7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 1/11
Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
The Failed States IndexReviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Policy, No. 149 (Jul. - Aug., 2005), pp. 56-65Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30048042 .
Accessed: 30/12/2012 14:45
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Foreign Policy.
http://www.jstor.org
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 2/11
T
m m s A
I
A b o u t b i l l i o n
p e o p l e
l i v e c o u n t r i e s
t h a t a r e
d a n g e r o f
c o l l a p s e .
In
t h e f i r s t
a n n u a l F a i l e d
S t a t e s
I n d e x
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y a n d
t h e
F u n d f o r
P e a c e
r a n k
t h e c o u n t r i e s
a b o u t
g o
o v e r t h e
b r i n k .
merica is now threatened less
by
con-
quering
states than
we are
by failing
ones."
That was the conclusion of the
2002 U.S. National
Security Strategy.
For a
country
whose
foreign policy
in
the 20th cen-
tury
was dominated
by
the
struggles against power-
ful states such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet
Union,
the U.S. assessment is
striking.
Nor is the
United States alone
in
diagnosing
the
problem.
U.N.
Secretary-General
ofi Annanhas warned hat
"ignor-
ing
failedstatescreates
problems
hat sometimes ome
back to bite us." French President
Jacques
Chirac
Copyright
005,
TheFund
or
Peaceandthe
Carnegie
ndow-
ment
for
International eace.All
rights
reserved. OREIGN
POLICYs a
registered
rademark wned
by
the
Carnegie
Endowment
or
International eace.
56
FOREIGN POLICY
m
1
Doinia
epbi
-itmla44
Veeul
Clmbi
E c u a d o
U
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 3/11
Russia
B o n a
Belarus
Turkey
m
A z e r b a i j a n
-Uzbksa
u m
m1
Saudi
vArabia
Iran
)mllr
mE
m
a n g l a d e s h
U
P h l i p i e
N o r t h
K o r e a
J i
9
Gabi,;
I
GuineaNigeri
De.
Rp
fteI
og
z
Angola
II1
S o a i
K e n y a
R w a n
U
II;
has
spoken
of "the threat hat failed states
carry
or
the world's
equilibrium."
World leaders once wor-
ried about who
was
amassing power;
now
they
worry
about the absence of
it.
Failed states have made
a remarkable
odyssey
from the
periphery
o the
very
center of
global
pol-
itics.
During
the Cold War,state failurewas seen
through
the
prism
of
superpower
conflict and was
rarely
addressed
as a
danger
n
its own
right.
In
the
1990s,
"failed states" fell
largely
nto the
province
of humanitarians
and human
rights
activists,
although hey
did
begin
to consume
the attentionof
the world's sole
superpower,
which led
interven-
tions
in
Somalia,Haiti, Bosnia,
and
Kosovo. For so-
called
foreign-policy
realists, however,
these states
and the
problems
they
posed
were
a distraction
from
weightier
ssues of
geopolitics.
Now,
it
seems,
everybody
cares. The
dangerous
exports
of failed states-whether
international
terrorists,
drug
barons,
or
weapons
arsenals-are
the
subject
of endless discussion
and
concern.
For
all the newfound
attention, however,
there
is still
uncertainty
about the definition and
scope
of the
problem.
How do you know a failed state when
you
see one?
Of
course,
a
government
hat has lost
control of its
territory
or of the
monopoly
on the
legitimate
use
of force has earned the label. But
there can be more subtle
attributes of failure.
Some
regimes,
for
example,
lack the
authority
to
make collective decisions or the
capacity
to deliv-
er
public
services.
In
other
countries,
the
populace
may rely entirely
on the black
market,
fail to
pay
taxes,
or
engage
in
large-scale
civil disobedience.
Outside intervention can
be both a
symptom
of
JULY
I
UGUST
2005
57
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 4/11
The
Failed
States
Index
and
a
trigger
for state
collapse.
A failed
state
may
be
subject
to
involuntary
restrictions
of its sover-
eignty,
such as
political
or
economic
sanctions,
the
presence
of
foreign military
forces
on
its
soil,
or
other
military
constraints,
such
as a
no-fly
zone.
