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75THE CONCORD REVIEW
Elizabeth Lee Jemison is at Princeton . She wrote th is paper at St. Marys
Episcopal School in Memp his, Tennessee, for Ms. Joan Traffas Hon ors
World H istory II course in the 2003-2004 academic year.
THE NAZI INFLUENCE
IN TH E FORMATION OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
Elizabeth Lee Jemison
South African apar theid was a system developed to p ro-tect the supremacy of Afrikaans-speaking whites and to repress
non-white groups through a policy of almost complete separation .
The Afrikaner people, the descendants of the first Dutch settlersin southern Africa, were the dominant white minority and , once
un ified beh ind the cause of apartheid, formed a majority of the all-
white electorate. Apar theid, the Afrikaans word for separateness,
began as a govern mental system after the elections of 1948 when
the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, became the majority Party, and
this system lasted until 1994. The Afrikaner white population
developed the apartheid system in 1948 in part as an outgrowth of
the ideology of Nazi Germany, an ideology the Afrikaners readilyaccepted because of the affinity they felt towards German s, and
because they feared being dominated by the English minority who
had previously controlled the coun try.
The desire of the Afrikaners for complete power in South
Africa began when the British took over the Cape area in 1806, in
an effort to p revent Napoleon from gaining control of the region.
The introduction of another European group vying for power
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76 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
served to awaken Afrikaner nationalism. The British who settled in
the Cape area in the ear ly 19th century brought with th em concepts
of the 18th century Enlightenment and the pro-business liberalism
of the 19th century. These ideas conflicted sharply with the con ser-
vative Calvinist ideology of the Dutch who h ad settled South Africa
beginning in th e mid-17th cen tury. As the result of the an ti-slavery
lobby in Britain and of the efforts of Christian missionaries to end
racial prejud ice, the British advocated a lessen ing of segregation
to allow some non-whites to participate at least partially in the
white-dominated society. Overall, the English possessed a more
advanced culture an d lifestyle than the Dutch living at the Cape,
so the Dutch were likely to be absorbed into a colonial British
society as secon d-class citizen s. Indignan t about the possibility of
such a fate and without sufficient skill to fend off the British, man y
of the Dutch Boers moved fur ther inland to areas to the northwest
of the Cape area beginning in 1835. These Afrikaners or
Voortrekkers conquered the land of native African tribes and
established au tonomous Boer republics. There, Afrikaners beganto cultivate an Afrikaner culture.1
These Afrikaner or Boer republics began to prosper,
especially after the discovery of gold an d diamonds within their
lands. This new-found wealth, however, worked to the detr imen t
of the Boer republics because when the British learned of the gold
and diamonds to be found further inland , they vied for control.
The conflicts erupting from the attempt on the part of the British
to incorporate th e Boer republics into th e British Empire even tu-
ally caused two Boer Wars. The first of these lasted from 1881-1882
and the second from 1899-1902. During these wars, the British
suppressed and mistreated Afrikaners. The British created volun -
tary concentration camps during the second Boer War where
many women and children came for protection, yet conditions in
these camps were such that 26,000 Afrikaners died of disease and
starvation. Towards the end of the second Boer War, the Britishbegan to burn Boer farmsdestroying crops and razing home-
steads. These wars illustrated the dangers of two self-proclaimed
Christian nations going to war against each other when both
nations believed in the same God and both were certain that God
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77THE CONCORD REVIEW
justified all their actions. 2 Th e Freethinker, a liberal English journal,
reported in October 1899, The Boer has a Mauser rifle in one
hand and a Dutch Bible in the other, while the Britisher hasweapon s in both hands and a Bible behind his back...Each informs
the God of that book which side he ought to take in the quarrel.3
Ultimately, the British gained control of the Boer Republics with
the Treaty of Vereeniging of 1902.
Though the Afrikaners were rou ted, many loyal Afrikaners
chose to destroy their weapon s rather than surrender th em to the
British, while still others accepted deportation rather than swearallegiance to Britain.4 Despite th eir defeat, many Boers felt pr ide
that while Britain used 448,000 soldiers in the war where 7,000 of
them died, the Boers never h ad more th an 70,000 soldiers ( rarely
more than 40,000) and most of these were civilians. Only 4,000
Boers died in th e war. This pr ide in their military record evolved
into a new wave of Afrikaner nationalism. Their defeat after
bloody wars made them more bitter towards the British than if
Britain had seized control of the Boer republics withou t a struggle.5
This century of conflict (1806-1902) encouraged Afrikaner unity
and a strong anti-British attitude that would serve as an initial
impetus for German sympathy culminating in intense pro-Nazism
in th e mid-20th century.
The extent of Afrikaner anti-British sentiment was most
eviden t in Afrikaners opposition to th e leadership of Jan Chris-
tian Smuts. Smuts, though an Afrikaner himself, was willing tonegotiate with the British; he served in a variety of offices in British-
controlled South Africa including two terms as prime minister.
Smuts had fought on the Boer side of the second Boer War but
later became active in seeking compromise between the two sides
by leading the Boer negotiations for surrender as the Transvaal
State Attorney. Smuts explained the Boer position,
We are n ot h ere as an army but as a people...Everyone rep resents the
Afrikaner peop le...They call up on us to avoid all measures which maylead to the decline and extermination of the Afrikaner people...We
commen ced this struggle and continued it to th is moment because
we wished to maintain our independence...But we may not sacrifice
the Afrikaner people for that independence. As soon as we are
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78 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
convinced th at, human ly speaking, there is no reasonable chance to
retain our indepen dence as republics, it clearly becomes our duty to
stop the struggle in order that we may not perhaps sacrifice ourpeop le and ou r future for a mere idea which cannot be realized.6
As the result of his efforts to lead the post-war n egotiations, Smuts
played crucial roles in convincing Britain to give Afrikaners gen-
eral auton omy and in uniting the defeated Boer republics with
British provinces to form the Un ion of South Africa in 1910.
Smuts belief that Britain h ad the right to rule South Africa
earn ed him a pro-British label and alienated man y fervent Afrikaner
nationalists. The first evidence of th is conflict appeared in 1914 at
the beginning of World War I when Smuts fought to en d a pro-
German rebellion led by Afrikaners. Smuts opposition to the
rebellion pr imarily caused the formation of the Afrikaner Nation-
alist Party later that year by J.B.M. Hertzog who wanted to make
British and Afrikaner cultures equal but separate entities.7 Th e
Nationalist Party grew in strength from 1914 until 1948 when it
gained a majority. From that political vantage, it was able to enactits policies of apartheid th at it developed during th is per iod of
ascendan cy. The Party became increasingly devoted to Afrikaner
sup remacy rather than Hertzogs initial policy of equality between
the two white groups.
