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Page 1: Groupon Analysis

The IPO AnalysisBy: Investors Mosaic

www.investorsmosaic.com

October 2011

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Page 2: Groupon Analysis

The Thesis

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Page 3: Groupon Analysis

Don’t Buy the IPO, a Better Risk/Reward Opportunity Will Present Itself

• Groupon is a viable business, but there are too many unknowns about the business model to invest at such an extreme valuation

• The company has grown so fast it likely lacks proper human and IT infrastructure, and is vulnerable to severe growing pains

• The management team is thin for such a large and complex business model (currently no CTO, CIO, or COO)

• Company may have to hit the pause button on growth to strengthen itself for long-term success = valuation compression

• Investors will face multiple rounds of stock sales in the medium and long-term as only 5% of stock being offered

• Management has “cashed out” hundreds of millions from previous financings, so incentives may not align with shareholders

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Page 4: Groupon Analysis

Recent Metrics Are Concerning as Growth Has Slowed, Creating Questions Around Their Ability to Grow Profitably

Takeaway: In an effort to minimize operating losses, Groupon has slowed spending on marketing and hiring of sales people. This has caused a significant slowdown in sequential growth and calls into question the scalability of the business.

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Page 5: Groupon Analysis

Key Metrics Point to Slowing Growth

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Page 6: Groupon Analysis

Key Metrics Point to Slowing Growth

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Page 7: Groupon Analysis

Growth Slowing as Groupon “Dresses Up” for the IPO; What Happens Next?

Takeaway: The million-dollar question is whether or not this is the pause that refreshes, or an indication that the business has gotten out over it’s skis.

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Page 8: Groupon Analysis

Key Financial Metrics

• Featured Merchants – this is the core of the business; without satisfied merchants, the business is not sustainable

• Groupons Sold – shows that people like what they are offering

• Average Revenue per Groupon – indicates relevance of deal

• % of Gross Billings Retained – indicates perceived value of service and the level of competition

• Repeat Customers – indicates customers satisfaction

• Subscribers – Provides a list of customers for Groupon to “mine”

Note: Subscribers is a misleading statistic! This has no indication of the quality of the lead. Merchant’s will ultimately care about getting “good” customers in the door, not just anybody.

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Page 9: Groupon Analysis

Bright spots Exist for the Business

• Groupon is the most recognized daily deal site

• Incremental profitability has improved lately (but at the cost of growth?)

• Revenue per Groupon on the rise• Some very smart Venture Capital firms

are involved (Accel Partners, DST, KPCB)

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Page 10: Groupon Analysis

There are Several Questions Regarding the Business Model That Need Answered Before We Can Confidently Recommend the Stock

• Do Groupons provide an attractive ROI for merchant’s?– Unclear if deals are generally profitable or create repeat customers

• Merchants are beginning to place limitations on Groupon deals– Merchants are becoming more savvy, which will limit revenue for Groupon

• Merchants may be unaware of the legal risk they are assuming– How will merchants respond to this risk when / if gift card laws become a

more prominent concern among regulators and lawmakers?• Competition likely drive down margins

– Recent quarters demonstrates that Groupon taking smaller cuts of deal• Not clear if network effects exist

– Larger merchant pool and subscriber base not driving scale in the business• Groupons only work for merchants that have high frequency customer

visits, not long-term purchases like eye glasses– How big is the pool of interested merchants once the hype wears off?

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Page 11: Groupon Analysis

There are Several Questions Concerning the Business Model That Need Answered Before We can Confidently Recommend the Stock

• Very manual business model due to need for huge sales force to reach widely distributed merchants; unlikely to experience economies of scale predicted by management.

– The recent quarter implies that lower spending = lower growth– Unlikely to achieve 25% - 35% operating margin predicted by mgmt

• Reports indicate that 25% of Groupon redeemers are loyal customers, eating into profitable repeat business.

