4 June 2014 | Vol. 5, № 19.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters,
Welcome to the Strategic Weekly Analysis.
We open this week’s coverage with an
evaluation by FDI Senior Visiting Fellow
Associate Professor Claude Rakisits of the
implications of the fracturing of the
Pakistani Taliban.
Next, we examine the issue of the proposed
Oman-India undersea gas pipeline and the
reasons why the project has been
resurrected.
Moving west, we analyse Russia’s bid to
construct eight nuclear reactors in Iran. This
has caused deep concern in both Saudi
Arabia and Israel, but for different reasons.
We then turn our attention to the evolving
nature of arms purchases in South Asia, as
both India and Pakistan look to diversify
their suppliers.
Our next stop is the world’s newest nation,
South Sudan. We evaluate the effect of its
on-going civil war on agricultural production
and the attendant risk of famine.
Next, we turn to the Seychelles and its
agreement with the European Union,
allowing it to fish in the waters off Mayotte,
in the Mozambique Channel. We examine
the implications of this agreement for its
tuna-fishing industry.
We look next to Indonesia, and explore the
continuing incidence of piracy in Indonesian
waters, even as attacks have fallen globally.
We conclude this edition in India, where we
investigate the likelihood of foreign trade
and economic relations becoming the basic
focus of the new Modi Government. We
also consider their influence on India’s likely
relations with its immediate neighbours.
I trust you will enjoy this edition of the
Strategic Weekly Analysis.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International
*****
Page 2 of 17
The War on the Pakistani Taliban: Some Good News of Sorts
The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) is fracturing and the military appears to have decided to turn
on some of its former militant allies. On the whole, this is good news in the government’s
attempts – by force or negotiations – to end the terrorist scourge weakening the Pakistani
state.
Background
Two important developments took place last week among the Taliban militants holed up in
the tribal areas of Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan. First, a North Waziristan-
based militant group led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur publicly revoked a peace accord with
Islamabad following an air strike against some of its positions. Second, the most important
faction of the TTP led by Khalid Mehsud, also known as Khan Said, alias Sajna, officially broke
away from the TTP, claiming that elements of the TTP had become too violent and
undisciplined.
Comment
For the last three months, the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been
engaged intermittently in negotiations with the TTP. Negotiating with the Taliban had been a
central plank of Sharif’s election campaign last year, but the negotiations have not delivered
anything and are effectively over.
At the same time as these talks were taking place, the militants launched terrorist attacks
against military targets. Having lost some 5,000 soldiers in the war against the TTP and their
fellow ideological travellers in the last decade, the military was never keen on the
government’s policy of talking to the TTP. Accordingly, using fighter jets, helicopter gunships
and heavy artillery, the military decided to retaliate hard against TTP targets in the tribal
areas. While these military operations are on a scale not seen for a long time, this is not the
long-awaited military operation into North Waziristan to dislodge the TTP and the Haqqani
network, an Afghan Taliban faction. Nevertheless, these retaliatory operations have been
very effective in eliminating large numbers of fighters, including a number of field
commanders.
What these operations almost certainly confirm is that the military has decided to no longer
differentiate between the “good” and “bad” Taliban. On the one hand, the “good” Taliban
are those militants who do not attack the Pakistani state and who focus on fighting the
Coalition forces in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the “bad” Taliban are those who attack
civilian and military targets in Pakistan and demand the implementation of Sharia law
throughout the land. If it is indeed the case that the military has finally decided to scrap its
flawed policy of differentiating between terrorists, then we have a game changer. Of course,
there will be blowback.
Already last week, the North Waziristan-based Gul Bahadur militant group publicly ripped up
its 2007 peace accord with the government. But, more importantly, Gul Bahadur has
reportedly asked its fighters to stop operations in Afghanistan and to return home to defend
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the home front, i.e. North Waziristan. An increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan is a distinct
possibility.
