1
7
Geographical Indications as Property European Union Association Agreements and Investor State Provisions
AnselmKampermanSanders
7.1 Introduction
UnderEuropeanUnion(EU)law,geographicalindications(GIs)areprotectedunder
threeguises:theprotectedGIs(PGI),theprotecteddesignationsoforigin(PDOs),and
thetraditionalspecialitiesguaranteed(TSGs).FortheEU,theprotectionofitsGIsin
andoutsideofEuropeisaveryrelevanteconomicissue,asthevalueofGIproductsin
2010wasestimatedat€54.3billion,ofwhichthesaleofwinesaccountsformorethan
half.1ItisnosurprisethattheEUisvigorouslytryingtoobtainprotectionforitsGIsin
majortradepartnernations.However,inthecontextoftheWorldTradeOrganization
(WTO),newworldnations,mostnotablytheNorthAmericas,AustraliaandNew
Zealand,haveconsistentlyrejectedthenotionofamultilateralregisterforGIsthatis
dominatedbyEuropeanclaims.Thus,itcomesasnosurprisethenthatinthecontextof
theWTOnegotiationmandatecontainedintheAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsof
1SeeFinalReportofAnd-Internationalontheexternalstudy:‘Valueof
productionofagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,wines,aromatisedwinesandspiritsprotectedbyageographicalindication(GI)’(October2012),http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external-studies/value-gi_en.htm.
2
IntellectualPropertyRights(TRIPS)2underArticle23,3nosignificantprogresshasbeen
madeorcanbeexpectedinthenearfuture.
Asaresultofthisstalemateatthemultilaterallevel,thestrategyoftheEUhas
beentoplacetheprotectionofGIsattheheartofitsintellectualproperty(IP)chapters
inbilateraltradeandinvestmentagreements(BTIAs).Inparticular,Article3(1)(e)of
theTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)4providestheEUwiththe
exclusivecompetencetodealwithcommoncommercialpolicy.5AccordingtoArticle
2SeeAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights,15April,1994,MarrakeshAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,Annex1C,1869U.N.T.S.299[hereinafterTRIPS].
3Seeid.art.23(4),whichmandatesthat‘negotiationsshallbeundertakenintheCouncilforTRIPSconcerningtheestablishmentofamultilateralsystemofnotificationandregistrationofgeographicalindications’.
4ConsolidatedVersionoftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,10October2012,2012O.J.(C326)1[hereinafterTFEU].
Begin Complex Note
5Seeid.Art.3(1)(e).SeeCase22/70,Comm’nv.Council,1971E.C.R.263[hereinafterERTA]:
EachtimetheCommunity[…]adoptsprovisionslayingdown
commonrules[…],theMemberStatesnolongerhavetheright,acting
individuallyorevencollectively,toundertakeobligationswiththird
countrieswhichaffectthoserules.[…]Whensuchcommonrulescome
intobeing,theCommunityaloneisinapositiontoassumeandcarryout
contractualobligationstowardsthirdcountriesaffectingthewhole
sphereofapplicationoftheCommunitylegalsystem.[…]Totheextentto
whichCommunityrulesarepromulgatedfortheattainmentofthe
objectivesoftheTreaty,theMemberStatescannot,outsidethe
3
207(1)oftheTFEU,6thisincludescommercialaspectsofIP.Notsurprisingly,the
numberofEUBTIAsisquicklygrowingandtheEU-SouthKorea7andEU-Singapore8
FreeTradeAgreements(FTAs),therecentCanada-EUTradeAgreement(CETA)9and
theEU-VietnamTradeAgreement10allcontainannexeslistingtheGIsthataretobe
protectedinthepartnercountriesaspartofthetradedeal.
ThenatureofBTIAs,however,isthatthesearemixedagreementsdealingwith
issuesoftariffsandtrade,butalsowithinvestmentprotectionand,increasingly,
investor-statedisputesettlement(ISDS).InthecontextoftheongoingnegotiationsISDS
hasbecomeahighlycontroversialissue,includinginthenegotiationsurroundingthe
TransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnershipAgreement(TTIP).11Thecontroversy
frameworkoftheCommunityinstitutions,assumeobligationswhich
mightaffectthoserulesoraltertheirscope.
End Complex Note
6TFEU,art.207(1).7EU-SouthKoreaFreeTradeAgreement,EU-S.Kor.,16September2010,54O.J.
(L127)1,46–47,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:TOC.
8EU-SingaporeFreeTradeAgreement,EU-Sing.,20September2013,http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/.
9ComprehensiveTradeandEconomicAgreement,Can.-EU,ConsolidatedCETAText,ch.22,IntellectualProperty,26September2014,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf[hereinafterCETA].
10EU-VietnamFreeTradeAgreement,EU-Viet.,5August2015,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/august/tradoc_153674.pdf[hereinafterEU-VietnamFTA].
11TheTransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership(TTIP)iscurrentlystillundernegotiation.FurtherdetailscanbeseenatInfocus:TransatlanticTradeand
4
liesinthefactthatthepolicyfreedomofasignatorystatetoanagreementcontaining
ISDSmaybecomelimitedonaccountofinvestorexpectationsthathavetobehonoured.
ThecontroversyisremarkabletotheextentthatISDShasbeenaprominentfeaturein
internationaltradeandinvestmentframeworkssincethemid-1970s.Infact,the
proliferationofISDSinbilateralagreementsissowidespreadandaffectssomany
tradingnationsglobally12thatitisalmostsurprisingthatrelativelyfewcaseshavebeen
broughtsofarclaimingviolationsundertheseprovisions.Alsoregionaltrade
agreementsliketheNorthAmericanFTA(NAFTA)13andtheTrans-PacificPartnership
Agreement(TPP)14containISDSclauses.
However,theconceptofISDSisrelativelynewinthefieldofIP.Thisisduetothe
factthatIPonlybecameaglobaltradeissuerelativelyrecentlythroughtheintegration
ofIPstandardsandIPenforcementintheWTOframework.Thatsaid,IPisalsopeculiar
inthesensethatthevaluationofIPasanobjectofpropertythatcanbeviewedasan
investmentisalsoarelativelynewconcept.Evennow,variousapproachestovaluation
accordingtoincome-based,market-basedandreviewofcost-basedapproaches,
coupledwithdivergingreportingstandards,yielddifferentresults.15Still,thenumberof
InvestmentPartnership(TTIP),EUR.COMM’N,http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/(lastupdated2June2016).
