Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law 47

I. Introduction ThisarticlediscussesvariousissueswithFairCreditReportingAct[FCRA]preemption,highlightingthemostunsettledpreemptionissuesunderthestatute.AreviewoftheseissuesrevealsajudicialneedtomorebroadlyconstrueandthoroughlyenforcetheFCRA’spreemptionprovisionstoprovideformorecertainoutcomesbycreditmarketparticipants,createmoreefficientinterstatecreditmarkets,andprovidemorecreditopportunitiesforconsumers. It isvitalthatwehaveanationalcreditreportingsystem.Creditorsneedtobeabletomakecreditdecisionsquickly–andoftenatadistance–withconfidencethatthosedecisionsaregroundedincorrectinformationabouttheconsumer. Recognizingthis,Congressin1970enactedtheFairCreditReportingAct.1Itsawaneedtoensure that thecredit reportingagencies,which“haveassumedavital role inassemblingandevaluatingconsumercreditandotherinformationonconsumers...,exercisetheirgraveresponsi-bilitywithfairness,impartiality,andarespectfortheconsumer’srighttoprivacy.”2Althoughmanystatesalreadypossessedlawsgoverningcreditreporting,requiringtheinterstateentitiesthatmakeupthecreditreportingnetworktocomplywithfiftysetsoflawswasunworkable.Congressrecog-nizedaneedtocreate“auniformnationalstandard,”so“companieswillnothavetocomplywithapatchworkofStatelaws.”3

DespiteCongress’sstatedgoalofprovidingclaritytothecreditreportingworld,theFCRA—throughamendmentsandadditions—hasitselfbecomeapatchworkofattimesinconsistentregulations.Initscurrentform,itcontainsthreeprincipalprovisionsdictatingwhenandhowthe

Preemption of State Law

A GUIDE THROUGH

MUDDY WATERS

FCRA

By Chad M. Pinson and John B. Lawrence*

48 Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law

FCRApreempts state law. Section1681t(a) is thegeneralpre-emptionprovision,providingthattheFCRAdoesnotpreemptstatelawexcepttotheextentthoselawsareinconsistentwiththeFCRA.4Thesubsequentprovision,section1681t(b),listsmorethattwentyspecificFCRAsections,declaringthatnostatemayimposeanyrequirementorprohibitionwithrespecttodutiesaris-ingunderthosesections.5Finally,section1681h(e)providesthatconsumers may not bring certain tort claims against credit re-portingagencies,furnishersofcreditinformation,orusersofthatinformation.6

The state of the law interpreting thesepreemption provisions is confused, with somecourts(relyingonstrainedreasoninganddisregard-ingthepurposebehindthestatute)givingthemafarmorenarrowreadingthanothers.Nationwideuniformityininterpretationiskeytothefunction-ingoftheFCRA.Withoutit,reportingagenciesandinformationfurnishershavenoclearguidanceinadministeringthereportingsystem,andconsumershavenoclearguidanceinseekingrecourseagainstunlawfulpractices. ThisarticlediscusseseachofthethreeprincipalFRCApreemptionprovisions,examining their functionandthe inter-playbetweenthem.Asisapparentfromthestatuteandthecaselaw,interpretingtheFCRA’sprovisionsfairlyandproperlyresultsinabroadandcomprehensivepreemptionscheme,whichinturnleadstoamoreeffectiveFCRA.

II. Generalpreemptionof“inconsistent”statelaw. Since itsenactment,theFCRAhas includedageneralstatementconcerningitspreemptionofinconsistentstatelaw.Initscurrentform,thatprovisionreads,

[T]histitledoesnotannul,alter,affect,orex-emptanyperson subject to theprovisionsofthistitlefromcomplyingwiththelawsofanyStatewith respect to the collection, distribu-tion,oruseofanyinformationonconsumers,

orforthepreventionormitigationofidentitytheft,except to the extent that those laws are in-consistent with any provisions of this title, andthenonlytotheextentofanyinconsistency.7

Whatmakesastatelaw“inconsistent”withtheFCRA?Courtsconstruethetermsuchthatastatelawisnotinconsistentmerelybecause it regulates amatter addressedby theFCRA.8 Rather,FCRAsection1681t(a)preemptsonlythosestatelaws“indirect

conflictwithfederallawsuchthatcompliancewithbothisimpos-sible,orthestatelawisanobstacletotheaccomplishmentofthefullpurposesandobjectivesofCongress.”9 This is inharmonywith the FederalTrade Commission’s interpretation of the sec-tion,whichstatesthatthe“basicrule” is that“State lawispre-emptedby theFCRAonlywhen compliancewith inconsistentStatelawwouldresultinviolationoftheFCRA.”10

Applyingtheseprinciples,theEightCircuit inDaven-port v. Farmers Ins. Groupupheldaprovision in theMinnesotaInsurance Fair Information Reporting Act that insurers notifycustomers and secure written authorization before collectinganddisclosing thecustomers’personal information.11 Plaintiffsallegedthatthedefendant-insurerviolatedtheprovisionbynotsecuringtheirauthorizationbeforecollectinganddisclosingtheirpersonal information.12 The insurermoved todismiss, arguingthat because the FCRA allows the collection and disclosure ofsuchinformationanddoesnotrequire anynoticeorauthoriza-tion,thefederallawpreemptedtheMIFIRA.13Thedistrictcourtfound that the FCRA did not preempt this state statute. TheEighthCircuitagreed,notingthatwhiletheinsurancecompany

Creditors need to be able to make credit decisions quickly – and often at a distance –

with confidence that those decisions are grounded in correct information about the consumer.

Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law 49

wascorrectthattheFCRAdoesnotexpresslyrequireinsurancecompaniestonotifyconsumersbeforecollectingpersonalinfor-mation,italsodoesnotaffirmativelyprohibitthemfromdoingsowithoutfirstprovidingnotice.14Thestatelawthuswasnot“inconsistentwith”theFCRA.15

Notall state laws containingmore stringent require-mentsthantheFCRA,however,areconsistentwiththefederalscheme.InRetail Credit Company v. Dade County,thecourtheldthattheFCRApreemptedacountyordinancerequiringreport-ingagenciesdisclosinginformationtoconsumerstoalsodisclosethesourceofthatinformation.16Theplaintiffreportingagencybroughttheactionseekingadeclaratoryjudgmentthattheordi-nancewasinvalid.Compliancewiththeordinancedidnotinher-entlyrequireviolationoftheFCRA,astheFCRAprovidedonlythatthereportingagency“neednot”disclosethesourceofthein-formation.17AreportingagencywouldnotbeinviolationoftheFCRAfordoingso.Nevertheless,thecourtheldthatthecountyordinancewaspreemptedafterexaminingtheFCRA’slegislativehistory.EarlydraftsoftheFCRAcontainedprovisionsrequiringthedisclosureofthesource,butthisdetailwas“deliberatelyomit-ted”fromthefinalbillafterCongressheardtestimonythatthedisclosureof informationsourcescouldpotentiallyresult inthe“dryingup”ofthosesources.18ThelawthuswasinconsistentwiththeFCRAeventhoughitwasnotincompatiblewiththetextoftheFCRA.

III. Exceptionstothegeneralpreemptionprovision. TheFCRAunderwentasubstantialrevisionin1996.The general provision that the FCRA does not preempt statelawsexcepttotheextenttheyareinconsistentwiththeFCRAremained,butCongressaddedalitanyofexceptionstothatgen-eralprovision.19Now,whethertheyareotherwiseinconsistentwiththeFCRAornot,“[n]orequirementorprohibitionmaybeimposedunderthelawsofanystatewithrespectto”issuesrelatedtovariousFCRAsections.20

Manyoftheseexceptionsarenarrowandspecific.Forexample,nostatemayimposeanyrequirementorprohibitionwithrespectto“theconductrequiredby”theFCRA’ssectionscoveringcreditcardnumbertruncation,fraudalerts,consumercomplaintscoordinationamongagencies,orrecordsdisposal.21Similarly,statesmaynotimposeanyrequirementorprohibitionwithrespecttothefrequencyoffreeannualcreditdisclosures.22

Others are written broadly, and as a result are morelikely to be open to various interpretations. The nine excep-tionsundersection1681t(b)(1),forexample,preemptallstaterequirementsorprohibitions“withrespecttoanysubjectmatterregulatedunder”variousFCRAsections.23Bypreemptingstatelawsconcerning“thesubjectmatter”ofthesesections,CongressexpandedtheFCRA’spreemptivereachbeyondthedutiesandprocedures specifically enumerated therein. Subject matterscoveredbytheseprovisionsincludetheinformationcontainedin consumer reports, the prescreening of consumer reports,information available to identify theft victims, and theuseofconsumerinformationtomakeasolicitationformarketingpur-poses.24Statesmayimposenorequirementorprohibitioncon-cerningthesesubjectmatters,evenifthelawconcernsanaspectofthesubjectmatterthatisnotcoveredintheFCRA.Whethera state law implicatesoneof these“subjectmatters,”however,maynotalwaysbeclear.AsisdiscussedinSectionV.Dbelow,courts and litigants have expended considerable energy since1996 debating which state law claims implicate “the subjectmatterregulatedunder§1681s-2,relatingtotheresponsibili-tiesofpersonswhofurnishinformationtoconsumerreportingagencies.”25

IV. Preemptionofclaims“in thenatureofdefamation,invasion of privacy, or negligence” against creditreportingagencies.

Inwhatcourtshavedescribedasa“quidproquoforfulldisclosure,”section1681h(e)grantsconsumerreportingagenciesqualifiedimmunityfromcertaintortclaims.26Underthisprovi-sion,

no consumer may bring any action or pro-ceedinginthenatureofdefamation,invasionof privacy, or negligence with respect to thereportingofinformationagainstanyconsum-erreportingagency,anyuserof information,or any person who furnishes information toaconsumerreportingagency,basedoninfor-mationdisclosedpursuanttosections1681g,1681h,or1681mofthistitle,orbasedonin-formationdisclosedby auserof a consumerreporttoorforaconsumeragainstwhomtheuserhastakenadverseaction,basedinwholeorinpartonthereport,exceptastofalsein-formationfurnishedwithmaliceorwillfulin-tenttoinjuresuchconsumer.27

TheFCRAthuspreemptsstatelawcausesofaction“inthenatureof”defamation,invasionofprivacy,ornegligenceiftwoprereq-uisitesaremet:(1)theinformationwasdisclosedpursuanttosec-tions1681g,1681h,or1681m;and(2)thedefendantdidnotactwithmaliceorwillfulintent.28

A. Impact of the requirement that the information be disclosed pursuant to sections 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m.