How manystates are at seriousriskof state fail-
ure? The World
Bank has
identified
about 30
"low-
income countries under
stress,"
whereas Britain's
Department
for
International
Development
has
named
46
"fragile"
tates
of
concern.
A
report
com-
missioned
by
the CIAhas
put
the number of
failing
states at about 20.
To
present
a
more
precise
picture
of
the
scope
and
implications
of the
problem,
the Fund
for
Peace,
an
independent
research
organization,
and
FOREIGN
POLICY
aveconducted
globalranking
of weak and
failing
states.
Using
12
social, economic, political,
and
military
ndicators,
we ranked
60
states
n order
of
their
vulnerability
o violent internalconflict.
(For
each
indicator,
he
Fund
for Peace
computed
scores
using
softwarethat
analyzed
data from tens of thou-
sands of international nd local media sources rom
the
last
half
of 2004. For
a
complete
discussion
of the
12
indicators,
leasego
to
www.ForeignPolicy.com
r
www.fundforpeace.org.)
he
resulting
ndex
provides
About billionftheworld'seopleiven
insecure
tates,
with
aryingegrees
f
vulnerability
o
widespread
ivil onflict.
a
profile
of
the new
world
disorderof the 21st cen-
tury
and
demonstrates hat the
problem
of
weak and
failing
states is far more serious
than
generally
thought.
About 2
billion
people
ive
in
insecure
tates,
with varyingdegreesof vulnerabilityo widespread
civil
conflict.
The
instability
hat the index
diagnoses
has
many
faces. In
the
Democratic
Republic
of the
Congo
or
Somalia,
state
failure
has been
apparent
for
years,
manifested
by
armed
conflict, famine,
disease out-
breaks,
and
refugee
flows.
In other
cases, however,
instability
s
more
elusive.
Often,
corrosiveelements
have
not
yet
triggered
open
hostilities,
and
pres-
sures
may
be
bubbling
ust
below
the
surface.
Large
stretches
of
lawless
territory
exist
in
many
countries
in the
index,
but
that
territory
has not
always
been
in
open
revolt
against
state
institutions.
R n
i g
I n t e t b e i h i h
2 p l t c l
Conflict
may
be concentrated
n local territories
seekingautonomy
or
secession
as
in
the
Philippines
and
Russia).
In other
countries,
nstability
akes
the
form of
episodic fighting,
drug
mafias,
or warlords
dominatingarge
waths
of
territory
as
n
Afghanistan,
Colombia,
and
Somalia).
State
collapse
sometimes
happens uddenly,
but
often the demise
of
the state
s
a slow and
steady
deterioration f socialand
political
institutions
Zimbabwe
and Guineaare
good
exam-
ples).
Some countries
emerging
rom conflict
may
be
on the mend but in
danger
of
backsliding
(Sierra
Leone
and
Angola).
The World Bank found
that,
within
five
years,
half
of
all countries
merging
rom
civil unrest
all back nto conflict n a
cycle
of
collapse
(Haiti
and
Liberia).
The 10 most at-riskcountries
n the index have
already
hown
clear
signs
of state
ailure.
vory
Coast,
a
country
ut
in
half
by
civil
war,
s
the most vulnera-
ble
to
disintegration;
t would
prob-
ably
collapse completely
if
U.N.
peacekeeping
orces
pulled
out.
It
is
followedby theDemocraticRepub-
lic
of
the
Congo,
Sudan,
raq,
Soma-
lia,
Sierra
Leone, Chad,
Yemen,
Liberia,
ndHaiti.The ndex ncludes
others
whose
instability
s less wide-
ly acknowledged,
including
Bangladesh
17th),
Guatemala
31st),
Egypt
38th),
SaudiArabia
45th),
and Russia
(59th).
Weak
states are most
prevalent
in
Africa,
but
they
also
appear
in
Asia,
Eastern
Europe,
Latin
America,
and the Middle East.
