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EUT EDIZIONI UNIVERSITÀ DI TRIESTE POLIARCHIE/POLIARCHIES 1/2018

Abstract

Since the beginning of the 2000s, a literature suggesting that development is an achievable goal for African states has emerged. Arguments like those that consider ‘neo-patrimonialism’ as an insurmountable obstacle to development have been cast-off in case states embark to re-invest rents in a long-term strategy (Khan and Sundaram 2000; Mkandawire 2001). This paper focuses on Angola, and it tries to determine whether oil rents have been so far employed according to a developmental strategy or for short-term consumption. It further argues that short-term consumption was initially encouraged and tolerated as part of an effort after the end of the civil war (2002) to foster elite cohesion, and it was later on demoted when the government adopted a comprehensive long-term development strategic vision, in 2007. However, the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the recent drop of oil prices have badly impacted on this strategy. As a result, the government is growingly turning to Chinese aid trying to keep the mismanagement of strategic resources under control.

Dagliinizideglianni2000,èemersaunaletteraturacheguardaconpiùfavorelapossibilitàdipoliti-chedisviluppodapartedeglistatiafricani.Ipotesicomequellacheguardavaal‘neo-patrimonialismo’comeunostacoloinsormontabileperlosvilupposonostateridimensionateinqueicasiincuigliStatiabbianodimostratocapacitàdi reinvestire le rendite secondostrategiedi lungoperiodo (KhanandSundaram2000;Mkandawire2001).Questocontributosiconcentrasulcasoangolanocercandodide-terminare se le rendite petrolifere siano state impiegate prevalentemente secondo strategie di svilup-pooperalimentareconsumidibreveperiodo.L’ipotesiècheiconsumidibreveperiodosianostatief-fettivamenteincoraggiatietolleratidopolafinedellaGuerracivile(2002),principalmenteconloscopodirendere l’élitepiùcoesa,machesianopoistatiaccompagnatidall’adozionedistrategiedi lungoperiodo,apartiredal2007.Tuttavia,lacrisifinanziariadel2007-08eilcalodeiprezzipetroliferihannoavutounimpattosuquestestrategie.Diconseguenza,ilgovernoangolanosièvistocostrettoaricor-rereall’aiutocineseeametteresottopiùstrettocontrollolacattivagestionedellerisorsestrategiche.

Keywords

Neo-patrimonialism; Africa; Angola; rents; statehood; elite Neo-patrimonialismo;Africa;Angola;rendite;statualità;élite

From Rentier to Developmental Neo-Patrimonialism In Angola

Il Neo-Patrimonialismo in Angola. Dallo stato ‘rentier’ a quello sviluppista*

Federico Battera

* Theauthorwish toacknowledge insightful commentsandcontributesonearlierversions fromFedericoCarmignaniandGabrielePastrello.TheresearchwassponsoredbytheUniversityofTrieste’sproject“GlobalPolitics,Decision-MakingandDemocracy”.

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Introduction

Sincetheendofthecivilwarin2002Angolahasmanagedtocombineaportentouseconomic development1 with a neo-patrimonial political system, usually considered asanobstacletoeconomicprosperityandsocialgrowth(Englebert2000;VandeWalle2001)2. Among such successful stories Angola is not alone, since in the last decade similarperformanceshavebeendocumentedalsoincountrieslikeRwanda,Ethiopia,etc. (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Indeed,there is now a growing trend in literature that looks to neo-patrimonialism through amorenuancedprism.ResearchessuchthatofKelsall(2011and2013)andKhanandSundaram(2000)considertheroleofrentsinearlycapitalismasmorebeneficialfortheeconomy.Thequestionhereis,however,whetherAngolacouldbeincludedinsuchpattern.Inotherwords: isAngolanneo-patrimonialismdevelopmental?Inordertoanswer this question we need to determine the role that rents have recently played in theAngolanpursuitofastablestatehoodandeconomicdevelopment.Itmeanstoes-tablishwhetherAngolangovernmentshavedeliberatelyengagedinastrategyofrentsmanagementtothebenefitofsocialdevelopmentwiththeaimoffosteringnationalunityandidentity(againsttribalismandethnicdivisions),orwhethersuchrentshavebeensimplyconsumedbyrulingelitestothedetrimentofordinarypeople(Hodges2004).Whetherrentextractionhasbeencentralizedtothebenefitofstate-buildingoronthecontraryade-centralizedconsumptionofrentsmorelikelyenvisageinthenear future a dissolution or a failure in statehood3. Similar questions have guided the work of the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) which has so far produced an abundantliteraturethathasbecomeareferencepointtosimilarstudies.Forexam-ple,BoothandGolooba-Mutebi,whoworkedonRwanda(BoothandGolooba-Mutebi2012:381),consideredthatalthough“business–politics interactions” is one of the main featurethatqualifiesRwandaasaneo-patrimonialpolity,“it is important to distinguish between more and less developmental forms of neo-patrimonialism”. In their opinions, developmental patrimonialism captures and helps to illuminate some distinctive fea-turesofRwanda’scurrentpoliticaleconomyandsystemwhichhassofarresultedinpoliticalstability,long-termrentdeploymentandnationalidentity.

1 Growth rates averagingmore than 15% from 2004 to 2008, making Angola one of the fastestgrowingcountriesinSub-SaharanAfrica(SSA).2 Neo-patrimonial states are usually considered as those ruled by and through patron-clientsrelationsandcompetitionwherethereisnodistinctionbetweenthepublicandprivaterealms.Rentsplayanimportantroleinrulingappropriationofpublicresourcestoprivateaims.3 AccordingtoCallaghy(1984),aslongascorruptionandpatrimonialismarecentralized,thesystemcohesionisnotthreatenedasithappenswhenpatrimonialismis“decentralized”.

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This paper moves along the same perspective. Certainly, Angola presents different features from those of Rwanda. The territorial magnitude is different. Ethnic and re-gionaldifferencesarequitemorecomplex.Atthesametime,theexperienceofalongcivilwarandtherecentneedtobroadenthebeneficiariesofeconomicgrowth,seemstohavefinallycompelledtheAngolanrulingelitetomovefromrentsmisappropria-tion to a more developmental strategy. The enormous disposal of economic resources has favored such move. Nevertheless, the growth has so far caused the enormous en-richmentofapowerfulelitewhilemostoftheordinarycitizenshascontinuedtolagindeeppoverty.Suchunbalanceddevelopmentisnotonlytheconsequenceofthepolit-icallongevityofastateleadershipandapowerfulpartybutalsodependsonhistoricalconditions.Thelonganduninterruptedsequenceofwarswhichdatebackfrominde-pendenceandcontinuedwithacivilconflictwhichopposedtherulingparty–MPLA(Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) –tootheroppositionmovements,mostnotablytheUNITA(União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola),remarkablyimpactedonthecurrentstructureofterritorialdistributionofthepopulation,whileatthesametimethepartyandtheleadershipinpowerhighlybenefittedfromastateofpermanent war which ended only in 2002. Such concentration of power has attracted a wideadverseliterature.Skepticismabouttherealcommitmentofthecurrentleader-shiptoreallyinvestinAngola’sfutureiswidelysharedbyinternationalobserversandNGOs4. According to them, growth is largely understood as an opportunity for a further enrichment of a small ruling elite “detached from the ruled masses”(Vidal2002:364).However,whileweacknowledgetheexistenceofample inequalities in theAngolansocietywealsosuggestthatthecentralizationofrentsandpoliticalleadershiphavemaderoomforamorestrategicapproachonbehalfoftheAngolanleadership,whichenvisagesmoreredistributioninthelongterm.Otherwaysaid,weaimtounderstandwhetherAngolastillfitsasanon-developmentalkleptocracyorhasmovedtowardsadevelopmentalregimeaccordingtotheKelsallet al. (2010) typology. According to this model(Kelsallet al.2010:11),developmentalregimesarethosewhereclientelismiscentralizedandorganized,rentsareusedtofinancepolicies,anti-corruptionispartlyentrenched,keypublicgoodsareprovided(includingventurecapital)andgrowthisabovepotential.

The paper is structured in six sections. In the next one the theoretical founda-tionofdevelopmentalneo-patrimonialismispresented.Insectionnumberthree,wewill dwell on the historical trajectory of the Angolan state concentrating on the mo-nopolisticpositionacquiredbythepartyinpower.SectionthreeenlightenswhytheAngolan state should be considered as a neo-patrimonial system andwhat are the

4 Mostnotablyamongthemany,MarquesdeMorais.SeeReferencesbelow.

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main features of Angolan neo-patrimonialism. Although we are not denying that graft hadplayedan important role forpersonalenrichment,wehoweverbelieve that forAngolanMPLAhierarchy,nationalism,state-buildingandelitecohesionwereprior-itieswhichwouldhelptoclarifywhyAngolahasso far failed inbridgingeconomicdifferences among classes and regions.

Section four deals with the used methodology. In particular, a set of indicators will giveevidencetoourattemptofmeasuringtwoimportantvariablesthatwethinkarecrucialtoascertainwhetherAngolafitsornotintothepatternbrieflydescribedabove:

– thematerialbasisofAngolanstatehood;

– thepolicies so far enacted toenlarge thebenefitsofAngolandevelopment toalargerspectrumofcitizens, inparticularanascentmiddleclass,andthe relatedoutcomeswhichcoverarangeofissuessuchasthelevelofpublicsocialspendingand the level of investments.

Wehaveresumedthelatteras‘stateintervention’.Toacertainextentthetwovariablesaremeasurable.Inparticular,measuringstatehoodisimportanttoascertainwhetherAngolameetssomeminimalrequirementstobeconsideredafunctioningstatewhichiscrucial forplanningdurableandeffectivepolicies.Totakesomeextremeformofneo-patrimonialstatessuchasthe‘Sultanisticregimes’asafarthestexample5, these failtomeetminimalrequirementsforstatehoodsincethisiserodedtothebenefitofpersonalruleandstateislikelytocollapsewiththeendofpersonalrule.SectionfiveprovidethereforewithabriefdescriptionoftheeconomicstructureandfoundationofAngolawhichisrelatedtothefirstvariable.Theoutcomesofthepoliciesenactedbythegovernmentarereleasedinsectionsixweresomeofthemarecomparedtootherpolitical systems,whichasAngola lack theminimal requirements tobe considereddemocracies, namely, Ethiopia and Rwanda.

