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SUSAN HA.ACK
SCIENCE AS SOCIAL? - YES AND NO'
Ours is an age in which partial truths are tirelessly transformed into total falsehood
as revolutionary revelations [Thomas
Staszl.:
INTRODUCTION
Some feminist philosophers of science claim the insight that scienc
It is true that the co-operative and competitive engagement o
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need for some re-thinking of the presuppositions of this, as I sha
Deferentialist" approach.
Radical critics of the Old Deferentialist picture' the "New Cynic
that there
are no
objective epistemic standards and that there is noth
logically special about science. My view of the matter is much less e
are objective epistemic standards. As I argued in
Evidence and Inqui
dards are not internal to science; they are the standards by which
worth of empirical evidence, and the rigor and thoroughness of emp
generally. By those standards, science has succeeded astonishingly w
not epistemologically privileged, but it is epistemologically distinguis
It is important to distinguish standards for judging the worth of
standards for the conduct of inquiry. The two are run together
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SCIENCE AS SOCIAL YES AND NO
success; as having plausibly filled in long, central entries greatly im
prospects for completing other parts of the puzzle.
Science has done this. not in virtue of its possession of a uniqu
method of inquiry, but because of the ways in which it has strengthene
and extended the m ethod all of us use when we try to figure out som
question. There is no such thing as
-
the scientific method" in the nar
which the phrase purportedly refers to a set of rules which can be gu
produce true, or probably true, or progressively more nearly true,
mechanical procedure can avoid the need for discretion, good judge
revealed by the Popperian shift from: make a bold conjecture, test it a
possible, and, if counter-evidence is found, abandon it and start again
bold conjecture, test it as severely as possible, and, if counter-eviden
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obliquely interconnected, areas of the puzzle. Then again, some inqui
suited by taste and temperament for deep or broad theoretical specula
precise and patient observation, some for devising complex instrume
for elaborate statistical evaluation, and so forth (rather as if we h
anagrams, specialists in Shakespearean allusions, devotees of exotic
and so on, working together on part of a crossword).
The social character of science also helps to compensate for indiv
nesses and idiosyncrasies. I doubt that criteria of better and worse
yield a linear ordering, and I am sure that no mechanical decision-
theory-choice is to be anticipated. But a community of inquirers wi
usefully, include some who are quick to start speculating towards
when the evidence begins to disfavor the old one, and others w
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Thus far I have focused on how the social character of science co
success. But both its internal organization and the environment in
work is conducted may be more
or less
conducive to good, hon
scrupulous inquiry. When one thinks of potential hindrances, the dr
of Nazi and Soviet science come first to rnind.'
3
These represent e
how the politicization of science, by putting scientists under press
dence favouring a politically desired conclusion, rather than honest
what hypothesis is best warranted, impedes achievement of the g
Other potential hindrances include: pressUre to solve problems whic
as socially urgent, rather than freedom to pursue those most suscep
in the present state of knowledge; the necessity to spend large amou
energy on obtaining resources, and to impress whatever body provid
due course, with one's success; dependence for resources on bodies
in the research coming out this way or that, or in rivals' being deni
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course, very fallible and imperfect) factors which help to
keep acce
priately correlated with warrant, they insist on "science as socia
focusing on
acceptance at the expense of warrant.
In fact, quite a go
Op on these various radical interpretations is to classify them acco
play down w arrant and accentuate acceptance; ignore warrant a
acknowledge only acceptance; or attempt to replace the notion of wa
socio-political ersatz.
Those who play down warrant and accentuate acceptance insist
determination of theory by
evidence
and the inextricability of non-ev
in theory-choice. Hence the first of the radical interpretations
social" that I want to consider that social values are inseparable
inquiry.
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truth, to act as if the theory were true (which is the sense in which it
true that "we have to accept
something"))'
A closely related interpretation of the theme of "science as social
goal of science is the improvement of society."' There is a temptation t
pointing to the OED's: "research - endeavour to discover facts"; bu
miss the point, which is, I take it, that the goal of science
ought to be
ment of society. Even taken as proposing only that science focus its
socially urgent problems, this is dubious. Knowledge is interconn
predictable ways, so it is hard to be sure what research will bring so
and focusing scientific effort artificially on problem s perceived as soci
apt to mean w asted resources, for the problems w hich we m ost want s
always those most susceptible to solution in the current state of kno
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issue is: scientific knowledge is nothing more than the product
social negotiation.
2
This is doubly false. First: the processes t
scientific knowledge is achieved are not
merely a
matter of social n
are processes of seeking out, checking, and assessing the weigh
Second, not everything that has thus far survived those processe
what survives those processes is what counts as
knowledge, wh
as knowledge but not all of it
is,
necessarily, knowledge. Som
surviving those processes, not be warranted; some may turn out to b
Some hold not only that knowledge, but also that reality, is socia
thus committing the same kinds of confusion twice over. Scientif
devised, articulated, developed, by scientists; theoretical concept
gene, force,
and so forth, are, if you like, their construction. And the
in true scientific theories arc real. But it doesn't follow, and neithe
electrons, genes, forces, etc., are constructed by the activity of the
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the slightest tendency to support the idea that democracy could rep
supportiveness, independent security, and comprehensiveness o
epistemic values.
22
What, finally, of the thesis that the physical sciences are subordina
sciences? This would be a consequence of the claim that reality i
structed; if physical science were, as that claim has it, a kind of myth
indeed, anthropology would achieve a certain priority over physics.
sequence so grossly implausible as to amount to a
reductio - albeit
a
- of social constructivism.