12AshortinternetsearchalsorevealsthatISDSisnotexclusivetotradedealsinvolvingWesternnations.Asiancountriesareequallypartiestosuchagreements,alsowhenitconcernstheirregionaltradeandinvestmentpartners.
13NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement,US-Can.-Mex.,17December1992,32I.L.M.289(1993)[hereinafterNAFTA].
14Trans-PacificPartnership,ch.18,IntellectualProperty,5November2015,https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/intellectual-property-3479efdc7adf#.ux18hliw0[hereinafterTPP,IntellectualPropertyChapter].
15SeeFinalReportfromtheExpertGrouponIntellectualPropertyValuation(29November2013),https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/Expert_Group_Report_on_Intellectual_Property_Valuation_IP_web_2.pdf.
5
ISDScomplaintsisrisingandthefirstcasesinvolvingcoreissuesofIPexpropriationare
currentlypending.
OfallIPrights,theEUregimeontheprotectionofGIsinvitesasubstantial
involvementofpublicauthorityindefiningtheGI’sspecification,aswellasthequality
maintenancethereof.Thismeansthatanychangeinthespecificationmaygiverisetoan
investor-statedispute.ThischapterchartsthelikelihoodthatGIsmaybecomeaboneof
contentionunderconstitutionalexpropriationprotectionlaws,WTOdisputesandISDS,
andconcludesthatgiventhenatureofGIprotection’sinclusionofspecifications,there
isahigherstateinvolvement,andaccordingly,ahigherlikelihoodthatmeasures
negativelyaffectingaGIproprietor’srightscanbeattributedtoastate.
7.2 Geographical Indications and Specifications in the European Union
TheEUPGI,PDOandTSGschemesoperateonthebasisofregistrationintheDatabase
OfOriginandRegistration(DOOR).16Therearealsoproduct-specificregimesand
databases,suchastheE-BACCHUS17forwinesandE-SPIRITDRINKS18forspirits.EU
lawalsoprotectsGIsforaromatizedwineproducts.19Generally,EUlawappliesto
productsoriginatingfromEUMemberStatesandthirdcountriesthatcomplywithEU
16SeeDOOR,EUR.COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html(lastvisited5June2016).17SeeE-Bacchus,EUR.COMM’N,http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/wine/e-
bacchus/.18SeeE-Spirit-Drinks,EUR.COMM’N,http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/spirits/.19Councilregulation1601/91of10June1991,layingdowngeneralrulesonthe
definition,descriptionandpresentationofaromatizedwines,aromatizedwine-baseddrinksandaromatizedwine-productcocktails,1991O.J.(L149)1.
6
rules.Alongsidetheexistingpublicregistries,thereareseveralcertificationschemesfor
agriculturalproductsandfoodstuffsintheEU.Theserangefromcomplianceobligations
withcompulsoryproductionstandardstoadditionalvoluntaryrequirementsrelatingto
environmentalprotection,animalwelfare,organolepticqualities,etc.Also,allkindsof
‘fairtrade’or‘slavefree’epithetsfallwithinthesevoluntaryregimes.Alltheseregimes
should,however,beincompliancewiththe‘EUbestpracticeguidelinesforvoluntary
certificationschemesforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs’,20inordertobein
compliancewithEUlaw.
In2005,theUnitedStates(theUS)andAustraliasuccessfullychallengedthe
legitimacyofECRegulation2081/9221onGIsforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,
whichwastheregulationinforceatthetime,beforetheWTO.Theregulationcontained
anumberofcontentiousprovisions,namelyonthe(1)equivalenceandreciprocity
conditionsinrespectofGIprotection;(2)proceduresrequiringnon-EUnationals,or
personsresidentorestablishedinnon-EUcountries,tofileanapplicationorobjection
intheEuropeanCommunitiesthroughtheirowngovernment,butnotdirectlywithEU
MemberStates;and(3)arequirementonthird-countrygovernmentstoprovidea
declarationthatstructureswereinplaceontheirterritoryenablingtheinspectionof
compliancewiththespecificationsoftheGIregistration.Onallthreepoints,theWTO
Panel22foundviolationsofArticle3(1)ofTRIPS23andArticleIII(4)oftheGeneral
20CommissionCommunication–EUbestpracticeguidelinesforvoluntary
certificationschemesforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,2010O.J.(C341)4,5.21CouncilRegulation2081/92of14July1992,ontheprotectionofGIsand
designationsoforiginforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,1992O.J.(L208)1–8.22ComplaintbytheUnitedStates,EC–TrademarksandGeographicalIndications
forAgriculturalProductsandFoodstuffs,WTODoc.WT/DS174/R(adopted20April2005);ComplaintbyAustralia,EC–ProtectionsofTrademarksandGeographicalIndicationsforAgriculturalProductsandFoodstuffs,WTODoc.WT/DS290/R(adopted
7
AgreementonTariffsandTrade1994(GATT),24andthattheGATTviolationswerenot
justifiedbyArticleXX(d)ofGATT.25IntheAustralianReport,theWTOPanelfurther
foundthattheseinspectionstructuresdidnotconstitutea‘technicalregulation’within
themeaningoftheAgreementonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade(TBT).26Asaresult,the
EUchangeditsregimeinMarch2006toensurecompliancewiththeWTOregime,
currentlyprimarilythroughtheFoodstuffsRegulation,27andcorrespondingprovisions
intheotherRegulations.28Thescopeorprotectionextendstoconsumerdeception;29
20April2005);seealsoLotharEhring,NationalTreatmentUndertheGATT1994,inTHEPRINCIPLEOFNATIONALTREATMENTININTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW–TRADE,INVESTMENTANDINTELLECTUALPROPERTY34–54(AnselmKampermanSandersed.,2014)[hereinafterTHEPRINCIPLEOFNATIONALTREATMENTININTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW];AnselmKampermanSanders,NationalTreatmentUndertheTRIPSAgreement,inTHEPRINCIPLEOFNATIONALTREATMENTININTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW,supra,at286–99.
23SeeTRIPS,art.3(1)(obligatingNationalTreatment(NT)inrespectofWTOMemberStates).
24SeeGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,15April1994,MarrakeshAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,Annex1A,LegalInstruments–ResultsoftheUruguayRound,art.III(4),1867U.N.T.S.187(1994)[hereinafterGATT1994].