WeconcludebyreasoningonthesupposeddissonantmarksbetweentheAngolandevelopmentandmoresuccessfulcasesasRwandawhichseemtobettermatchthefeaturesofthedefinitionofneo-patrimonialdevelopmentalstate.SinceinAngolathelong-termstrategyissomethingunderconstructionbythecurrentgovernment,suchstudyshouldbeconsideredjustasapreliminaryinvestigationandtheresultsarefarfrombeingconclusive6.

5 Under ‘sultanism’, personal rule exercise its power without restraint and administration isconstantly subverted by arbitrary personal decisions of the ruler (Chehabi and Linz 1998: 8). TheCentralAfricanRepublicunderBokassaandLibyaunderQaddafiweresomeprominentexamples.Inthe case of Angola we are very far from these cases.6 ItisworthtonoticethatAngolaattractedattentionalsoinarecentlypublishedpaperbySylviaCroese(2016).Sheconcentratedonasingleissue–housingdelivery–whichhasbeensuccessfulin

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Developmental Neo-Patrimonialism in Literature

Neo-patrimonialismhas gained ground and influence inAfrican studies in the lastthreedecades.FirstdevelopedasaconceptbyEisenstadt(1973),bydrawingfromthewell-knownWeberianconceptof‘patrimonialism’usedtodescribenewsocio-politi-calphenomenon–i.e.politicalcohesionamongelite–innewlyindependentandau-thoritarian African countries, neo-patrimonialism further developed as a functional ‘catch-allconcept’(ErdmannandEngel2006).Mostrecently,ithasbeenadoptedbyneo-liberalswiththeaimtoexplaintheinabilitytoreformandmodernizeboththeeconomyandpoliticsinAfrica.Theroleplayedbyrentsiscrucialtoneo-patrimonialarguments.TheAfricanstateremainsessentially‘rentier’andrents–minerals,aid,etc.–arecapturedbypowerfulelites(ChabalandDaloz1999)whichopposereformsinordertomaintainpower.Dysfunctionsanddisorderofthe‘officialstate’function-allyworkfortheonesinpower.Thestateiskidnappedbyan‘unofficialstate’–l’État rhizomeofBayart(1989)–madeupofcohesivecliques.Neithereconomynorpoliticsescape from failure to the point that any attempt to transit to democracy is doomed to fail(VandeWalle2001)7.

Thepaucityofsuchargumentscouldnotstandtomoreacuteanalysis.Mkandawire(2001:299)brilliantlyunderlinedhow‘neo-patrimonial’statesinandoutsideAfricahadforlongpursuedawiderangeofdevelopmentalpolicies.Earlieranalysisestab-lishedhowpatrimonialstatecouldpursueeffectiveadministrativetasks(Crook1989).8 Theproblemshouldnotbeaboutrents“persebut rents attached to a wrong strategy” (Mkandawire2001:301).Similarly,alsoKhanandSundaram(2000)havemovedac-cordingtothisperspective:eliminationofrentsdoesnotnecessarilyfavorgrowth;onthecontrary,intheearlystagesofcapitalism,rentscouldbeconduciveforeconomicdevelopmentanddemocratization,althoughdesirable,doesnotnecessarilymeanthatrent-seeking accumulation is given upwith harmful effects on development (Khan2005).Rentscouldbetherefore‘productive’or‘unproductive’(Mkandawire2001:301)

attractinginvestmentsandimportantforrentdistribution,althoughthetwomainagenciesresponsibleforthemanagementofconstruction–GRNandSonangol–werenotactuallyshieldedfromgraftandpersonal enrichment.Her conclusions supportour analysis.Weavoided to concentrateona singleissue preferring to focus more on general and strategic issues.7 Itmustbenotedthatwhilemostofthe90s’literatureconcerningneo-patrimonialregimeswasdevotedtoSub-SaharanAfrica,mostrecentliteraturehasgrowinglyshiftedtoMiddleEast.BachandGazibo(2012)stretchedtheconcepttoincludePutin’sRussiaandBerlusconi’sItaly.8 ForathoroughinvestigationanddeconstructionoftheconceptseeMkandawire(2015).Thispaperattractedextensiveinterestandfavorablereception.InFebruary2017,JCAShostedacolloquiumon“African perspectives on global corruption” devoted to the theme. (http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/7812/Global%20Corruption%20Draft%20Programme%20(002).pdf)

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according to pro-growth long-term strategies and largely independent from regime type.Suchapproachesintheeconomicliteraturearefurtherreinforcedbyoldargu-ments in favor of a certain degree of authoritarianism in the early stage of development thatcouldbefoundinpoliticalscientistssuchasHuntington(1968).MorerecentlyPrzeworskiandLimongi(1993)foundanempiricalpositiverelationshipbetweensomeauthoritarian regimes and economic growth.

The Historical Roots of Angolan Neo-Patrimonialism: From Scarce Resources to Oil Bonanza

Angolanneo-patrimonialismismarkedbytwomainfeatures:along-standingpartyinpower–theMPLA,sinceindependence(1975)–andthepoliticallongevityofitspresident, EduardoDos Santos (since 1979). The absence of any leadership changefavored the grip of the party on state institutions, the army in particular, and the com-mand of Dos Santos on the party. After more than thirty years in power, the current presidentwasabletosurviveoppositionintheparty9, civil war and transition from the one-partystatetoamulti-partysystem.AllhascontributedtostrengthenhimastheManofthesystem.Warand,atleastintheearlystages,alsoideologyhaveplayedanimportantroleinsuchachievement.Independencewasobtainedthroughaliberationwar and ideological opposition to Portuguese colonial rule. The war continued after independenceasMPLAstruggledtoassert itselfagainst internalandexternalpow-erfulopponentsduringaperiodmarkedbyanincreasingideologicalconflictbetweenWestandEast(early80s).Ideology–anti-colonialistandMarxist–grantedtothoseinpowerthelegitimizationtoexcludeopponentsbothoutsideandinsidetheparty.Althoughlateron,ideologycommitmentswereabandonedwellbeforethefirstopen-ings to multi-party politics (multi-party elections were held in 1992)10, that happened onlywhenDosSantosandthosearoundhimhadalreadyestablishedastrongpowerstructureabovethecountry.Twenty-sevenyearsofcivilwar inparticularcreatedastrongcentripetalactiontowardsDosSantos’rule.Thepersistenceofethniccleavagesandthegrowingethnicovertonesofthecivilwarparadoxicallyfavoredsuchresult.

ThesplitintheAngolannationalliberationmovementsafterindependence(1975)hadbeenhistoricallyexplainedbytheethnicbackgroundofthethreeorganizations:the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola)identifiedwiththeNorth-Western

9 By1985,DosSantosassuredhis“‘absolute’control over the power apparatus”winningoveronboththeleftwingandrightwingintheparty(Vidal2002:255-271).10 Socialism was formally abandoned by the 1990 Congress. However, from 1987 onwards thetransitiontoamarketeconomyhadalreadybegun(Vidal2002).

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Bakongopeople;theMPLAwhichhaditsbasisintheMbunduethnicgroup,concentrat-edaroundLuanda;theUNITArepresentedtheOvimbundu,thataremostofthepop-ulation in the area of the central plateau.11Itisnoteworthy,however,thattheMPLA,ratherthanexclusivelyrelyingononeethnicgroup,stronglyidentifieditselfalsowiththewidercategoryoftheurbanpopulationofLuanda,andinparticular,withthelessdefinedcategoryofAfro-PortugueseCreolewhichhadadministeredtheColonyduringtheperiodofthePortugueseRepublic12andbeforetheadventoftheSalazarregime(1926-68).Accordingtothisperspective,someauthorshaveproposedadifferentac-count to theoriginof the twomain independencemovements–MPLAandUNITA,oncethelattersupplantedtheFNLA–bybrowsingthroughsocialclassdivisionsthatcolonial rule had engendered in the Angolan society and their lasting effects. This the-sishasbeenthoroughlydevelopedbytheFrenchsociologistChristineMessiant(2006).Theauthoridentifiedtwosocialcategoriesasrelevanttoadifferentinterpretationonthe nature of Angolan nationalism and, ultimately, on its particular version of neo-pat-rimonialism. A class of old assimilados,representedbytheCreoleeliteofurbancenters,opposed to an emerging class of people from the central plateau, which, thanks to the Protestantmissions,haddevelopedaculturallevelsoastoensurethatitsmembersclaimed greater social equality with the old assimilados.TherivalrybetweentheMPLAandUNITAowessomuchtothissocialantagonism(Messiant2006).

SuchapproachseemsparticularlyconvincinginexplainingthecontrastbetweenthetwomainplayersintheAngolancivilwarandtheconsequentbi-polarizationofthecivilwar(Vidal2002:376).UNITAperceivedtheurbanCreoleclassaspartofthecolonialpowerandidentifieditselfwiththeindigenouspeopleslivinginthehinter-landanddevelopedanideologicaltoneaccordingly(Mabeko-Tali2001)13.

ThesocialoriginofMPLAis importanttounderstandtherootsofthecurrentneo-patrimonial ofAngolanpolity, but it is not enough. In fact, as a result of theadherenceofMPLAtotheCommunistblocduringtheColdwar,thepartyorganizeditself around the principle of democratic centralism, with a Central Committee and PoliticalBureauthatrepresentedtheperipheralsections.Suchstructuralorganiza-

11 ThisdifferentethnicarrayledPélissier(1977)todefinethethreemovementsas“ethno-nationalists”.12 ThePortugueseRepublicextendedbetween1910and1926andcoincidedwiththeimplementationof the policy of “colonial autonomy” within favored the Afro-Portuguese Creoles to whom in fact was delegatedtheadministrationofthecolony(MacQueen1997:5).13 Although UNITA after independence departed from the Maoist rhetoric, its ideological tunemaintainedtheequationbetweentheCreoleclassandcolonialism.Followingthispattern,theFNLAstandsoutbecause,whileidentifyingitselfwiththeBakongoelite,themovementwasbornandfedthankstotheAngolanmigrantsinBelgianCongo,wherethismovementwasalsobased.SincetheroleofFNLAhasbeenmarginal,wenolongerconcentrateonthismovement.

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tionwhichhasshapedtheMPLAuptonowhasalsoreinforcedelitecohesioninatime of scarce resources14.