In 1919 Smuts had become prime minister when his pro-
British Union Party was still the majority party. Upon entering
office, he experienced dissent from the Afrikaners who viewed
him as a British agent for h is belief that the Un ion of South Africa
did not have the right to secede from the British empire. In th e
wake of his experience with the pro-German rebellion in 1914,
Smuts was very cautious in his opposition to the Afrikaners.8 After
he lost power to Hertzog in 1924, Smuts became more politically
astute and aware of the strength of his opposition. Smuts and
Hertzog reconciled their differen ces to form the Un ited Party in
1933 in which Smuts served as deputy pr ime minister un til Hertzogresigned from the government in 1939, when South Africa en-
tered World War II supporting the Allies. Hertzogs resignation
made Smuts very aware of the division among South Africans in
their opin ions on World War II an d of the possibility of a civil war
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79THE CONCORD REVIEW
resulting between the South Africans of British descent who were
pro-Allies and the Afrikaners who were pro-Nazi.9 Smuts leading
South African forces on the side of the British in World War IIangered the more conservative Afrikaners whose position the
newspaper,Die Burger, captured when it posed the question, Why
should we fight for Britain, the only country which has ever
attacked us?10 Although he was an Afrikaner, J. C. Smuts was the
object of many Afrikaners frustrations at the failed attempts at
Afrikaner independence, and he ironically became a symbol of
oppressive British imperialism. In an attempt to distance them-
selves from Smuts, many Afrikaners aligned themselves with Ger-
many against the old enemy, Britain. Anti-British sentiment was
not a d irect cause of the bu lk of pro-German and later p ro-Nazi
sentiment in South Africa, but it contr ibuted in laying the ground-
work for stronger ideological identification with Germany.
Where an ti-British sen timen t was un able to produce last-
ing German sympathies, ideological identification with German
nationalism especially through Afrikaners adoption of the con-cept of a volkgeist forged strong ties between Afrikaners and
Germans. Johann von H erder, an early romantic German nation-
alist coined the term volkin hisIdeas of a Philosophy of Human History
to describe the cultural heritage of the common people in an y
particular area; Herder called the character d istinctive to a culture
its volkgeist. A later German philosopher, J. G. Fichte, built on
Herders concepts ofvolkan d volkgeistby claiming in hisAddresses
to the German Nation that the German volkgeistwas superior to th at
of other cultures. Fichtes theor ies, first expressed in 1808, intro-
duced the concept of German supremacy that became the first
seeds of Nazism. Afrikaners adop ted this concept of a volkfor th eir
own purposes. The volk stood for the identity of the common
people, so Afrikaners used it to glorify the Voortrekkers who
traveled deeper into Africa, conquered native tribes, and estab-
lished the Boer Republics; they were the paragons of Afrikaneridealism.
In addition, many Afrikaners were of German as well as
Dutch ancestry and shared a common bond with Germans through
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80 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
their identification with Protestantism. Most Afrikaner students
who traveled to Europe to pursue their post-graduate stud ies at a
large university studied in Holland or Germany rather thanEngland despite the fact that more of these students spoke En-
glish, not German. Several future leaders of the apartheid era
encoun tered Nazism while studying in Germany.11
Strong pro-German sen timent was evident as ear ly as 1914
when German n ationalism caused an Afrikaner rebellion against
British ru le. Many Afrikaners opposed the Versailles Treaty end-
ing World War I. They viewed it as a cruel domination of thealready defeated Germans. Even Smuts attempted to persuade th e
British to negotiate a less debilitating treaty with Germany.12 As the
Nazi Party gained power in Germany, Afrikaners felt an inclina-
tion to support Nazism as both Nazism an d th eir own Voor trekker
heritage relied h eavily on the idea ofvolkto promote the concepts
of racial supremacy. Nazis and Afrikaners construed the concept
ofvolkto permit a form of xenoph obia that would p reserve their
Western Christian tradition from the dangers Asian and Sovietpowers posed.13 Afrikaners adopted Hitlers concept of a master
race and Nazi German n ationalism to th eir Afrikaner situation.14
Nazi influence in shaping the ideology of Afrikaners was not the
primary cause of Afrikaner belief in the superiority of whites over
blacks, but Nazism was largely responsible for encouraging the
idea th at Afrikaners were superior to any other groups of whites.15
Afrikaners distorted their Calvinist beliefs to fur ther th isattitude of not on ly white supremacy but also of sup remacy of the
Afrikaner volkover all other groups. Because Afrikaner culture
derived support from the Calvinist tradition, the religious ties of
Afrikaners were a natural place to find additional support for the
Afrikaner volk. Accordingly, they claimed that God had estab-
lished the volkas a tool for His purposes in South Africa. Afrikaners
took Calvinisms doctrine of election and claimed that it sup-
ported the spiritual, biological, and cultural superiority of theelect Afrikaner cultu re. Afrikaners further adapted Calvinism to
include a national consciousness in th e doctrines of election and
vocation, thus making the salvation of the Afrikaner nation from
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81THE CONCORD REVIEW
the evils of British domination appear comparable to the spiritual
salvation of its inhabitants. Through this combination of deeply
entrenched doctrines of Calvinism and the newer concept ofnationalism expressed through suppor t of the Afrikaner volk, th e
concept of Christian-Nationalism emerged. Afrikaner journalists
supported the concept of Christian-Nationalism by frequently
referring to the growth of Afrikaner power in the British-con-
trolled government as similar to the biblical story of the young
Hebrew boy, David, defeating the Philistine giant, Goliath.16 By
equating Calvinism to Nationalism and by seeing the struggle for
Afrikaner political power as obedience to divine will, Christian-
Nationalists stressed the State at the expense of more liberal ideas
of individual freedom. This made the emerging ideas of totalitari-
anism and fascism seem reasonable and compatible with Chris-
tian-Nationalism.17
The Chr istian-Nationalist movement grew in importance
and became a central part of the campaign for Afrikaner indepen-
den ce and for apartheid. Afrikaners, after h aving gained indepen-dence from Britain in 1961, revealed the degree to which they
thought that independence from Britain was their divinely or-
dained destiny when the Afrikaner newspaper, Die Transvaler,
reported, Our republic is the inevitable fulfillment of Gods plan
for our people...a plan formed in 1653 when [the first Dutch
settlers] ar rived at the Cape...for which the defeat of our Republics
in 1902 was a necessary step.18 In add ition to advocating indepen-
dence from Britain, Afrikaners manipulated Calvins teachings to
claim that Calvinisms clear delineation between the elect and th e
damned supported the formation of aparth eids rigid racial and
ethnic distinctions.19
While Christian-Nationalism provided an ideological jus-
tification for fascism, anti-Semitism in the 1930s further linked the
ideologies of Chr istian-Nationalism and Nazism. Both formulated
similar policies to control Jews within their respective countries.Interestingly, there was initially resistance to this trend from
powerful Afrikaner leaders. In 1929, General J.B.M. Hertzog, the
founder of the Nationalist Party, expressed decent tolerance,
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82 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
saying that the Jews were the ethnic group whose concerns were
most similar to those of the Afrikaner . In 1930 Dr. Daniel F. Malan,
who later became the head of the Nationalist Party and the firstprime minister of South Africa un der the aparth eid regime, also
outwardly supported Jewish equality; but at the same time, he
initiated the Immigration Quota Act to allow immigration only
from a select group of countries excluding those eastern Euro-
pean countries from which Jews most frequently immigrated.
