Hartmut Esser
Segregation and Ethnic Stratification.Institutional Completeness and the Ethnic Mobility Trap
University of MannheimFaculty of Social SciencesMannheim Center for European Social Research
Hartmut Esser
Segregation and ethnische Schichtung.Institutionelle Vollständigkeit und die ethnische Mobilitätsfalle
Universität MannheimFakultät für SozialwissenschaftenMannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung Research
1. The Problem2. Breton & Wiley3. A General Model4. Four Special Cases5. Empirical Evidence?6. Conclusions
Outline
1. The Problem
Background
Ethnic stratification as a possible alternative outcome to„structural assimilation“ (segmented assimilation)
Labor market performance as a necessary prerequisite ofany social integration into functionally differentiatedmarket societies
Function(s) of ethnic segregation?
Segregation Ethnic Stratification???
? really true?
? if yes: why?
? if not: why not?
Two propositions ...
Segregation as an obstacle
Segregation as support
Mechanisms: missing opportunities, discrimination, stress ...
Mechanisms: solidarity, self-esteem, own institutions ...
... and a third one:
Segregation as support serving (unintendedly) as an obstacle
Two (classic) references:
Raymond Breton (AJS 1964): Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities
Norbert F. Wiley (SF 1967): The Ethnic Mobility Trap
Topic:
• Elaborating and combining the arguments• Modelling the mechanism(s)• Application to some special constellations
2. Breton & Wiley
Raymond Breton: Institutional Completeness
Guiding idea
Institutionally complete ethnic communities allowand motivate the (exclusive) preservation of ingroup relations.
Main propositions:
„ ... that the direction of the immigrants´ integration will to a large extent result from the forces of attraction (positive or negative) stemming from the various communities.“
and
„These forces are generated by the social organization of thecommunities.“
„Institutional completeness would be at its extremewhenever the ethnic community could perform all theservices required by its members.“
What is „Institutional Completeness“?
Emergence of IC:
• (cultural and/or social) „distances“• the „level of resources among the members of the ethnic group“• activities of „social entrepreneurs“• the „number of immigrants“• migration as an „individual or a group phenomenon“
In sum:
demand: migrants with problems of easy integration in rc
supply: ethnic entrepreneurs (actors with special abilities: business experience, bilingual abilities, social
capital)
Institutional completeness creates ingroup opportunities with chances for economic success, prestige and mobility within the boundaries of the ethnic group.
Consequence(s) of IC:
„Members would never have to make use of native institutionsfor the satisfaction of their needs, such as education, work,food and clothing, medical care, or social assistance.“
Segregation
**ethnic entrepreneurs/organizational investments
resources distances embeddedness group size
Summary Breton (+):
Organization Inst. Completeness
chain-migration/cumulative causation
Norbert F. Wiley: The Ethnic Mobility Trap
Guiding Idea
Ethnic opportunities for social mobility have in most casesa relatively low ceiling, but are more attractive, because theprobability of success is higher.
„Briefly, a mobility trap is an opportunity for mobilitywhich offers a good deal less than it seems to, and, oncepursued, permits release only at the cost of somedownward mobility.“
What is an „Ethnic Mobility Trap“?
The EMT-Mechanism:
• Mobility is a consequence of investment decisions.
• Choice between two alternative routes of investment:
The „trap“:
- safe and comfortable, but with a low ceiling- unsafe and uncomfortable, but with a high ceiling
If there are ingroup opportunities, they will be preferred, justbecause the probability of success is very much higher.
Once off to a „wrong“ start, the decision is almostirreversible.
Other examples:
age-grade-trap: cultivation of age-specific behavior
overspecialization trap: concentration on only one sociological paradigm/ field
localité trap: investment in local prestige
minority group trap: „... not only ethnic and racial roups, but, under some conditions, religious, female, radical political and other ...groups which offer advancement within their ghettos.“
Consequence(s) of EMT:
• Underinvestment in efficient and generalized capital• Low chances of placement on central positions• Status differentials between ethnic group and natives• Emergence of ethnic stratification ...
... by „voluntary“ decisions
Summary Wiley:
**migrants/mobility investments
IngroupOpportunities
Ethnic Stratification
EMT
Combination of Breton &Wiley:
... which offers (internal) safe, but limited opportunities for vertical mobility for other members of the ethnic group...
... and the structural result of this mobility trap is an ethnic stratification.
Ethnic segregations can motivate ethnic entrepreneurs to create ethnic organizations up to institutional completeness ...
Inst.Compl.Int. Opport.
**
EthnicStratification
migrants/mobility investments
Segregation
**
Organization
entrepreneurs/organizational investments
resources distances embeddedness group size chain-migration/
cumulative causation
3. A General Model
Three Steps:
1. The general (micro-)mechanism: investments2. Structural (and other) conditions: demand and supply3. Aggregations and processes : explaining the links
Step 1: Investment Strategies
Two types of actors/activities:
Question: how to explain differences in investment behavior?