25GATT1994,art.XX(d)(providingthatanexceptioncanbemadetomeasuresfallingfoulofthemandatedstandardsiftheyare‘necessarytosecurecompliancewithlawsorregulations’).
26SeeAgreementonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade,GATTSecretariat.UruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiations:LegalInstrumentsEmbodyingtheResultsoftheUruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiationsdoneatMarrakeshon15April1994(2003),GATTDoc.MTN/FAII-A1A-6(15December1993)[hereinafterTBT],www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf.
27Regulation1151/2012concerningcertainfoodstuffsandcertainnon-foodagriculturalproducts(the‘FoodstuffsRegulation’),2012O.J.(L343),1–29.
28Regulation1308/2013concerningwinesandsparklingwines,2013O.J.(L347)671–854;Regulation110/2008onthedefinition,description,presentation,labellingandtheprotectionofgeographicalindicationsofspiritdrinks,2008O.J.(L39)16–54;CouncilRegulation1601/91of10June1991,layingdowngeneralrulesonthe
8
commercialuseincomparableproducts;30commercialuseexploitingreputation;31and
misuse,imitationorevocation32inrelationtotheregisteredGI.TheenforcementofaGI
is,however,aprivatelawissue.
Moreinteresting,forthepurposeofthischapter,however,istheproduct
specification–itsestablishment,inspectionandenforcement–asthisrequiresthe
involvementofpublicauthority.Thedefinitionoftheproductaccordingtoprecise
specificationsanditsanalysisbynationalauthoritiesisaprocessintegraltothe
registrationoftheGIattheEUlevel.
Begin Table
Table Image
Source:http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/index_en
.htm
End Table
Thedefinitionoftheproductcomprisesthefollowingelements:theproduct
name,applicantdetails,productclass,thenameoftheproduct,thedescriptionofthe
product,adefinitionofthegeographicalarea,proofoftheproduct’sorigin,adescription
ofthemethodofproduction,thelinkagebetweentheproductandthearea,the
definition,descriptionandpresentationofaromatizedwines,aromatizedwine-baseddrinksandaromatizedwine-productcocktails,1991O.J.(L149)1–9.
292012O.J.(L343),art.13(c)–(d).302012O.J.(L343),art.13(a).31Id.32Id.art.13(b).
9
nominationofaninspectionbodyandlabellinginformation.33ForPDOs,allproduction
stepsmusttakeplacewithinthegeographicalarea,whereasforPGIsatleastone
productionstepmusttakeplacewithinthegeographicalarea.Itisalsoatthispoint
wherespecificrulesconcerningslicing,grating,packagingandthelikeoftheproductto
whichtheregisterednamerefersmaybestatedandjustified.Giventhefactthatthese
typesofconditionsonrepackagingorslicingresultingeographicalrestrictionshaving
strongprotectionistandanticompetitiveeffects,theyareamongthemostcontroversial
specifications.
In1997,theConsorziodelProsciuttodiParma,34theItaliantradeassociationof
200traditionalproducersofParmaHam,soughtinjunctionsagainstAsdaStoresinthe
UnitedKingdomtorestrainthemfromsellingpre-slicedpacketsofprosciuttoas‘Parma
Ham’,aprotectedPDO.ThehamwasslicedbyasupplierofAsdaoutsidetheproduction
region,andpre-packagedwithoutsupervisionbytheinspectionbodyresponsiblefor
enforcingEUproductionregulations.Theslicingofthehamitselfcannotbeproblematic
assuch,35butthequestioniswhetherslicingthehamawayfromtheconsumer’seyes
andofferingthemasapre-packagedproductnotbearingtheConsorzio’smarkwould
beinfringinguponthePDO.TheConsorzio’sargumentwasthattheconsumercouldnot
verifytheorigin,andthequalityofthehamcouldnotbeguaranteed.TheCourtof
33SeeGuidetoApplicants,EUR.COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/guides/guide-for-applicants_en.pdf(lastvisited5June2016).
34SeePROSCIUTTODIPARMA,www.prosciuttodiparma.com/(lastvisited5June2016).
35Onecanfollowthehilariousvideosofthe‘ProsciuttodiParmaDOPslicinginstructionvideosonYouTube.ProsciuttodiParmaDOP,EnglishTutorial:PreparingandslicingParmaHam,YOUTUBE(16October2012),www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qfVIzmqlGE.
10
JusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(CJEU36)held37thatprotectionconferredbyaPDOdid
notnormallyextendtooperationssuchasgrating,slicingandpackagingtheproduct.
TheCJEU,however,statedthatthoseoperationswereprohibitedtothirdparties
outsidetheregionofproductiononlyiftheywereexpresslylaiddowninthe
specification,andifthisconditionwasbroughttotheattentionofeconomicoperators
byadequatepublicityinCommunitylegislation.Thelatterwasnotyetthecaseunder
theoldregime.38UnderArticle8.239ofRegulation1151/2012,theproductspecification
isnowtobeincludedinthesingledocumentthatiscontainedintheDOORregister,and
theConsorziocannowenforceitsslicingandpackagingrules.
Thespecificationalsocontainsthenamesoftheinspectionbodiesresponsible
forenforcingEUproductionregulations.40IneachMemberState,publicauthoritiesor
governmentagenciesareentrustedwiththistask.Whenitcomestodefiningor
redefiningthespecification,however,quitealotofstateinvolvementcanbeobserved.
Acaseonpointistheenlargementin2009,activelysupportedbytheItalian
government,oftheareaofproductionfor‘ItalianProsecco’.41Theproductionofthis
36FormerlyEuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ).37CaseC-108/01,ConsorziodelProsciuttodiParmaenSalumificioS.RitaSpAv.
AsdaStoresLtdandHygradeFoodsLtd.,2003E.C.R.I-5163.38Regulation2081/92ontheprotectionofgeographicalindicationsand
designationsoforiginforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,1992O.J.(L208)1–8.392012O.J.(L343),art.8(2).40Foralistofinspectionbodies,seeEUR.COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/compliance-authorities_en.pdf(lastvisited5June2016).
41SeeProseccoWine,WINE-SEARCHER,www.wine-searcher.com/regions-prosecco(lastupdated7November2013),forabriefsummary;FilippoMattiaGinanni,The2009ProseccoDOCReform,WINE&SPIRITEDUC.TR.,www.wsetglobal.com/documents/julian_brind_scholarship_2015_prosecco_reform__filippo_ginanni.pdf.