Sections1681g,1681h, and1681mall governdisclo-suresmadetoconsumers.Theformertworequireconsumerre-portingagenciestodiscloseconsumerinformationtoaconsumerathisorherrequest,whilethelatterrequiresusersofconsumerreportstakingadverseactionagainstaconsumertodiscloseinfor-mationtothatconsumer.29Becausethesesectionsdonotregulatedisclosuresmadetothirdparties,plaintiffshavearguedthatsec-tion1681h(e)preemptsonlythoseclaimsarisingfromcommuni-cationsbetweenthedefendantandtheconsumer. Thebetterreadingofsection1681h(e),however,isthatit should not be read so narrowly. The preemption is plainlymeanttoencompasssomeactionsfordefamation,asdefamationisoneofthethreecausesofactionspecificallylistedintheprovi-sion.30Butacauseofactionfordefamationnecessarilyarisesoutofadisclosuretoathirdparty.31Thusunderthenarrowreading,

50 Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law

“theprovisionwouldbaronlythosedefamationclaimsthatwouldfailasamatteroflaw.”32Theinclusionofdefamationinsection1681h(e)wouldbesuperfluousandmeaningless.Tointerpretthestatuteinsuchawaywouldviolatethewell-establishedprincipleofstatutoryconstructionthat,“astatuteought,uponthewhole,tobesoconstructedthat,ifitcanbeprevented,noclause,sen-tence,orwordshallbesuperfluous,void,orinsignificant.”33Ac-cordingly,somecourtshaverejectedthenarrowreadingentirely.34

Othercourtshavedeclinedtoholdthatsection1681h(e)preemptsstatelawclaimswhenthedisclosureismadetoathirdparty,buteffectivelyarriveat thesameresultbyholdingthataclaimispreemptediftheconsumerreceivesacopyofthereportat any time.35InThornton,theplaintifffirstbecameawarethathercreditreportcontainedtheallegedlydefamatorystatement—thatshehadbeen“forthepastfourmonthslivingwithoutbenefitofmatrimonywithamalecompanion”—whenherinsuranceagentcalledrequestinginformationonthe“companion.”36 Thorntonrequestedacopyofthereport,andthensuedEquifaxfordefama-tionandlibel.37TheEighthCircuitheldthatThornton’sreceiptof her report brought her claims within the section 1681h(e)’spreemption,eventhoughsherequestedthereportonlyafterbe-inginformedbyathirdpartyoftheallegedlytortiousstatement.38Othercourtshavesimilarlyfoundthat“[t]heconditionalprivi-legeofsection1681h(e)applieseventhoughtheconsumerfirstlearnsofthederogatoryinformationfromathirdparty,aslongasthecreditreportingagencylaterprovidestheinformationtotheconsumerpursuanttotheFCRA.”39Aconsumercomplainingofinformationinacreditreport is likelytoatsomepointrequestandreceivethereportpursuanttotheFCRA.Becauseofthis,adefendantwillrarelyifeverbefacedwithasuitbasedsolelyonadisclosuremadetothirdparties.

B. The claim is preempted unless the defendant acted with malice or willful intent.

Eveniftheconsumerestablishesthattheinformationatissuewasneverdisclosedpursuanttosections1681g,1681h,or1681m,thestatelawclaimisstillpreemptedbytheFCRAun-lessthedefendantacted“withmaliceorwillfulintenttoinjure”to consumer.40 Because “malice” is not defined in the FCRA,courtsusethemeaninggiventotheterminthecontextoflibellitigation.41Inthatcontext,theSupremeCourthasheldthatastatementismadewithmaliceifitismade“withknowledgethatitwas falseorwithrecklessdisregardofwhether itwas falseornot.”42“Recklessdisregard,”inturn,isshownthroughevidencethatthedefendant“entertainedactualdoubtaboutthetruthofthestatement.”43

Becausemalice cannotbe shownexceptwhere the re-portingagencyactuallyknewastatementwasfalse,ordoubteditstruthfulness,theclaimisnecessarilypreemptedifthedefendanthadnonoticeoftheinaccuracyatthetimethereportwasmade.44InYeager,theconsumerbroughtclaimsfordefamation,invasionofprivacy,negligence, and tortious interference againstTRW.45The dispute centered on a civil judgment that was incorrectlylistedonfoursuccessivecreditreports,whichYeagerclaimedre-sultedinlendersdenyinghimcreditheotherwisewouldhaveob-tained.46YeagerdidnotlearnoforinformTRWoftheproblemuntilafterthethirdcreditreportwasissued.ThecourtgrantedTRW summary judgment with respect to the first three creditreports,holdingthat“[m]alicecannotbeshownwherethereisnoevidencewhichwouldindicatethattheagency inquestionhadnoticeof the inaccuracy in its reportuntil after the reportwaspublished.”47 BecauseYeagerhadnotifiedTRWof themistakepriortotheissuanceofthefourthreport,theclaimsastheyre-latedtothatfinalreportwereallowedtoproceed.48