Turning to the second big development, the break-away of the critical Khalid Mehsud faction
from the TTP, it is unclear what this will mean for the government’s attempts to end
terrorism in Pakistan. On the one hand, the fracturing of the TTP means that the terrorists
as a fighting force are weakening and the military could take advantage of this diminished
capability by launching more military operations. On the other hand, the new break-away
faction might be able to bring in new recruits more easily now that it is has broken with the
unpopular leader of the TTP, Maulana Fazullah. Reportedly, Khalid Mehsud has the support
of most of the experienced fighters, as well as the Punjabi Taliban.
It is important to note that the selection of Fazullah as the new leader of the TTP upon the
death of his predecessor, Hakimullah Mehsud, following a drone strike in November 2013
was a controversial one. While Fazlullah was the local TTP leader in Swat in 2009 when he
stood up against the military and earned respect for that, not being a Mehsud also means he
has no following in North Waziristan. Moreover, he resides most of the time in Afghanistan,
away from the main recruitment base for the TTP. Khalid Mehsud, who had been temporary
leader following the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, had expected to be chosen as the new
TTP leader.
Although we know that Fazullah has not been supportive of the talks with the government,
it is unclear what Khalid Mehsud’s position is on negotiating with Islamabad and whether he
will want to cut a separate deal with the government. Given, however, that all past peace
agreements with militants have been broken by them, it is unlikely that the military would
agree to such an accord with Khalid Mehsud, especially if there has been a change in
approach vis-à-vis the terrorists. Certainly, Kabul and the Obama Administration would not
be keen to see Islamabad sign a peace accord with Khalid Mehsud as that would free up
potential fighters to assist the Afghan Taliban fight the departing Coalition forces from
Afghanistan.
So, while the military is finally taking a tougher line against the TTP and other terrorist
groups, the government does not have a clear strategy on how to deal with the on-going
threat of terrorism. Moreover, civil-military relations are probably at their lowest in many
years, and this is very bad news when the country is faced with an existential threat which
will simply not go away.
Honorary Associate Professor Claude Rakisits FDI Senior Visiting Fellow
About the Author: Dr Rakisits is Honorary Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Deakin
University. He is also Senior Fellow at Georgetown University’s Centre for Australian, New
Zealand and Pacific Studies and Director at Politact, an advisory consultancy firm, both in
Washington DC. His principal research interests are Pakistan and Afghanistan. He has almost
30 years of professional experience and knowledge in defence and strategic issues,
intelligence and international affairs. A/Prof Rakisits has taught at universities in Australia,
Page 4 of 17
Canada, the United States and Switzerland. He writes and comments regularly for Australian
and international media. He visits Pakistan on a regular basis.
*****
Oman: India’s Answer to an Energy Supply Crisis?
India’s recent interest in establishing an underwater energy pipeline with Oman comes out
of the blue, considering that the initiative failed some 21 years ago. There are, however,
new motives behind the renewed interest.
Background
The history of the Oman-India underwater pipeline project dates back to 1985, when the
two states signed an agreement to increase the development of energy-related enterprises
between them. The proposal to construct the Oman-India pipeline came about in 1993,
during a state visit to Muscat by the late Prime Minister, P. V. Narasimha Rao. The proposal
was for a pipeline to connect Sur in Oman to the state of Gujarat, via the Indian Ocean.
Subsequently, the Indian Navy was awarded a US$5 million contract by Oman, to commence
hydrographic surveys of the Omani coast. The idea was buried, however, after extensive
discussions between the two sides and the prospect of the project going ahead faded – until
a few weeks ago.
Comment
February 2013 saw India’s Ministry for External affairs uncover the long-forgotten
infrastructure project to transport natural gas to India from Iran, Oman and, perhaps, Qatar.
Currently, India is already in a long-term gas supply agreement with Qatar and is seeking to
finalise similar deals with Iran and Oman.
The Omani Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf bin Abdullah, met India’s External Affairs
Minister, Salman Khurshid, in New Delhi in February 2014. According to newspaper reports,
the discussions included the idea of an Oman-India deep sea pipeline. India’s Ministry of
External Affairs has made no official announcement to date, but neither has there been any
denial. Though the details remain unclear, the project is obviously highly important for
India’s energy security strategy.