RelationsbetweentheSovietUnionandtheMPLAhadbegunin1964atthedawnofAngolannationalism(BlumandHope2003:250)andin1969theUSSRprovidedar-maments to the movement15.DuringtheColdwar,theSovietUnion,alongwithCuba,representedtheMPLAmainallies.ThesupportandaidthattheMPLAgovernmentreceivedfromtheUSSR,playedacrucialroletoenablethegovernmenttopursuethewareffortandtoshapethecountryinaccordancetothegrowingneedstocentralizethecountry resources. In thiscontext, it shouldnotbe forgotten that thedifficultyofestablishing,throughouttheperiodofthecivilwar,arealcontroloftheterritory,necessarilyledtheMPLAGovernmenttofostercloserpolitical-militaryrelationswithUSSR,inordertoconsolidatethestabilityoftheregime(Malaquias2000).Inanycase,anyrealcommitmenttothesocialistdoctrineofMPLAwaswithtimeandpracticedi-luted(Sommerville1986:174)tothepointthatthegovernmentwasabletoestablishcommercialandindustrialrelationsalsowiththeWest16.

During the whole civil war (1976-2002) the territorial control posed an important problemtoMPLAleadershipbutatthesametimefavoredcentralization.Duringlongphasesofcivilconflict,MPLAcontrolledonlythecapitalandtheneighboringprovinceofBengowhileUNITAwasabletomanageuptothe70%ofAngolansoil.ThisfactorresultedinahyperdevelopmentofLuanda.PeopleflewfromtheperipherytoLuandalooking for safety. This fact caused political effects. People moving to the capital city werenot,indeed,onlyseekingprotectionbutalsointegrationintothepoliticalsystem.ThatcontributedtoenlargethebasesofMPLAacrossdifferentethnicgroupsandcreat-edasolidsocio-politicalfoundation.TheareaundercontrolbeingmodestmadeeasierforMPLAtomanageandorganize.IfweestimatethatabouthalfofAngolanpopulationresidesinthemetropolitanareaofthecapitalforallthelastinginternalconflictandcurrentlyLuandahosts¼ofthetotalAngolanpopulation(about7-8millionpeople)17,

14 Oilwasfirstdiscovered in1955onshore,butproductionstagnatedupto themid-80s tofinallyboomatthebeginningofthe2000saftertheexploitationofdeepwaterfieldswentatfullspeed.15 In termsoforganizationandof themanagementof thenew independentstate, thisalignmentresultedintheadoptionofcertainmeasureswiththeaimofnationalizemuchoftheAngolaneconomyandtocentralizepoweradoptingthemodeloftheSovietparty-Staterelationship(Hodges2004:9).16 Reference ismade towhathasbeencalled the“privatediplomacy” thatenabledAngola to signcommercialagreementsfortheexploitationofoilresourceswithUScompaniesevenduringtheperiodoftheColdwarandforthedurationofthecivilwar(Reno2000:219).Unlikeothereconomicdomains,Luandaavoidedtonationalizeactivitiesofcompaniesoperatingintheextractivesector(EnnesFerreira2005).17 Official Census results of 2014, http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2014/10/16/angola-has-a- population-of-24-3-million-people/.

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wecaneasilyunderstandtheeffectsoftheconflictontheorganizationandthepoliti-cal foundations of the party of Eduardo Dos Santos.

Partycentralizationandtheoverlapbetweenpartyorganizationandstatestruc-tures,alsoallowedtoenlargethesocialbasisoftheregimeaslongassocialgroupswereincluded.Sincethesocialbasisoftheregimewasfarmoreimportantthananyideologicalallegiance,integrationintoMPLAwasrealizedthroughkinshiptieswithfamily networks interacting among themselves through marriages and the like. These tiespervadedallthestructuresatthetopofthestateasleadingofficesinvariouspo-liticalandinstitutionaldomainswereprogressivelyoccupied.Suchidentificationbe-tweenstate,partyanditssocialbasishadthereforeaterritorialimpact.Stateauthoritycoincided with the territory of the social groups included in the party. On this part of the Angola the regime grasp was undisputed.

The Creole social class which was at the foundation and represented the core of theoriginalMPLAstructureexpandedandgrewinnumberasprogressivelyintegrat-ed native components within the party and their own group. As a consequence its numberdiluted.Migrationfromtheperipherytothecenterthereforegeneratedtheexpansionof theparty to thepoint toencompassmostof theethnicgroupswhichmingledintheurbanconurbations.ThisenabledMPLAtostandasasubstantiveandnon-exclusionaryparty,advocatingitselfasthebuilderofanationandnotastheman-ifestationoffactionsupremacyovertheothersandatthesametimetoefficacious-lycounterthemilitaryandideologicalthreatofSavimbi’sUNITA.GeneralelectionsheldinSeptember1992confirmedthesuccessofMPLAformula.Whilemanipulationandwidespread irregularitiesmarkedtheresults inareaswerebothMPLA(Luanda,Bengo,MalanjeandKwanza-Norte)andUNITA(Huambo,Bié,BenguelaandKuando-Kubango)werestrong.Notwithstanding,MPLAwasabletowinoverareaspoorlycon-trolledasmuchof theEastandtheSouth.Clearly theMPLAabilityofwinningtheconfidenceofmuchoftheminoritygroupsoutsidetheCreole/M’Bundu-Ovimbundofriction,madethedifference.WhileMPLAwasabletopresentitselfasanationalpartytryingtobuildanincludingmulti-racialnation,UNITAappearedasanethnicpartytomuchoftheelectors(Bridgland1995).Suchresultswererejectedbythemainopposi-tionparty–UNITA–asconsideredrigged.Aftertheelectionsthecivilwarresumedandfor longthecountrydidnotexperiencedmultipartyelectionsagainupto2008parliamentary ones which followed the end of the civil war and the military defeat of UNITAof2002.Duringtheseelectionsandthefollowingin2012,MPLAlargelybene-fittedofhishegemonicpositionintermsofresourcesandcoveragebythemedia18. The

18 ThetransformationofUNITAfromrebelmovementintoapoliticalpartywasnotsuccessfulanditsleadershipdidn’tchangetheirimageofrepresentingonlyafactionofthecountry.UNITAcontinuedtobelargelyperceivedasathreattounityandpeacefulcohabitation.

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politicalsystemremainedinsolidhandsbehindafaçadeelectoraldemocracywhichgrantedoppositionameagershareintheNationalAssembly19. According to the con-stitution,suchelectionsconfirmedalsoDosSantosasPresidentoftheRepublichavingbeenpreviouslydesignatedbyhispartyasheadoftheMPLApartylist20.

ThehistoricaltrajectoryofAngolanpowerhasthereforefavoredthecentralizationandelitecohesioninMPLA.Atthesametimethestronggripofthoseinpoweroverresources has developed the political and economic system towards what it is usually knownas‘neo-patrimonialism’.InthecaseofAngola,wecanconsidersuchmodernformof patrimonialism as ‘functional’21 since it does not oppose economic growth anditisasubstantivedeparturefromanenduredperceptionofneo-patrimonialism.Havingendedtheconflictin2002,DosSantosfoundhimselfinapositiontoplanthereconstructionofthecountryaspossessinganenormouseconomicpotentialbasedonvastmineralresources,oilinparticular.Inthisguise,theMPLAunderthesupervisionof thePresidenthasoperateda redistributionofwealthbasedonprioritiesdefinedatthetopofthesystem.Thisprocesshasmeanttheincorporationintheestablishedpowerstructuresofa largebureaucraticelite,alreadycreatedbeforetheendof thecivil war, which had allowed individuals to maintain their own loyalty and patronage networkswhilebeinglinkedtoapowerfulleadershipthatprovidesthedirectioninor-der to control the system22.Oilresourceshasbeensofarmeanttofosterelitecohesionand national foundation. The party is called to play an important role and patronage isintendedtobridgethegapbetweenthosewhoareassimilatedintothesystemandthosewhoareout,beyondtheirethnicorregionalistbackground(Lemarchand1972).Corruption, which is widespread, plays a functional role within the party power struc-ture and to the maintenance of the same. It is however tolerated up to a certain point that is until it does not affect economic development. At the same time it represents adifferentandunconventionalmethodofwealth redistribution.Powerfulelementswithin the power establishment are therefore periodically and surgically removedfrom assignments in order to reinforce the central authority of the leader. Sometimes some of them are asked to remit the money to the state, in private form without needs

19 AlthoughthemainoppositionpartyUNITAmanagedtoincreaseitsshare(from16to32seatsoutof220)from2008to2012,theNationalAssemblyremainedoverwhelminglydominatedbytheMPLA(175/220seatswith71.8%ofthevotescastin2012).20 TheAngolanindirectpresidentialelectionsystemcontributestoreinforcethepoliticalpowerofthe party and of the president over the party.21 NunoVidal(2002),whoisquitemorecritic,definesitas“post-modern”.Itsdistinguishingfactorsare that redistribution and interdependencies happenedmore at the top with the exclusion of thebottom.22 Numbersofpeopleemployedinthepublicsector(constructionincluded)isestimatedaroundhalfamillionalmostdoubledfromfiguresofthemiddleofthe90s(RoA2014).

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toturntojustice.Thecaseofformervice-presidentofSONANGOL,MateusdeBrito,showshow‘decentralized’corruptioniskeptundercontrolbytheexecutivepowerandpossiblyeasedwiththeaimofstability23.

The Angolan constitutional system entrusts the President with enormous powers. Central power has assumed the direction of the economy, where oil is intended to foster theeconomicfoundationofthecountrybuildingituparoundbigenterprisesinorderto win the challenges provided from the international system to the African economies which are notoriously weak24.Wecanobserveasimilarhighlycentralizedapproachtowards the lowest echelons of the administrative structure, since the Presidency has also the prerogative to appoint and dismiss provincial governors, as there are no local elections25.Consequentlylocaladministratorsarenotrequiredtobuilduptheirownconstituencies since they are forced to rely on the support from the top. The President in that guise maintains total control even on the more peripheral areas toward which heturnedhisattentionduringthefirstphaseofcountryreconstructionbetween2002and2012withahugeplanofpublicworks(roads,airports,waterdistribution,energy,healthprograms,etc.).Thereforethepublicdirectlylookatthepresidencyasthesoleresponsibleofimplementinglocalpoliciesandgovernorsareremovedandrandom-ly appointed. This way to manage government position prevents the formation of a realalternativepowerthatcouldthreatencentralpower.Thisstrategyhasbeenrou-tinelyemployed:partysecretarieschangefrequently,fromLopoFortunatoFerreiradoNascimento to JoãoManuelGonçalvesLourenço,withoutdamaging thePresident’shegemony.Furthermore,policies to thebenefitof theperiphery engender in fact acentripetalreboundthatfurtherlimitstheroleoflocaladministratorsastomereim-plementagenciesofpoliciesdefinedelsewhere.