– Merchants need to figure out how to optimize Groupon offers in order to make it a sustainable marketing offering

• A Rice University Study in September 2010 showed that:– Groupon’s were profitable for 66%, not profitable for 32%– 42% of the merchants would not run another Groupon deal

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Page 12: Groupon Analysis

There Are Several Red Flags That Give Us Pause as Investors

• Groupon had to re-file their IPO prospectus twice because of accounting irregularities, indicating neglect or incompetence.

– Cut revenue by 50% because they reported all gross billings as revenue although Groupon never had claim to this cash stream

– Removed adj. consolidated segment operating income from S-1 because the SEC felt it was an inaccurate representation of on-going expenses

• Two Chief Operating Officers have left over the past six months, and the CTO left in March. Groupon has yet to find a replacements.

– Could suggest complete lack of infrastructure at the company

– Something must be wrong for these people to leave right before the “big” IPO. Suspicious.

• The company is only selling 5% of shares outstanding, which should be viewed as a gimmick to get a one-day pop.

– VC’s and employees are not cashing out on this deal, suggesting there will be substantial stock coming on the market when the lock-up expires, or new secondaries are filed.

– Despite the small % offering, the absolute number of shares is huge (30 million) when compared to LinkedIn’s 8 million offering.

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Page 13: Groupon Analysis

There Are Several Red Flags That Give Us Pause as Investors

• Two classes of shares – management will own only 0.4% of shares, but control 35% of the voting power.

– Most of this voting power resides with CEO Mason and Chairman Lefkofsky

• A company is still an infant – only 3 years old – and lacks proper infrastructure that will need to be addressed soon, and likely to be painful.

– They’ve only had a CFO for 10 months

– No COO, CTO, or CIO

– Over the past three years, Groupon has hired 9.5 people per day on average! It’s extremely unlikely that the company could have done this without cutting corners and hiring undesirable employees

• Groupon risks legal action for not properly following abandoned property laws related to unclaimed gift cards, and attempts to place all the risk on the merchants.

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Page 14: Groupon Analysis

Explosive Growth Has Left Several Gaps in the Company’s Management Infrastructure

Groupon LivingSocial

CEO Andrew Mason Tim O'ShaughnessyCIO None Val AleksenkoCTO None Aaron BatalionCFO Jason Child John BaxCOO None Eric EichmanGeneral Counnsel David Schellhase Jim BramsonVP, Sales Darren Schwartz Mandy ColeVP, Product Jeffery Holden Ian CostelloVP, Corporate Development Jason Harinstein Jake MaasVP, Human Resources Brian Schipper Jennifer TrzepaczVP, Engineering & Operations Brian Totty NoneVP, Marketing Aaron Cooper Camille Watson

• Hard to believe that such Groupon can maintain customer service levels after such a massive hiring binge. Shake out likely, and during the road show, the CEO mentioned that they’ll be firing the bottom 10% to improve service levels.

• Groupon has vacancies in key managerial positions that prevent the company from establishing a long-term direction and laying the foundation for sustainable growth.

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Page 15: Groupon Analysis

The Business Model is Not Showing Meaningful Signs of Economies of Scale to Justify Valuation

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Page 16: Groupon Analysis

It’s Hard to Tell if Groupon’s Negative Working Capital Position is Sustainable

• Groupon collects cash from the subscriber before they pay the merchants, creating an attractive cash “float” to fund the business.

• However, if growth slows or declines, a cash squeeze is possible as incoming payables will not offset liabilities.

• As of 3Q 2011, Groupon owes merchants $465M.

• We cannot determine if this is a long-term sustainable profile, so we need to analyze a few more quarterly reports before making an assessment.

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Page 17: Groupon Analysis

Investors Mosaic Survey Suggest the Daily Deal Business is Viable, but Still Needs to be Fine-Tuned

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Page 18: Groupon Analysis

• LivingSocial appears to be building a better, more sustainable business that is focused on building a higher-quality list of subscribers.

• What does Amazon know that we don’t? They can provide massive distribution for LivingSocial via the Kindle platform.