Itissimilarlydifficulttoshow“willfulintent,”whichis

demonstratedbyestablishingthatthedefendant“knowinglyandintentionally commit[ted] an act in consciousdisregard for therightsofothers.”49 Thewillful intentprongof thepreemptiontest results in somewhat of a paradoxwithin section1681h(e).Theprovisionpurportstopreemptclaims“inthenatureof...negligence...exceptastofalseinformationfurnishedwith...willfulintent,”50butthereofcoursecanbenoclaimofnegligenceallegingwillfulintent.Asonecourtexplained,

This results in a requirement that Plaintiffprove intentional or malicious negligence. This levelofnegligence is inherentlycontra-dictoryinthatnegligencedoesnotincludeanelementofintent.Infact,“intentionalnegli-gence”isanoxymoron.Thereisnocauseofaction...fornegligencewheretheoffendingactionwastakenwithintenttoinjure.51

Whetherorhowthiscontradictionimpactstheinterpretationofthestatuteisunclear.Congressplainlyintendedtopreemptallclaimsthatdonotinvolvemaliciousorintentionalinjury,includ-ingnegligenceclaims.

V. Preemptionofclaims“inthenatureofdefamation,invasion of privacy, or negligence” against creditinformationfurnishers.

Onitsface,section1681h(e)appliesequallytoany“per-sonwhofurnishesinformationtoaconsumerreportingagency”as it does to consumer reporting agencies themselves.52 Andforalmost30yearsafter theFCRA’senactment, itdid. But in1996,whenCongressaddedthepreemptionprovisionsinsection1681t(b),oneofthoseexceptionstothegeneralruleprovidedthat“[n]orequirementorprohibitionmaybeimposedunderthelawsofanyStatewithrespect toanysubjectmatter regulatedunder§1681s-2,relatingtotheresponsibilitiesofpersonswhofurnishinformationtoconsumerreportingagencies.”53(Section1681s-2(a)regulatesthedutyofa furnisherof informationtoprovideaccurate information; section 1681s-2(b) regulates the duties afurnisherofinformationhasuponreceivingnoticeofadispute.)54

Theadditionof section1681t(b)(1)(F)has resulted inaheateddebateastohowtoreconcileitwithsection1681h(e).“Attempting to reconcile the two sections has left the districtcourtsindisarray.”55Theinconsistencybetweenthetwoisclear.Under section1681h(e), credit information furnishersmaynotbefoundliableforstatelawdefamation,invasionofprivacy,ornegligenceclaims“except as to false information furnishedwithmaliceorintenttoinjure.”56Butundersection1681t(b)(1)(F),creditinformationfurnishersarenotsubjecttoany statelawre-latedtotheirroleasfurnishers.57

Fifteen years after section 1681t(b)(1)(F) was intro-duced, thisdebate is stillunresolved. Nocircuit courthas ad-dressedtheissue,58butthedozensoffederaldistrictcourtsthathavetackledithaveovertimedevelopedthreedistinctapproach-es: the “total preemption” approach, the “statutory” approach,andthe“temporal”approach.59Evenwithinsomecircuits,thereisnoconsensusastowhichofthesedisparatetheoriesiscorrect.60

A. The “total preemption” approach. The clearest of the three approaches is the “total pre-emption”approach,which,asitsnameimplies,positsthatwiththeadditionofsection1681t(b)(1)(F)allstatelawclaimsagainstcreditinformationfurnishersthattouchuponFCRA-relatedis-sues are preempted.61 Courts adopting this approach contendthat,despite the fact thatCongressdidnotremovementionofcreditinformationregardingfurnishersinsection1681h(e),itin-tendedforthenewsection1681t(b)(1)(F)topreempteventhoseclaimspreviouslyallowedunder1681h(e).Asexplainedbythe

Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law 51

courtthatfirstadoptedtheapproach,While Congress did not specifically provide. . . that section1681t supersedes1681h, itis clear from the faceof section1681t(b)(1)(F)thatCongresswantedtoeliminateallstatecausesofaction“relatingtotheresponsibilitiesofpersonswhofurnishinformationtocreditreportingagencies.”Anyotherinterpretationwouldflyinthefaceoftheplainmeaningofthestatute.62

Where this approach is applied, a consumer may notbringanystatelawclaimconcerningafurnisher’sFCRAobliga-tions, “including those involvingmalicious andwillful tortiousconduct.”63