Experts
have for
yearsdiscussedan "arc of instability"-an expres-
sion
that
came into use
in the 1970s to
refer
to
a
"MuslimCrescent"
extending
from
Afghanistan
o
the
"Stans"
n the southern
part
of the formerSovi-
et
Union. Our
study suggests
that
the
concept
is
too
narrow.
The
geography
of
weak
states revealsa
territorial
expanse
that
extends
from
Moscow to
Mexico
City,
far
wider
than
an "arc"
would
suggest,
and
not limited to the
Muslim
world.
The
index does
not
provide
any
easy
answers
or
those
ooking
o shore
up
countries
n
the brink.
Elec-
tions are
almost
universally
regarded
as
helpful
in
reducing
conflict.
However,
f
they
are
rigged,
con-
58
FOREIGN
POLICY
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 5/11
I n d i c a t o r s I n s t a b i l i t
1
106.0
Ivory
oast
2 105.3 Dem. ep.f heCongo
3 104.1 Sudan
4
103.2
Iraq
5 102.3
Somalia
6
102.1 Sierra eone
7
100.9 Chad
8
99.7
Yemen
9 99.5 Liberia
10 99.2
Haiti
11
99.0
Afghanistan
12
96.5 Rwanda
13
95.7 North
orea
14 95.0 Colombia
15 94.9 Zimbabwe
16
94.7 Guinea
17 94.3 Bangladesh
17
94.3
Burundi
19 94.2 Dominican
epublic
20
93.7
Centralfrican
epublic
21 93.5 Bosniand
Herzegovina
21
93.5
Venezuela
23 93.4 Burma
24 93.2
Uzbekistan
25 92.7
Kenya
26
92.0
Bhutan
27
91.7
Uganda
28 91.5 Laos
28 91.5
Syria
30 91.1
Ethiopia
31 91.0 Guatemala
31 91.0 Tanzania
33 90.9
Equatorial
uinea
34 89.4 Pakistan
35 89.0
Nepal
36 88.9
Paraguay
36 88.9 Lebanon
38
88.8
Egypt
38 88.8 Ukraine
40 88.1 Peru
41
87.6 Honduras
42 87.5
Mozambique
43
87.3
Angola
43 87.3 Belarus
45 87.1 Saudi rabia
46 87.0 Ecuador
46 87.0 Indonesia
48 86.7
Tajikistan
49 86.1
Turkey
50 85.7
Azerbaijan
51 85.6 Bahrain
52 84.9 Vietnam
53 84.6 Cameroon
54 84.3
Nigeria
55 84.1 Eritrea
56 83.9
Philippines
57 83.8 Iran
58 83.7 Cuba
59
83.5 Russia
60 82.4 Gambia
8.0 8.0 7.7 8.8
7.7
9.5
9.1
i i i
7.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.1 8.7 9.1
I
8.6
7.8 9.1 8.5
9.2 8.7
8.0 8.7 7.3
8.0
[.