LivingSocial Has Taken the Slower Growth Path, Which May be More Sustainable

Suggests that LivingSocial has more relevant deals for their subscribers

Groupon LivingSocial

Markets 175 174Countries in Operation 45 25Subscribers (in millions) 143 46Employees 10,418 3,900

Markets per Country 3.9 7.0Subscribers per Market (millions) 0.8 0.3Subscribers per Country (millions) 3.2 1.8Cumulative Deals Purchased (millions) 30 22 as % of subscribers 21% 48%

Subscribers per Employee 13,726 11,795 Cumulative Deals per Employee 2,880 5,641

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Financials

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Page 20: Groupon Analysis

Key Metrics HistoryKey Metrics 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11

Gross Billings 44,383 91,424 194,272 415,269 668,174 929,249 1,157,210 Revenue 20,272 38,666 81,779 172,224 295,523 392,582 430,161 Gross Billings Per Sales Person 347 71 124 161 188 192 238 Revenue Per Sales Person 158 30 52 67 83 81 89

New Subscribers 1,627,332 7,010,911 10,924,087 29,214,197 32,516,201 32,617,293 27,148,537 Subscribers 3,434,610 10,445,521 21,369,608 50,583,805 83,100,006 115,717,299 142,865,836 Featured Merchants 2,903 9,565 18,722 35,099 56,781 78,466 78,649 Groupons Sold 1,760,398 4,062,458 8,237,733 16,235,481 28,094,743 32,525,739 33,009,042 Groupons Sold per Featured Merchants 606 425 440 463 495 415 420

Avg. Rev. per Subscriber 7.70$ 5.60$ 5.10$ 4.80$ 4.40$ 3.90$ 3.30$ Avg. Rev. per Groupon Sold 11.50$ 9.50$ 9.90$ 10.60$ 10.50$ 12.10$ 13.00$

New Repeat Customers 258,344 636,299 1,129,825 2,297,185 3,711,436 3,871,264 3,978,857 Cumulative Repeat Customers 420,667 1,056,966 2,186,791 4,483,976 8,195,412 12,066,676 16,045,533 Cumulative Customers 16,000,000 23,000,000 30,000,000 % of total subscribers 19% 20% 21%

New Markets 13 20 22 69 21 - - Total Markets 43 63 85 154 175 175 175

Sales ForceNorth America 128 201 348 493 661 990 1,004 International - 1,080 1,224 2,080 2,895 3,860 3,849 Total 128 1,281 1,572 2,573 3,556 4,850 4,853

Sales people hired per day 0.6 12.8 3.2 11.1 10.9 14.4 0.0 Revenue as % of Gross Billings 46% 42% 42% 41% 44% 42% 37%

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Page 21: Groupon Analysis

Key Metrics History

Income Statement 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11Revenue 20,272 38,666 81,779 172,224 295,523 392,582 430,161 Income (Loss) from Operations 8,571 (36,819) (55,967) (336,129) (117,148) (101,027) (239) Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Groupon 8,511 (35,929) (49,032) (313,230) (102,668) (101,240) (10,573)

AdjustmentsStock-Based Compensation 116 3,960 4,663 27,429 18,864 38,718 3,340 Acquisition-related Expenses - 9,434 28,410 165,339 - - (4,793) Total Adjustments 116 13,394 33,073 192,768 18,864 38,718 (1,453)

CSOINorth America 8,687 (378) 3,160 (21,905) (21,778) (10,501) 18,836 International - (23,047) (26,054) (121,456) (76,506) (51,808) (20,528) Total CSOI 8,687 (23,425) (22,894) (143,361) (98,284) (62,309) (1,692)

As % of SalesCSOI 42.9% -60.6% -28.0% -83.2% -33.3% -15.9% -0.4%TTM 23.1% -21.4% -26.1% -57.8% -49.0% -34.7% -23.7%

Incremental Revenue 11,020 18,394 43,113 90,445 123,299 97,059 37,579 Incremental CSOI (Loss) 10,249 (32,112) 531 (120,467) 45,077 35,975 60,617 Incremental Operating Margin 93% -175% 1% -133% 37% 37% 161%Incremental Operating Margin (TTM) -63% -31% -87% -39% -11% 6%