23 AnotheroutstandingcasewasthatofFernando‘Nando’PiedadeDosSantos,whoisacousinofthePresident,currentPresidentoftheNationalassembly.In2011,hewasVice-PresidentoftheRepublic.HewasforcedtoresigninNovember2011beingsuspectedtohavereceivedillicitinvestmentsfromLibanese firms. (http://club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9350:nando-impedido-de-entrar-nos-estados-unidos&catid=11&lang=pt). Factionalismoftodayisunabletoendangerpoliticalandeconomicpositionatthetop.FactionalismplayedanimportantroleintheMPLAuptothemiddleofthe80sbutwasdefinitivelyresolvedinfavorofDosSantoswellbeforethecivilwarthateruptedagainfortenyearsafter1992).24 This point will be investigated further on. See for more details the presidential messageaddressed to the nation in occasion of the 40th anniversary of independence (Nov. 11th, 2015) (http://club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22645:angola-40-anos- integra-da-mensagem-do-presidente-da-republica&catid=23:politica&lang=pt&Itemid=1123).25 Thefirstpartiallocalelectionareexpectedfor2018.

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Measuring Statehood

In the introduction, we have considered neo-patrimonial states those where rents playacrucialroleindefiningpowerrelations.Furthermore,byfollowingMkandawire(2001) andotherswehavealsodiscriminated rentsbetween thosewhich stimulateproduction against those that prompt only consumption. Productive rents, which are important to sustain a developmental state, need at least two conditions26:

a) Rentsaccumulationmustbecentralized–i.e.governedbyonepersonand/ororga-nization(usuallyapoliticalparty);

b) Theexistenceofalong-termstrategyofpro-growthinvestments.

Centralizationisneededtoavoidthatalternativepowerfulcentersemergetothepointtodefygovernmentcontrol (Callaghy1984).Furthermore, rentsmustbeenoughtosustaingrowth.Whengrowthisconspicuous,amoderatewasteofresourcesintermsofconsumptionandcorruptioncanbetolerated27.Theexistenceofapro-growthlong-termstrategyimpliesthat investmentsanddevelopingprogramsbenefitsmustalsobeallocatedoutsidea‘coregroup’,i.e.aclique,smallelite,co-ethnicorco-regionalfactions.Whatwemeanbyallocationoutsidethecoregroupisnotonlytheredistribu-tiontoordinarycitizensbutalsotheexistenceornotofregionalsocio-economicun-balances28.DuringthewarbetweenUNITAandMPLAthecountrywasdividedbetweenpro-government–muchofthecoastalareas–andanti-governmentregions–muchofthe interior. At that time, such divide was also perceived as ethnic.

Asfarasrentscentralizationisconcerned,partydominancehasfavoredthecaptureofthestateanditsstructures–thebureaucracy,theparastatals,etc.–bythepartyinpower.Mostoftheliteratureagreeonthat:partystructuresandthoseofthebureaucra-cyarebarelydefined(Gastrow2013).Mostofcrucialparastatalsarepresidedbypower-fulmembersoftheparty,theirfamiliesorcronies(Kibble2006;SoaresdeOliveira2007

26 Rentsareheredefinedasrevenuesincreasingtoafactorofproduction(land,labororcapital)inexcessofnormaltradingprofitsinacompetitivemarket(BoothandGolooba-Mutebi2011:6).27 How‘moderate’shouldbetheappropriationofresourcesbyindividualsdependsonthequantityof theresourcesatstatedisposal. Ifservicesaredeliveredtocitizensanddevelopmental targetaremetwecanarguethatmisappropriationistolerable.PRofChinaisastandingcaseasitisfoundinliterature.HuntingtoninPolitical Order in Changing Societies(1968:64)arguesthatcorruptioncouldhave positive political as well as economical side-effects when moderate.28 Thelatterhasmuchtodowith“horizontallegitimacy”(Holsti1996:97),whichmeansthepoliticallydefined community that underlies the state. We should remember that regional concentration ofeconomicpowercontributedtoprecipitatethecivilwar.

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and 2011). A powerful network (futungo)29hasestablisheditselfabovethemostimpor-tant positions in economy, military and government. At the top of such system there is SONANGOL(Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola)andachainofsemi-publicorprivatefirmsledbypowerfulmembersoffutungo30. Consequently, rents during and aftertheendoftheColdwar,provedtobecrucialasaninstrumentofdominionoftherulingeliteofMPLA.Finally,withtheendofthecivilwarin2002,UNITAasapowerfulchallengingorganizationhasalsobedefeated31.Therefore,rentshavenowbeencen-tralized into a solid and interconnected clique around thePresidencywhich strictlycontrols the party in power. Personal enrichment is tolerated to the point of not endan-gering the system and factionalism is ruled out and punished.

Angola benefitted of enormous resources fromoil exploitation since the endofthecivilwar in2002and the resulting loweringofmilitaryexpenses.Consumptionopportunitiesof theelitecertainlyboomedbut resourceswerestillenoughtostartinvestmentprogramsandtoenactormaintainredistributivemeasures. If we follow Skocpol(1985:9)theabilityto‘implementofficialgoals’couldbealsoameasureofstate capacity.

IfweagreethereforethatAngola isa‘neo-patrimonial’ stateandthatrentsen-dowed those in government with enormous resources for consumption, neverthe-lessbymeasuringstatehoodwefindrobustargumentswhichdistanceAngola frommore controversial and weak African states. Wehave first considered statehood astheoutcomeoftwomainmacro-dimensions–authority and effectiveness–withthefirstmeantaspoliticalorderandthesecondrelatedtothecapacityofstateagenciestoprovidewithservicesthepublicthroughfunctioninggovernmentstructures32. As far as authority is concerned political violence is today almost completely under con-

29 FromthenameofthepresidentialcompoundinLuanda.AccordingtoSoaresdeOliveira(2007:606), The FutungoisanebulousgroupofunelectedofficialsandbusinessmenbuiltaroundPresidentEduardodosSantos.Theybecamethekeystructureofpowerinthe1980s,withtherelativesideliningofMPLApartyorgansand“formal state structures”.30 SeethecontroversialreportsofMarquesdeMorais(2010and2011).Amongtheprivatecompanies,“GEFI”(Sociedade de Gestão e Partecipações Financeiras)standsoutasaprivatebusinessoftheMPLA.GEFI control directly or indirectly enterprises which operate in the bank system, construction,industryetc.Importantpoliticalpersonalitiesarepartofthisbusiness.ItisdifficulttoevaluatetheinstrumentalrolethatGEFIhadplayedfordevelopmentasithappenedwithTri-StarinRwanda(BoothandGolooba-Mutebi2012).Nottomentionthedelicateissueoftransparency.However,realeconomicpowerinAngolarestsonSONANGOL.31 WemustremindthatUNITAbenefittedfromthecontrolofdiamondrichfieldsduringthecivilwar(Le Billon 2001).32 SeeBrattonandChang(2006).Whatforusis“authority”fortheauthorsis“scope”andwhatforusis“effectiveness”forBrattonandChangis“capacity”.Wehavenotconsidered“legitimacy”asamacro-dimension since for us this is more a consequence of the other two.

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trol of the central government33.Wearethereforeabletooperationalizeourdesignbyconcentratingonlyon“statehoodaseffectiveness”.Wehaveoperationalizedsuchbyselectingtwomainvariables:thematerial basis of statehood and state interven-tion.Thelatterisdependentfromtheformersincethematerialbasisofstatehoodisapre-conditionforaminimalstateassuch.Thetwowillbethesubjectofthefollowingchapters.Oncemeasuredthetwovariables,wearelikelytoestablishwhetherAngolacouldbeconsideredaspotentiallydevelopmentalornot.Wehaveincludedalsosomeobservationson“administrativeefficiency”34,sincethismeasureimpliestheexistenceoffunctioninginstitutionsandimpactsonthestatecapabilities,havingacapablebu-reaucracy a reinforcing effect on growth (Evans and Rauch 1999)35.Inthefinalchapterweconcludewithsomeconclusiveremarks.Wewillseewhetherthenewinternationaleconomiccontextstrengthensorweakensthemeasuresofaradopted.

As far the material basis of statehoodisconcerned,twoindicatorsareusedhere–government revenue (excluding grants) as % of GDP, and taxes on income, profits, and capi-tal gains as % of revenue –whicharefoundintheWorldBank’sWDI(WorldDevelopmentIndicators)and/orinthedatabaseprovidedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).

As for state intervention,wehaveusedfourdirectindicators:general government total expenditure36, level of investment (both public and private), public spending on health/education as the main indicator for social spending and the volume of subsidies, whichpartiallycouldbeconsideredasafurtherredistributivemeasure.Wecouldfi-nallymeasuretheirpossibleeffectbylookingatsomeindirectindicatorssuchaslifeexpectancy,under-5mortality rates,enrollmentand literacy,etc.Dataare found inmanydatasetsavailablebutwehavereliedonthoseprovidedbyUNICEFandUNECA.Asfortheeffectsofsuchintervention,otherdatawillbegiven, such as poverty, liter-acy, life expectancy, etc.,ifpossibledisaggregatedatprovinciallevelinordertodetectterritorialinequalities.Figure1resumesthevariablesanddimensionstogetherwiththeir direct indicators.

33 EventhepoliticalsituationinCabindahasbeenforthemostresolvedafternegotiationwithFLECin 2006.34 Theindicatorsused–government effectiveness and control of corruption–arebasedontheWorldBank’sWGI(WorldGovernanceIndicators).35 Institutionsand,inparticular,bureaucraticapparatusesarecrucialforstatecapacity(Skocpol1985).36 SuchdataarefoundintheWDIoftheWBandIMFdatasets.