8.3 6.3
8.7
8.2
8.8 8.9
8.2
8.4
II
8.0
7.4
6.3
8.3
7.8
UlIU
8.7
8.0
8.0
7.5
8.9
8.7 7.5 9.1
8.7
6.3
8.6
8.0
7.1 8.3
[i
8.0 8.9
9.0
9.1
7.0
9.4
8.0
7.8
8.0 6.4
8.2
8.8
[
9.3
6.4
9.4
7.6
7.8
7.3 8.1
7.5
8.2
8.2 6.5 7.9
l
I
8.0
7.7 3.4 8.1 9.4 8.7 7.8 8.5
8.0
8.0
7.4
7.5 8.1
8.1
7.9 8.2 8.0
7.8
8.0 8.6 9.5
5.0
8.3
5.0
8.9
8.2
8.0
6.0
7.2 8.1 9.0 8.3 8.0
3.0
8.0 6.9
7.1
4.2
8.2
5.4 9.2
I
8.0 6.4
7.7 7.3
7.9
8.5
7.5
7.9 6.7
6.0 6.1 4.5
[
7.5 8.1 8.1
9.2
7.5
8.4 7.0 7.6 6.0 7.4 9.5 8.2 8.5 8.0 8.7 6.0
7.2 7.1
3.8
7.8
7.2
9.0
8.3 7.5 8.6
i
-I
8.0
7.1
8.5
6.8
6.8
9.6
-
7.0 9.2
4.0
5.0
3.0
7.0
9.0
-
8.0 8.2 7.0
7.0
8.0 5.7 5.7 8.5 6.0
7.3 8.7
8.0 8.0 6.8
7.6 4.5 8.2 9.1 7.8
7.2
7.5
8.0 6.3
8.0
-
6.9 9.2 8.0 7.5
3.0
6.5 8.0 6.8
6.8 6.0 9.1 5.0 9.4 8.0
8.0
6.7 8.3 6.3 8.9
7.4
8.5
8.4 8.4
4.0
8.0
8.0 5.5 8.0
[
8.0
5.0
8.0 6.0
I
6.7
7.6 6.9
5.7
8.4
6.0
8.0
8.4
8.3
8.0
8.1 7.3
-
6.7
6.3 8.8
-
6.5 7.9
2.5
6.7
8.0
7.5 6.8 5.0 9.0 5.0
7.6
8.2
7.4
8.7
8.0 6.0 7.3
8.5
7.9
5.5
6.3
8.9
6.0
6.0 7.4 7.5
7.7
9.5 5.0 8.7 8.1 9.1
4.0
7.2 7.6 6.7 4.5 8.2 7.8 8.6 7.9 7.5 7.1
8.0
6.0
6.3 9.0
5.1
8.0
7.8 7.0
5.0
5.0
5.0 6.9 8.0
3.3
7.5 8.1
0
9.3
8.5
8.0
5.6 4.0
7.1
8.9 6.0 9.1
7.6
8.0
6.7
4.0
5.0 6.9 8.3 7.8 7.0 8.3 8.0
8.7
6.0
8.0
8.0 7.5
7.1 7.0 4.7
8.7
4.3
7.3
8.1 9.2
8.0
7.8
5.0 3.8
9.5 7.3 7.7 8.5
8.2
5.0
7.0
6.9
8.8 7.3 8.9 5.5 8.5
2.0
9.1 6.8
6.0
7.0 6.6
9.0
8.5
5.0 9.6
4.4 7.1
8.9
7.0
6.0 5.3 5.4
3.0 7.2
8.0
9.1
6.0
8.0 5.7 9.0 7.8
8.1
6.7
7.4
3.8
8.2 5.0
7.9 6.3
3.8
4.4
7.9
7.2 8.3
7.0
8.1 8.8
8.0 7.0
2.4
5.4
8.5
7.0 7.3 6.8
9.4 7.5
7.6 6.3 7.8 8.8
2.2
4.3 8.6
8.3 5.4
6.0
5.6 6.9 5.0
9.5
7.5
7.9 8.0
8.6
4.0
8.6 7.0 6.3 8.9 4.0 9.2 4.0 8.6 7.6 8.8 5.0
5.0
6.2 6.7 5.3
8.6
5.0
U
8.0 9.5 5.0
8.0 7.3 5.0
4.2
4.8
5.0
8.0 9.1 7.0
8.0
6.0
6.0 5.8
4.1 5.0 8.5
7.0
9.6
7.0
6.0 5.0 6.7
9.0
1.7
4.0
8.4 9.6
7.5
8.6
8.0 5.6
8.5
3.4
7.6 4.3 8.4 8.0
6.4
7.2
7.0
5.1
8.6
4.2
6.4
7.5 6.6 8.0
8.2 5.0
7.2
3.0
6.5
8.7
5.8 8.8 6.9 6.7
z W
8.3
4.5
8.0 8.0
5.4
4.0
l(
8.8 9.0 7.0 5.7
5.0
9.2 5.0
7.0 7.0 6.5 8.2 4.7 9.3
3.8
8.2 7.0
9.2
4.0
5.0
8.0 7.3 6.0
3.3
9.1 4.8 8.8
7.3 9.1 6.1
5.0
8.0 6.3 5.4 5.7 7.8
3.8 9.0 8.6 6.3
6.0
7.5
2.3
3.8
9.4 6.7 9.0 7.6 9.2
4.0
7.0 7.0
5.4 4.0 6.7 8.1
7.0
7.9
6.0 8.3 6.0
JULYI
AUGUST
2005
59
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 6/11
The Failed
States Index
]
ducted
during
ctive
ighting,
r attract low
turnout,
they
can be ineffective r evenharmful o
stability.