Despite such voices, anti-Semitism rose at an alarming rate in both
Germany and South Africa during the 1930s. In fact, South African
anti-Semitism was directly related to th e an ti-Semitism an d perse-
cution policies in Germany. Because of the persecution of Jews in
Germany, there was a dramatic increase in the number of Jews
immigrating to South Africa from Germany. Many Afrikaners
noted th is increase with alarm, fearing that Jews would even tually
overpower Afrikaners economic and political con trol. Thus, with
the Immigration Quota Act, the govern men t seemed to legitimize
anti-Semitism,20
and anti-Semitism became an official policy of theAfrikaner Nation alist Par ty.
Several militan t Nazi-sympath izing organizations protested
the immigration of Jews into South Africa. One such gang was The
South African Grey Shirt Party, led by L.T. Weichardt, a South
African of German descent. The Grey Shirts became very active in
anti-Semitic protest against th e r ising n umbers of German Jewish
immigrants.21 These immigran ts formed 57.4% of the 6,295 Ger-
mans immigrating to South Africa from 1933-1936. Other Nazi
sympathizing organizations included the Boerenasie and the New
Order; all these were anti-Semitic, but the Grey Shirts were the
most vehemently anti-Semitic of these groups.22 Initially, the
Afrikaner Nationalist Party attempted to oppose the Grey Shirts
anti-Semitism, bu t the Party soon became involved in pressing for
a new restriction on immigration of Jews that went into effect on
November 1, 1936. Before th is new restriction went in to effect, theSS Stuttgart, a chartered ship, carr ied 600 German-Jewish refugees
to South Africa. A protest organized by the Grey Shirts met the ship
near the docks in Cape Town as a show of the force various militant
groups possessed. 23 In reaction to the SS Stuttgart incident, the
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83THE CONCORD REVIEW
Nationalist Party met n ear Stellenbosch University, a cen ter for
Afrikaner volkidentification. Here Dr. Hendrik Venvoerd, a Na-
tionalist Party member, and five other Stellenbosch professorspledged th emselves to pursue an end to all Jewish immigration.24
Verwoerd further pursued anti-Semitic policies by suggesting to
the government that it no longer give Jews any new trading
licenses.25 Verwoerd became even more ou tspoken on the subject
of anti-Semitism when , in 1937, he became ed itor ofDie Transvaler,
the newspaper published by the Nationalist Party of the Tran svaal
region, which provided a prominent voice on Party issues for
several decades. His first editorial was a caustic diatribe against
Jews.26
Afrikaners con tinued to pursue increasingly radical anti-
Semitic legislation throughout the late 1930s, keeping pace with
that of Nazi German y. In 1937, the Aliens Act created an Immi-
grant Selection Board to ensure assimilability among all immi-
grants. Although this act did not explicitly prohibit Jewish immi-
gration, Afrikaners often considered Jews non -assimilables andprevented them from immigrating.27 The ambiguities in the Aliens
Act caused the Nationalist Party to fight for a number of new
deman ds to prevent all Jewish immigration and thus minimize the
role of Jews in South Africa. These demands included the explicit
prohibition of all future Jewish immigration, the removal of
Yiddish as an approved European language for immigration
purposes, and prohibition of Jews and other non-assimilable
groups from joining certain professions.28 Following these de-
mands of the Nation alist Party, Eric Louw, later Foreign Minister ,
introduced another an ti-Semitic bill that strongly resembled Nazi
legislationthe Aliens Amendment an d Immigration Bill of 1939.
His bill was a means of suppressing all Jews. This bill suggested that
Jews threatened to overpower Protestants in the business world
and were innately cunning and manipulative, and th at Jews were
a dan ger to society. To support h is claim, Louw maintained th atJews were involved in the Bolshevik Revolution and therefore
intended to spread Communism worldwide. This bill defined Jews
as anyone with parents who were at least par tly Jewish regardless
of actual religious faith or practices. The majority Union Party
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84 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
however vehemently opposed and rejected this bill. Stuttaford,
then Minister of the Inter ior, remarked that the bill reminded h im
of the Inquisition du ring the Middle Ages, and J. H. Hofmeyer, aUnion Party member of Parliament, considered the bill even
worse in parts than Nazi rhetoric. Although the Aliens Amend-
ment and Immigration Bill failed, the fact that politicians intro-
duced such bills showed the extremes of South African anti-
Semitism in the 1930s.29
Many of the Jews who immigrated to South Africa adapted
more readily to urban life than the largely agrarian Afrikaners andwere generally better educated; subsequently, most Jews seemed
noticeably wealth ier th an Afrikaners. Afrikaners blamed th e Jews
for their own lack of wealth by branding them enemies of society
and of the Afrikaner in particular.30 Thus, by blaming Jews for
Afrikaner economic hardships and by seeking to prevent Jewish
immigration , Afrikaners found a scapegoat for their own difficulty
in adjusting to an urban, industrial society. This anti-Semitism
grew in its irrationality and contrad iction un til Afrikaners accusedJews of being both ruth less capitalists and subversive Commun ists.
A 1937 poster for the South African Nationalist Peoples Move-
ment read, We say: Down with the Jewish Communism! Down
with the exploiters of Democracy! Down with the exploiters of the
Trade Unions! Down with the Bolshevik agitators who want...to
satisfy their hatred of...Christian Afrikaners...Down with Judaism,
the enemy of the whole world!31 Dr. D.F. Malan, the incoming
leader of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, voiced this slander in a
speech made on July 10, 1939: Behind the organized South
African Jewry stands organized world Jewry...They have robbed
the population of its heritage so that the Afrikaner lives in the land
of his father but no longer possesses it.32 Malan also voiced his
opinion that Jews should never comprise more than five percen t
of the population of any region. In add ition to an ti-Semitism from
the political arena, a committee within a synod of the DutchReformed Church concluded after much examination that the
Jews were not Gods chosen people as described in the Old
Testament. While the whole synod voted against accepting this
committee declaration, the introduction of such a claim revealed
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85THE CONCORD REVIEW
the extent of Afrikaner anti-Semitism at this time.33 This strong
attitude of anti-Semitism fed the ideological bond between
Afrikaners and Nazi German y. This, along with the con cepts of theAfrikaner volkand Christian-Nationalism, provided a firm foun da-
tion for the formation of strong, Nazi-sympathizing organizations.
The Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) was the earli-
est conservative Afrikaner group which closely aligned itself with
Nazi Germany, and which was influential in the founding of
aparth eid in 1948. The Broederbond began as a fratern ity of men
devoted to the Afrikaner cause in 1918 and became a secretorganization in 1924. In 1918, a mob interrupted a Nationalist
Party gathering in Johan nesburg where Dr. D.F. Malan, then the
Party leader in Cape Town, was speaking. The mob vandalized the
Nationalist Club building and injured some of the Party members
attending the meeting. This disturbance left a deep impression
especially on three Afrikaner teenagers at this meetingH.J.