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The Economic Foundation of the Angolan State

Angola’s economyhas stronglyexpandedafter theendof the civilwar (seeTab.1).Angolaremainsasoneofthemostpromisingeconomieswithrobustpotentialitiestowinpovertyandinequalities.Macroeconomicindicatorsarereassuring.Externaldebtissustainableaveraging25%ofnominalGDPin201437;currentaccountbalanceshavebeenalsopositive,fluctuatingbetween+25.6(%ofGDP)in2006anda+6.7(%ofGDP)in2013,withtheexceptionof2009(-10.0).In2009,AngolarequestedIMFforastand-byarrangement(SBA).Asofficialreservesfellbyone-thirdinthefirsthalfof2009,inordertoavoidadisruptivedevaluationoftheexchangeratewithdestabilizingsocialconse-quences, theGoAproposeda27-monthSBAaiming toalleviate immediate liquiditypressures.Asforthebeginningof2012,theeconomicprogramunderpinnedbySBAhadmetthekeyobjectiveofrestoringmacroeconomicstability.Undertheprogram,theau-thoritiesundertookasignificantfiscaladjustment,settleddomesticarrears,rebuiltfor-eignreserves,stabilizedtheexchangerate,andreducedinflation(IMF2012).ThereforetheGoAmanagedtoendurethefinancialcrisisalthoughtheimpactongrowth.WhiletheGDPhadgrownatdouble-digitsbetween2004and2008,withapeakof+22.6%in200738,perspectiveforgrowthresumedsteadilybutwidelyunder10%.

37 Upfrom22.1%in2013.Domesticdebtremainedat11.6%ofnominalGDP(AfDBet al.,2015:5).38 Thepercapitaannualincomehassteadilyincreasedtoofrom2004from2480to5400USD(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx.).

Figure1–Variablesand(direct)IndicatorsforStatehood

VARIABLES INDICATORS

material basis of statehoodGovernment revenue (GR)

Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains (TIP)

state intervention

General government total expenditure (GGTE)

Level of investment (LI)

Public spending on health/education (PSHE)

Volume of subsidies (VS)

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Table1–GDPgrowth(annual%)(2002-2016)

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

13.8 5.2 10.9 18.3 20.7 22.6 13.8 2.4 3.4 3.9 5.2 6.8 4.8 3.0 0.0

Source:WB(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2016&locations=AO&start=2013&view=chart&year_high_desc=true)

Notwithstanding such proved capacities as a state some economic weaknesses and unbalancesremains.Thefirstpointstooildependency.Lackofdiversificationintheeconomic production is a secondmainweakness.While growth in agriculture andmanufacturing sectorshavebeen robust in recent times39, the economyexpansioncontinues indeedtoowemainly tooilproductionandexportwhichup to recentlyhavebenefittedlargelyfromtherisingoilprices.Oilproductionandexportaccountedabout46%ofAngola’sGDPand96%ofitsexportsin2012.Therecentcrashofcrudeoil price has impacted on the spending plans is alarming the government which is seekingtoplugfinancialgapsthatareemerging40.Suchinabilityofthegovernmenttodiversifytheeconomyisduetothelackoftime–growthhasbeentoorecenttoarrangeproperinstrumentsfordiversification–anditindeedleavesthecountryvul-nerableagainstexternalshocksasithappenedwiththe2007-08worldfinancialcrisisand again most recently with the collapse of oil prices. In particular agriculture, is a standing case for the economic potentialities poorly disclosed so far given that agri-culturestillemploysabouttwo-thirdofAngolanlaborforce.Before independence,Angolawasself-sufficientinallkeyfoodcrops(exceptwheat)andwasanexporterofcash crops, in particular coffee and sugar. The civil war and poor investments had an impactandthecountryhasbeendependentonfoodimportsandfoodaidsince1990.Amere10%ofthearablelandiscurrentlyundercultivationandper-acreproductiv-ityisoneofthelowestinsub-SaharanAfrica(IFAD2014).Althoughgrowing,con-tributionofcrops,livestock,forestryandfisheriestoGDPisabout5.4%(WB2013);afigurethatincreasedabouta10-yearaveragerateof13%,primarilyduetopublicinvestmentprograms.Whilethegrowthinagriculturalsectormayhavecontributed

39 Manufacturinggrowthin2012hasbeenonlyabout1.3%againstagrowthover10%in2010and2011(WB2013).Themanufacturingsectoraccountforameager6%ofGDPin2012.40 AfricaConfidential, Oil Fuels Luanda Panic,Vol.56,No.3,6thFebruary2015.

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toareductioninhunger,itisbelievedtohavehadalesserimpactonpovertyreduc-tionwhichremainswidespreadinruralareas.Theobstacletomoveforwardismainlyduetotheinabilitysofarbytheagriculturalsectortosupplytheindustrywithtrans-formable rawmaterials because of the lowproductivity, lack of infrastructure andinadequacy of the tenure system41. Furthermore, budget allocations on agriculturehad so far low.42

Apart from oil dependence a third important weakness is that while the level ofgrowthinthe2000shasprovidedimportantfiscalrevenuesenablingpublicex-penditures to increase 43, one of the most salient features of Angola according to a recentWorldBankreport(2013)isthenonethelessverylowlevelofinvestments,bothpublic andprivate.Total investments’ rate is about 13%ofGDP (10publicand3private)whichstandsfarbelowthenormalaverageforSSAof24%(13%forprivateinvestmentsalone)andtheleastamongtheAfricanoilexporters(Staines2013:28).Thatthemostimportantdriverofinvestmentsremainsthestateisnotaproblemin sebutifweconsiderthenationalbudgetcurrentexpenditures,whichmainlymeanssalariesandsubsidies(18%),theyaccountstillforaboutthree-quar-tersofpublicexpenditures44,whilecapitalexpenditures,whichhadthepotential-itytoredressthemany infrastructurebottlenecksandboostthenon-oilsectors,account for the rest.

ThesameWorldBankreportpointtoafourth“weakness”(WB2013:ix).Thekeyeconomicsectorsarestillmadeoffewlargefirmsandwhataremissedarethemiddlelevelones,thosebetweenthelargestandthemultitudeofverysmalloneswhicharepartofthe informalsector.Twoimportantnon-oilsectorsbenefittedfromtheeco-nomicexpansionsofar:theconstructionsector,whichistightlylinkedtopublicca-pabilitytospend,andtheservicesectorastelecommunicationsandfinancialservices,whicharegrowinglyrequiredbybigexternalinvestors45.Suchexpansioninconstruc-

41 The rural areas has in matters of land mainly been left to govern themselves according to‘customary’ rules. In 2004, theParliament enacted a land law (Lei de Terras, Lei 09/04) in order to increase the agricultural producers’ security to land through the establishment of clearer titlingprocedures.Theresulthasbeenmixed.However,thereactionsbythesmall-holderproducershasnotalwaysbeenagainstmorecommercializedmodesofproduction(Jul-LarsenandBertelsen2011).42 Thedevelopmentofagriculturesectorisalsoaffectedbythedeminingprocessstillinprogressinlarge part of the country.43 Fiscalrevenuesarealsodependentfromtheoilsector(AfDB2011:4).In2008,thenon-oilsectorrepresented42%ofGDP,butcontributedonlyto20.5%offiscalrevenues.44 Thatincludesfundsdirectedtopublicenterprises,includingSONANGOL,tocoverlossesandfuelsubsidywhichwasestimatedatabout5%ofGDPin2012(WB2013:9).Totalsubsidiesaccountedabout8.1%ofGDPin2011.45 Servicesaccountedfor23.2%oftheGDP.

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tions has had nevertheless a side-effect on property values and retail prices with dis-tortiveeffectsontheeconomyandperverseconsequencesonordinarycitizenswithentiredistrictsof thecapital cityexposed to requalificationandexpulsionswithorwithoutrelocation(Gastrow2013).

Astheeconomyisexpectedtomovefromadominantpublic-sectortoamuchmoremarket-orientedeconomy, the stark contrastbetweenaffluenceandpovertyisincreasinglyalarmingtheMPLAgovernmentandcouldputheavypressureonitsabilitytokeepundercontrolsocialtensionsthatmightarise.Whathasbeensofaracceptedbythepublic–ade factosingle-partysystem–couldbeputunderstressas longer as disaffection from the party in government would widen and part of the citizenswouldbedriventoprotest.Asinothersingle-partyordominantpartysys-temsthelegitimacyofgovernmentsisindeedstrictlyentwinedtotheabilityofthoseingovernmentstoprovidewithredistributivemeasures, i.e.theabilitytokeeponsocialspending.However,inordertodothat,theGoAisfirmlypersuadedthatmain-tainingthecommandofthemostcrucialsectorsasthebankingsystemthroughbigsemi-publicfirmssuchasSONANGOLandUNITELisamiddle-termmeasurewhichwill protect the economic national assets against international pressures to privat-izethem.Inordertodothat,aidbythegovernment–intheformofthe“rents”–tothosefirmsisdeemedcrucialinordertoprovideforthelackofprivatecapitalaccu-mulationwhichthecountryhashistoricallyexhibited.Inthisguise,theGoAisnotwilling to accept that the international market leaves to indigenous enterprises only thesmall-mediumsector(SMEs).Thestateisthereforeexpectedtocontinuetoplaya crucial role in the economy.

Angola Statehood in Perspective

Puttinginperspectiveandconsideringthatpublicexternaldebt(17%ofGDP)issimilaror lower than other developmental neo-patrimonialist countries which, as Angola, did notmeetminimalrequirementsforbeingconsidereddemocraciessuchasRwanda(15%)andEthiopia(26%),investmentswhichwereabout13%ofGDPareverylowifcomparedtothesecountries(Ethiopia26%andRwanda22%)(WB2013:11).Donorsexplainpoorinvestmentleveltoafeebleinvestmentmanagement.InOctober2012,thegovernmentreactedwiththeestablishmentofasovereignwealthfund(Fundo Soberano de Angola) whichwaswelcomedasastepforwardintermsofexpenditureplanningandarequire-mentfortheestablishingofalong-termdevelopmentstrategicvision,adoptedbytheGovernmentofAngola (GoA) in2007–thesocalled“vision2025”(Angola 2025: Um Pais com Futuro)−togetherwithafive-yearmedium-termStrategicPlan(2009-2013)

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meanttooperationalizeit46.Amongtheobjectivesofthetwodocumentstherewereim-portantguidelinestobepursuedbytheGoAwhichwereimportantforbothstatehoodaswellastoappeasedonorsandtheinternationalcommunity:toassurehighsustain-ableeconomicgrowthbyenhancingindustrializationthroughimportsubstitution(ISI);todevelopinfrastructures;topromotetransparencyonbusiness;toeradicatefamine,povertyand illiteracy; to favordecentralizationanddeconcentrationand topromotenational cohesion. In this list democracy was also mentioned. There is no apparent con-tradictionbetweenthemanyobjectivespursuedbysuchstrategicguidelines,butatleasttwopointsmustbe stressedbecause theymeanadeparture from the tenantsof theWashingtonConsensusandhelptooutlinethestrategicapproachofthegovernment.Inparticular,ISIstrategyfordevelopmentisintended‘toprotect’localindustryinitsearlystages47while‘decentralization’ishereintendedmoreas‘deconcentration’ofservicesprovidedbythepublicadministrationwhilemaintainingthecentralgovernmentstrongcontrolling the administrative structure.