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Page 22: Groupon Analysis

Balance Sheet & Cash Flow Statement

BALANCE SHEET 2Q 2011 3Q 2011Cash & Equivalents 225,093 243,935 Accounts Receivable 99,674 109,852 Prepaid Expenses & Other 50,947 111,856 Total Current Assets - 375,714 - 465,643

P&E, net 36,532 41,374 Goodwill 162,796 169,152 Intangible Assets, net 39,516 50,141 Investments in Equity Interests 1,256 45,194 Deferred Income Taxes 14,119 13,361 Other Non-Current Assets 7,779 10,702 Total Assets - 637,712 - 795,567

Accounts Payable 49,033 40,345 Accrued Merchant Payable 391,894 465,586 Accrued Expenses 164,700 156,552 Due to Related Parties 264 260 Deferred Income Taxes 13,058 12,597 Other Current Liabilities 61,669 91,353 Total Current Liabilities - 680,618 - 766,693

Deferred Income Taxes 2,180 4,788 Other Non-Current Liabilities 23,533 39,719 Total Liabilities - 706,331 - 811,200

Other 681 2,198 Other Equity 9 9 Treasury Stock (808,448) (808,666) Additional Paid-In Capital 1,352,133 1,422,351 Stockholder Receivable (180) (7,965) Accumulated Deficit (623,376) (633,949) Accumulated Other Income 13,443 13,524 Total Groupon, Inc. Equity - (66,419) - (14,696)

Non-Controlling Interests (2,881) (3,135) Total Equity (Deficit) - (69,300) - (17,831) Total Liabilities & Equity - 637,712 - 795,567

check o.k. o.k. o.k. o.k.

Working Capital (304,904) - (301,050) as % of sales -44% -27%

Merchant Payable as % of Sales 57% 42%

CASH FLOW STATEMENT 2Q 2011 3Q 2011Net Loss (27,439) (223,667) (77,783) (238,083) D&A 1,886 15,696 6,908 22,754 Stock-based Compensation 4,076 57,582 8,739 60,922 Deferred Income Taxes (929) (2,237) (4,615) 602 Excess Tax Benefit - (3,532) - (11,323) Losses in Equity Interests - 8,763 - 19,974 Non-Cash Interest Expense 72 - 106 - Acquisition-related Expense 9,434 - 37,844 (4,793) Gain on Return of Common Stock - - - (4,916)

Working Capital Accounts Receivable (3,477) (53,072) (16,071) (69,690) Prepaid Expenses & Other 2,818 (17,221) 1,916 (41,023) Accounts Payable 4,702 (14,374) 12,178 (21,924) Accrued Merchant Payable 18,726 216,870 47,518 314,872 Accrued Expenses & Other 3,084 74,756 23,690 108,963 Due to Related Parties 3,555 46 682 361 Other (980) (1,626) (6,146) (7,185) Net Cash From Operations 15,528 57,984 34,966 129,511

PP&E (3,934) (21,202) (6,092) (29,825) Acquisitions, net of cash 5,603 (3,696) 6,495 (12,553) Purchase of Intangible Assets - (272) (707) (15,072) Changes in Restricted Cash 200 (1,025) 200 (8,141) Purchase of Investments in Subsidiaries - (34,387) - (34,887) Purchase of Equity in Investments - (9,921) - (20,189) Net Cash in Investing 1,869 (70,503) (104) (120,667)

Issuance of Stock 134,932 509,692 134,932 509,692 Excess Tax Benefit - 3,532 - 11,323 Loans from Related Parties 1,647 - 5,035 - Repayments of Loans to Related Parties - (14,358) - (14,358) Preferred Stock Distributions - - - - Repurchase of Common Stock (119,891) (353,550) (119,891) (353,550) Proceeds from Exercise of Stock Options 37 1,234 68 2,269 Proceeds from Sales of Common Stock - 137 - 137 Dividends Paid - - - - Redemption of Preferred Stock - (35,003) - (35,221) Net Cash From Financing 16,725 111,684 20,144 120,292