Klopper, H.W. van der Merwe, and Daniel H.C. du Plessiswho
met the following day to p ledge themselves to restore th e Afrikanerto h is rightful place in South Africa. On Jun e 5, 1918, these three
under the guidance of Rev. J.F. Naude of the Dutch Reformed
Church, held a meeting in du Plessis home. This meeting marked
the beginn ing of the Broederbond . The n ame of the organization
that th ey began with on ly eighteen members was Jong Suid-Afrika
(Young South Africa), bu t by 1920, the organ ization took the
name Afrikaner Broederbond, and considered itself a quasi-
religious organization for the purpose of promoting Afrikaner
unity and of allowing young nationalist-minded Afrikaners to
meet on e anoth er. Membership was open , and the Broederbond
strongly encouraged its 37 members to wear Broederbon d buttons
to distinguish themselves.34 However, the Broederbond did not
remain as open and harmless an organization as it began.
As the Broederbond grew, its nature changed and it
became increasingly exclusive by the late 1930s. Membership wasvery limited. In 1944, membership was about 2,674 with 8.6% of
these being public servants and 33.3% educators.35 The mission of
the Broederbond was to promote Afrikaner interests in every area.
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86 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
Its secretive, cult-like nature prevented the South African people
from realizing the full extent of the power of the Broederbond
until it had gained a firm grip on South African politics. TheBroederbond was the means by which the ideological ideas of
Afrikaner volkand Christian-Nationalism attempted to unify all
Afrikaners into a single force.36 In 1946, Senator Andrew Conroy,
the Minister of Lands and an ou tspoken anti-Broederbond mem-
ber of the United Party, estimated that the Broederbond had
strong influence over nine out of ten Dutch Reformed Church
congregations. Because of this and other allegations of
Broederbond involvement in the Dutch Reformed Church, the
Church launched an investigation of the Broederbond in 1949.
They reported that the Broederbond was a ben ign social organi-
zation open to all Afrikaans-speaking Protestan ts who were loyal to
South Africa. Many of the Broederbonds critics argued that
precisely the Broederbonds influence within the church had
secured a favorable, though fraudu lent, report.37
Just as its critics feared, the Broederbonds membershipwas not as open as the Dutch Reformed Churchs report alleged.
The Broederbond denied membership to J.B.M. Hertzog and J.C.
Smuts, both Afrikaans-speaking Protestants, for their willingness
to negotiate with Britain and for their refusal to den y the r ight of
English-speaking South Africans to participate in govern ment.38
Hertzog also denounced the Broederbond for their refusal to
negotiate with English-speaking South Africans and for hindering
his diplomatic efforts. The Broederbond countered by accusing
Hertzog of trying to increase his own political power by provoking
English-speaking South Africans to fear Afrikaners.39 Smuts con-
sidered the Broederbond a dan gerous organization but failed to
oppose it publicly for some time despite h aving the power granted
by the special War Measures Act of 1941 to do so. Accord ing to h is
Director of Military Intelligence, E. G. Malherbe, Smuts chose not
to expose the Broederbond because so many Broederbond mem-bers were Dutch Reformed Church ministers and teachers, profes-
sions for which Smuts had great respect. Smuts refused to oppose
the p ro-Nazi attitudes of un iversity students and professors except
in the case of those who committed civil crimes.40 Even tually Smuts
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87THE CONCORD REVIEW
yielded to the repeated counsel of his military intelligence who
believed that the th reat posed by the Broederbond was great. The
Broederbond became aware of Smuts plans for action in 1943 butallowed members to deal with Smuts coming ultimatum as each
saw fit. In 1944, Smuts demanded that all Broederbond members
who were public servants ( including teachers) resign either from
the Broederbond or from their public service positions. After th is
order, 1,094 Broederbond members resigned from th e organiza-
tion, but man y more resigned from their civil service position . Of
those who resigned from the Broederbond, 807 rejoined after
Smuts administration lost power to the Nationalist Party in the
1948 elections. Broederbond members gained much public sym-
pathy du ring this period for their loyalty to th e Afrikaner cause,41
while Smuts publicly denounced th e Broederbond as A dan ger-
ous, cunning, political Fascist organ isation .42 Broederbond mem-
bers responded by repeatedly denying Smuts allegations, and
claiming that the Broederbond was a benign cultural organiza-
tion.When the Broederbond began in 1918, it was not the
fascist organ ization that Smuts denounced in 1944, but with th e
rise of Nazi Germany, the link between the ideology of the
Broederbond and that of Nazi Germany grew. This link became
critical to the Broederbond with the 1934 visit of Graf von
Durckheim Montmartin, a representative of Nazi Germany.
Montmartin came to South Africa with the official intention of
attending a conference on education, but according to docu-
men ts confiscated during World War II at the German diplomacy
headquarters for the Union of South Africa, Hitler sent Montmartin
with the purpose of determining what support South Africa might
provide to Germany in th e n ew world order that Hitler en visioned .
Montmartin met secretly with top Broederbond leaders to discuss
how the Broederbond might be of service to this end. After this
meeting with Montmartin, the Broederbond reorganized itself toresemble the Nazi Party. One exception in th is new organ ization
was the Broederbonds use of the Dutch Reformed Church to
inspire nationalism and support of all Afrikaners, whereas Hitler
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88 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
had reverted to the symbols of Nordic mythology to provide a
competitive religious awe for the Nazi Party.43
Montmartins appeal emph asized the value of anti-British
propaganda as a means of secur ing South African support for Nazi
Germany and included another sphere of possible influence,
young South African scholars whom the Broederbond encour-
aged to study at German universities. One implementation of
Montmartin an d the Broederbonds strategy of anti-British p ropa-
ganda during World War II involved a radio station in Zeesen,
Germany that broadcast very clearly to South Africa, more clearlythan the British Broadcasting Company or any South African
radio stations. This radio station was very popular for its music
programs. After the popular music programs, a South African
teacher studying in Germany, Dr. Erik Holm, broadcast vehemen t
anti-British and anti-Semitic messages in Afrikaans to the listen ers
in South Africa. After the war, a South African cou rt found Holm
guilty of treason and imprisoned him, but when the Nationalist
Party came into power after the elections of 1948, the n ew govern -ment released Holm from prison after on ly serving one year of his
10-year sentence. Ironically, Holm later received an appointment
to the Department of Education.44 Influenced by Holms pro-
Nazism, newspapers open ly began to reflect Nazi sympathy before
and during the war. One example wasDie Transvaler, published by
Dr. Verwoerd, a Broederbond member. In addition to his anti-
Semitic editorials, Verwoerd expressed delight at Allied defeats
and much dismay in h is reports on Nazi losses. Such Broederbond
propaganda prompted much concern among government offi-
cials about the growing power of the organization as the tie
between the Broederbond and th e Nazi Party became evident to
those outside of the organization.45
Janie Malherbe, a South African captain of Military Intel-
ligence, realized the danger of Broederbonds close alliance with
the Nazi Party after Montmartins visit. She reported : This ter ri-fying octopus-like grip on the South African way of life was made
possible by reorganising the Broederbond on the pattern of
Hitlers highly successful Nazi state, complete with fuehrer,
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gauleiters, group an d cell leaders, spread in a sinister network over
the whole of South Africa.46 The Afrikaner Broederbond fol-
lowed the ideological and organizational patterns of the NaziParty and advocated support of the Nazi Germany under the
assumption that in Hitlers new world order, Hitler would give
Afrikaners independent ru le of South Africa as a reward for their
loyalty to and support of Nazism.