Given India’s quest to be a leading super-power in the twenty-first century, it will require
copious amounts of energy to fuel those aspirations. Of the available energy options, India
requires large quantities of natural gas, this being one of the cleaner ones, to fuel its
petrochemical and fertiliser industries and for its power-generation plants. The International
Energy Association estimates that India will require 190 billion cubic metres of natural gas
annually by 2035. India has, therefore, explored opportunities to widen its fuel mix and
Page 5 of 17
diversify its supply chain. From this perspective, its pursuit of a gas pipeline with Oman gains
added relevance.
There are, however, other factors that might have kindled the renewed interest in the
project. The first is probably the reduction of international economic sanctions against Iran;
this is expected to allow that country to freely market its oil and gas resources. According to
March 2013 estimates by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Iran has the
second largest gas reserves in the world at 1,187 trillion cubic feet, trailing only Russia. The
majority of those reserves, however, are undeveloped. Once the sanctions are lifted, Iran is
expected to once again become an important presence in the global oil and gas market.
Even though Japan, China, India and South Korea were exempted from the trade sanctions
against Iran, that country’s markets could soon expand exponentially, making India face
additional competition in acquiring Iranian energy.
Second, the large gas reserves in Oman could be another factor. While liquefied natural gas
has played a major part in Oman’s growing gas exports so far, the number of developed gas
fields pales in the face of the under-developed ones. Large investments will be needed to
develop these fields, which will only be economically possible after Oman has found
committed demand for it. Given India’s strategic need to secure fuel supplies, there could be
mutual interest between the two countries to develop and secure this resource.
Finally, there are geopolitical considerations related to the three transnational pipelines
India once considered joining. Two of them – the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline and the
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Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline – have been, to all intents and purposes, terminated.
The deal with Oman could be India’s attempt to secure an energy supply that is immune to
transportation costs, bypasses intermediary states and is virtually secure from acts of
sabotage.
If India does succeed in bringing this project to a successful conclusion, it could mark the
beginning of a renewed attempt to get its economy back on track.
Adil Cader Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Iran and Russia Increase Nuclear Co-operation despite
Regional Protests
Russia has committed itself to assisting Iran in building eight nuclear reactors. The deal
has sparked concern, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Israel, over growing Iranian power in
the region.
Background
Iran continues to develop its nuclear programme, angering both Saudi Arabia and Israel,
which believe that it is intended for military application. The programme has increased
Russian influence in the region, as it provides special assistance in constructing eight nuclear
reactors. The continuation of Iran’s nuclear programme also appears to be leading to a
makeshift alliance between the two countries, already bolstered by prior economic
agreements. The decision of the US to remove some of the sanctions it placed on Iran has
also had an impact on the situation; Israel and Saudi Arabia believe this will further
encourage nuclear proliferation.
Comment
A nuclear-powered Iran is one of Israel’s greatest regional security concerns. Saudi Arabia is
also concerned, as the situation directly threatens its own goal of regional hegemony. Thus,
when the US started to water down its sanctions and tone down the rhetoric towards Iran,
the two countries became concerned about a more prosperous Iran with the capability of
becoming a nuclear power. Israel is particularly vocal about possible Iranian nuclear
armaments; most likely due to the extreme language of former Iranian President
Ahmadinejad, when he threatened to annihilate Israel. The Israelis fear that a nuclear-armed
Iran would be a precursor to aggression and possible war in the Middle East.
Page 7 of 17
On the other hand, Iran appears to have assuaged Western apprehensions through the
nuclear talks, especially most recently in Vienna. This has gone some way towards satisfying
the US demand for regional peace, as it seeks to shift its primary focus to Asia.
Israel’s response is essentially to take matters into its own hands, increasing communication
with the United Arab Emirates in a joint effort to counter Iran. A nuclear-armed Iran is
certainly not in Israeli interests.
Saudi Arabia is also opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, but for a different reason. A profitable
and unsanctioned Iran threatens the Kingdom’s position as the world’s key oil supplier, as
well as being the regional power in the Middle East. It is particularly troubling for Saudi
Arabia that Russia appears to be working with Iran, in assisting its nuclear programme.