B. The “temporal” approach. The total preemption approach has been criticizedby somecourts,whichbelieve it contravenes theprinciple thatstatutes shouldnotbe construed in amanner that renders anyclauseorwordsuperfluous.64 Theyarguethattotalpreemptionimproperlyignoresthefactthatthewords“personwhofurnishesinformationtoaconsumerreportingagency”remaininsection1681h(e).Nevertheless,thesecourtsrecognizethatsometheoryisneededtoreconcilesections1681h(e)and1681t(b)(1)(F). Thetemporalapproachisonesuchattempttoharmo-nize the two sections without finding totalpreemption. Under this approach, section1681h(e) preempts state law claimsbasedontheactionsofafurnisherofinformationbefore thereceiverhasreceivednoticeoftheinaccu-racy, and section 1681t(b)(1)(F) applies afterthefurnisherreceivessuchnotice.65 Sections1681s-2(a)(1)(A)and(B)governthefurnishingofinformationwith“reasonablecausetobelievethattheinforma-tionisinaccurate”orafternotificationfromtheconsumerofaninaccuracy.66Section1681s-2(b)specificallydealswithdutiesaf-terreceivinganoticeofdisputefromareportingagency.67Thus,courtsadoptingthetemporalapproachreasonthatsection1681s-2onlyregulatesfurnishersofinformationaftertheyreceivenoticethat the furnished informationmaynotbeaccurate.68 Becausesection1681t(b)(1)(F)appliesonlyto“subjectmatter[s]regulat-edunder§1681s-2,”69thesecourtsbelievethatsection1681h(e)still governs the preemption of claims arising prior to the fur-nisherreceivingactualorconstructivenoticeofinaccuracy.70 Theendresultofthisapproachisthatstatelawclaimsagainstfurnishersarepreemptedunlessboth(1)theactionsgiv-ingrisetotheclaimoccurredbeforethefurnisherhadnoticeoftheinaccuracy,and(2)theclaimallegesmaliceorwillfulintenttoinjuretheconsumer.71

C. The “statutory” approach. The third approach to reconciling the two preemp-tionprovisionsisthe“statutory”approach,underwhichsection1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts only statutory state causes of action,leavingsection1681h(e)toaddressthepreemptionofcommonlawstatecausesofaction.72Courtsapplyingthisapproachreasonthat section1681h(e) refers tocommon lawcausesofaction—”defamation,invasionofprivacy,ornegligence”73—whilesection1681t(b)(1)(F)“appearsto”dealonlywithstatestatutoryregula-tions.74Insupportofthelatterpoint,thesecourtsnotethatCon-gressexceptedtwostatestatuesfrombeingpreemptedbysection1681t(b)(1)(F).75Thusunderthestatutoryapproach,aconsumercannotbringanystatestatutoryclaimagainstacredit informa-tionfurnisher,butcanbringastatecommonlawclaimifeithermaliceofwillfulintenttoinjureisalleged.

D. Conclusion: “Total preemption” is the most sensible approach.

Ofthesethreetheories,thetotalpreemptionapproachfindsthemostsupportintheFCRA,andmostfaithfullycapturesCongressionalintent.TheothertwoapproachesarefoundedonmisreadingsoftheFCRA,andresultinpreemptionschemesthatcanonlybedescribedasillogical. Thetemporalapproachisbasedonthefallacythatsec-tion1681s-2only governs a furnisher’s responsibilities after re-ceiving notice of an inaccuracy. In reality, the “subject matterregulatedunder section1681s-2”76 is the“dutyof furnishersofinformation to provide accurate information,”77 regardless ofwhetherthefurnisherhasnoticeofanyinaccuracy.78Moreover,this approach leads to a “perverse”79 and “troubling”80 result: itgivesfurnishersmoreprotectionforactscommittedafterreceiv-ing notice of dispute than for acts committed before receivingnotice.81 If the temporal approach is correct, a consumer canbringatortactionagainstafurnisherwhohadnonoticethattheinformationwasincorrect,butispreventedfrombringingatortactionagainstafurnisherwhohadnoticeoftheincorrectinfor-mation,evenifthefurnisheractedwithwillfulintenttoinjuretheconsumer.82 ThiscannothavebeentheintentofCongress. Asonecourtremarked,“[i]tseemsodd...thatCongressintendedtoprotectfurnishersofinformationmoreoncetheyhaveknowl-edgethataconsumerisdisputinganitemonhiscreditreport;one

would,logically,expecttheoppositepolicy.”83

The result of the statutory approach is nearly as puz-zling.ThereisnologicalreasonwhyCongresswouldindiscrimi-nately preempt all statutory claims, but allow certain commonlawclaims.Nothinginherenttostatutoryclaimsseparatesthemfromcommonlawclaims,otherthanthefactthattheyarecodi-fied.Anobjectivelookatsections1681h(e)and1681t(b)(1)(F)demonstrates thatCongressdidnotendeavor tocreateseparatepreemption rules for statutory and common law claims. Sec-tion1681t(b)(1)(F)doesnotlimititselftostatutoryclaims.Theevidencecitedbycourtsinsupportoftheconclusionthatitdoesso—thattherearetwoexceptionstotheprovision,andtheyareboth statutes—is superficial, and the reliance on it is misguid-ed. Courts applying the statutory approach thus are forced to“read[]anelementintosection1681t(b)(1)(F)thatitstextdoesnotcontain.”84Likewise,section1681h(e)doesnotlimititselftocommonlawclaims.Itspecificallyappliesto“anyactionorpro-ceedingin the nature of defamation,invasionofprivacy,ornegli-gence.”85Thereisnoreasonwhythisshouldnotapplyequallytoanystatutoryclaimthatis“inthenatureof”defamation,invasionofprivacy,ornegligence. Indeed,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,interpretinganotherfederallawpreemptingany“requirementorprohibition...imposedunderStateLaw,”rejectedtheargumentthatCongressintendedonlytotrumpstatestatues.86“[S]uchananalysisisatoddsbothwiththeplainwordsofthe[Act]andwiththegeneralunderstandingofcommon-lawdamagesactions.Thephrase‘[n]orequirementorprohibition’sweepsbroadlyandsuggestsnodis-tinction between positive enactments and common law; to thecontrary,thosewordseasilyencompassobligationsthattaketheformofcommon-lawrules.”87ThesameanalysisappliesequallytotheFCRA. Asonedistrictcourtexplained, the“plain languageof

