economics: Can We Afford Hegemony?
• Military Power: Are We Strong Enough for Hegemony?
• Strategic Choices: Force Structure Implications
What Is Hegemony?
• History abounds with states whose resources or willpower were inadequate to achieve hegemony or keep it.
• Good reason to question current US resources and willpower – but are we willing to recast our goals and retreat from hegemony?
• Hegemons rarely abandon their goals without a fight.
Elements of Hegemony
Asymmetry of Power You usually get what you want
Goals: security, economics, ideology What you want
National Willpower How badly you want it
Resources: Preponderant Military Power Preponderant Economic Power
Are you strong enough to get it and keep it?
Structure: Organizations, treaties, alliances, etc. that exercise military and economic preponderance to assure the fulfillment of national goals
How you sustain it over the long term
Basic Grand Strategies
Strategy Military Posture Advantages Disadvantages
Hegemony (Containment)
Strong forward presence Full spectrum of capabilities
Greatest US influence Regional rivalries dampened Eurasian hegemons checked Nuclear proliferation reduced Freedom & prosperity flourish?
Most expensive Provokes counterbalancing Must keep challengers down Provokes terrorism
Offshore Balancing (Détente)
Limited forward presence Emphasis on air and sea power
Freedom of action Shifts burden to others Cheaper than hegemony Reduced tension w/ PRC, Russia Avoids “wars of credibility” Less terrorism?
Encourages aggressors “Finlandization” Nuclear proliferation Regional instability Hard for US to return Less influence Less freedom & prosperity?
Isolationism Hemispheric defense plus nuclear deterrent
Cheapest Everyone else may fight and weaken each other
Least US influence We may get drawn in if everyone else fights
Mostly acquired 1947-53 until
NATO expansion 1999-2003
De facto protectorates
We don’t want hostile powers to dominate Europe or Japan – but how much help should these wealthy countries get from us now?
Security Goals
DoD obligated to defend 25% of world population and 65% of world GDP (not including Middle East oil)
Overstretch?
Ideological Goals: Necessary and Affordable?
• American strategy since 1943 has always been about much more than just “security”
• Idealism: We must propagate our values because we are only safe and prosperous in a world in which our values prevail (i.e. democracy and open markets)
• Realism: We do not need to propagate our values, because this leads to overexpansion, unnecessary war, and avoidable hostility. Focus strictly on security, do business with bad guys.
• Difficult to argue that promotion of democracy has succeeded and improved American security since 2001
• If it is necessary to propagate democracy and open markets, are these goals actually achievable, and at what price?
“Promoting Democracy” Lacks Popular Support
POLITICO Poll July 2014 U.S. military actions should be limited to direct threats to our national security
67% As the world’s moral leader, the U.S. has a responsibility to use its military to protect democracy around the globe
22%
Rebuild public support or change strategy
Public and elite at odds:
Decreasing Popular Support for Intervention Abroad
Pew, May 2016 Product of: War fatigue High cost Unattainable goals Bad execution
Rebuild public support or change strategy
Popular Skepticism About Free Trade
Negative views of free trade significantly higher than these totals for people who make under $75,000 / year
General public does not regard Free Trade as a particularly compelling benefit
High Trade Deficits = Jobs Exported
Stagnant Real Wages Since 1973
Significant Unemployment
The average citizen could reasonably conclude that
American foreign policy does not benefit him personally
Realist Foreign Policy: Thwarted Inside the Beltway?
• Free Trade, human rights, promotion of democracy, etc. enjoy very strong support from many in government, academia, think tanks, etc.
• American public is less convinced we should actively promote these ideals and is unwilling to pay much for them
• “Realist” candidate could certainly get elected – but would face tremendous resistance from entire establishment
• Foreign policy elite has a long history of ignoring and mocking what the public wants…
National Morale and Willpower
• National character: energy, ambition, discipline, initiative • National beliefs, myths, ideology, religion • Culture of honor, valor, hardship, self-sacrifice • Internal unity, cohesion • Tradition of victory • Patriotic education • Defeat can motivate (Germany 1918) or demotivate (1945) • Long, costly wars demotivate – especially COIN campaigns • Inspirational leadership • Self-preservation versus existential threat • Sense of “national momentum” • Weary hegemon versus hungry challenger
Vietnam GWOT
Current average trust level is 19% but level is lower among certain groups: Gen X, Boomers (15%) Whites (15%) Republicans (11%) Higher but still not impressive trust levels among Democrats, minorities, youth (26%)
Is an activist foreign policy of any kind – let alone “hegemony” – sustainable with such a low level
of public trust in government?