11
sparklingwinehasbeentraditionallyconfinedtotheVenetoRegionaroundVenice,but
itwassuddenly‘strategically’expandedtoincludethetownofProsecco,whichis
locatedintheFriuli-VeneziaGiuliaRegionnearTriesteandtheSlovenianborder.Thisis
theplacewheretheProseccograpevarietyisbelievedtohaveoriginatedfrom.Yet,
uponaccessiontotheEUin2013,CroatiafoundthatitssweetProšekdessertwine,
whichisdifferentfromItalianProseccoinallaspectsofmethodsofproductionand
grapesused,couldnolongercoexistintheEUwithItalianProsecco.42
Inshort,GIsarepeculiarinthesensethattheyconstituteatypeofIPrightwhere
alotofstateinvolvementcanbeobserved,especiallyinthedrafting,maintenanceand
alterationoftheGI’sspecification.ThismayleadtotheconsortiumofGIproducers,or
the(semi-)stateauthorityitselftoalteraGIspecificationaftertheGIhasbeen
registered.Asaconsequence,thismaygiverisetoinvestor-statedisputesbyprivate
partiesthatmayconsiderthemselvesaffectedbythesechangesortherecognitionofGIs
ingeneral(inthattheymaynolongerbeabletomarkettheirproductsunderthesame
orsimilarnames),sincemanyofthesemeasuresleadingtothedefinitionoftheGI’s
specificationcanbedirectlyorindirectlyattributedtothestate.
7.3 Geographical Indications as Property
LikeotherIPrights,GIsareprotectedasproprietaryinterests.Thisbecomesapparent
fromtheWTOPanelreportinEC–TrademarksandGeographicalIndications,43but
evenmoresointhecontextoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR).
42SeeAnselmKampermanSanders,GeographicalIndicationsofOrigin:WhenGIs
BecomeCommodities,AllGlovesComeOff,46IIC-INT’LREV.INTELL.PROP.&COMPETITIONL.(IIC)755–59(2015).
431992O.J.(L208)1–8.
12
InthecaseofAnheuser-Buschv.Portugal,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights
(ECtHR)heldthattheprotectionprovidedforbyArticle1oftheProtocolNo.1tothe
ECHR,44whichguaranteestherighttoproperty,45isapplicabletoIPassuch.46This
44SeeMonicaCarss-Frisk,AGuidetotheImplementationofArticle1ofthe
ProtocolNo.1totheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,inHUMANRIGHTSHANDBOOK(Eur.Council,HumanRightsHandbooksNo.4,2001),www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-EN-HRHAND-04(2003).pdf.
Begin Complex Note
45ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedomsProtocol1art.1,4November1950,213U.N.T.S.222(EuropeanConventiononHumanRights)[hereinafterECHR]:
Everynaturalorlegalpersonisentitledtothepeacefulenjoyment
ofhispossessions.Nooneshallbedeprivedofhispossessionsexceptin
thepublicinterestandsubjecttotheconditionsprovidedforbylawand
bythegeneralprinciplesofinternationallaw.
Theprecedingprovisionsshallnot,however,inanywayimpairthe
rightofastatetoenforcesuchlawsatitdeemsnecessarytocontrolthe
useofpropertyinaccordancewiththegeneralinterestortosecurethe
paymentoftaxesorothercontributionsorpenalties.
End Complex Note
46Anheuser-BuschInc.v.Portugal,App.No.73049/01,44Eur.H.R.Rep.42,para.72(2007)(statingthat‘Article1ofProtocolNo.1isapplicabletointellectualpropertyassuch’,butinthecaseathanddecidedthatlegitimateregulatoryinterestsmayjustifyinterferencewiththerightofpropertyinlinewiththecourt’sgeneralapproachtointerferencewiththerighttoproperty).SeealsoAnselmKampermanSanders,ProfessionalCaseComment,CaseNo.73049/01oftheGrandChamberoftheECHR,Anheuser-BushInc.v.Portugal,4EUR.HUMANRIGHTSCASES(EHRC)433–37(2007).
13
meansthattheownerofanintellectual‘possession’isprotectedinrespectof(1)the
peacefulenjoymentofproperty;(2)deprivationofpossessionsandtheconditions
thereto;and(3)thecontroloftheuseofpropertybythestateinaccordancewith
generalinterest.Inherentintheconventionistherecognitionthatafairbalanceneeds
tobestruckbetweenthedemandsofthegeneralinterestsofsocietyandthe
requirementsoftheprotectionoftheindividual’sfundamentalrights.47
Since2000theEUCharterontheProtectionofFundamentalHumanRights48
recognizedsimilarprinciplesthatEUcitizenscanrelyon.InScarletExtendedv.
Sabam,49theCJEUheld:
47SeeJamesv.theUnitedKingdom,8Eur.H.R.Rep.A98,para.46(1986).
Begin Complex Note
48CharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnionart.17,18December2000,2000O.J.(C364)1,ontherighttopropertyprovides:
1. Everyonehastherighttoown,use,disposeofandbequeathhisorher
lawfullyacquiredpossessions.Noonemaybedeprivedofhisorher
possessions,exceptinthepublicinterestandinthecasesandunderthe
conditionsprovidedforbylaw,subjecttofaircompensationbeingpaidin
goodtimefortheirloss.Theuseofpropertymayberegulatedbylawinso
farasisnecessaryforthegeneralinterest.
2. Intellectualpropertyshallbeprotected.
End Complex Note
49CaseC-70/10ScarletExtendedv.SociétéBelgedesauteurs,compositeursetéditeursSCRL(SABAM),2011E.C.R.I-11959.
14
Theprotectionoftherighttointellectualpropertyisindeed
enshrinedinArticle17(2)oftheCharterofFundamentalRightsofthe
EuropeanUnion(‘theCharter’).Thereis,however,nothingwhatsoeverin
thewordingofthatprovisionorintheCourt’scase-lawtosuggestthat
thatrightisinviolableandmustforthatreasonbeabsolutelyprotected…
Theprotectionofthefundamentalrighttoproperty,whichincludesthe
rightslinkedtointellectualproperty,mustbebalancedagainstthe
protectionofotherfundamentalrights.