Saudi Arabia has little influence over Iran, however, particularly since the US seems to have
decided that under its new leadership Iran is far more approachable. In addition, its
relationship with Russia potentially offers Iran protection from a greater power, even if only
to protect its own potential income. Even without the implications of the US-Iran
rapprochement, Saudi Arabia is not able to assert itself as a regional hegemon, especially
with the rising power of Turkey.
Russia certainly appears to want to supplant the US as the dominant external force in the
region, assisting Iran in the face of international pressure designed to stop its nuclear
programme. The growing Russian influence, coupled with the decreased tension between
Tehran and Washington, could lead to Iran becoming the regional hegemon, especially given
its geographical location.
Russia’s support of Iran may, perhaps, be seen in strategic terms. The central location of Iran
and its still unsettled relationship with the US could give Russia a Middle-Eastern presence
and a strong ally in the region. This would counter US and Saudi Arabian strategic goals.
Russia is also assisting India in the construction of its own nuclear reactors. Thus, it appears
that Russia is attempting to expand its influence in this area of the Indian Ocean region,
capitalising on a waning US interest; such a development would also counter what appears
to be a growing economic relationship between Iran and China.
Ultimately, the situation could herald a shift in regional hegemony. With Russian assistance,
Iran is gaining traction while making moves towards the normalisation of ties with the US, as
well as weakening Saudi oil exports. Iran must be encouraged to extend its new-found
co-operation with the West.
Bryn Lacey Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Page 8 of 17
South Asian Arms Negotiations Indicate Evolving Security
Relationships
Recent public announcements regarding South Asian arms purchases, where the
negotiating state suppliers are always not the usual vendors, underline the strategic
security shifts that are accompanying wider Asia’s rapid geopolitical developments.
Background
On 2 June, Sergei Chemezov, the head of Russia’s state-owned military supplier, Rostec,
announced that Moscow had lifted its Soviet-era arms embargo on Pakistan and that the
two countries were negotiating the terms of Pakistan’s purchase of Russian attack
helicopters. Soon after, on 3 June, the Times of India reported that long-standing fighter jet
negotiations between India’s Defence Ministry and France’s Dassault, potentially worth
US$20 billion, could be ‘wrapped up in the next three months.’ These emerging arms deals
highlight the strategic security and military shifts that accompany the wider region’s
changing geopolitical landscape.
Comment
A Soviet embargo on weapons and military technology sales to Pakistan has been in place
since Pakistan backed the mujahedeen in opposing the 1979-89 Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. With the lifting of the embargo and negotiations underway for the Pakistani
purchase of Russian Mi-35 attack helicopters, a new era in Russian-Pakistan military
cooperation appears to be brewing.
India, Pakistan’s arch-rival, remains the largest arms importer in the world. The South Asian
power is diversifying its imports, moving away from its reliance on Russia, its primary arms
provider for decades, to United States, Israeli and European suppliers. The negotiations with
Dassault for 126 Rafale fighters are a case in point. From a strategic perspective, India does
not wish to be constrained to the one supplier. It has, moreover, been forced to look
elsewhere for its military hardware because of extended supply delays, escalating prices and
sub-standard quality issues. Its purchase of the Russian Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier
from Russia highlights these very issues.
The perceived need in South Asia for force projection, force deterrence and defence
capability is a product of the region’s insecurity and instability. India and Pakistan’s Kashmir
dispute, their on-going rivalry and their strategic divergences over Afghanistan underscore
South Asia’s complex web of military rivalries, internal insecurities, strategic hedging,
extremist fostering and tacit nuclear posturing. Moreover, Pakistan’s use of attack
helicopters to fight the Waziristan-based extremists who plague the country, and India’s
concern at the extremist threat spreading to its borders, will ensure each country’s military
demands remains high.
Military expansion is also an outcome of China’s growing aggression in the East and South
China Seas. India has territorial disputes with China, which feeds into India’s uncertainty. As
Page 9 of 17
a result, it has diversified its military procurement to encompass arms deals with the United
States and Europe.
As US and NATO/ISAF forces prepare to depart Afghanistan at the end of this year, the post-
2014 security of Afghanistan is uncertain. While their security influence in Afghanistan will
linger, pending a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), regional leaders perceive the future of
Afghanistan’s security hinges significantly on developments in Pakistan. The support that the
Taliban fighters receive from institutional elements in Pakistan contributes to their
continued strength and insurgency.