Effect of Foreign Exchange (516) 7,095 1,316 (4,034) Change in Cash 33,606 106,260 56,322 125,102

Cash at Beginning 12,313 118,833 12,313 118,833 Cash at End 45,919 225,093 68,635 243,935

Page 23: Groupon Analysis

Base Case Financials

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Revenue 312,941 1,554,464 1,941,123 2,223,809 2,408,066 Operating Income (180,993) (157,923) 92,122 183,741 247,126 Tax Rate 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%Net Income (117,645) (102,650) 59,879 119,432 160,632

Shares Outstanding 637 637 669 703 738 EPS (0.18)$ (0.16)$ 0.09$ 0.17$ 0.22$

Revenue growth yoy 397% 25% 15% 8%Operating Income Growth nm nm 99% 34%Operating Margin -10.2% 4.7% 8.3% 10.3%Net Margin -6.6% 3.1% 5.4% 6.7%

Base Case Financials

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

745,348 3,966,294 5,546,067 6,540,614 7,082,547 312,941 1,554,464 1,941,123 2,223,809 2,408,066

48,776,527 99,425,323 32,327,905 15,030,435 16,269,427 50,583,805 150,009,128 182,337,032 197,367,468 213,636,895

66,289 288,613 283,923 298,406 323,004 30,296,070 124,988,114 120,962,027 125,873,571 130,984,542

457 433 426 422 406

6.19$ 15.50$ 11.68$ 11.71$ 11.72$ 10.33$ 12.44$ 16.05$ 17.67$ 18.38$

Key Metrics

Gross BillingsRevenueGross Billings Per Sales PersonRevenue Per Sales Person

New SubscribersSubscribersFeatured MerchantsGroupons SoldGroupons Sold per Featured Merchants

Avg. Rev. per SubscriberAvg. Rev. per Groupon Sold

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Page 24: Groupon Analysis

Valuation

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Page 25: Groupon Analysis

Fundraising History Has Benefited Early Investors, not the Business

• Previous investors have milked the hype, VC funding bubble, and over-inflated revenue metrics to cash out $956 million.

• The CEO’s incentives may be skewed since he has already collected $31M; will he be overly aggressive to hit a homerun?

• Now Groupon is asking for ~$500M for general corporate purposes &acquisitions.

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Page 26: Groupon Analysis

Valuation at the Last Round was a Bubble, so You Should Be Careful About Paying Much More

• In December 2010 and January 2011, Groupon raised $942M from unusual investors such as Fidelity Investments, T. Rowe Price, and The Growth Fund of America. These are traditional mutual funds investing far outside of their typical mandate. This is the definition of a bubble.

• During this round, the common stock was valued at $7.90. Also, investors also likely used over-inflated revenue to justify their valuation. Yikes.

Groupon Valuation @ Mid PointProposed Share Price 17.00$ Shares Outstanding 637 Market Cap ($BN) 10,834$

2012 Revenue 1,941 Price / Sales 5.6x

2012 EPS 0.09$ P/E 2012 190.0x

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Page 27: Groupon Analysis

Valuation Comparisons

• As of 10/28/2011. • Sources: Yahoo Finance and Market Watch

Valuation Worksheet($ in 000's)

Market CapEnterprise

ValuePrice /

2011 SalesPrice /

2012 Sales12 Revenue

GrowthPrice / TTM

EBITDAGross

MarginEBITDA

MarginOperating

Margin ROIC

Google 187,140 153,150 6.4x 5.2x 22% 11.4x 64.5% 45.9% 35.4% 20.7%Amazon 90,000 88,000 1.8x 1.4x 33% 48.1x 22.0% 3.7% 4.1% 17.7%Salesforce 17,560 17,910 7.9x 6.3x 25% 155.7x 80.5% 5.2% 5.9% 4.0%Red Hat 9,270 8,020 8.2x 7.1x 15% 35.5x 83.5% 20.0% 16.0% 8.9%LinkedIn 8,360 8,520 16.5x 10.9x 52% 177.9x 73.5% 9.4% 8.1% 7.3%Tibco 4,440 4,150 4.9x 4.4x 11% 21.5x 71.6% 21.2% 16.5% 9.3%Pandora 2,290 2,330 8.4x 5.5x 52% nm 91.6% nm nm nmZillow 779 729 12.6x 8.4x 50% 578.3x 66.4% 2.0% nm nmHomeaway 2,720 2,600 12.0x 9.5x 26% 77.2x 78.8% 14.8% 8.7% 4.6%Average 8.7x 6.5x 32% 138.2x 70.3% 15.3% 13.5% 10.3%