Inthemethodologicalsectionwehadidentifiedtwomainvariablesofstatehood:thematerialbasisofstatehoodandstateintervention.Asfarastheformer,twoindi-catorshavebeenemployed.Infigure2trendanalysisongovernment revenue(excludinggrants)(GR)whichwaschosenasfirstindicator(seeFig.1)forthematerialbasisofstatehood is represented.

ThefiguredepictedisthatofanostensibleswingingGRduetothedifferentmac-ro-economictrends.However,generallyspeakingdataremainsverypromisingifcom-paredwiththoseofEthiopiaandRwanda.GRinEthiopiabarelyreached20%ofGDPintheperiodconsidered,whilethatofRwandastabilizedaround25%inrecenttimes.InthecaseofAngolasuchrevenueswereforthemostduetooilexploitationandexport,whilenon-oilrevenuesrangedbetween1/3and1/5oftheGR.SoasfarasthematerialbasisofstatehoodiscertainthatthankstomineralresourcesAngolaisbettersuitedforbecomingdevelopmental.Thefallingofoilpriceswillcertainlyleadtosignificantrevenueshortfallsasithappensinotherenergyexportingnations,buttheperspectiveofadescentofAngolaintoaVenezuela’sscenario–rampantinflationcoupledwithfoodshortagesandacollapseofforeigninvestments–islikelytobeexcluded,giventheumbrellaprovidedbytheChinesestrategicpartnership48.

46 InDecember2012anewstrategicplanwaspresentedcoveringthefollowingfiveyears(RdA-MPDT2012).47 According to a trade policy review by theWTO,Angola have increased tariff rates in order toprotectitseconomy,onaveragefrom7.4%,in2005,to10.9%,in2015(https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp421_crc_e.htm).48 InOctober2015, Luandaannounced tobegoing to receive a loanof about6USDbillion fromChina.Thisloanwillhoweverlikelytoraisethedebtfrom32to46%ofGDP(MISNA,October16,2015).On strategic partnership with China, see Corkin (2013).

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However, statehood is not only about resources since administrative efficiency im-pactsontheabilityofgovernmentstospendmoneyaccordingtothedecidedstrategicgoals.Wecouldmeasurethatdrawingupontwooutofthesixdimensionsofgovern-anceindicatedbytheWorldBank’sWGI:government effectiveness(GE)andcontrol of corruption (CC). These more than the others capture the essence of administrative ef-ficiency49sinceGEreferstoperceptiononthequalityofpublicservice,degreeofitsindependence,credibilityofthegovernment’scommitmenttopolicies,etc.,whileCCisaperceptionindexaimingatcapture“the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain”(Kaufmannet al. 2010:4).Theresultsarequiteimportant.Whileef-fectiveness improved for all, more moderately in the case of Angola and Ethiopia, far betterinRwanda50, as far as corruption is concerned, Angola is the only one where cor-ruption has worsened51.Onthecontrary,inthecaseofRwanda,corruptionhasbeenefficaciouslyputundercontroltothepointthatthescore ispositive.Animportantresult for a SSA country.

49 The others are: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence/terrorism;regulatoryquality;ruleoflaw.Formajordetailssee(Kaufmannet al.2010:4).50 From-1.3to-1.0forAngolabetween1996and2012;from-0.9to-0.4forEthiopiaduringthesametime span; from -1.2 to -0.1 for Rwanda.51 From-1.0to-1.3forAngolabetween1996and2012;from-1.1to-0.6forEthiopia;from-0.9(in1998)to+0.6forRwanda.

Figure2–Government Revenue(excludinggrants)(GR)(%ofGDP)(1999-2013)

52

Fig. 2 – Government Revenue (excluding grants) (GR) (% of GDP) (1999-2013)

Source: IMF (2015: 6)

TAB. 2 – TIP: Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains (% of Revenue) (2003-2015)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Angola 41.0 48.4 56.0 43.2 39.1 48.7 54.8 34.1 27.6 31.9 29.7 30.7 40.2

Ethiopia 14.2 14.0 9.9 15.1 15.6 10.3 10.9 13.8 16.0

Rwanda 19.5 18.7 19.3 20.0 25.0 21.5 23.8

Source: WB (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.YPKG.RV.ZS?view=chart)

42

52,8

45,2

32,6

38,7 36,7

43,9

50,245,8

50,9

34,5

43,548,8

45,940,5

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

GR (% of GDP)

Source:IMF(2015:6)

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WhatthesenumberscaptureisthatifAngola’sgovernmenthascertainlyimprovedthequalityandthequantityoftheservicesdeliveredtothepublic,atthesametimeit is struggling against corruption with few successes since corruption rather tends tospreadasmuchasstateservicesdoexpand.Ifweconsidercorruptionfromamorequalitative perspective52wefind that it isnotonlyaboutgrandcorruptionbutalsoabout petty bribery (gasosas) where bribes are demanded for accessing public ser-vicessuchhealthoreducation.However,whetherpettycorruptionisabletoendangertheAngolanpoliticalsystemanditsadministrativeefficiencyisdoubtful.Normally,stateswherecorruptioniswidelyspreadandacceptedinalllayersofthebureaucracyareprobablyweakerthanthosewheremuchofthecorruptionisconcentratedinfewhands.ThelatterratherseemsthecaseofAngola.AccordingtoareportofShaxsonet al.(2008),whilegovernmentcronieswereallowedtoenrichthemselvesinthecourseoftheirdutiestheywerestillexpectedtoperformaccordingtocertainstandardsofefficiencyinordernottoberemovedfromtheirpost.However,grandcorruptionmayhavealsoimpactedontheabilityofcollectingtaxes.Suchmeasureiscapturedbythefollowingindicator:taxes on income, profits, and capital gains(TIP).TIPreferstotaxesthat “are levied on the actual or presumptive net income of individuals, on the profits of corporations and enterprises, and on capital gains, whether realized or not, on land, se-curities, and other assets”53.Table2summarizesthedata.AngolaisagaincomparedtoRwanda and Ethiopia.

Table2–TIP:Taxesonincome,profits,andcapitalgains(%ofRevenue)(2003-2015)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Angola 41.0 48.4 56.0 43.2 39.1 48.7 54.8 34.1 27.6 31.9 29.7 30.7 40.2

Ethiopia 14.2 14.0 9.9 15.1 15.6 10.3 10.9 13.8 16.0

Rwanda 19.5 18.7 19.3 20.0 25.0 21.5 23.8

Source:WB(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.YPKG.RV.ZS?view=chart)

52 See TI report of 2010.53 SeetheWorldBankwebsiteformajorexplanations(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.YPKG.RV.ZS?page=2).

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Thedatacollecteddepictadecliningcapacitytocollecttaxes,atleastafter2009.LessperformingcountriessuchasEthiopiahavebeenabletomaintaintheircapacitymorestableor,asinthecaseofRwandatoincreaseit,althoughonashortertimespan.Areasoncouldbecertainlydue to factorsonwhich the IOsareparticularly sensitivesuchascapitalflight,regulatoryloopholes(FjeldstadandHeggstad,2014),corruptionand non-transparency in reforming taxation (CMI-CEIC 2014a; CMI-CEIC 2014b)54, however it is also certain that it was the crisis that oil economies endured in the last fewyearsthatmostlyimpactedonthecapacityofrisingtaxes55.Asfarastaxationisconcerned,yetastructuralproblemremains.Forexample,whilenon-oilincometaxesgrewstronglyin2012accordingtotheWorldBank(WB2013:9)theystillrepresentonly15%ofallrevenues.Allthesecauseswillcertainlyhaveaneffectonthecapacityof the state to spend money for development, which we have considered as part of the “state intervention” dimension.

In themethodological sectionwe identified a number of indicatorswhichweregroupedundersuchdimension.Threeofthemaredirectindicators:generalgovern-menttotalexpenditure(GGTE),levelofinvestment(LI),publicspendingonhealthandeducation(PSHE)andvolumeofsubsidies(VS).Allhavebeenmeasuredas%ofGDPapartfromVS.

Thefigure(FIG.3)depictaconstantcapacitytospend(GGTE):spanningbetween35%to42%ofGDPduring2000-13withanapexin2008(55.4%).

Asithaspreviouslymentioned,however,mostoftheamountsarecurrentexpen-ditures with less than one-quarter devoted to development. Notwithstanding, large amounts have allowed an enduring capacity to develop infrastructures on a huge scale investmentsinthelastdecade.Benefittingfromafiscalsurplusandalowandman-ageablepublicdebtburden,Angolacouldbeinapositiontofurtherboostinvestmentspendingover themediumterm(WB2013:vii)unless the fallofoilpriceswillnothamperstrategiesforinvestmentanddiversification.ThisiseventruerifweconsiderthatAngolalevelsofinvestment(12.6%ofGDP)arecurrentlybelowtheaverageforSSA(WB2013:11)56.

54 For instance, mismanagement (i.e. “corruption”) of oil resources are well documented or matter of speculation(MarquesdeMorais2011).55 Nigeria,forinstance,isfacingsimilarproblems(Africa Confidential,November20,2015).56 Such level of investment was not only far below the two developmental countries– Ethiopia(26.1%)andRwanda(22.2%)–alreadymentionedandwhicharenon-mineraleconomies,butbelowotheroil/mineraleconomies;someofthemasDRC(23.8%)orNigeria(23.5%)didnotbenefitfromthepoliticalstabilitywhichAngolaenjoyed.