Economic Factors
U.S. Economy Strong but No Longer Preponderant
Soviet GDP was perhaps 1/3 that of US during Cold War. Not an equal competition. But US versus China…
Completely inexcusable for EU (with 5x population and 12x the GDP) to permit Russia to intimidate it. Inconceivable that Russia will give up nuclear weapons given her economic and geographic situation.
Source: Eurostat, Bloomberg
Share of World GDP
Major Power Demographics, 2010 – 2050
2010 Pop (m)
2050 Pop (m)
TFR 2015 Median Age 2010
Median Age 2050
Age 65+ 2010 (%)
Age 65+ 2050 (%)
USA 312 401 1.87 37 41 13.1 21.4
China 1,360 1,385 1.60 35 46 8.3 23.9
Japan 127 108 1.40 45 53 23.0 36.5
Russia 144 121 1.61 38 42 13.1 20.5
Germany 83 73 1.44 44 51 20.8 32.7
France 63 73 2.08 40 43 16.8 25.5
UK 62 73 1.89 40 43 16.6 24.7
Source: Aging in the U.S. and Other Countries, 2010 to 2050, Pew Research Center, 1/30/14
USA 1950: TFR 3.75, Median Age 30, Age 65+ 8% (only LDCs have these numbers today)
Today’s Major Powers Have Sub-Replacement Fertility and Increasingly Old Populations
• More spending on pensions/health, less on defense • Fewer kids = unwilling to risk them in war = more robots? • Money, technical expertise more important than raw
manpower for air, sea, nuclear force generation • Less capability to do occupation/pacification/COIN:
– Forget occupying any large, poor country 2020 – 2050
• Europe, Japan, Korea weaker and less useful as allies • Russia increasingly weak • Major Powers more threatened by LDCs than each other?
Today’s Major Powers Have Sub-Replacement Fertility and Increasingly Old Populations
Major Power Demographics: Implications
Economic Burden of Defense
Defense as Percentage of GDP
Defense Share of Federal Spending
CBO: Unsustainable Federal spending and debt
Gross Government Debt as % of GDP
USA 106
China 66
Japan 238
Russia 11
Germany 82
France 90
UK 85
Hegemony is Very Affordable!
Unless You Are a Welfare State! (Entitlements Overstretch)
Military Factors
Military Downsizing 1991 – 2016
• US military was deployed forward during the Cold War and backstopped with powerful strategic deterrent
• Military buildup during the 1980s revitalized the strategic deterrent, the Navy, and forward deployed forces
• After 1991, some US forces remained forward but military began transitioning to a CONUS-based force
• Services have been on a “procurement holiday” since 1992
Nuclear Deterrent Forces Smaller, Older than in 1990
Number Entered Service
Minuteman III 450 1970
Ohio SSBN 14 1981
B-52H Bomber 78 1962
B-2 Bomber 20 1993
• Last US nuclear weapon tested in 1992 – no engineers today have tested or designed one
• US nuclear weapons experts aging (40% over 50 in 2009)
• Delivery systems and weapons aging, need replacement
• Weapons rely on tritium, which US has not produced since 1988, and stockpile is decaying
Recapitalization IOC
New ICBM 2027
Ohio Replacement 2030
B-21 Bomber 2030
80%
US Troop Deployments, 1950-2015
Source: Tim Kane, “The Decline of American Engagement,” Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.
Long-Term Trend: Strategic Withdrawal of US Forces from Eurasia
1980-1990: >2m troops
431,000 overseas (21%)
2015: 1.3m troops
201,000 overseas (15%)
1965-1975: >3m troops
782,000 overseas (27%)
Overseas US Troop Deployments, 1950-2015
Source: Tim Kane, “The Decline of American Engagement,” Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.
93% of US troops overseas were in Europe, Japan, and Korea in 2015
Korea
Vietnam
War on Terror
Trend in US Troop Deployments
Source: Tim Kane, “The Decline of American Engagement,” Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.