The total preemption approach is the fairest read-ing of the statute, and is the most supportive of the

clear Congressional intent.

52 Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law

section1681t(b)(1)(F)clearlyeliminatedallstatecausesofactionagainstfurnishersofinformation.”88Thesectionunambiguouslystatesthat“[n]orequirementorprohibitionmaybeimposedun-derthelawsofanyState...relatingtotheresponsibilitiesofper-sonswhofurnishinformationtoconsumerreportingagencies.”89Another court put it even more succinctly: “[Section 1681t(b)(1)(F)] isclearandunequivocal. Itmeanswhat itsays.”90 Thelegislative history confirms that the total preemption approachreflectsCongress’sintent.91RepresentativesKennedyandThom-as explained that the 1996 amendments to section1681tweremeanttocreate“auniformnationalstandard,”“socompanieswillnothavetocomplywithapatchworkofStatelaws.”92Allowingconsumerstobringanystatelawclaimarisingoutofacreditin-formationfurnisher’sFCRAresponsibilitieswouldfrustrateCon-gress’sintentincreatingthatuniformnationalstandard.93ItisnosurprisethatwithintheNinthCircuit,whosecourtsmayhavethemostexperiencewithconsumerFCRAclaims,thisisthemajorityview.94

The temporal and statutory approaches grew out of adesire to read theFCRA in amanner thatdoesnot render su-perfluousthewords“personwhofurnishesinformationtoacon-sumerreportingagency”insection1681h(e).Butthosealternateapproaches suffer from and create even greater problems. TheycutofftheFCRA’snosetospiteitsface.“[W]hiletheruleagainstsuperfluitiesisahelpfultoolofstatutoryinterpretation,itisnotaninexorablecommand,andneednotbefollowedatallcosts.”95Noneofthethreeapproachesiswithoutproblem,butthetotalpreemptionapproachisthefairestreadingofthestatute,andisthemostsupportiveoftheclearCongressionalintent.

VI.Conclusion CongressrightlyintendedtheFCRAtoserveasacom-prehensive statute regulating the practice and industry of creditreporting. Over theyears,numerous stateshaveenacted legisla-tionfurtherregulatingthisconduct.Thesestatutes,althoughwellmeaning,makeitinefficientandoftenconfusingforlenders,credi-tors, and credit reporting agencies to conduct business. This isespeciallytrueinanincreasinglymobileandtransientconsumer/borrowerpopulationwithmoreinterstatecreditor/consumer-lend-ersituations.Thisultimatelynegativelyimpactsconsumers,bor-rowers,andcreditapplicantscaughtupinacreditreportingsystemmademore inefficientbyanever-expandingwebof state regula-tionthatapproachesandoftensubtlyencroachesontheFCRA—whichwasintendedtobecomprehensiveandgenerallypreemptive.IngrayareascourtswouldserveCongressionalintent,marketef-ficiency,andconsumerinterestsbyinterpretingFCRApreemptionbroadly. Thiswould eliminate confusion,provide certainty, andmakecreditmarketsmoreefficientandavailable.

*Mr.PinsonisapartneratBakerBottsL.L.P.specializingincom-merciallitigation,classaction,consumer,credit,deceptivetradepractices,consumeradvertising,fraud,privacy,datasecurity,databreach,banking,andfinancialtransactionmatters.Mr.Lawrenceis anassociate at thefirm specializing in commercial litigation,classaction,datasecurity,tradesecret,andsecuritiesmatters.

1 15U.S.C.§1681,etseq.2 15U.S.C.§1681.3 Kodrick v. Ferguson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 788, 794 (N.D. Ill.1999) (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. H9810–11) (concerning the1996amendmenttotheFCRA).4 15U.S.C.§1681t(a).5 Id.6 15U.S.C.§1681h(e).

7 15U.S.C.§1681t(a)(emphasisadded).8 Davenportv.FarmersIns.Group,378F.3d839,843(8thCir.2004);Cisnerosv.U.D.Registry,Inc.,39Cal.App.4th548,577–78(1995).9 Cisneros,39Cal.App.4that577.10 16C.F.R.§622.11 Davenport,378F.3dat843.12 Id.at841.13 Id.