lec-
toral
democracyappears
o
have had
only
a modest
impact
on the
stability
of states such as
Iraq,
Rwan-
da,
Kenya,
Venezuela,
igeria,
andIndonesia.Ukraine
ranksashighlyvulnerablenlargepartbecauseof last
year'sdisputed
election.
What
are
the
clearest
early warning signs
of a
failing
state?
Among
the
12
indicatorswe
use,
two
consistently
ranknearthe
top.
Uneven
development
is
high
in
almost all the states
in
the
index,
suggest-
ing
that
inequality
within states-and not
merely
poverty-increases instability.
Criminalization or
delegitimization
of the
state,
which occurs when
state institutionsare
regarded
as
corrupt, llegal,
or
ineffective,
also
figured prominently. Facing
this
condition,
people
often shift their
allegiances
to
other
leaders-opposition parties,
warlords,
ethnic
nationalists, clergy,or rebel forces. Demographic
factors,
especially
population pressures
stemming
from
refugees, nternallydisplacedpopulations,
and
environmental
degradation,
are also found
in
most
at-risk
countries,
as
are
consistent
human
rights
violations.
Identifying
he
signs
of statefailure s eas-
ier
than
crafting
solutions,
but
pinpointing
where
state
collapse
is
likely
is a
necessary
irst
step.
Go1ing
Critica[l1
F
or those near the
epicenter,
state failure is
always rightening.
tate ailurewithnuclear
weapons
could be a
nightmare
for
everyone.
Four countries
in
this
ranking
are
particularly
worrisome because of the nuclear
capabilities
or ambitions
they
harbor. North
Korea,
with
an insular
regime
and a hostile
worldview,
is
13th on the list of countries at risk of
collapse.
Pakistan,
ranked
34th,
has a substantialarsenal.
Iran,
which the United Statesaccuses of
seeking
weapons,is ranked57th, still n thedangerzone.
Russia,
with its massivenuclear
arsenal,
s 59th.
If
any
of these
regimes
begin
o
teeter,
mad dash
to secure the nukes
(or
their
building
blocks)
will
surely
follow.
Recent
history
offersa best-case cenario or
how these
weapons
can be rounded
up.
The
new states of
Ukraine,
Belarus,
and Kazakhstan
had nuclear
weapons
on
their
territory
when the
Soviet Union disintegrat-
ed
in 1991.
After inten-
sive
negotiations, they
eventuallyagreed
o cede
them and later
joined
the
Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion
Treaty
(NPT).
n
all,
about
3,400
warheads
were returned o
Russia.
Likewise,
South Africa
gave up
its entire nuclear
program
when the
apartheid regime negotiated
a transition to
majority
rule
in
1989. The
country
later
joined
the
NPT,
and
inspectors
verified the end of its
nuclear
weapons program.
The chancesof
securing
warheads
n
the event
of a
state's
failure
depend
on how the failure
unfolds.
If
the
collapse
s
accompanied
by
large-
scale
ooting
and
civil
disorder,
he
job
may
be next
to
impossible.
The failure of coalition
military
forces to securesensitivesites
in
Iraq
s a sober-
ing lesson.Thepresenceof radical slamicgroups
in
Pakistanmakes ts nucleararsenal
a
particular
concern. It has even been
reported
hat
the
Pen-
tagon
has
contingency plans
for
securing
Pak-
istani
nukes
n
the
case
of a
coup
or civil
strife,
but
experts
admit that
hunting
down these
weapons
on short notice
would be a
long
shot at best.