1. entrepreneurs: (eg-)organizational investments2. migrants : (rc-)mobility investments
Alternatives:
• no investment (ni)• investment (in)
Components:
U(sq) value status quo without investmentU(in) value investment returnp probability of successC investment costs
following standard-investment-theory we derivefor the decision to invest (EU(in) > EU(ni)):
Investment Motive Investment Risk>
U(in) – U(sq) > C/p
p-
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C
U+
U-
pp+
ni
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
in
2
1
1
4
3
C/p
increase ofincentives
increase ofopportunities
C´
increaseof costs
investment
p-
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C
U+
U-
pp+
ni
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
in
2
1
1
4
3
C´/p
increase ofincentives
increase ofopportunities
C´
increaseof costs
noinvestment
p-
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C
U+
U-
pp+
ni
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
in
2
1
1
4
3
C/p
increase ofincentives
increase ofopportunities
C´
decreaseof costs
p-
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C
U+
U-
pp+
ni
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
in
2
1
1
4
3
C/p
increase ofincentives
increase ofopportunities
C´
investment
Step 2: Structural Conditions
Application of the general model to the two typesof investments:
1. (eg-)organizational investment (ethnic business)2. (rc-)mobility investments (language, education)
p-
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C
U+
U-
pp+
no
(eg-)ethnic organization & IC
or
1
1
4
C/p
groupsize
organizational skills
C´
ethnicsocial capital
IC
p-
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C
U+
U-
pp+
eg
(rc-)mobility investments, IC & EMTrc
1
1
4
C/p
rc-ressources
C´
decreasingdistance
ethnicmobilty trap
rc-labormarket
institutionalcompleteness
3
structuralassimilation
p-
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C
U+
U-
pp+
eg
(rc-)mobility investments: Segregation&Stressrc
1
C/p
stress
C´
decreasingdistance
preventedinvestment
2 4
possibleinvestment
Step 3: Aggregations and processes
so far: structured decisions of individual actors
now: interdependencies and collective consequences
Variables: EU-weights for eg- versus rc-investments
varying with:
group size ressources/distances ethnic organization
EU(rc)
EU(eg)
group size
The Basic Model
ethnic organizationwith „critical mass“
high resourceslow distances
EU (rc)EU (eg)
low resourceshigh distances
„individualistic“aggregation
4. Four Special Cases
1. „Normal“ migrants2. Intergenerational Integration3. IC and EMT4. Segmented Assimilation
group size
Model 1: „normal“ migrants
EU(rc)EU(eg)
high resourceslow distances
no embeddenessno organization
(straight) assimilation
group size
Model 2a: Intergenerational Integration
EU(rc)EU(eg)
follow-up generations:exposure&acceptance
ethnic organization
competition/distances
(chain)immigration
Contact Conflict Accommodation Assimilation
(RRC)
group size
Model 2b: Intergenerational Integration (De-Institutionalization)
EU(rc)EU(eg)
dissolutionof ethniccommunity
group size
Model 2c: Intergenerational Integration (De-Institutionalization)
EU(rc)EU(eg)
group size
Model 2d: Intergenerational Integration (absorption)
EU(rc)EU(eg)
„leaving the colony“
(structural)assimilation
absorption
group size
Model 3: Institutional Completeness&Ethnic Mobility Trap
EUrc)EUeg)
increase of eg-opportunities
EMTIC
follow-up generations
„individualistic“ segregation
(net-)replenishment
ethnicorganization
furtherincrease of eg-opportunities
group size
EUin)EUni) rc-core culture
exposure/values
Model 4: Segmented Assimilation
subculturalstatus system
rc-subcultureexposure/values
segmentedassimilation
rc-subculture
: rc-Subculture Mobility Trap
5. Empirical Evidence?
Is there really such an effect of institutional completeness on the emergence of an ethnic stratification?
Three References:
1. Breton 19642. Fong and Ooka 20013. Portes and Rumbaut 2001
Breton (1964: 197): IC and ingroup relations
degree of institutional completeness
proportion low medium highof mainlyingroup .21 .54 .89relations* (62) (28) (83)
•*„The relationship held under all ... controls“ (group size, residential concentration, proportion of professionals). Exception: language; reduction „by as much as one-third“.
Fong & Ooka (2002: 140): Ethnic economy and outgroup relations
Odds
education 2.10language 2.23length of stay 1.03 (ns)single migrant 4.34family migration 2.62perception of own group 3.61
* „The result indicatesthat, controlling for other factors, workingin the Chinese ethniceconomy significantlyreduces the level ofparticipation in thewider society“
participation inethnic economy 0.55*
„ ... Cuban-American students are also affected by an unexpectedconsequence of the successful economic performance of theearlier exile generation. By creating such opportunities, the Cubanethnic economy paradoxically facilitated school attrition, especially among children whose families confronted a moredifficult situation“ (266/7)
Portes & Rumbaut (2001: 266f.): School achievement of late- coming Cuban-Americans
6. Conclusions
• There are relations between IC and ES by EMT, but they are conditional.
• The interplay of the various factors and processes is not uncomplicated, therefore explicit theoretical modelling is necessary.
• Other factors, like discrimination, legal restrictions or stress, are still possible and could easily be included (via bridge hypotheses on the U-, p- or C-terms for investment).
• Main aspect: solving the „problem of incompleteness“ of integration-theory