14 Id.at842.15 Id.at843.16 393F.Supp.577,581–82(S.D.Fla.1975).17 Id.at581.18 Id.at581–82.19 15U.S.C.§1681t(a),(b).20 15U.S.C.§1681t(b).21 15U.S.C.§§1681t(b)(5)(A),(B),(G),and(H).22 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(4).23 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1).Thesectionalsolistsseveralstatelawsthatwouldbepreemptedbythissection,butwhichCongressdeterminedshouldbegrandfatheredinastheyexistedatthetimeofthesection’s1996enactment.24 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1)(A),(E),(G),and(H).25 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1)(F).26 Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 619 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir.1980) (citing Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp.577,584(S.D.Fla.1975)(“ItisclearthatthequalifiedimmunityprovidedforbyCongressismeanttobea‘quidproquoforfulldisclosure.’”)).27 15U.S.C.§1681h(e).28 Id.;see also Thornton,619F.2dat703.29 15U.S.C.§§1681g,1681h,1681m.30 15U.S.C.§1681h(e).31 McKeownv.SearsRoebuck&Co.,335F.Supp.2d917,942–43 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (“All defamation claims arise outofdisclosurestothirdparties; it isaprimafacieelementoftheclaim.”).32 Id.33 TRWInc.v.Andrews,534U.S.19,31(2001).34 McKeown,335F.Supp.2dat943;Carlsonv.TransUnion,LLC,261F.Supp.2d663,664n.2(N.D.Tex.2003).35 Thornton,619F.2dat704;Gohmanv.EquifaxInformationSvcs., LLC,395F.Supp.2d822,829(D.Minn.2005);Grahamv.CSCCreditSvcs.,Inc.,306F.Supp.2d873,882(D.Minn.2004).36 Thornton,619F.2dat702.37 Id.at704–05.38 Id.at704.39 Grahamv.CSCCreditSvcs.,Inc.,306F.Supp.2d873,882(D.Minn.2004);see Gohmanv.EquifaxInformationSvcs., LLC,395F.Supp.2d822,829(D.Minn.2005).40 15U.S.C.§1681h(e).41 Thornton,619F.2dat705;Yeagerv.TRWInc.,984F.Supp.517,523(E.D.Tex.1997);Wigginsv.EquifaxSvcs.,Inc.,848F.Supp.213,223(D.D.C.1993).42 NewYorkTimesv.Sullivan,376U.S.254,279–80(1964),cited in Thornton,619F.2dat705andWiggins,848F.Supp.at223.43 Wiggins,848F.Supp.at223.44 See Yeager,984F.Supp.at524.45 Id.at519.46 Id.47 Id.at524.48 Id.at524–25.

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49 Id. at523(citingWiggins,848F.Supp.at219).50 15U.S.C.§1681h(e).51 Carlson,261F.Supp.2dat665(discussingTexasnegligencelaw); see Shannon v. Equifax Information Svcs., 764 F. Supp.2d714, 727–28 (E.D.Penn. 2011) (“Bydefinition, a plaintiffcannotallegewillfulnegligence. Therefore,theonlynegligenceactionthatPlaintiffcanpursueifanegligenceactionundertheFCRA.”).52 15U.S.C.§1681h(e).53 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1)(F).Section54A(a)ofchapter93oftheMassachusettsAnnotatedLawsandsection1785.25(a)oftheCaliforniaCivilcode,asineffectin1996,areexceptedfromthisprovision.15U.S.C.§§1681t(b)(1)(F)(i)–(ii).54 Whether the FCRA preempts causes of action againstinformation furnishersnot specifically related toeitherof theseissues is another question. The California Supreme CourtrecentlyheldtheFCRAdidnotpreemptaclaimthatamedicalprovider had furnished confidential patient information to aconsumerreportingagency,concludingthatsection1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts state law claims only insofar as they arise out ofa requirementorprohibitionwith respect to the specificdutiesregulated by section 1681s-2. Brown v. Mortensen, ___ P.3d___,2011WL2409913(Cal.2011).55 Gormanv.Wolpoff&Abramson,LLP,584F.3d1147,1166(9thCir.2009),cert. denied,131S.Ct.71(2010).InGorman,theNinthCircuitnoted that thedistrict courthadapplied thetotalpreemptionapproach,butthat“[i]ntheend,weneednotdecide this issue.” Id. at1167 (9thCir.2009); see also Rossv.FDIC,625F.3d808,814n.*(4thCir.2010)(commentingthat“[c]ourts have taken a variety of approaches to resolving thisconflict,”butthat its“dispositionofthiscaseonothergroundsmeansweneednotaddressthisissue”).56 15U.S.C.§1681h(e)(emphasisadded).57 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1)(F).58 Thoughtheyhaverecentlyhadtheopportunity.TheNinthCircuithastwicethisyeardeclinedreachthe issue. Johnsonv.WellsFargoHomeMortgage,Inc., 635F.3d401,421(9thCir.2011);Gormanv.Wolpoff&Abramson, LLP,584F.3d1147,1167 (9thCir.2009), cert. denied,131S.Ct.71 (2010). TheTenthCircuithaditsownopportunityin2010.SeeRossv.FDIC,625F.3d808,814n.*(4thCir.2010).59 Buraye v. Equifax, 625 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898 (C.D. Cal.2008).60 See, e.g.,Id.at899(notingthatwithintheNinthCircuit,courtsutilizeboththetotalpreemptionandstatutoryapproaches).61 Nelsonv.EquifaxInformationSvcs.,LLC,522F.Supp.2d1222,1233(C.D.Cal.2007); see alsoBuraye,625F.Supp2dat 900; Roybal v. Equifax, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181 (E.D.Cal.2005);Davisv.MarylandBank,No.00-04191,2002WL32713429,at*12–*13(N.D.Cal.2002);Rileyv.GeneralMotorsAcceptance Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1324–25 (S.D. Ala.2002).62 Jaramilo v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 155 F.Supp.2d356,361–62(E.D.Pa.2001).63 Buraye, 625 F.Supp.2d at 899 (citing Davis, 2002 WL32713429,at*13).64 See, e.g.,Barnhillv.BankofAmerica,N.A.,378F.Supp.2d696,700–01(D.S.C.2005)(citingTRWInc.,534U.S.at31). 65 Kane v. Guaranty Residential Lending, Inc., No. 04-CV-4847,2005WL1153623,at*8(E.D.N.Y.)May16,2005);seealso Ryderv.WashingtonMut.Bank,F.A.,371F.Supp.2d152,154–55(D.Conn.2005);Woltersdorfv.PentagonFed.CreditUnion, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226–27 (N.D. Ala. 2004);Staffordv.CrossCountryBank,262F.Supp.2d776,785–86