For its part, Russia is probably developing new markets to compensate for its loss of market
share in India. For strategic reasons, presumably to give India pause for thought, it is
engaging in a military sales partnership with Pakistan. Furthermore, as Russia isolates itself
from the wider international community following its engagements in Ukraine, it will likely
pursue broadened relationships with Pakistan and China, which could lead to enhanced sales
of arms and military technology to those countries.
It is difficult to dissociate the timing of Russian openness to new military deals with Pakistan
with the moves from India towards military purchases from sources other than its traditional
Russian suppliers. Developments in the seas off East and South-East Asia, with their
attendant security challenges, also provide Russia with the opportunity to develop markets
in those regions. The sheer force of economics will lead Russia to find markets for its military
products to compensate for its loss of market share in India.
Despite these events, however, it is unlikely that Russia will cease to be India’s primary
supplier of arms and military technology any time soon. India’s existing store of Russian
weaponry precludes that event and its on-going competition with China will further
underscore the need to keep Russia on-side. Arms purchases will help it to achieve that goal.
The secret agreement signed between Russia and India whereby India would pay Russia to
supply arms and armaments to the Afghan National Security Forces to sustain them after US
and NATO forces cease combat operations there this year, moreover, demonstrates that
Russia and India still have a sound relationship. It would appear then that India will still turn
to Russia to obtain its basic armaments but increasingly purchase specifically-required
equipment from other vendor countries.
Hugo Seymour Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Page 10 of 17
South Sudan Faces Famine as Civil War Continues
South Sudan is at a high risk of famine, warns the UN, following the displacement of more
than 1.3 million people and the disruption of the planting season, as civil war continues to
affect the country.
Background
The world’s newest country, South Sudan is facing a famine greater than that seen in
Ethiopia in the 1980s. Civil war has been disrupting the country since December 2013 and
has exacerbated existing food insecurity. Crops have not been planted in time for the
coming season, herders have had to abandon their animals or lead them to poor grazing
areas and fishermen have been barred from rivers and waterways. While more international
aid is needed to alleviate the risk of famine, a cessation of the conflict is the only way that
food insecurity can be addressed in the long-term.
Comment
The UN has warned that some 7.3 million people are at risk of hunger in South Sudan. While
the country produced 900,000 tons of food in 2013, food production is expected to be
reduced by a third this year. At least four million people already face alarming food
insecurity. Other estimates show that 223,000 children face severe malnutrition. While
famine has not yet been declared, it is a critical risk for early 2015.
Earlier this month, UN officials outlined the need for US$1.8 billion in aid, an increase of
US$500 million from their previous plea, with US$77 million required for a programme run
by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The FAO’s programme responds to the
urgent needs triggered by the current crisis. It is also designed to continue vital livelihood
protection and support programmes in less-affected states, ensuring that their agricultural
production continues. The international community is committed to meeting the urgent
humanitarian needs in South Sudan, with the four biggest donors pledging over US$600
million.
Up to 95 per cent of South Sudan’s population depends on farming, fishing or herding to
meet food and income needs. As a result, improving the agricultural sector’s productivity is
essential for long-term development and food security. Increasing the availability of quality
seeds and planting material and improving access to them, will be critical to recovering the
levels of crop and vegetable production. FAO Programmes intend to address the above and
develop agricultural infrastructure to reduce food insecurity impacts in South Sudan.
With an end to the conflict unlikely in the short to medium term, addressing the threat of
famine is a continuing challenge. The civil war is exacerbating the precarious nature of food
security in the country. Attacks on humanitarian personnel and convoys are diminishing the
effectiveness of international assistance. Although the warring parties signed a peace
agreement on 9 May, heavy fighting resumed immediately in the states of Unity, Upper Nile
and Jonglei. Only a rapid termination of the conflict will improve the effectiveness of
international support and create an environment conducive to building improved food
security.
Page 11 of 17
Cécile Levacher Research Assistant Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme
*****
EU Fisheries Agreement Benefits Mayotte and Seychelles
The EU has strengthened the Seychellois fishing industry, granting it access to fish stocks in
Mayotte waters and further developing conservation policies in the region.