Country IndexRanking Nuclear tatus
Not nownhetherucleararheadsave
NorthKorea
13
been
eveloped.
issile aterial
ufficientor
betweenne ndive uclearevices.
Pakistan
34
Between4and 8nucleararheads.issile
materialor
p
o50nuclearevices.
Iran
57
No
warheads.raniumnrichment
rogram
I
and
ossibleeaponsrogram.
Russia
59
Approximately
,200
uclear
eapons.
I
Nuclearrialtlnill
iativle;
DI nf
ri
60 FOREIGN POLICY
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 7/11
Ir w IIY ̀ IY Y -
, -
Z.,
O u t
o f S
g h t
N V I i e n t h e
M i g h t y
F a l l
IA
en a large tate alls, veryone ears bout
b
it-and
some
unlucky eighborsmay
even
be
brought
own
with t. Countries
n
the ndex's
danger
one nclude ndonesia
242
million
peo-
ple),
Pakistan
162million),
Russia
143million),
and
Nigeria
(129 million).
The
Democratic
Republic
f the
Congo
60 million)
as
n
many
waysalreadyailedmore hanonce,and t is esti-
mated hat he
resulting
onflicts nddisease ave
probably
akenat least3 million ives.
Therecent
experiences
f
Congo
and heformer
Yugoslavia
suggest
hatstate ailure
n thisscale an
spin
off
smaller onflicts hatcreate
egional
nrest nd
humanitarian
rises.
Congo'scollapse
was,
in
part,precipitated
y
Rwanda's
urmoil,
and it
led
to
the
military
nvolvementf at leastseven
other tates. ermed
Africa's
irstworld
war,"
he
Congo
conflict
aised
the.specter
f entire ailed
regions.
Yugoslavia'sisintegration,
hich,
when
compared
o other
states,
was
relatively
mall,
sent
refugees
ouring
nto Western
Europe
nd
destabilizedeveral
eighboring
ountries.
Only
after hree
years
andmore
han
250,000
deaths
did
theU.S.-ledNATO
orces estore rder.
Outside
ntervention
o
address tate
ailure
becomes
tougher roposition
hena
large
tate
isin tsdeath hroes.Onthepositiveide,because
the stakes
re o
high,
a
politically
nd
diplomat-
icallyengaged
nternational
ommunity
s more
likely.
However,
he
logistical
nd
rooprequire-
ments
necessary
or
any
effective umanitarian
interventionr
peacekeeping
ission-whether
welcomed or not-could be
overwhelming.
Attempting
o establishrder
n
Iraq,
whichhasa
population
f
only
26
million,
has stretchedhe
limitsof the world'smost
capable
military.
f
the
failed tatewere our imes s
arge,
t couldmake
the
slog
n
Iraq
ook ikea cakewalk.
JULY I
AUGUST 2005 61
A r i e s p r 1 0
p o l
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 8/11
The Failed States Index
J
F
ueling Failure
The
discovery
f
large
oil and
gas
reserveshas
been a boon to many nationaleconomies,
and countries
often
spend
decades
trying
to
strike
t
rich.
But is black
gold
actually
good
for
stable
government?
Political cientists
have
coined
the term
"pet-
rostate" o describe
country
hat s
dependent
n
income from oil and
gas
yet plagued by
weak
institutions,
a
poorly
functioningpublic
sector,
and
a
gross disparity
of
power
and wealth. Some
experts
have
argued
hat
arge
oil
economies
often
stunt he
development
f
stable,
ransparent
nsti-
tutions-a phenomenon
hat has been abeled he
"resource
urse."
Jose
Ramos-Horta,
he
foreign
minister f East
Timor,
as
openly
worried
hat
his
small
country might
not be able to handle the
temptations
hatwill arisewhen t
begins
o
exploit
its
offshore
oil and
gas
fieldswith
Australia's
elp.
"Whileoil and
gas
revenuescan be a
blessing,"
Ramos-Horta
has
said,
"we are conscious
that
our
public
administration,
ur
Treasury,
ndother
branchesof
government
re
very
weak."