23
In any event, I shall not linger over th
subord inate to sociology" thesis, since it now appears for w hat I
desperate last-ditch effort to save one or another of the radical inte
"science as social" by focusing attention on complications which, if
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competition, productive rivalry. And it evades the question, w
scientific knowledge stressing supposedly feminine qualities should
be a better truer, more adequate theory of scientific knowledge.
Most feminist philosophers of science, however, have been attrac
of "science as social" in one and/or another of the radical interpret
in section II. Longino and Nelson are com mitted to the thesis that s
inextricable from science, both urging that the underdeterminatio
data leaves "slack" to be taken up by political considerations.
27 He
connection with feminism is clear enough: "doing science as a
thought is, requires one to ensure that it is feminist values that info
But, in the relevant interpretation, the thesis that science is social is
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This inference is, of course, fallacious; but it is so ubiquitous that
name: I call it "the 'passes for' fallacy."
Its ubiquity is closely r
astonishing outbreak of sneer quotes one finds in the literature of fe
sophy of science ("knowledge," "truth," "reality," "objectivity," et
with the pull towards accounts which accentuate acceptance. i.e., wha
time taken to be scientific knowledge. over warrant. It is worthy of
"passes for" fallacy is encouraged by the idea which, to repeat. I
epistemic standards are internal to science.
The "passes for" fallacy is ubiquitous; but I want to focus for a
characteristic. instance. It occurs in a paper in the first half of which
explains why she believes that the claim that there are differences in br
and function between the sexes which explain the (as she adds, th
gender-related d ifferences in cognitive ability, is not well-warrante
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that it is not good, honest, thorough, inquiry; so I do not think it a
describe my epistemological position as "feminist"
anything.
The point is not that I don't think sexism in scientific theorizin
science; I do. It is not that I don't care about justice for women; I do.
don't think there are legitimate feminist questions ethical and poli
about science; I do.
34
It is, rather, that I see the aspiration to a fem
logy of science as pulling towards the politicization of inquiry; which
whether in the interests of good political values or bad, is always epi
unsound.
And it is no more sound feminism than it is sound epistemology.
another paper to spell out in detail why, in my opinion, what is prese
as "feminist philosophy of science" is contrary to women's interes
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Questions,
8.1
Spring 1995. 20-31; to 'Towards a Sober Sociology of Science.*
Reason a nd Science.
cds Paul R. Gross and N orman Levitt. in
Annals of the Ne
Sciences,
775,
1996. 259-65, and forthcoming w ith Johns Hopk ins University Pr
and to 'The Puzzle of "Scientific Method".' forthcoming
in Revue Internationale de
6
Substantiar
here, should not be interpreted as meaning simply, "synthetic." Th
intended, substantial mathematical truths, and trivial empirical ones. In this
Collected Papers
4.91: "those who 'like myself] maintain that arithmetical t
necessary" are not
co ipso saying that they are verbal in their nature.'
7 I have given here a very brief summary of the much more detailed account to be fo
and inquiry.
Chapter 4. I note that this account acknowledges that there is such a
but-less-than-conclusive evidence, but does not require that there be a fornuilizable i
The analogy is due to Michael Polanyi, from The Republic of Science,' in
Kno
Marjorie Utile, University of C hicago Press. Chicago, IL, 1969, 49-62.
At the time of w riting
Evidence and Inquiry
pointed out the difficulty of extrapol
there offered of "A is more/less justified in believing
that p" to
the impersonal locu
The present paragraph offers an extrapolation to 'To is warranted within comm unit
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2t
The strategy is illustrated in a particularly striking way by the terms in which,
Whose Knowledge?
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 1991) Sandra Hardin
"justify" her theory. which unmistakably reveal that she has identified this with the q
her theory to this or that audience.
22
Some of those who think science would be better if it were more democratic ma
the epistemological issues on which l have focused, but questions of access to scien
they have run the two sorts of question together). Certainly it is desirable that no
excluded from science on the grounds of race, sex. eye-color. or any irrelevant factor
rather a meritocratic than a democratic one.
" Putting me in mind of C. 1. Lewis's shrewd description of the method -which the
applies": "he simply doesn't believe any evidence which is unfavorable to his bigote
any such is put forward, he will argue it away by using this same method over again
Nature of the Right,
Columbia University Press. New York. NY, 1955, p. 321.
4 The Science Question in Feminism,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca. NY. 1986. p.
25 So. in a minimal sort of way. did J. S. Mill. who qualifies as a feminist if any mal
But this obviously does not establish the required connection.
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SCIENCE AS SOCIAL ' YES AND NO
Man Field Belenky, Blythe Mcvicker Clinch
Nancy Rule Goldberger and J
tionven
i
li 'ays of
Knivinnk".
Basic Books. Ness York. NY. 190 - a remarkable ssor
.ctente. As antidotes. I recommend Carol Tay ris. The
sure 04 Woman.
Simon
York. NY and London. 1992. especially Chapter
2:
and Martha T. Mednick.
Psychological Constructs: Stop the Bandwagon, I Want to Get 011.'
Amen, an
-23.
Apropos. see Harriet Baher, The Market for Feminist Epistemology.'
The Mo
1994. 403-23.
r
That is preposterous sthic.h puts the last first and the first last... Valuing k
p,,,ierize
the idea and %a
,
servhodv shall produce written research in order to
decreed a know. ledge cAplosion
-
- Jacques Barrun,
The American University.
Har
York. NY. Iianston. IL. and London, 1968, p 221
See
also Susan Haack. "Pr
Cori ,cquoucs.'
Smith' Philosophy and Polies.
13.2. 1996. 296-315. and in
St
PhilosophA. and Public eds Ellen Frankel Paul
et rtt..
Cambridge University
19%.
296--315
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