Opinionsonhowthisbalanceshouldbestruck,however,naturallydiffer,dependingon
one’sperspective.InaEuropeancase,BritishAmericanTobacco,50involvingchallenges
torestrictionsonadvertising,brandingandtrademarkcommunicationinrelationto
tobaccoproducts,theCJEUheldthatrestrictionsontrademarkuserequiringlabelsto
displayhealthwarningsbytakingup30percentofthefrontand40percentoftheback
ofacigarettepackage51amounttoalegitimaterestrictionthatstillallowsforanormal
useofthetrademark.Thetobaccocompanieshadarguedthatthereisadefacto
expropriationoftheirpropertyinthetrademark.Asimilarargumentwasmadeinthe
well-publicizedcaseconstitutionalchallengetotheAustralianTobaccoPlainPackaging
Act2011.52TheHighCourtofAustraliainBATv.CommonwealthofAustralia53heldthat
50CaseC-491/01,TheQueenv.SecretaryofStateforHealth,exparteBritish
AmericanTobacco(Investments)LtdandImperialTobaccoLtd.,2002E.C.R.I-11453.51CurrentrequirementsareevenmorestringentunderDirective2014/40/EU,
oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof3April2014,ontheapproximationofthelaws,regulationsandadministrativeprovisionsoftheMemberStatesconcerningthemanufacture,presentationandsaleoftobaccoandrelatedproductsandrepealingDirective2001/37/EC,2014O.J.(L127)1,withArts.8–10amountingtoa‘75%rule’intermsofthepackagehavingtodisplayhealthwarnings.
52SeeTobaccoPlainPackagingAct2011(Austl.).
15
therewasnoacquisitionofpropertythatwouldhaverequiredso-called‘justterms’
protectionundertheAustralianconstitution.YetitistheAustralianTobaccoPlain
PackagingAct2011thathasalsoproducedtwoWTOchallengestotobaccoplain
packaging,byUkraine54andbyanumberofotherstates.55AlthoughUkrainesuspended
itsproceedingson28May2015,thelitigationbyHonduras,Cuba,Indonesiaandthe
DominicanRepublicremainsunaffected.Plainpackagingalsosparkedinvestor-state
disputes.56Thesecasesraisequestionsontheremainingpolicyfreedomthatnation
stateshaveinregulatingtheuseorexerciseofIPinlightofsocietalinterests,suchas
publichealth,inthecontextofmultilateralandbilateraltradeagreements,and
investmentprotectionagreements.
53BritishAmericanTobaccoAustralasiaLimitedandOrsv.Commonwealthof
Australia,2012250CLR1.54ComplaintbyUkraine,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,
andOtherPlainPackagingRequirementsApplicabletoTobaccoProductsandPackaging,WTODoc.WT/DS343/1(13March2012).
55ComplaintbyHonduras,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,GeographicalIndicationsandOtherPlainPackagingRequirementsApplicabletoTobaccoProductsandPackaging,WTODoc.WT/DS435/1(4April2012[hereinafterAustralia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks);ComplaintbyDominicanRepublic,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,WTODoc.WT/DS441/1(18July2012);ComplaintbyCuba,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,WTODoc.WT/DS458/1(3May2013);andComplaintbyIndonesia,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,WTODoc.WT/DS467/1(20September2013).
56SeeinfraPartV.
16
7.4 Investor-State Dispute Settlement and WTO Law
Bilateralfreetradeandinvestmentagreementsmayprovideadditionalprotectionto
investorsinrelationtotheirinvestmentsthatarethenconsideredtobe‘possessions’in
thestatewheresuchinvestmentshavebeenmade.Thequestionisthentowhatextent
protectiongrantedbymeansofbilateralagreementschangesthelegalrelations
betweenWTOMembers.AlthoughtheannexestoEUBTIAslistGIsthataretobe
protectedundertheagreement,57itremainstobeexaminedwhattheireffectunderthe
WTODisputeSettlementUnderstanding(DSU)is.
TheWTOAppellateBody,inMexico–TaxesonSoftDrinks,58rejectedthenotion
thatpartiescanmodifyWTOobligationsbymeansofanFTA,whereastheWTOPanelin
Peru–AdditionalDuty59wasnotsocategoricallyopposed.Inthelattercase,thereare
numerousreferencestoPeru’sfreedomtomaintainapricerangesystem(PRS)under
anFTAwithcomplainantGuatemala.TheWTOPanel,however,observedthattheFTA
inquestionwasnotyetinforce,andthatitsprovisionsshouldthereforehavelimited
legaleffectsonthedisputeathand.Peru’sargumentsinrespectoftheFTAwerethat,
evenassumingthatPeru’sPRSwasWTO-inconsistent,PeruandGuatemalahad
modifiedbetweenthemselvestherelevantWTOprovisionstotheextentthattheFTA
allowedPerutomaintainthePRS.Uponappeal,theAppellateBodystated:
57SeesupraPartI.58AppellateBodyReport,Mexico–TaxMeasuresonSoftDrinksandOther
Beverages,WTODoc.WT/DS308/AB/R,(adopted6March2006).59PanelReport,Peru–AdditionalDutyonImportsofCertainAgricultural
Products,WTODoc.WT/DS457/R(adopted27November2014)[hereinafterAdditionalDutyPanelReport].
17
[W]eareoftheviewthattheconsiderationofprovisionsofanFTA
forthepurposeofdeterminingwhetheraMemberhascompliedwithits
WTOobligationsinvolveslegalcharacterizationsthatfallwithinthescope
ofappellatereviewunderArticle17.6oftheDSU.60
However,italsoconsideredthatWTOMemberscannotmodifyWTOprovisionssuch
thatthesebecomeWTO-inconsistent,evenifthesechanges‘merely’operatebilaterally
interpartesandnotamongstallWTOMembers.Inparticular,theAppellateBodyheld:
Wenote,however,thatPeruhasnotyetratifiedtheFTA.Inthis
respect,itisnotclearwhetherPerucanbeconsideredasa‘party’tothe
FTA.Moreover,weexpressreservationsastowhethertheprovisionsof
theFTA(inparticularparagraph9ofAnnex2.3),whichcouldarguablybe
construedastoallowPerutomaintainthePRSinitsbilateralrelations
withGuatemala,canbeusedunderArticle31(3)oftheVienna
ConventioninestablishingthecommonintentionofWTOMembers
underlyingtheprovisionsofArticle4.2oftheAgreementonAgriculture
andArticleII:1(b)oftheGATT1994.Inourview,suchanapproachwould
suggestthatWTOprovisionscanbeinterpreteddifferently,dependingon
theMemberstowhichtheyapplyandontheirrightsandobligations
underanFTAtowhichtheyareparties.61
Inthecaseathand,thismeansthatPeruundertheFTAisonlyallowedtomaintaina
WTO-consistentPRS,whichshouldmeettherequirementsofArticleXXIV62oftheGATT
60AppellateBodyReport,Peru–AdditionalDutyonImportsofCertain
AgriculturalProducts,5.86WTODoc.WT/DS457/AB/R(adopted20July2015).61AdditionalDutyPanelReport,supranote60,at¶5.106.62GATT1994art.XXIV(5)(providingthatpartiescanformcustomunionsor
freetradeareas,subjecttocertainconditionsbeingmet).