The index
suggests
hat
many
states
with oil
and
gas
are
indeedvulnerable.
raq,
home to the
world'ssecond-largest il reserves, s the fourth
C i t c a l s t t e
most
vulnerable
ountry,although
he
causes of
its
instability
re
manifold.
Chad,
which
has
nego-
tiated a
major
oil
pipeline
deal with
private
com-
panies
and the World
Bank,
is the seventhmost
vulnerable.Oil-rich
Venezuela,
under he mercu-
rial
eadership
f President
Hugo
Chavez,
s 21st.
Most of the
energy-rich
tates, however,
are
clustered oward the back of the
index,
indicat-
ing
that
they
are
vulnerable
but have also man-
aged
to craft and
preserve
a semblance of sta-
bility.
These states-Saudi
Arabia, Indonesia,
Bahrain,
and
Nigeria,among
others-have filled
their coffers
with oil
money.
But
those
funds
may come at a steep politicalcost.
Th
Continntt~aluDivid
Seven
of the 10 weakest states are
in
Africa.
Several
tates,
ncluding
Liberia,
he Democ-
ratic
Republic
of the
Congo,
and Sierra
Leone,
havesuffered
arge-scale
ivilwars.Sudan s
in
the
midst of what some observers have termed a
genocide.
Is
Africa doomed to remain he No.
1
manufacturer f failed states?
A decade
ago,
there was considerable
hope
that South Africaand
Nigeria
could
help
fill
the
continent's
governancegap. Today,
hat
hope
is
much diminished. outhAfricanPresidentThabo
Mbeki racks
up frequent flyer
miles
trying
to
resolve
many
African
rises,
but his interventions
haveoften acked
ollow-up.
SouthAfrica
has sent
troops
o
join
the
peacekeeping
missions
n
Congo
and
Darfur,
but it lacks the
resources-including
soldiers ree of HIV-to
impose
solutions.
The limits of South African
diplomacy
are
particularly pparent
n
Zimbabwe,
where
strong-
man PresidentRobert
Mugabe
has
presided
over
his country'sdownwardspiral(it now ranks as
the 15th most at-risk
country).
Mbeki has
opted
for what he calls
"quiet diplomacy"
toward
Mugabe,
but
many
observersbelievethat South
Africa s
propping
up
a dictatorrather han
pre-
venting
a
looming political
meltdown.
Nigeria,
Africa'smost
populous country,
s
itselfa weak state
(ranking
54th).
Its current
ov-
ernment s
consumed
by cleaningup corruption
and
mediating
erioussectarian ension at home.
Even
f
Nigeria
can overcome ts own
challenges,
it is
in
no
position
to
export stability.
62 FOREIGN POLICY
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 9/11
I v o r y
D e m o c r a t i c
R e p u b l i c
t h e
C o n g o
C o a s t
S o a i
A f h n s a
H a t
R a d
Z i m b a b w
o n i a d H e z e o v n
T a z a i
Y e m e n
B u r u n d i
A n g o l a
B a h r a i n
Less
pending Militarypending
as
a
percentage
f
GDP)
More
pending
T h
W a
r l
iT
I n
P o w e r o
s a d ,
c o m r r e
a g u n b u t
g u n
b a r r e l
d o n t
n e c e s a r i l y
p r o d u c e
p o w e r f u l
a t e
c o m p a e d
t h e
i d e x
r a n i n g s
t a t e
s p n d i n g
o n t h e m i l
t r y a n
o u d
h t
s a e s c o e w i h
m a l m d i m
l a r g e
a n d
s u p e r s i z e d
d e f e n s e
b u d g e t s .
Y e m e n t h e
g h t h -
m o t v u n r a l s a e
s e d i g a
h p p n
. 8 p r c n
g r o s s
o m e s t i
p r o d c t
m i i t a r y . T h e
m s t
v u l e r a b l
s t a e ,
v o y
C a s ,
s e n s
o l y 1 . 2 p e c e n .
i b e i a a n d t h
D e m c r t i
R p u l i
o n g
a s o h a e m a l
e f n s
b u g t .
ag
m l t ry i
o s i n o
saiiyhwve Fv
JULY I
AUGUST 2005 63
This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 10/11
7/21/2019 Failed State
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/failed-state 11/11
eacekeepers
n P a r a d e
F
oreign
intervention
s not a cure-all for
states on the edge.TheDemocraticRepub-
lic
of the
Congo,
which hosts
a
16,000
mem-
ber U.N.
peacekeeping
force,
ranks second in
the index.