Background
The Seychellois fisheries have developed into an integral supply source for states around the
world. Specialising in tuna fishing, it utilises its key strategic position to net migratory tuna
off its coast towards Mayotte. The inclusion of Mayotte in the EU has now had a flow-on
effect for the fisheries based in the Seychelles.
The EU hopes to enhance the industry, while simultaneously developing strong policies to
protect the resource. The landmark agreement, made in late 2013 and formalised in May
2014, allows the Seychelles to operate eight tuna purse seine vessels in the region, subject
to the payment of fees to the Union. This marks it as the first state outside the EU to be
granted permission to fish
in its waters.1
Comment
Mayotte, an island in the
Comoros Archipelago off
the East African coast, has
now become one of the
outer-most regions of the
EU. As an overseas
départment of France, it is
as much a part of France as
Hawaii is of the United
States. While the new
relationship with the EU
1 Uranie, S., ‘European Union allows Seychelles flagged ships to fish in Mayotte waters’, Seychelles
News Agency, 27 May 2014. <www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/597/European+Union+allows+Seychelles+flagged+ships+tt+fish+in+Mayotte+waters>.
Page 12 of 17
will reap benefits for the locals of Mayotte, it placed the Seychelles in an interesting
position. Without permission, Seychellois vessels could not legally fish the waters off
Mayotte after 1 January 2014.
The signing of this agreement grants fishing permission to the Seychelles, has and it also
highlights key prerequisites that the EU insists must be followed and further developed. The
fees paid by Seychellois vessels entering Mayotte waters will enable Mayotte to develop its
administrative and control systems, as well as improve governance and undertake capacity
building in the industry.2
Victoria, the Seychellois capital, is one of the five busiest tuna fishing ports in the world, with
the fishing industry as a whole contributing US$370 million ($392 million) to the national
economy. The licence to fish in Mayotte waters does, however, come with environmental
responsibilities. The newly-signed EU agreement falls under the conservation and
management measures established by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the body
responsible for the management of the tuna stocks in the Indian Ocean. This means that the
Seychelles will have to follow established protocols in fishing for tuna in these waters. The
Seychelles has welcomed this development, however, as it has previously actively worked
towards establishing efficient and sustainable fishing strategies, while extending its efforts
against illegal fishing off its coast.
This development is a positive step, as it also ensures the future operations of the
Seychellois fleet in the region. As part of the agreement, the Seychelles promises to fulfil its
obligations, enforcing the actions presented by the IOTC. The EU also has a vested interest in
the promotion of the tuna market within the Seychelles. Victoria is a major source of canned
tuna for the EU. In 2012, for example, it shipped nearly five million cans of tuna to Europe, a
929 per cent increase on exports in the 1990s.
The new contract is for six years, building on the existing partnership giving the EU access to
fish in Seychellois waters.3 Effectively, EU-Seychelles relations have taken a small but
significant step forward.
Kyle Sargon Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
2 ‘EU and Seychelles sign fisheries access agreement’, FIS Australia, 18 November 2013.
<http://www.fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?monthyear=&day=18&id=64820&l=e&special=&ndb=1%20target=>. 3 ‘Seychelles Seiners Licensed To Fish In EU Waters’, ATUNA, 18 November 2013.
<http://www.atuna.com/NewsArchive/ViewArticle.asp?ID=13649>.
Page 13 of 17
Pirates Release Ship, but Indonesia still Worst for Piracy
The recent hijacking of an Indonesian-bound ship has once again highlighted the growing
problem of piracy in Indonesia. As the world’s leading hotspot for attacks, Indonesia will
need to step up its efforts to tackle piracy if it is to show the rest of South-East Asia that it
has the capacity to defend its waters.
Background
Pirates have finally released an Indonesian-bound Thai tanker after stealing its cargo, the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) said on 2 June. The tanker, which left Singapore on 27
May but soon lost communication, was en route to the port of Pontianak in West Borneo.