(W.D.Ky.2003);Vazquez-Garciav.Trans-UniondePuertoRico,222F.Supp.2d150,161(D.P.R.2002);Aklagiv.NationsCreditFin.Svcs.,196F.Supp.2d1186,1194–95(D.Kan.2002).66 15U.S.C.§§1681s-2(a)(1)(A)–(B).67 15U.S.C.§1681s-2(b).68 Kane,2005WL1153623,at*8.69 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1)(F).70 Kane,2005WL1153623,at*8.71 See Barnhill,378F.Supp.2dat701;Vazquez-Garcia, 222F.Supp.2dat163.72 Meisel v. USA Shade and Fabric Structures, Inc., ___ F.Supp. 2d ___, 2011WL 2413174, at *6 (N.D.Tex. June 14,2011);Barnhill,378F.Supp.2dat703;see also Wolfev.MBNAAmer.Bank,485F.Supp.2d874,886–87(W.D.Tenn.2007);Gormanv.Wolpoff&Abramson,LLP,370F.Supp.2d1005,1009–1010(N.D.Cal.2005);McCloudv.HomesideLending,309 F. Supp. 2d 1335,1341–42 (N.D. Ala. 2004); Gordon v.GreenpointCredit,266F.Supp.2d1007,1013(S.D.Ia.2003);Carlsonv.TransUnion,LLC,259F.Supp.2d517,521(N.D.Tex.2003);Johnsonv.CitiMortgage,Inc.,351F.Supp.2d1368,1375–76(N.D.Ga.2004)73 15U.S.C.§1681h(e).74 McCloud v. Homeside Lending, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1335,1341(N.D.Ala.2004).75 Id.76 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1)(F).77 15U.S.C.§1681s-2(a).78 Gordon, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1013 (holding the temporalapproach to be “strained at best” because section 1681s-2“chargesfurnishersofinformationwithadutytoreportaccurateinformationregardlessofwhetherthefurnisherhasnoticeofthedispute”).79 Barnhill,378F.Supp.2dat702.80 Johnson,351F.Supp.2dat1374.81 Id.at1374–75;Barnhill,378F.Supp.2dat702.82 Barnhill,378F.Supp.2dat702.83 Johnson,351F.Supp.2dat1375;see also Meisel,2011WL2413174,at*7.84 Kane,2005WL1153623,at*9.85 15U.S.C.§1681h(e)(emphasisadded).86 Cipollonev.LiggettGroup,Inc.,505U.S.504,521(1992),cited in Carruthersv.AmericanHondaFin.Corp.,717F.Supp.2d1251,1255(N.D.Fla.2010).87 Id.88 Jaramilo,155F.Supp.2dat362,quoted in Riley,26F.Supp.2dat1322.89 15U.S.C.§1681t(b)(1)(F).90 Carruthers,717F.Supp.2dat1254.91 Buraye,625F.Supp.2dat900(quotingDavis,2002WL32713429, at *13) (adopting the total preemption approachbecause “the legislative history demonstrates that Congressenacted section 1681t(b(1)(F) in order to create a uniformschemegoverningdisclosureofcreditinformation”);Carruthers,717F.Supp.2dat1256.92 Kodrick v. Ferguson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 788, 794 (N.D. Ill.1999)(quoting140Cong.Rec.H9810–11).93 See Buraye,625F.Supp.2dat900(citingDavis,2002WL32713429,at*13).94 Id.at899(observingthatthemajorityofcourtsintheNinthCircuithaveutilizedthetotalpreemptionapproach,andlistingcases).95 Carruthers,717F.Supp.2dat1257(collectingauthorities).