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Stateinterventionisnotonlyaboutgeneralexpendituresandlevelofinvestmentsbuthave also an impact on social welfare. Angola allocated to health and education 2.1 and3.5(asannually%ofGDP)respectively,between2007and2011(Source:UNICEF).These are not enormous efforts, compared to developing countries like Rwanda57, if weconsiderthatinAngolafuelpricesubsidiesalonewere3.7%ofGDPin2014(IMF2015:6).As inotheroil-producercountries (WB2005:3), subsidiespolicies canbeconsideredasthemostimportantmeasureofredistribution.InAngola,fuelsubsidiesarepartofasetofotherutilitypricesubsidieswhichincludewater,gasandelectric-ityconsumption(WB2005).Criticsarguethatmorethan50%offuelsubsidiesgotohouseholdsinthetop20%oftheincomedistribution,sincemostoftherecipientsarepeople who owes a vehicle or live in a city. Notwithstanding that, poor households spendahighershareoftheirtotalbudgetonfuelthandothebetter-offhouseholds.Therefore, plans to reduce it, would severely impact on poor households, unless other offsettingmeasurearetakenintoconsideration.Angolahasbeenabletomaintainanaveragevolumeofsubsidies(VS)above20%oftotalexpensesinthelasttenyears,as

57 Duringthesameyears,Rwandadevotedtohealthandeducation,7.8%and4.4%oftheGDP.Impactsof these efforts are provided in note 61.

Figure3–GeneralGovernmentTotalExpenditure(GGTE)%ofGDP(2000-2013)

53

Fig. 3 – General Government Total Expenditure (GGTE) % of GDP (2000-2013)

Source: IMF

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=58&pr.y=5&sy=2011&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=614&s=GGX_NGDP&grp=0&a

TAB. 3 – VS: Volume of subsidies (% of Expense) (2003-2015)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

20.2 14.4 22.8 23.2 28.4 19.8 20.1 31.0 32.5 24.2 24.8 26.7 19.5

Source: WB

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TRFT.ZS?end=2015&locations=AO&start=2014&view=chart

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

GGTE

Source:IMFhttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=58&pr.y=5&sy=2011&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=614&s=GGX_NGDP&grp=0&a

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itisshownintable3.SuchVSincludesnotonlynonrepayabletransferstoprivateandpublicenterprises–notablySONANGOLasthemainbeneficiary–butalsotosocialassistance.

Table3–VS:Volumeofsubsidies(%ofExpense)(2003-2015)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

20.2 14.4 22.8 23.2 28.4 19.8 20.1 31.0 32.5 24.2 24.8 26.7 19.5

Source:WB(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TRFT.ZS?end=2015&locations=AO&start=2014&view=chart)

Reducing them is politically risky58,unlessalleviatedbyothermeasuressuchasdirectcashtransfers;policyadoptedbyotherSSAcountries(IMF2015:17),notablyamongthemRwandaandEthiopia.However,suchmeasurerequiresstrongeradministrativecapacities which at the moment Angola is lacking59. Currently, social assistance in Angolaisprovidedbyanumberofdirectsocialprograms,which,however,havealim-itedcoverageofpoorhouseholds.While,goodprogresseshasbeenrecordedasaresultof an increased amount of money devoted to social welfare measures, poverty remains highwithreductionresultsbelowexpectations60, and while the most outstanding re-sulthasbeenthatAngolaachievedtheMDGhungertargetin2013anditreducedun-der-nutritionbymorethan50%over1990-2013(UNECA2014),thishasbeenachievedthrough food importation61.

58 InIndonesia,forexample,protestsmotivatedbyanattempttoraisefuelpricesin1998ledtoaseriesofeventsthatculminatedwiththecollapseoftheregimepresidedbySuharto(Metschies2005).59 Cashtransferscouldincludetheeliminationoffeesforstate-runschools,priceceilingsonpublic-transportfares,etc.(IMF2015:17).60 CalculationbasedontheWB’sWDIindicateadropfrom54%to43%inpovertyheadcountratioat$1.25adaybetween2000and2009.AselsewhereinSSA,inabsolutetermsthenumberofpoorpeoplehasincreased(ChenandRavallion2008).61 Asforhealth,lifeexpectancyhasimprovedfrom1990to2012from41.2to51.5(from33.5to62.8inRwanda)whileduringthesametimeunder-5mortalityratedroppedfrom213to164per1000livebirths(in Rwanda they decreased from 152 to 42). As far as education is concerned, literacy rate improved from67%to71%(58%to68%inRwanda)amongadultsaged15andover,whilenetenrolmentratesinprimaryschoolimprovedsignificantlyfrom53%(79%,inRwanda)duringthecivilwar(1999)upto86%in2011(98%,inRwanda),throughhoweveradeteriorationofgendergap(UNECA2014:41).

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Povertyincidenceisnowestimatedaround37%,whichmeansthat37%ofAngolansliveunderthepovertyline(4,793kwanzaspermonth).Differencesbetweenruralandurbanareasremainsveryimportant,withmostofthepoorconcentratedinruralareas.Inurbanareasaround1/5ofthepopulationispoorwhileinruralareas3/5ofpopula-tionisinpoverty.Povertyspreadsalsodifferentlyamongregions,withmorethan1/2ofpoorpopulationintheSouth-Centre,North-CentreandintheEast,whileonly8.6%ofLuandapopulationispoorandbetween1/3and2/5intheSouthandintheNorth(RdA-MdP2011:128).Averagepersonalincomesareverydifferentwithalmostthreetimes in Luanda compared to the East region. These income variations has an impact ontheaccessibilitytoservicesprovidedtothepopulation.Forexample,thenationalproportionofpopulationwhohasneverattendedschoolisabout20%.Butthisfiguredropsto16%inZaireprovince,whichisintheNorth,or9%inLuandaprovince,andrisesto37%inLundaNorthor42%inKuandoKubango,bothintheEast.Thesere-gionalunbalancespointtotheinheritanceofthecivilwarandamodelofdevelopmentwhich in the recent past concentrated much of the resources in the capital city and did not spare neither former opposition stronghold such as the South-Centre nor govern-ment stronghold such as the North-Centre62.TheGoAiscommittedtobridgesuchgapthrough medium-long term infrastructural investments which are supposed to consol-idateofsomeaxesconnectedthroughcorridors(RdA-MPDT2012:86-88).However,povertyisintheshorttermisratherreceptivetoexternalshocksandAngolaisalmostcompletely devoid of “safety nets” devoted to protect poor households during eco-nomic crisis and at the moment no solid plans for a national safety net system are in place(Monchuk2014:149-150).

Conclusions: Loosing the Momentum?

TheAngolancaseisanimportantcontributiontothestudyofthedevelopmentandexpansionofstatehoodinAfrica.Itshowsboththeobstaclesandtheadvantagesingeneratingdevelopmentalpoliciesinapoliticalsettingwhichisalternativetoliberaldemocracyand ismarkedbyextendedcentralizedpatrimonialpracticesbya long-time president and party in power. Dos Santos has perfectly survived for nearly four decadesmarkedbyalongperiodofcivilwarandinstability.Hehasledthecountryfromthepost-independenceerathroughthecivilwaruptothebeginningofapor-

62 North-Centre corresponds to the Bengo, Kwanza Norte and Melanje provinces. South-CentrecorrespondstoKwanzaSul,Benguela,HuamboandBié.Tenyearsago85%oftheregistereddoctorsinthecountrywereinLuanda(Kibble2006:535).

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tentousinfrastructuralandeconomicdevelopmentinaneramarkedbygrowingglo-balizationandinterdependence.

Politically, the Angolan model is a departure from the classical mode of patrimonial politieswhichareusuallyweak.Twoimportantfactorscontributedtofosterastableneo-patrimonialstatebasedonadominantpartywhichrestsonclannetworks:dem-ocratic centralism within the party and civil war which favored such centralism. Such politicalsystemhasenduredthankstotwofurtherstructuralfactors:thedisposalofvastmineralresourcesthathasallowedalargeredistributionofwealthfirsttoaneliteandsubsequentlytoanenlargingsocialbase63,andaterritorialconfigurationthatfa-vored the ‘concentration of the majority of the population in and around Luanda. Both havecontributedto‘functionally’shapetheAngolanpatrimonialismtothepointthatthesystemhasbeenabletothriveindifficulttimes.Howtheachievedpoliticalstabili-tyisabouttodeliveritseconomicpotentialstoawiderpublicandbeyondtheeliteandthemiddleclassremainstobeseen.Althoughimprovementsinsocialachievements,inequalitiesremainimportant.Itisnotonlyaboutaccumulationbytheeliteagainstmostofordinarypeoplebutfarmoreimportantareregionalinequalitiesandconcen-trationofmajor investmentswhich found itdifficult toexpandoutsidea coreareaaroundLuanda.GiventhefactthatMPLAenjoysweakerlegitimacyinperipheralareaafailureofintegrationmeansinperspectivetheriskofpoliticalinstabilityevenifnocredibleoppositionmovementisatthemomentabletodefytheregime.

AngolastaysinthemiddleoftheKelsalletal.(2010:8)model,asithasmentionedin the introduction. Between a non-developmental kleptocracy and a developmental rentier state like Rwanda. In particular, contrary to Rwanda, anti-corruption stances finditdifficulttoentrenchintotheparty.However,corruptionisprobablytheleastim-portantobstaclethatifnotseriouslyaddressedcouldhampertheGoAcommitmenttoexpanddevelopment64.Itisdoubtfulthatcorruptionisofsuchtoendangerefficiency.

63 AccordingtoanAfricanDevelopmentBank(AfDB2011)middleclasseshaveexpandedinAfricainthelasttwodecades.Angolaestimateputaround13.2%ofthepopulationinthemiddleclass“withoutfloatingclass”in2010(AfDB2011:5).“Floatingclass”arethosewithapercapitaconsumptionlevelofbetween$2-$4perday,whichisslightlyabovethepovertyline.Theyarethemorevulnerableincaseofeconomiccrisis,whichistheactualconditionofAngolaafterthedropofoilprices.Withthe“floatingclass,middleclassinAngolaisaround38.1%.Thetwomeasuresareinlinewiththeaveragefortheentire Africa, North Africa included.64 Angola ranks in 161st position according to the CPI2014; one of the most corrupted countries in theworldaswellasinSub-SaharanAfrica(SSA)(beingSomaliatheworstintheworld–174th–andBotswanathebestinSSAin31stposition).Intheabsenceofreliableindicatorsofneo-patrimonialism(ErdmannandEngel2006:22-24),wecouldemploycorruptionasaproxyindicator.Althoughdifferent–corruptionisamorecircumscribablephenomenonwhichimpliesanexchangebetweenpoliticaldecisionandmoney– corruption implies the same discretionary power of an office as neo-patrimonialism.CorruptionisemployedbyMinxinPei(2006)asanindicatorofde-institutionalizationinChina.