The attack is the latest in a string of hijackings in South-East Asia, with pirates recently
stepping up operations in waters off Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. While overall
attacks are down 11 per cent globally since 2011, piracy in the archipelago has continued to
soar. Now the top location in the world for pirate attacks, the country must step up its
efforts to combat piracy in the coming years.
Comment
The Indonesian-bound Thai oil tanker was hijacked soon after departing Singapore on 27
May, with pirates destroying its communication system and stealing the tanker’s oil cargo,
the IMB’s Kuala Lumpur-based Piracy Reporting Centre said. While the 14 crew on board
were unharmed, attacks in the region are becoming more frequent as pirates step up their
operations. Between January and March 2014, says the IMB, 23 actual or attempted attacks
were recorded in South-East Asian waters, the vast majority of which occurred off Indonesia.
By contrast, Somalia, once a global hive for pirate activity, had just seven attacks throughout
the whole of 2013.
This underlines a worrying trend for Indonesia. Although global piracy reached a six-year low
in 2013, with attacks down 11 per cent in total since 2011, piracy in Indonesia continues to
go from bad to worse. Last year there were a total of 106 actual or attempted attacks in the
archipelago, making it the worst location in the world for piracy according to a recent report
by Allianz, a global insurance firm. The country’s hapless police and naval forces, already
overstretched in patrolling the Strait of Malacca, can do little to stop the looting it seems;
the past five years has seen attacks in Indonesian waters increase sevenfold. Things are likely
to get worse before they get better.
Unfortunately for Jakarta, there appears no easy fix to the problem. Some of this comes
down to geography: Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago with 17,500 islands,
stretching across some 5,300 kilometres from east to west. Many of its waterways,
meanwhile, are made up of shallow estuaries and there are bountiful coastal mangrove
forests in which to hide. That makes policing all of its waters near impossible, even for an
advanced navy. Yet Indonesia’s navy is far from advanced. A 2013 defence paper, published
by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, noted that the Indonesian navy, or TNI-AL, is a
long way off being able to control its territorial waters effectively. Moreover, it says, even
Page 14 of 17
with ambitious plans to upgrade its naval forces in the coming decades, Indonesia’s coastal
defence will improve only ‘incrementally’ in the future. Still, this is only part of the problem.
The country’s constrained naval capabilities are also matched by a lack of political will to
tackle the growing problem. Unlike the high-profile hijackings off the coast of Somalia or
Nigeria, the attacks in Indonesia remain localised, opportunistic thefts carried out by small
groups of bandits. Large, organised criminal syndicates are notably absent from the waters
of Indonesia, and kidnappings for ransoms are rare. International attention, therefore, has
not been nearly as intense. Without such alarm, the issue has never really been a key
political item. But the pirates are becoming more brazen and the Allianz report warns that
‘there is potential for such attacks to escalate into a more organised piracy model unless
they are controlled.’ This means that, at the very least, Jakarta should keep the pirates in
check.
Unlike the Strait of Malacca, however, few countries have a national interest in helping
Indonesia to keep its waterways safe and secure. Even in the Strait, by far the busiest
shipping lane in Asia, regional co-operation is not always totally forthcoming. Despite an
agreement between the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to launch a
public campaign, mistrust remains pervasive and a united front is not always noticeable.
Given this, Jakarta will likely have to battle the pirates alone. For now, it may not seem like
an urgent maritime issue, especially given the rising tensions in the nearby South China Sea.
But, as Indonesia aims to expand its naval capabilities in the coming decades, the piracy
threat should not be ignored. If Indonesia really wants to show the rest of South-East Asia
that it can defend its waters, it will need to address the piracy issue first.
Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Indian Foreign Policy Priorities: Foreign Investment Likely to
Take Centre Stage under Modi
Foreign trade and invigorated economic relationships are likely to form the basis of Modi’s
foreign policy. India will seek security guarantees amongst its South Asian neighbours and
increased trade and investment with regional actors further afield.
Background
Prime Minister Modi has backed a domestic growth-and-governance agenda. This could
benefit from a foreign policy that encourages greater foreign investment and stronger trade
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relationships. The Indian election campaign focussed little attention on foreign policy issues.
With his pro-business attitude and liberal views on foreign investment, the expectation is
that Modi will pursue improved economic relations with regional actors.