In 1939, while th e Broederbond was growing in strength
and World War II was underway, Afrikaner conservatives who
wanted violently to pursue Afrikaner con trol of South Africa led anew military-minded organization, the Ossewa Brandwag (liter-
ally Brigade of Ox-wagon Sentinels, referring to the p ioneering
Voortrekkers). Colonel J.C.C. Laas, a former military officer
inten sely loyal to the Afrikaner volkand the Voortrekker heritage,
founded the Ossewa Brandwag to promote Afrikaner heritage, but
the organization quickly grew into a popular military movemen t.
Laas led the O ssewa Brandwag from February 1939 un til the rapid
growth of the organization expanded beyond h is managing capa-bilities, prompting his resignation in October 1940.47 After Laas
stepped down from the leadership, the Ossewa Brandwag became
more militant in nature under the leadership of Dr. Hans van
Rensburg. As the national leader, he h ad the title Comman dan t-
General, and local leaders became generals.
The Ossewa Brandwag, like the Broederbond, supported
Nazi Germany.48
The group strongly opposed the efforts of Smutsand his army to support the British; its opposition posed a signifi-
cant threat because the Ossewa Brandwag had more members
than Smuts army.49 The groups Nazi sympathy became clear
when it printed its constitution in German Gothic type and when
it chose an eagle, the emblem of the Nazi Reichstag, as its
emblem.50 The Ossewa Brandwag opposed the growth of urban
areas using the Dutch Reformed Churchs doctrine of British-
Jewish capitalism.51 A cartoon from the Afrikaner nationalistnewspaper,Die Burger, opposed the alleged control of the British
market system by Jewish professionals. The cartoon pictured an
exaggeratedly rotund, greedy Jew riding on the shoulders of a
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90 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
gaunt Smuts and Hertzog, and it suggested that wealthy Jews
controlled the pro-British government.52 Some Afrikaners ex-
pressed the opinion that Jews, in league with the British, deviouslyworked to increase their wealth and power at the expense of
hardworking Afrikaners who steadfastly did th eir best to survive in
a harsh world. To many, it appeared that the British and th e Jews
oppressed the Afrikaners; Afrikaners could free themselves by
supporting Nazi Germany, which promised to destroy both groups.
The Ossewa Bran dwag became increasingly Nazi-oriented .
They formed the Stormjaers (stormtroopers), who were a secre-tive part of the Ossewa Brandwag composed mostly of police
officers. The Stormjaers threatened and attacked anyone who was
not as conservative as they, including Nationalist Party leaders
such as Dr. Hen drik Verwoerd . The Stormjaers considered them-
selves to be acting for the best interests of the Ossewa Bran dwag
but may not have always acted under the direct orders of the
group.53 The violence of the Stormjaers demonstrated the grave
dan ger the O ssewa Brandwag posed as it sought to create a fasciststate.
J.C. Smuts, while hesitant to confront the Broederbond,
nonetheless opposed the Ossewa Brandwag with much fervor as
the type of organization that brought Hitler to power in Germany
and that might have the capability to bring a similar leader to
power in South Africa.54 His criticism was not without justification;
the Ossewa Brandwag was evidence of the growth of Nazi sympathyand dedication to Afrikaner supremacy in South Africa. Rev. J. D.
Vorster , one general in th e Ossewa Bran dwag, a Nationalist Party
leader, and a future Nationalist prime minister, expressed the
rapidly changing opinions of many who became increasingly
right-wing. In 1934, Vorster denounced Fascism and Nazism in
par ticular bu t after h e became an Assistant-hoof Komman dan t in
the Ossewa Brandwag, he expressed his admiration of Hitler and
his desire for a South Africa in which only Afrikaners had wealthand political powerall Jews expelled from the country, and
democratic elections terminated.55 Vorster h oped for a n ew South
African govern ment where, the Afrikaner will no longer cooper-
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91THE CONCORD REVIEW
ate with the Englishman. He will make the conditions and the
Englishman will be compelled to submit.56 Vorster spoke to the
Afrikaner Nationalist Studentebond, th e youth wing of the OssewaBrandwag, saying, Hitlers Mein Kampfshows the way to great-
nessthe path of South Africa. Hitler gave the Germans
a...fanaticism which causes them to stand back for no one. We
must follow his example because only by such holy fanaticism can
the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.57 Because the violent
nature of Vorsters opinions threatened th e govern ments stabil-
ity, Smuts jailed Vorster along with some other Ossewa Brandwag
members dur ing much of World War II.58
Vorsters desire for a new South African govern ment an d
for the expulsion of Jews from South Africa was a common desire
throughout the O ssewa Brandwag. The group assured its mem-
bers that, the man with a crooked nose [is] the danger to the
country.59 In 1940, the Afrikaner Nationalist Studentebond, the
youth wing of the Ossewa Brandwag, acted upon the groups
desire for a n ew government and issued a Freedom Manifesto asa promise on the part of the youth to fight to overthrow the
parliamentary government and establish a Christian-Nationalist
govern men t under an elected d ictator. This plan included a state-
controlled press, a state education system with Christian-Nation al-
ist principles, and Afrikaans as the official language of South
Africa. While th is document n ever explicitly mentioned Nazism,
the government described was very similar to th e d ictatorship in
Nazi Germany.60
In September 1940, the newspaper, Die Suiderstem, pub-
lished Constitution from the Christian-Nationalist Republic as
the Ossewa Bran dwags plan for a new governmen t. This govern-
ment was viewed byDie Suiderstem as a Nazi state with only a few
changes such as the title of the dictator being president instead of
fueh rer, and the basis of the govern men t being Christian-Nation-
alist rather than Nation al-Socialist.61 During the same mon th, theCape Timespublished an article asserting that the Ossewa Brandwag
was in the process of arranging a coup to establish a Christian-
Nationalist dictatorship. This report claimed that there were
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92 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
Ossewa Brandwag members in important positions in public
service, the police force, and virtually every major private industry
such as mining and railroads who were ready to act upon thecommand of the group to assist in a coup designed to exile all Jews
and subject all British South Africans to Afrikaner control.62 In the
same year, the Ossewa Brandwag issued a similar plan for a new
South Africa with its Declaration on the Boer Republic. This new
government was to be a compilation of the governments of the
initial Boer Republics with many elements of Nazi government
and some aspects of other govern ments including that of Mussolini
in Italy. This govern ment called for a head of state with unlimited
power who would support the concentration of power and wealth
in th e hands of Afrikaners and discrimination against all English-
speakers.63
However, this republic never had a chance to become
more than an idea because with the Allies complete victory over
the Nazis in 1945, the Ossewa Bran dwag lost much of its support
and its members dispersed. Many joined the Nationalist Party,which grew in power during th is transition . Some Ossewa Brandwag
members formed another minor Fascist organization, but its
membership and influence were very small.64 The postwar era saw
the rapid growth of the Nationalist Party un til it won a majority in
1948 and began the system of apartheid.