18
1994,whichpermitscertainspecificdeviationsfromWTOrules.Allsuchdepartures
requirethatthelevelofdutiesandotherregulationsofcommerceapplicableineachof
theFTAmemberstothetradeofnon-FTAmembersshallnotbehigherormore
restrictivethanthoseapplicablepriortotheformationoftheFTA.63
InTurkey–Textiles,64theAppellateBodyheldthatthejustificationformeasures
thatareinconsistentwithcertainGATT1994provisionsrequiresthepartyclaimingthe
benefitofthedefenceprovidedforbyArticleXXIVGATT1994liesincloserintegration
betweentheeconomiesofthecountriespartytosuchanagreement.Itisclearthat
Peru’sPRSmeasurecannotbeinterpretedasameasurefosteringcloserintegration;
rather,itresultsintheopposite.TheGI‘claw-back’annexestoEUBTIAscanarguably
beheldtocontainobligationsthatapproximatetheeconomiesofthepartiestothe
agreement,providingtheholderofsuchaGIlegalcertaintynotonlyastotheprotection
andenforcementoftheGIbutalsoastotheprotectionofan‘investment’intermsof
productionandmarketingofaGIproduct.
TheWTODisputeSettlementBodyhasmeanwhileestablisheddispute
settlementpanelsinrelationtoAustralia’stobaccoplainpackagingmeasure.GIsare
partofthepropertypackageonwhichtheclaimisbased.Thefivecomplainantsare
arguingthatthemeasureisinconsistentwithAustralia’sWTOobligationsunder
TRIPS,65TBT66andtheGATT1994.67InrespectoftrademarksandGIs,theclaimisthat
restrictionsontheiruseamounttoanexpropriationofproperty.Thereisonlyone
63GATT1994art.XXIV(5)(a).64AppellateBodyReport,Turkey–RestrictionsonImportsofTextileand
ClothingProducts,WTODoc.WT/DS34/AB/R(adopted19November1999).65TRIPS,supranote2.66TBT,supranote26.67GATT1994art.III(4).
19
caveatthatwillbeofrelevancetoadecisioninthesecases68inthecontextofTRIPS,and
thatisthatinEC–GeographicalIndications,thepanelheld:
[T]heTRIPSAgreementdoesnotgenerallyprovideforthegrantof
positiverightstoexploitorusecertainsubjectmatter,butrather
providesforthegrantofnegativerightstopreventcertainacts.This
fundamentalfeatureofintellectualpropertyprotectioninherentlygrants
Membersfreedomtopursuelegitimatepublicpolicyobjectivessince
manymeasurestoattainthosepublicpolicyobjectiveslieoutsidethe
scopeofintellectualpropertyrightsanddonotrequireanexception
undertheTRIPSAgreement.69
7.5 Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Geographical Indications
TheISDScaseofPhilipMorrisAsiav.Australia70showsthatinvestor-statedisputescan
bebroughtinsupportof,orasanalternativeto,constitutionalandWTOchallenges.In
thiscase,PhilipMorrisAsiachallengedthetobaccoplainpackaginglegislationunder
the1993AgreementbetweentheGovernmentofAustraliaandtheGovernmentofHong
KongforthePromotionandProtectionofInvestments.Thearbitrationwasconducted
undertheUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(UNCITRAL)
68Seesupranotes54&55.TheChairofthepanelinformedtheDispute
SettlementBodyon10October2014thatthepanelexpectstoissueitsfinalreporttothepartiesinthesecondhalfof2016.
69SeePanelReport,EC–TrademarksandGeographicalIndications,7.210,WTODoc.WT/DS/174R(adopted15March2005).
70PhilipMorrisAsiaLimited(HongKong)v.TheCommonwealthofAustralia,CaseNo.2012–12(Perm.Ct.Arb.22June2011),www.pcacases.com/web/view/5.
20
ArbitrationRules2010.71Inadecisionof18December2015,theTribunalhearingthe
caseruledthatithadnojurisdictiontohearPhilipMorrisAsia’sclaim.
However,itisimportanttorealizethattheproliferationofISDSclausesin
bilateraltradeagreementsisincreasing.Investor-statedisputesettlementrevolves
aroundthequestionofwhetherexpropriation,directlyorindirectly,hasbeen
conductedaccordingtotheprinciplesofFairandEquitableTreatment(FET).FETis
determinedthroughapplyingprinciplesof(1)reasonableness,(2)consistency,(3)non-
discrimination,(4)transparencyand(5)dueprocess.Inthiscontext,thelegitimate
expectationsofaninvestoraretakenintoconsiderationinordertoassesswhetherthe
statehasexpropriatedinbadfaith,throughcoercion,bymeansofthreatsor
harassment.Duetothefactthatthereisnotrueharmonizedmultilateraldispute
settlementsysteminrelationtoinvestmentdisputes,theinterpretationandapplication
oftheseprinciplesarenotuniform.Duetotheconfidentialnatureofarbitration,notall
arbitrationreportsarepublic.Themostconcreteexpressionsofwhatlegitimate
investorexpectationsarecanbefoundinstatementsmadeinpublishedcasesthatseem
toindicatethatabalancemustbestruck.
Forexample,inInternationalThunderbirdv.Mexico,72aNAFTAdispute
conductedunderUNCITRALArbitrationRules,thepanelheld:
[A]situationwhereaContractingParty’sconductcreates
reasonableandjustifiableexpectationsonthepartofaninvestor(or
investment)toactinrelianceonsaidconduct,suchthatafailurebythe
71UNCITRALArbitrationRules,U.N.COMM’NINT’LTRADEL.,
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html(lastvisited6June2016).