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Aswehaveestablishedsofar, inAngola,corruption,althoughimportantandwide-spread,isforthemostcentrallycontrolled.Efficiencyisonlypartiallyaffectedanditisgenerallyimproving.Wecansaythatproductiveandconsumptionactivitieshavewalkedsidebysidethankstoenormousresourcesavailablesince2002.ThePresidentallowedpersonalenrichmentbasedonthepromiseofengaginginproductiveinvest-ment for the development of the country. Some networks performed well, others have beenmorecontroversial65.Butcontrary toZimbabwe,whichepitomizesanti-devel-opmentalpatrimonialism(DawsonandKelsall2011), thestatehasnotbeenerodedbypredatoryactivities66. The current sudden fall of oil prices will determine the real extentoftheAngolanneo-patrimonialismduetotheneedofreducingconsiderablytheresourcesdrivenforconsumptionactivitiesandfocalizingthecentralrentsmainlyin productive investment.

Far more important, therefore, economic diversification remains the problem.Economicdiversificationneedsfurtherinvestments.Therecentfallofoilpriceswillseriouslyaffect the levelof investmentswhich,aswehavealreadyestablished,waslowerthanexpectationsforacountrywhichlargelybenefittedofenormousresourcesduringthe2000s.Suchresourceshavebeenlargelyemployedtoovercometheeco-nomiclegaciesofthecivilwar,fosterpoliticalstabilityandelitecohesion,butwerenotimmediatelyinvestedaccordingtoalongtermperspective.Theresulthasbeena growth that has failed to deliver development according to its potential, another important requisite for developmental patrimonialism67. Long-term strategies have beensetoutrecentlybuttheycouldbecompromisedbythefallofoilpricesunlessneutralizedbycorrectivemeasures.ThisyearGoAhasslashedoffathirdofitsbudgetbecauseofthefallofoilrevenues.Oneofthemeasurehasbeenfirstthereductionofoilsubsidieswhichhasproducedabouta100%ofincreaseinfuelpricesinthefollow-ing seven months68.Ameasurethathasseriouslyaffectedthoseofthe“middlefloatingclass”whoarepartofthesocialbasesofMPLA.AccordingtoIMFestimates,“it will be critical to bring the public sector wage bill, as a share of GDP, more in line with the new

65 AsisthecaseofthemuchdiscussedVice-PresidentManuelVicenteandGen.ManuelHélderVieiraDias“Kopelipa”,currentlydirectoroftheNationalReconstructionOffice.66 DawsonandKelsall(2011:24)mentioned“anti-urbanism”aspoliticalcultureintheZANU-PFthatmilitatesagainsturban-industrialdevelopment.ThereisnothingofthiskindintheMPLA,whichhadbeenratherurbanoriented.67 Basedoncross-countryrelationbetweentheincomeandnon-incomecomponentsoftheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),Angolawouldbeexpectedtohaveavalueforthenon-incomecomponentequalto0.67,whileitsactualvalueis0.48(IMF2014:26).ThisisoneofthelargestgapinSSA.68 “Amidyachtsofrichelite,Angola’spoorcrushedbyoilpricedrop”(The Star Online),May20,2015.See also MISNA,October6,2015.FromthefirstJanuary2016oilsubsidieshasbeenremovedattherequestofIMF.Savedresourcesshouldbedivertedtosocialspending.

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revenue reality of the budget”69.PredictionsforgrowthbytheIMFwillbefor4.5%in2015and3.9%in2016,wellbelowthenumbersenjoyedtillrecently.Thesamebudgetcuthasthereforereducedthelevelofpublicinvestmentby45%withsurelyindirecteffectsonthepublicexpensesdevotedtostrengthenthepublicservicewhichwereplannedthisyeartobehigherthanthosefordefenseandsecurity70. To limit short-fallingovernmentrevenue,theGoAannouncedaplantoraiseupto1.5USDbillionfromabondissue.Butprospectstoconvinceinvestorsareweak71. For this very reason, Luandaannouncedtobegoingtoreceivetheimportant,alreadymentionedloanfromChina72.Withoutdiversificationandariseofoilpricesthecountryrisksthereforetolose momentum.

Ifsucheconomicadversitymayhavepoliticaleffectsishoweverdoubtful,andal-thoughprotestshaverecentlyparalyzedtheVianadistrictofLuandaforacoupleofdays, the level of protest still remains very low73.AdecreaseofapprovaltoMPLAbythepublicisdifficulttotranslateinastrengtheningoftheoppositioninacountrysodeeplywearybyyearsofcivilconflict.TheMPLAshouldbeableoncemoretokeepundercontrolsocialtensionsthatcouldariseparticularlyinthesuburbsofoverpop-ulatedLuanda.However,thestarkcontrastbetweenaffluenceandpoverty,whichiswidespreadandpersistent,couldchallengetheregimeinthelongrun.Theproblemofinequalities are well known at the top of the regime. It is clear that the personal wealth ofseveralmembersofAngolanelitehaspublicimplications74anditisdifficulttotol-erateitinthelongrun.However,growingdissentsagainstthepartyinpowershoulddifficultlyprovokearevolutionoraresurgenceofinsurgency.Noriscertainifitwillaffecttheproblemofsuccessionintheshortrun.Thiswillratherconcerntheabilityofthepartyinpowertoensureitsownsurvival.Uptonow,thepoliticalarenahasbeen

69 “IMFurgesAngolatodiversifyitseconomy”(Public Finance International),August26,2015.Publicsector wages grew by about 6% in real terms in 2012 and about 10% in 2011. Such increases hadbolsteredconsumption.70 “Angolabudgethitbyfallingoilprices”(AFP),March19,2015.Oppositionssaythatthepowerfulmilitary (FAA), the most important pillar of the regime and one of the major and operational army in Sub-SaharanAfricawillbebarelyaffected.Angoladestined4.9%ofGDPin2013and13.8%ofcentralgovernmentexpenditurein2012tomilitaryexpenditure.Muchmorethaneducation(3.5%ofGDPin2010)andhealth(3.8%ofGDPin2013).(Source:WDI).ItisquitenotoriousthatamongthepowerelitemembersoftheFAAareamongthemajorresponsibleforlandgrabinthecountry.71 “LuandaSeeksEurobondLifeline”(Africa Confidential),October2015.72 InSeptember2016,DosSantossackedtheMinisterofFinance,ArmandoManuel,aftertalkswiththe IMF stalled overmedium-term emergency funding. In June 2016, Dos Santos announced thatAngolawouldnolongerparticipateinlong-termloannegotiationswiththeIMF.73 Protestsstartedfromtaxydrivers(MISNA),October5and7,2015.74 ItiswellknownthatthePresident’sdaughter,IsabelDosSantos,istherichestwomanofAfrica.

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managedwithintheparty,firstintheCentralCommitteeandthenintheBureauwheredisagreements over economic priorities are partially tolerated. Such differences within thepartydampenstheinternaltensionsandfindsinthePresidencyapointofequilib-rium.IfitistruethatAngolaunderDosSantoshasbecomeprogressivelycharacterizedbypersonalruletothedemiseofpartyastheplacewherepoliciesarecollectivelydis-cussed,selectedandgoverned,theMPLAhasbeenmaintainedasaninterfacebetweenthoseinandthoseexcludedfromthebenefitsbestowedbythesystem.TheimportantVIIOrdinaryCongress ofMPLA to be convened inAugust 2016will determine thecapabilityofthePresidenttoreformthepartyandopenittoayoungergenerationinordertocurbsocialdiscontentinthecurrenteconomiccrisis75.HowsuchapoliticalsystemmaysurvivefurthereconomicdeclineandtheunavoidableendofDosSantos,who is 73, remains though matter of speculation76. In a similar setting, Ethiopia and its partyinpower–theEPRDF–hasbeenabletosurvivetheunexpecteddeathofMelesZenawiin2012.

75 AnewstatuteofthepartyhasbeenapprovedbyMPLA.IntheOrdinaryCongressofAugust2016,the40percentofthenewCentralCommitteewillbecomposedbymemberswhohadneverbeenpartofitbeforeandneverengagedinpoliticalactivities.Thiswillpushalargenumbersoftheoldhierarchyoutside the active political life and intend to a deep renewal of the human reservoir of the party.76 InMarch 2016, Dos Santos has announced his intention to leave the presidency in 2018. TheAugust2016Congresswilldecidealsoabouthis succession.ThenominationofManuelVicenteasVice-PresidentofAngolainSeptember2012hadbeenunderstoodasthemostprobablesuccessorofDosSantosatthetopofthepoliticalsystem,amidsomedissatisfactionsamongMPLAapparatchiks(Jeune Afrique, 8 février 2012). Vicente had been previously head of SONANGOL since 1999. Hisinvolvement with the Chinese dealmaker Sam Pa, arrested in Beijing on 8 October as part of acrackdownontheSinopecoilcompanywhichoperatedinAngolainpartnershipwiththeSONANGOL,hasbeenunderstoodbyAfrica Confidential (October23, 2015) as ademiseonpolitical ambitionofVicente.AccordingtothePortugueseweeklyJornal de Negócios,IsabelDosSantoswillplayaroleinthefuturerestructuringofSONANGOL(January21,2016).

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About the Author

Federico Battera is Associate professor of African Political Systems at the Department of PoliticalandSocialSciences–UniversityofTrieste–Italy.Heistheauthorofaseriesofarticlesand chapters on Somali, Kenyan, Zambian andNorth-African andMiddle East politics andhistory.HerecentlypublishedontheJournal of Asian and African Studies and on Contemporary Arab Affairs.

Federico Battera

DepartmentofPoliticalandSocialSciences,UniversityofTrieste,PiazzaleEuropa,1Trieste,34127, Italy

e-mail:[email protected]