• The “right” valuation for Groupon will become more clear as the margin profile of the business unfolds. If the company achieves 25% - 35% operating margin as management predicts, this business is worth 5x – 6x sales. If the company is closer to Amazon’s high-volume, low-margin business, the business is worth ~2x sales.

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Page 28: Groupon Analysis

Valuation is Very Sensitive to Revenue Growth as the Company will be Valued on Price/Sales. The “Base Case” of $10.32 is our Fair Value Estimate.

Upside Case (15% discount rate) 2011 2012 2013 2014Revenue Multiple 6.5x 6.5x 6.5x 6.5xImplied Market Cap 10,104,016 12,617,302 14,454,756 15,652,429 Shares Outstanding (in millions) 637 669 703 738 Per Share 15.85$ 18.86$ 20.57$ 21.22$ NPV 15.85$ 16.40$ 15.56$ 13.95$ Average 14.90$

Downside Case (15% discount rate) 2011 2012 2013 2014Revenue Multiple 3.0x 3.0x 3.0x 3.0xImplied Market Cap 4,663,392 5,823,370 6,671,426 7,224,198 Shares Outstanding (in millions) 637 669 703 738 Per Share 7.32$ 8.70$ 9.49$ 9.79$ NPV 7.32$ 7.57$ 7.18$ 6.44$ Average 6.88$

Base Case (15% discount rate) 2011 2012 2013 2014Revenue Multiple 4.5x 4.5x 4.5x 4.5xImplied Market Cap 6,995,088 8,735,055 10,007,139 10,836,297 Shares Outstanding (in millions) 637 669 703 738 Per Share 10.98$ 13.05$ 14.24$ 14.69$ NPV 10.98$ 11.35$ 10.77$ 9.66$ Average 10.32$

Investors Mosaic’s Fair Value Estimate

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Page 29: Groupon Analysis

Takeaways

• The Daily Deal industry is viable, but it’s competitive landscape and long-term profitability is unclear

• Groupon is a legitimate business, but several unanswered questions surround the company and it’s business model and cash flow generation capabilities

• Because of these uncertainties, it’s unwise to invest at such a lofty valuation

• Groupon may need to shrink in the short-term to solidify it’s human and technology infrastructure for long-term growth

• Near-term growth trends have slowed meaningfully as the company “dresses up” the financials for the IPO

• Valuation will be tied revenue (price to sales)• Pass on the IPO and wait for a better entry point

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Page 30: Groupon Analysis

Appendices

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Page 31: Groupon Analysis

Executive Departures Are Cause for Concern Due to the Complexity of the Business Model

• Robert Solomon, former COO, leaves Groupon after only one year to return to silicon valley.

• Groupon hires Margo Georgiadis as new COO on April 21, 2011. She is a former Google executive – VP of Global Sales Operations.– In late September, Margo Georgiadis leaves Groupon to return to Google

after only 5 months on the job. (Her employment agreement was to pay her $500k /year salary with 100% bonus potential).

• Ken Pellitier, former CTO, left on March 23, 2010. Only one day after Robert Solomon departed.

Takeaway: Such high-level departures, especially in such short order, do not reflect well on upper management. Furthermore, why are these people so eager to leave so close to a “mega” IPO? Suspicious…

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Page 32: Groupon Analysis

Other Information

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Page 33: Groupon Analysis

Key Metrics Groupon is not Providing

• Email open rates• Employee turn-over

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Page 34: Groupon Analysis

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