72InternationalThunderbirdGamingCorporationv.TheUnitedMexicanStates,NAFTA,ArbitralAward(26January2006),www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_award.pdf.
21
NAFTAPartytohonourthoseexpectationscouldcausetheinvestor(or
investment)tosufferdamages.73
Conversely,inSalukav.CzechRepublic,74aninvestor-statedisputealsoconducted
underUNCITRALArbitrationRules,thepanelheld:
Noinvestormayreasonablyexpectthatthecircumstances
prevailingatthetimetheinvestmentismaderemaintotallyunchanged.
Inordertodeterminewhetherfrustrationoftheforeigninvestor’s
expectationswasjustifiedandreasonable,thehostState’slegitimateright
subsequentlytoregulatedomesticmattersinthepublicinterestmustbe
takenintoconsiderationaswell.75
TherearefewISDScasesinvolvingIP.76Thesearecasesthathavebeenarguedunder
therulesoftheInternationalCentreforSettlementofInvestmentDisputes(ICSID),
whichisanindependentbranchoftheWorldBank.
First,therewasafailedattemptatarguingatrademarkinfringementcaseunder
investor-statedisputesettlementinAHSv.Niger.77Inthiscase,althoughaconcessionto
serviceNiger’snationalairporthadbeenterminated,therewascontinueduseofseized
equipmentanduniformsbearingthetrademarksofthecomplainant.Thepanelheld
73Id.at49,para.147.74SalukaInvestmentsBV(TheNetherlands)v.CzechRepublic,PartialAward,
(Perm.Ct.Arb.17March2006),http://archive.pca-cpa.org/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306ba57.pdf?fil_id=105.
75Id.at66,para.305.76Foracomprehensiveoverview,seeH.GrosseRuse-Khan,Litigating
IntellectualPropertyRightsinInvestor-StateArbitration:FromPlainPackagingtoPatentRevocation(Univ.Cambridge,LegalStudiesResearchPaperSeriesNo.52,2014).
77AHSNigerandMenziesMiddleEastandAfricaS.A.v.RepublicofNiger,ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/11/11Award(15July2013),www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3034.pdf.
22
thatithadnojurisdiction,asIPenforcementisacivilmatterthatcannotberaisedinthe
contextoftheISDSexpropriationcomplaint.
Second,thereistheongoingcaseofPhilipMorrisv.Uruguay78thatisargued
undertheUruguay-SwitzerlandFTA,79andwherethelegitimacyofplainpackaging
tobaccoproductsischallenged.Inthiscasejurisdictionhasbeenestablishedand
proceedingsonthemeritsaretofollow.
Third,thereisaNAFTA80casearguedunderUNCITRALArbitrationRules.InEli
Lillyv.Canada,81pharmaceuticalcompanyEliLillysoughtdamagesfor$100million
CADandchallengedchangestothepatentabilityrequirementsinrespectofutilityor
industrialapplicability,leadingtheCanadianpatentofficetoinvalidatetwoofEliLilly’s
patentsfortheStratteraattention-deficitdisorderpillandtheZyprexaantipsychotic
treatment.EliLillyarguedthattheinterpretationoftheterm‘useful’intheCanadian
PatentActbytheCanadiancourtsledtoanunjustifiedexpropriationandaviolationof
Canada’sobligationsunderNAFTAonthebasisthatitisarbitraryanddiscriminatory.
CanadaconverselyarguedthatEliLilly’sclaimswerebeyondthejurisdictionofthe
Tribunal.ThehearingisscheduledforMay30–June9,2016.
CasesinvolvingIPcanbeandareclearlybroughtifmeasuresnegatively
impactinguponthe‘investment’canbeattributedtoastatethathassubmittedtoISDS.
IssuessuchasIPenforcementorthresholdsforpatentabilityassuchappeartobe
78PhilipMorrisBrandsSàrlv.OrientalRepublicofUruguay,ICSIDCaseNo.
ARB/10/7,www.italaw.com/cases/460.79AgreementBetweentheSwissConfederationandtheOrientalRepublicof
UruguayontheRecipocalPromotionandProtectionofInvestments,7October1988,1976U.N.T.S.389.
80NAFTA,supranote13.81EliLillyandCo.v.TheGovernmentofCanada,ICSIDCaseNo.UNCT/14/2
NAFTA(7November2012).
23
outsideoftheremitofISDS,astheseareciviloradministrativematterswhereaccessto
judicialreviewisusuallyprovided.However,complaintsover(arbitraryor
discriminatory)denialofjusticemaynotbe.Inthecasesdescribedabove,onecanargue
thatthegeneralmeasurestakenareneitherofanarbitrarynordiscriminatorynature.
GIspecifications,ontheotherhand,arediscriminatorybynaturesincetheyarealways
specificallytargeted,andthischaracteristicexceedsthealreadyexclusionarynatureof
anIPright.Thisisbecause,aswehaveseen,thedefinitionoftheproductcomprisesnot
onlytheproductnameandrelatedlabellingbutalsothedescriptionoftheproduct,a
definitionofthegeographicalarea,proofoftheproduct’sorigin,adescriptionofthe
methodofproduction,thelinkagebetweentheproductandthearea,thenominationof
aninspectionbodyempoweredtopolicethespecification.
Thismeansthatthereareanumberofactionsthatmayhaveanimmediate
impact,notonlyontheexistenceandexerciseofaGI,butalsoonitsvalueandcosts.
TheexampleoftheItalianProseccoDOCreform82comestomind,asanenlargementof
thegeographicalarea,butalsoapossiblereductionthereofhasimmediateeffectsfor
producerswithinandoutsideofthearea.Productionmethodsmayalsobesubjectto
changes.Changestoproductionrequirementsresultingfromaraiseinfoodsafety
standardsmaybelegitimizedwithinthecontextoftheWTOAgreementonthe
ApplicationofSanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasures(SPS).83ManyoftheGIproduction
requirementsare,however,steepedinatraditionandculturethatsolicitthedemand
82Seesupranote41.83SeeAgreementontheApplicationofSanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasures,15
April1994,MarrakeshAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,Annex1,1867U.N.T.S.493.