The Nationalist Party that began in 1914 un der the leader-
ship of J.B.M. Hertzog grew steadily from its foun ding to WorldWar II, but it experienced its greatest growth un der Dr. D. F. Malan
dur ing World War II and immediately after the war, especially with
the collapse of the Ossewa Brandwag and other fascist groups.
During the growth of Afrikaner n ationalism in th e early 1930s, the
Nationalist Party un der Hertzog did not actively pu rsue indepen-
dence from Britain. The Nationalist Party thereby gave up the
relative freedom and autonomy of South Africa within the British
Empire for th is radical step for complete independen ce.65 WhenHertzog united with Smuts to form the United Party in 1933,
Malan assumed leadership of the Nationalist Party which began to
pursue a more radical path. At the apogee of Nazi Germanys
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93THE CONCORD REVIEW
power, the Nationalist Party attempted to maintain an official
position of neutrality between Britain an d Nazi German y because
it was an official political party in th e South Africa parliament andtherefore did not want to allow the pro-Nazi, radical Afrikaners to
sway its policy or to p reven t it from being able to work with the pro-
British government under Smuts. Although it did not go so far as
to declare open support of Nazi Germany, the Nationalist Party
did change its primary objective. No longer did it promote equal
political participation between Afrikaans-speaking and English-
speaking South Africans. Rather, its new priority was that of
establishing an indepen den t Afrikaner republic. The Nationalist
Party attempted to distinguish between its support of the Afrikaner
republic based on the doctrine of Christian-Nationalism, as the
will of God, and its opposition to Nazism. Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd
vowed, The Afrikaner will have as little to do with German
National Socialism as with British imperialism...he will be as little
a tool of Hitler as of Chamberlain.66
Despite the official position of supporting the Afrikanerand not the Nazi, man y members of the Nationalist Party openly
supported Nazi Germany. Even Hertzog expressed his distrust of
a majority-ruled, democratic, free-market society with a free press
in favor of a new world order of Christian-Nationalism and
National Socialism.67 During the course of World War II, the
Nationalist Party published four documents that demonstrated
the extent of the Nationalist Partys Nazi support and the influ-
ence of the Ossewa Brandwag and other militant groups.68 Otto du
Plessis, the Nationalist Partys Secretary of Information , wrote the
first of these documents in 1940. In a pamph let entitled The New
South AfricaThe Revolution of the Twentieth Centuryhe heralded the
new place South Africa would have in the Nazis new world order.69
This document supported an Afrikaner state affirming, The
philosophy at the basis of the new order...is undiluted and un-
equivocal nationalism.70
Du Plessis fur ther argued,Afrikanerdom...has, under th e imported British system, not known
full political, economic, and social freedom. It consequently pines
for the new system of a new order, which would br ing with it true
national freedom in all spheres of life.71 In his plan, Du Plessis
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94 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
cited Germany as a model for this new order an d wanted Afrikaner
nationalism to imitate that of Germany, where Every German
must be small so that Germany can be great.72 The Nationalist
Party supported this extreme nationalism believing that it would
elevate the country at the expense of the ruth less foreign capital-
ist. The Ossewa Brandwag supported the Nationalist Partys
position in th is document by pattern ing several of its own docu-
ments after The New South AfricaThe Revolution of the Twentieth
Century.73 In 1941 Dr. Malan, the Nationalist Party leader, further
revealed the pro-Nazi stance of the Nationalist Party when he
wrote The Republican Order: Future Policy as Set Out by Dr. Malan.74
This document showed fewer parallels to the govern ment of Nazi
Germany than Du Plessis The New South Africa. Rather, The Repub-
lican Orderdescribed the political structure of the Boer republics
as a un iquely Afrikaner model of govern ment. This documen t did
link itself to Nazi Germany by its mentioning the expectation that
through its victory in World War II, Germany would drive the
British out of South Africa.75
Malan formed a strategic rather th anideological tie with Germany in his The Republican Order, but he
strengthened this tie in 1942 with his ideological Draft for a
Republic. The Christian-Nationalist republic that Malan described
in th is documen t had a presiden t with unlimited powers, directly
and only responsible to God.76 The p residen t had the power to
control and dismiss Parliament and his Cabinet, to declare war
and control the military, to control the economy, to prevent
competition, and to censor the press. Critics accused Malan ofsupporting Hitlers pure race concepts because he specified,
Each coloured group...will be segregated , not only as regards to
place of dwelling...but also with regard to sph eres of work.77 Th e
Eastern Province Herald, a pro-British newspaper, claimed in an
editorial published on January 24, 1942, that Malans document
Borrowed from Mussolini for his group system, Goebbles on the
matter of press and radio control and propaganda generally, Hitler
in respect of the arbitrary, all-embracing, over-riding powers of the
Fuehrer-President, ...[and] Mr. Pirows new order study group for
various odds and ends dictated by an earnest desire to steal their
synth etic thunder.78
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95THE CONCORD REVIEW
A fourth important publication by the Nationalist Party
during World War II was its 1944The Social and Economic Policy of the
Nationalist Party. This documen t maintained that all major aspects
of South African economics should be controlled by the state
through a Central Economics Coun cil to ensure the stability of the
economy and limit competition in all sectors. This plan con cluded
with the proud assertion, Our whole econ omic life will be con -
trolled by the Cen tral Economics Council. All key industries will be
controlled by the State...[This is] the sensible way of a con trolled
economic system within the framework of a national govern ment.
This is the way to th e New Order in th e Free Republic of South
Africa.79 This publication was the last of the documents of the
Nationalist Party that borrowed heavily from Nazi Germany. After
this point in th e war, German ys imminen t defeat weakened an y
bon d that Afrikaners wanted to claim with her. In 1945, the Ossewa
Brandwag and other militant pro-Nazi groups disbanded when
the Allies had completely defeated Nazi Germany.
The fascist documents that the Nationalist Party and oth erorganizations such as the Ossewa Brandwag published during
World War II represented th e more conservative en d of Afrikaner
political opinion. Other more moderate groups supported South
African neutrality in the war, aiding neither Britain nor German y,
while the most conservative Afrikaners supported Britain with
only minimal reservations. Because Afrikaner sentiment covered
this wide spectrum, World War II caused great division and
fragmentation of the Afrikaners. After the war, many of these
splintered groups joined the Nationalist Party, which became less
militant in its quest for fascism and refocused on its original
purpose, the elevation of the Afrikaner.80 In general, this postwar
period was a time of un ification of the many Afrikaner factions that
were splintered by World War II. The influence of the members of
the Ossewa Brandwag, who joined the Nationalist Party after their
organization collapsed in 1945, prevented the Nationalist Partyfrom becoming overly passive or conciliatory. Nonetheless, the
Party knew that it no longer had support for the totalitarian
governmen t described in its The New South AfricaThe Revolution
of the Twentieth Century and MalansDraft for a Republic. Still the
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96 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
influence of Nazism remained as it had provided a foundation
upon which many of the Nationalist Party leaders built their
political beliefs and policies. Even when Nazism collapsed, the
seed of its ideology remained buried in the ideology of the
Nationalist Party. All of the new leaders had been members of the
Broederbond, and some had been members of the Ossewa
Brandwag. The men who would become the leaders of the apart-
heid regime d id not repudiate the ideology of Nazism; rather, they
adap ted their political positions on ly enough to win power in the
post-World War II South Africa.