Comment
India’s relations with its nearest neighbours have begun on a positive footing under Modi.
Relations with Pakistan are off to a good start, after the Pakistani President, Nawaz Sharif,
visited India for Modi’s inauguration. Modi also has an interest in furthering the
development of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). He has
adopted a brand of fast-track diplomacy, which saw him invite the heads of the SAARC
countries to his swearing-in ceremony. This action suggests that he views improved relations
with these countries as central to his foreign policy doctrine.
There are indications that China will seek a strengthened relationship with India. The
Chinese Foreign Minister will visit India in early June, in a bid to foster closer economic
co-operation between the two countries. Modi has visited China in the past, as the Chief
Minister of Gujarat, and the majority of Chinese investment in India is located in that state.4
Modi has developed a strong economic relationship with China, which he shows every sign
of wanting to develop further, to the benefit of the Indian economy.
The position of India in the global economy means that both the US and India could greatly
benefit from increasing trade relations. Increased US trade and investment in India would
probably push the region in a more democratic direction, which is in the interests of both
countries. US Senator Mark Warner has outlined a US action plan for Modi’s first 100 days in
power. The plan includes recommendations for a joint energy project, foreign direct
investment and a review of US visa policies, which are viewed as being overly restrictive on
Indian business leaders and investors.5
If the Indian Government agrees to these proposals, it could lead to stronger economic
relations between the two countries. Modi does not have a wholly warm relationship with
the US, after Washington refused to grant him an entry visa when he was Chief Minister of
Gujarat. If he is able to put his personal issues behind him, which he surely must, then the
US-India relationship has every chance of flourishing under his watch.
Australia views India as a natural ally in the Indian Ocean region and trade between the two
countries is growing. Australia provides a politically stable and reliable source of energy and
resources for the expanding Indian economy. Modi will wish to conclude the Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation Agreement negotiations with Australia. Such an agreement would
increase investment and decrease trade barriers, to the benefit of both parties.
4 ‘China to Send its Foreign Minister to India to Meet Modi’, Times of India, 29 May 2014.
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-to-send-its-foreign-minister-to-India-to-meet-Modi/articleshow/35729028.cms?>. 5 ‘Top Senator Proposes 100 Days Action Plan for India-US’, The Hindu, 30 May 2014.
<http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/top-senator-proposes-100-days-action-plan-for-indiaus/article6064337.ece?homepage=true>.
Page 16 of 17
Indian energy requirements from Africa and the Middle East have increased in recent years.
India, therefore, has an interest in ensuring that energy flows and freedom of navigation in
the region are not curtailed. As the Indian Navy is growing at a slower rate than its Chinese
counterpart, New Delhi may have to continue to rely upon the US as the premier naval
power in the Indian Ocean. Both governments have strategic interests in limiting Chinese
encroachment into the region. To better guarantee its own strategic interests, however,
India may speed up the process of enhancing its own blue-water naval capability, although
this remains a longer-term prospect.
Foreign policy in India is likely to focus upon economic revival, by expanding trade and
investment relationships with China, the US and Australia. Closer to home, the Indian
Government will seek to improve security ties with its SAARC neighbours and may pursue a
programme that leads to it acquiring a blue-water navy that would allow it to project power
further into the Indian Ocean.
If Modi is able to carry out his agenda, this could be a period of economic growth in India to
rival that experienced in the early years of this century.
Mervyn Piesse Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
What’s Next?
NATO will discuss the details of its continued troop presence in Afghanistan at a Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels on 4 June.
The South Sudanese Government and rebels will resume peace talks, focussing on the formation of all-inclusive interim government, on 5 June.
Beijing will host the sixth ministerial meeting of the China-Arab Co-operation Forum on 5 June.
On 6 June, China will hold the first auction of 200,000 carbon permits in Shenzhen under a new emissions trading scheme.
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will visit China on 6 June.
African Union permanent representatives will meet in the organisation’s headquarters on 6 June to draft the agenda for the July African Union Heads of States Summit.
Afghanistan will hold a presidential election runoff on 7 June.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit India on 8 June for meetings with new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.
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