24
foraparticularproduct.Ifone,forexample,ordersLimburgGrottoCheese,84one
expectsthecheesetohavebeenripenedthroughcompletelynaturalprocessesby
exposureofthecheesetotheatmosphereofalimestonecavethatcontainsthe
BrevibacteriumLinensthatproducesacheesewithapungentodour.Thecheesesripen
onoakwoodenboardsandneedtobeturnedregularly.Thisisadelicateoperationas
thefungigrowingonthecheesesarepoisonous.Theresultoffoodsafetystandards(no
oak,stainlesssteelracks,etc.)hasbeenthatthetraditionalproductionforthe
traditionalconnoisseurconsumerhasnowmovedliterallyandfiguratively
underground.Asaresult,onlythemoreindustrialproducersremainaroundtosella
productthatiscompliantwithlegalstandards.Theyaresellingaproductthatmaybe
safer(althoughthisisoftendisputed)butiscertainlyfarlesstraditionalthanthe
consumerisledtobelieve.Phasing-outrulesconcerningslicing,grating,packaging,etc.
stemfromadesiretofreethemarketfromanticompetitiverestrictions,butarguably
thesecouldalsobemeasuresthathaveanegativeimpactontheinvestmentsmadeby
producersbenefittingfromGIspecificationscontainingsuchrules.Theseformsof
proprietaryprotectionofGIsviaindividualregulationsarealsoopentonon-European
entities,aswehaveseenabove.So,aUSassociationthatholdsanEUGI,suchasthe
IdahoPotatoCommission,85couldthenalsosuebeforethespecialISDScourts
envisagedundertheTTIP86foraweakeningorstrengtheningofprotectionstandardsin
Europe.Inmostcases,afterall,themeasurecanbeattributedtothestate,anddespite
84The‘DuchyofLimburg’wasastateintheHolyRomanEmpire(1065–1794)andapartoftheGermanConfederation(1839–1867).Since1839‘Limburg’isaprovinceinBelgium,andaprovinceintheNetherlands.Furthermore,itisthenameofatowninBelgium,andinGermanyitisusedinrespectofvariouscities,towns,acastle,abbeyandairfield.
85SeeIDAHOPOTATOCOMM’N,https://idahopotato.com(lastvisited6June2016).86EU-VietnamFTA,supranote10.
25
attemptsbyEUMemberStatestodenyprivatepartiestherighttoinvokeinternational
treaties,theCJEUhasaffirmedthedirecteffectofinternationaltreatiesthatbindthe
EU.87
7.6 Conclusion
MorethananyotherIP,aGIdisplaysaveryhighlevelofstateinvolvementinrelationto
specificationsthatdonotdirectlyconcerntheexerciseoftheIPrightintermsof
protectionagainstconsumerconfusionandthelike,butthatverymuchinfluencesthe
valueoftheGIforitsowner.Definitionsofterritory,methodsofproduction,sanitary
andphytosanitarystandards,andothermorenefariousrulesconcerningslicing,
grating,packaging,etc.canbechangedatthebehestofmembersoftheconsortium,but
alsoof(semi-)stateauthoritiesoragencies.Insofarastheseleadtoanegativeimpacton
membersoftheconsortium,orthirdparties,thereappearstobeanincreaseinthe
optionstochallengesuchmeasuresunderdomesticconstitutionalandWTOrules,or
bilateralandregionaltradeandinvestmentagreementscontainingISDS.TheseISDS
87CaseC-104/81,HauptzollamtMainzv.C.A.Kupferberg,1982E.C.R.3641.See
alsoCaseC-265/03,IgorSimutenkovv.MinisteriodeEducaciónyCulturaandRealFederaciónEspañoladeFútbol(EU-RussiaPartnershipAgreement),2005E.C.R.I-2579(precludingimposinglimitsinfieldingindividualsportsmenfromnon-EEAmembers).ButseeCaseC-240/09,LesoochranárskezoskupenieVLKv.MinisterstvoživotnéhoprostrediaSlovenskejrepubliky(AarhusConvention),2011E.C.R.I-1255(holdingthatintheabsenceofEUrulesgoverningthematter,itisforthedomesticlegalsystemofeachMemberStatetolaydownthedetailedproceduralrulesgoverningactionsforsafeguardingrightswhichindividualsderivefromEUlaw);JoinedCasesC-404&C-4055/12P,Councilv.StichtingNatuurenMilieuandPesticideActionNetworkEurope(AarhusConvention),2015EUR-LexCELEXLEXIS62012CJ0404(13January2015)(holdingthatanNGOhasnostandingtoinvoketheAarhusConventioninachallengetothepostponementofcleanairrequirements).
26
clausesarecommonlyincludedinrecentUSandEUtradeandinvestmentagreements,
alsothosewithAsianpartners.Todate,onlyalimitednumberofsuchcasesthathave
beenbroughtinvolveIPrights.Thelikelihoodofsuccessappearslimited,butseveral
keycasesarestillpending.InISDScomplaintsoverIPenforcement,tribunalsseem
hesitanttoacceptjurisdictionoverthesecases.Intheplainpackagingtobaccocases,the
questionwillbetheextenttowhichWTOMembershavepolicyfreedominarticulating
exceptionstoWTOobligations.
EUGIspecificationsareverytargetedandindividualinnature,sothatany
measureaffectingthemmaybeconsideredarbitraryordiscriminatorymuchmore
easilyascomparedtogeneralpolicymeasuresaffectingtheuse,grantorscopeofa
trademark,design,copyrightorpatentright.Furthermore,manyspecificationsare
rootedincultureandcustomratherthaninscienceandutility,whichraisesthechances
ofadisputeoverarbitrarinessanddiscriminationinstandardsimposedwhen
determiningissuesofcultureandcustom.Finally,measuresaffectingGIspecifications
areoftenattributabletoapublicauthorityoragency.Thiscombinationincreasesthe
likelihoodofsuccessofclaimsforprotectionofGIsaspropertyandinvestments.If,for
example,anEUcompanytakesover(i.e.,invests)abusinesslocatedinVietnamor
KoreathatisinvolvedintheproductionofaGIproduct,andtheVietnameseorKorean
authorityredefinesthegeographicalareainsuchawaythattheEUcompanycanno
longerusethatGI,thiscouldgiverisetoanISDScase.ThesamecouldbetrueforaUS
companymakinginvestmentsinAsianjurisdictions.Thisshouldbetakeninto
considerationwhendraftingorchangingGIproductspecifications.
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