With the adven t of the post-World War II world, Afrikaners
felt threatened by the new spirit of liberalism introduced by the
Allies in the Atlantic declaration an d the U.N. Charter of Human
Rights. The increasing numbers of black laborers who were mov-
ing into the cities to find work also seemed to th reaten conserva-
tive Afrikaners when man y of these laborers embraced the grow-
ing Communist Party as a way to oppose their harsh working
conditions. The Communist influen ce on black laborers culmi-nated in a widespread strike among mine workers in 1946 that
further frightened Afrikaners who recognized Communism as a
threat to their livelihood. The African Mine Workers Union
organized th is strike of between 75,000 and 100,000 black mine
workers who worked in extremely dan gerous conditions for less
than a ten th of the pay of white workers. The strike on ly lasted a
week before the government violently forced workers back to th e
mines, yet it affected more th an 30 mines.81 The liberal post-war
doctrines and th e mineworkers strike encouraged Afrikaners to
retreat to a position of isolation from the new intellectual curren ts
abroad.82 Opposition to Smuts as pr ime minister grew during this
period. Smuts was reviled for leading South African troops to the
aid of the Allies and for intern ing some of the most conservative
Afrikaner nationalists ( such as Rev. J.D. Vorster ) , which reminded
Afrikaners of the British concentration camps in which manyBoers died during the Second Boer War.83
After 1945, the concepts of the Afrikaner volkand Chris-
tian-Nationalism became increasingly central to the Afrikaner
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97THE CONCORD REVIEW
cause as Afrikaners became more un ified in their work toward pro-
Afrikaner ru le. The concepts of the volkand of Christian-Nation-
alism directly aided Afrikaner unity and effor ts towards auton omy,whereas concepts of Nazism or totalitarian governments, while
embraced by many Afrikaners, also divided the Afrikaners. The
concepts ofvolkand Christian-Nationalism had origins in Hegels
and Fichtes German nationalism and in the Dutch Reformed
Churchs bran d of Calvinism, both of which preceded the rise of
Nazi Germany. They did not lose validity by the end of World War
II. Increasing numbers of Afrikaners believed like Dr. D.F. Malan
that the purity of the Afrikaner volkdepended on the prevention
of intermarrying with other races and that without a rigid system
of separation of the races intermarrying would occur and the
Afrikaner race would lose some of its poten cy in its unique work of
fulfilling the will of God.84 Accordingly, the Nationalist Party
founded the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs in 1947 to
oppose th e South Africa Institute of Race Relations which man y
Nationalists considered too liberal and pro-British. Some Afrikanersderogatively referred to it as the English Institute. This organ iza-
tion was responsible for the development of the theory of apart-
heid and for the implementation of it after the Nationalist victory
in 1948.85 On e Broederbond member and former Ossewa Brandwag
general, Stellenbosch Professor G. Cronje, wrote in hisVoogdyskap
en Apartheid, The Christian standpoint boils down to the belief
that it is Gods will that there should be a variety of races, volks, and
cultures, and...the glorification an d maintenance of such variety,regarded from a Christian viewpoint, is justified an d moreover can
be taken as obedience to the will of God.86 Thus, the official
standpoint of the Dutch Reformed Church, the largest religious
denomination among Afrikaners, seemed to support a national
plan of segregation . Malan, who h ad been a minister p rior to h is
en try into the political realm, remarked that while establishing a
system of segregation is not under the jurisdiction of the church,
the govern men t should pay close atten tion to th e Churchs guide-
lines in the establishment of such a system. He meant that govern -
mental policies regarding race must stress separation .87
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98 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
Aware of the growing desire among Afrikaners for an
institutionalized system of segregation , Malan led the Nationalist
Party on a platform of apartheid in the elections of 1948.88 Th e
Broederbond was active in the elections of 1948 with at least 60
Nationalist Party candidates known to be members, including
Malan who became prime minister. One of the candidates was
W.C. du Plessis who had served as a South African diplomat but
resigned when Smuts ordered in 1944 that no public servants
could be Broederbond members. The fact that du Plessis reen-
tered the political sph ere in the same election in which Smuts lost
power demonstrated the change of the political climate in South
Africa.89 In the final count, the Nationalist Party, with its political
ally, the much smaller Havengas Afrikaner Party, won 79 of the
150 seats in parliament. The two parties had each received a
plurality, not a majority, of all the votes cast.90 The alliance of these
two Afrikaner parties revealed the unification of all Afrikaners
after World War II to fight for political power, but their victory did
not represent the true will of the electorate that had cast 140,000more votes for the parties in opposition to the allied Nationalist
Party and Havengas Afrikaner Party than for this apartheid
platform.91 This election marked the beginning of apartheid in
South Africa. Under Malans leadership, the Nationalist Party
legislated th e complete separation of whites from non-whites ( that
had already been in practice) but also introduced th e separation
of one non-white group from another.
The Broederbond was influential in these first years of
apar theid by establishing the Institute for Christian-National Edu-
cation and th e Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organizations as
well as by obtaining from th e Dutch Reformed Church a doctrinal
justification of apar theid.92 In 1948, the Federation of Afrikaans
Cultural Organizations published Christian-National Education Poli-
cies that outlined the principles the new government should
maintain to ensure that schools were, places where our childrenare soaked and nourished in the Christian-National spiritual
cultural stuff of our nation.93 The document included instruc-
tion on proposed teaching methods intended to provide an
education steeped in Christian-Nationalism, and it concluded
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99THE CONCORD REVIEW
with the Afrikaner position on education of non-whites that
represented the emph asis on white supremacy in the new Nation-
alist government. Article 14Instruction and Education ofColoureds affirmed, We believe th at the instruction of Coloured
people should be regarded as a subdivision of the vocation and
task of the Afrikaner to Christianize the non-European by the
European, and par ticularly by the Afrikaner.94 The final section
of this document, Article 15The Teaching and Education of
Natives, professed white supremacy even more emphatically: We
believe that the education and task of white South Africa with
respect to th e n ative is to Christianize h im...and this vocation and
task has foun d its immediate application and task in the principles
of trusteeship, no[ t] placing of the native on the level of the white,
and in segregation.95 Thus, the new South African government
implemen ting aparth eid relied heavily on the p rinciples of Chris-
tian-Nationalism.