Iraq
is the
fourth
most vulnerable
country,
Haiti
is
10th,
Afghanistan
is
11th,
and
Bosnia
claims the 21st
spot.
Congo,
Haiti,
and Sudan
are
recipients
of
what
might
be
termed
peacekeeping
on
the
cheap.
In
none
of these
countries
is the multi-
national
force
strong enough
to assert control
over the
country.
The small
AfricanUnion
force
in
Sudan,
for
example,
has
failed to
prevent
ongoing
atrocities
n
the Darfur
region.
Instead,
the
international
orces
in
these
places
have,
in
some
ways,
become
additional factions
in
envi-
ronments
already
chock-full of
warring camps.
Overwhelming
intervention,
like that
employed
in
Bosnia
in
1995,
is
at the
other end
of the
spectrum.
There,
foreign
troops
effec-
tively installed an international protectorate
for the
ethnically
divided
country.
Bosnia's
standing
in the index is
surely
better than it
would have been
if
peacekeepers
had never
arrived. But
some
observers
suggest
that
an
overweening
foreign presence
has stunted the
country's
political development.
Ten
years
after
large-scale
intervention,
nobody
thinks the
peacekeepers
can
leave
anytime
soon.
Iraq
and
Afghanistan
fall
in
between
these
two
poles.
In
both
countries,
U.S.-led forces
toppled existing governments,
but
they
have
steered
away
from
establishing protectorates.
Relatively
quick
elections
put
in
place
fragile
new
regimes
that are
now
struggling
to assert
control.
The fate of these
experiments
n
nation
building
will
shape
the
menu
of
options
for
future
foreign
interventions.
-dH
Want
to
KnowMore?
]
More informationon the methodologyusedin the FOREIGN OLICY/Fundor Peace Failed State
Index is
available
at
www.ForeignPolicy.com
and
on the
Web site of the Fund for
Peace
at
www.fundforpeace.org.
For a transnational ook at
responses
to
failed
states,
see the British
study
on state
instability,
Investing
n Prevention:An International
Strategy
o
Manage
Risks
of Instability
and
Improve
Cri-
sis
Response
(London:
PrimeMinister's
Strategy
Unit,
2005).
The CIA's
Directorate
of
Intelligence
fundeda
study
on
state
failure,
and
some of
its
findings
an be read
n
StateFailureTaskForce
Report:
Phase
III
Findings
(McLean:
Science
Applications
International
Corporation,
2000),
prepared
by
Jack
A.
Goldstone,
Ted Robert
Gurr,
and others.
Regionalexperts speculateabout what will happenafter strongmenfall in "The Day After"
(FOREIGN
POLICY,
November/December
2003).
Several
good
case
studies of
countries n conflict
are available n
Ending
Civil Wars:
The
Implementation
of
Peace
Agreements
Boulder:
Lynne
Rien-
ner, 2002),
edited
by
Stephen
John
Stedman,
Donald
Rothchild,
and
Elizabeth
M. Cousens. Polit-
ical
scientist
Francis
Fukuyama mphasizes
building
basic state
institutions
n
State-Building:
Gov-
ernance
and World
Order n the
21st
Century
Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
2004).
For a detailed
look at how the United Nations
has
fared
in
recent
state-building
efforts,
see
You,
the
People:
The
United
Nations,
Transitional
Administration,
and
State-Building
(New
York:
Oxford
University
Press,
2004),
by
Simon
Chesterman.
)For
links to relevantWeb
sites,
access to the
FP
Archive,
and
a
comprehensive
ndex of
related
FOREIGN
POLICY
articles,
go
to
www.ForeignPolicy.com.
JULY
I
AUGUST
2005 65
Top Related