Zero US troops overseas by 2045 if current trend continues unchanged
US Army in Europe: Currently 13% of 1989 Level
1989: 6 Divisions 1,500 tanks 213,000 troops 41 garrisons (850 sites)
2016: 2 Brigade CTs 0 tanks (250 in POL) 28,000 troops 7 garrisons (90 sites)
Army still operating equipment acquired in the 1980s: Abrams, Bradley, Apache - and plans to keep this equipment until 2050 (!)
60% Reduction in USAF Since 1990 Type 1990 Inventory 2015 Inventory Entered Service
A-10 572 283 1979
F-15C/D 765 245 1979
F-15E 125 218 1987
F-16 1,613 958 1984
F-22 - 187 2001
F-35 - 72 2011
B-52 230 77 1960
B-1 96 62 1986
B-2 1 20 1989
KC-10 59 59 1981
KC-135 559 398 1958
C-5 127 50 1970
C-17 - 222 1992
Other 5,760 1,178
Total 9,907 4,029 (41%)
52% of the current inventory is a legacy of the Reagan-era buildup. Only 21% of current inventory was built after 2000.
Very few current aircraft have the stealth and range needed to fight large enemies
who have advanced air
defenses
USAF Reduction in Europe
Relative to 1986: 56% Decline in Personnel
75% Decline in Aircraft
74,715 personnel 784 aircraft 8 Fighter Wings 14 “other” Wings 32 Main Bases
33,000 personnel 200 aircraft 3 Fighter Wings 7 “other” Wings 7 Main Bases
1986 2016
1980s Navy – Nearly 600 Ships 2016 Navy – Under 300 Ships
1987 2016 2030 2040
Aircraft Carrier 14 11 11 10
Large Surface Combatant 108 87 95 85
Small Surface Combatant 115 22 52 56
SSN 102 53 42 47
SSGN 0 4 0 0
SSBN 37 14 11 10
Amphibious 59 31 36 33
Combat Logistics Force 159
29 29 29
Support Vessels 31 36 32
Total 594 282 312 302
Current Reagan-era Ships: 4 CVN, 18 CG/DD, 15 SSN, 14 SSBN, 10 Amphibs
Attack sub shortfall starting in 2025 and lack of numbers, range and stealth in naval aviation have negative implications for control of the Western Pacific
Declining Overseas Base Structure
DoD Overseas Bases 1990 2015 Reduction
Number Bases 1,669 587 65%
Million Acres 1.7 0.6
Most US Bases are still in Britain, Germany, Japan,
and Korea
Retreating to CONUS
• 55% reduction in forward-deployed force levels since 1990
• 75-90% reduction in troops and airpower in Europe
– We are already in an Offshore Balancing posture there
– Make this “official” and pull the plug in Europe to enable forward defense in Asia?
• US forces are still, to a great extent, living on the legacy of the Reagan-era buildup
• Any strategy selected will require significant military modernization, but with different numbers and with emphasis on different types of forces
• Hegemony clearly requires far larger and more expensive forces than Offshore Balancing
Force Structure Implications
Isolationism Offshore Balancing Hegemony
Army “Small” Support to Civil
Authorities
“Less” 6 Divisions?
“More” 12-18 Divisions?
Defend Allies Fight two MRCs
Air Force Continental Air Defense
Command Sea/Air Emphasis on
airpower, stealth, long-range strike
Deter by Punishment
Sea/Air Control plus punishment plus
support for forward ground forces
Deter by Denial
Navy Coastal Defense Not Power Projection
Strategic Forces Minimum Deterrent Coercive Force Coercive Force plus Extended Deterrence
Offshore Balancing may not save money relative to today, but forces needed to support hegemony would cost a great deal more than that
Strategic forces, stealthy long-range strike especially important to deter Russia, China
Conclusions
• Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing is an extension of the Cold War “containment versus détente” debate
• US has been retreating to CONUS since 1991 – question is whether or not this can and should be reversed
• Offshore balancing with an emphasis on long-range, stealthy land- and sea-based airpower is cheaper than hegemony but still requires military modernization
– Will this inevitably collapse into isolationism?
• Hegemony (engagement in Eurasia) requires:
– Leadership with the will to win
– Economic expansion
– Expanding and modernizing the military
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