Despite the reliance of the Nationalist governmen t on the
concepts of Christian-Nationalism and the Afrikaner volk, th einfluence of Nazism remained within the Nationalist Party pr ima-
rily through the continued control of the governmen t by members
of the Broederbond. All pr ime ministers and most major political
leaders during the apartheid era were members of the
Broederbond. Through its secret nature, the Broederbond re-
tained much of its right-wing ideology during the period between
the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Nationalist Party victory in
1948. The leaders of South Africa after 1948 no longer espoused
Nazism as they had during World War II, but they had come to
their political and intellectual maturity un der the shadow of Nazi
Germany and had devoted years of their lives to the fur theran ce of
its ideology. Thus, a strain of the infamous regime that terrorized
Europe in the first half of the twentieth century persisted to
control South Africa for th e second h alf of the cen tury.
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100 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
Endnotes
1
Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism and the Riseof the Afrikaner Broederbu nd in South Africa, 1918-1948
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989) pp. xix-xx; see
also William Henry Vatcher, Jr., White Laager: The Rise of
Afrikaner Nationalism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1965) pp. 3-42 David Nash, The Boer War and its Humanitarian
Critics, History Tod ay 49 (June 1999) p. 42, found using
InfoTrac Web: Stud ent Edition .3
Ibid., p. 34 Ivor Wilkins and H ans Strydom, The Broederbond ( New
York: Paddington Press, 1979)5 Ibid., pp . 37-386 Ibid., p. 367 Bloomberg, p. 1838 Kenneth Ingh am, Jan Christian Smuts: the Conscience of
a South African (New York: St. Martins Press, 1986) p. 1189 Bloomberg, p. 183
10
Vatcher, p. 6311 Bloomberg, p. 13712 Ibid., p. 13613 Bloomberg, p. 16214 Vatcher, p. 6015 Brian Bun ting, The Rise of the South African Reich
(Penguin Africa Library, 1969, Available as ebook at http:/ /
www.anc.org.za/ books/ reich.html) ch. 4. p. 2 of 1216 Ibid., p. xx17
Bloomberg, pp. 100-10118 Ibid., p. xxi19 Ibid., p. 10020 Bun ting, ch. 4, p. 2 of 1221 Vatcher, p. 6422 Bunting, ch. 4, pp. 3-4 of 1223 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 3 of 1224 Ibid., ch. 4, pp. 3-4 of 1225 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 3 of 1226
Vatcher, p. 6127 Bun ting, ch. 4, p. 4 of 1228 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 5 of 1229 Ibid., ch. 4, pp. 4-5 of 1230 Vatcher, p. 61
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101THE CONCORD REVIEW
31 Ibid., p. 6232 Ibid., p. 6133
Ibid., pp . 61, 6334 Wilkins, pp. 44-4635 Bun ting, ch. 3 p. 3 of 836 Bloomberg, p . xxii37 Bun ting, ch. 3, p. 3 of 838 Ibid., ch. 3, p. 2 of 839 Ibid., ch. 3, p. 2 of 840 Wilkins, pp. 78-7941 Ibid., pp . 82-8442
Bunting, ch. 3, pp. 2-3 of 8; see also Wilkins, p. 8343 Bunting, ch. 3, pp. 1-2; see also Wilkins, pp. 76-7744 Wilkins, pp. 77-7845 Ibid., p. 7746 Bunting, ch. 3 pp. 1-2 of 847 Bloomberg, p. 16348 Ibid., pp . 161-16249 Wilkins, p. 7750 There is also some evidence that th e organization used a
swastika as a symbol of its power and prestige, bu t th at is notcertain. Vatcher , p. 66
51 Bloomberg, p. 16252 Vatcher, p. 6153 There are no clear records of any orders the Ossewa
Brandwag issued to th e Stormjaers probably because the grou p
did n ot wish any record of its respon sibility for acts of violence.
Bloomberg, p. 16654 Ibid., p. 16855
Ibid ., p. 167; see also Wilkins, pp . 77-7856 Vatcher, p. 6357 Ibid., p. 6358 Wilkins, pp. 77-7859 Vatcher, p. 6560 Bloomberg, pp. 165-166; see also Wilkins, pp. 256-25761 Vatcher, p. 6662 Ibid., p. 6663 Bloomberg, p. 16764
Ibid., pp . 201-20265 Ingham, p. 18266 Bloomberg, p. 16567 Bunting, ch. 4, pp . 1-2 of 8
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102 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
My sources differed on the exten t to which they considered
the Nationalist Party to be sympathetic to the Nazis perhaps as
the result of the desire of the auth ors to present the NationalistParty in e ither a positive or negative light. Whatever the official
platform of the Party, most members were pro-Nazi as
dem onstrated by Nationalist Party publications during the war.68 This evidence of a radical faction within the Nationalist
Party causes a minority of scholars to con sider the Ossewa
Brand wag as no thing more than a radical branch of the
Nationalist Party. Kenneth Ingham suggested th is in h is
favorable biography on Smuts perhaps to min imize the degree
of opposition that Smuts faced. Ingham, p. 213; see alsoVatcher, p. 68
69 Bloomberg, p. 16570 Vatcher, p. 6971 Ibid., p. 6972 Ibid., p. 6973 Ibid., pp. 68-6974 Most branches of the Nationalist Party published this
document without its subtitle. The Transvaal bran ch of the
Party added the subtitle when it published th e documen t.75 Vatcher, p. 7076 Ibid., pp. 70-7277 Ibid., p. 7378 Ibid., p. 7379 Ibid., p. 7380 Bloomberg, pp. 202-20381 M.P. Naicker, The African Miners Strike of 1945, from
Notes and Documents, No. 21/ 76. Sept. 1976 http :/ /
www.anc.org.za/ ancdocs/ history/ misc/ miners.html ( 1 July2003)
82 Ibid., pp. 202, 20483 Wilkins, p. 8084 D.F. Malan, person al letter, 12 February 195485 Vatcher, p. 15186 Bloomberg, pp. 203, 20587 Malan, letter88 Bloomberg, pp. 203-20489
Bun ting, ch. 3, p. 390 Bloomberg, p. 20591 Ibid., p. 20592 Ibid., p. 20893 Vatcher, p. 289
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103THE CONCORD REVIEW
94 Ibid., p. 30095 Ibid., p. 300
Bibliography
Bloomberg, Char les, Christian Nationalism and the Rise of
the Afrikaner Broederbund in South Africa, 1918-1948
Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1989
Bunting, Brian, The Rise of the South African Reich
Penguin Africa Library, 1969, available as an ebook at http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ books/ reich.html
Ingh am, Kenneth , Jan Chr istian Smuts: the Conscience of a
Sou th African New York: St. Martins Press, 1986
Malan, Daniel F., Personal letter, 12 February 1954 (no
source given)
Naicker, M.P., The African Miners Strike of 1945, fromNotes and Documents, No. 21/ 76, Sept. 1976 http :/ /
www.anc.org.za/ ancdocs/ history/ misc/ miners.html ( 1 July
2003)
Nash, David, The Boer War and its Humanitarian Critics,
History Today 49 (June 1999): 42, found using InfoTrac Web:
Student Edition
Vatcher, William Henry, Jr., White Laager: The Rise ofAfrikaner Nationalism New York: Frederick A. Praeger ,
Publishers, 1965
Wilkins, Ivor, and H ans Strydom, The Broederbond New
York: Paddington Press, 1979
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104 Elizabeth Lee Jemison
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